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In an era when adversarial politics is condemned for either being archaic or right-wing 
extremism, proposing that incivility can be used to counter existing hegemonies, despite 
its potential to incite violence, is proposing an unorthodox project. By rejecting 
foundationalist approaches to the current incivility crisis, this study sees an opportunity for 
it to act as a populist rapture that defies simple binary categorisation and deconstructs 
incivility, at an ontological level, to reveal the deep meanings and concealed causes that 
contrast the grand narrative of hate speech. After an overview in chapter one, the study 
continues with a theoretical review of literature on incivility, guided by the works of radical 
democracy theorists who universalise what seems particular to Kenya. This review is 
followed by the description of Bakhtin’s concept of carnivalesque as utani, a joking 
relationship common in East Africa. For its theoretical perspective, the study is guided by 
Mouffe’s theory of agonistic democracy and a research method developed by transforming 
Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) work in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic, into a method for Discourse Analysis. Various concepts from Laclau and 
Mouffe’s work are used to innovate an explanation of how political practices in social 
media, both linguistic and material texts, enhance incivility and the struggle to fix a 
regime’s preferred meaning. Guided by Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Analysis, the study 
describes how the government is using linguistic tools and physical technologies to repair 
the dislocation caused by incivility in social media in its attempts to re-create hegemonic 
practices. Without engaging in naïve reversal of the polarities between acceptable and 
unacceptable speech, and considering that at the ontological level politics is a friend—
enemy relation, the study argues that incivility in social media is part of the return of politics 
in a post-political era, rather than simple unacceptable speech. While remaining aware of 
the dangers of extreme speech, but  without reinforcing the anti-political rational 
consensus narrative, incivility is seen as having disruptive counterhegemonic potential, 
that is, if we consider the powerplay inherent in democracy. It means that binary opposition 
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PART I: Introduction, situating the study and theoretical framework 
This section introduces the content of this dissertation and Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) 
Discourse Analysis approach. The dissertation is about the deconstruction of extreme 
speech in social media. It seeks to answer the question whether this category of speech, 
presented maily as anti-democratic hate speech, can indeed also enhance democracy. 
This question is answered in relation to the role of incivility in the dislocation and repair of 
hegemony in Kenya. To achieve the objective of this study, Part I describes the context of 
incivility as a form of extreme speech in Kenya and proposes how post-foundationalism 
research approaches can be used to analyse the construction of the dominant meaning of 
unacceptable speech. Part I has the following: Chapter One presents the structure of the 
thesis, Chapter Two lays out the theoretical review of literature on incivility from a post-
structuralist perspective guided by the works of Antonio Gramsci, Althusser, Laclau, 
Mouffe, and Žižek among other radical democracy theorists. Chapter Three compares 
Bakhtin’s concept of carnivalesque to utani, the joking relationship common in East Africa. 
Chapter Four is a description of theories of dissensus democracy, starting with Carl 











Chapter One  
This charm, this spellbinding virtue, this power of fascination, can 
be—alternately or simultaneously—beneficent or maleficent. 
Derrida (1981:70). 
1.1 Background of the study 
Offensive comments in social media sites are a common problem in Kenya. Although sites, 
such as Facebook, Twitter and blogs, have increased participation in political discourse 
by enabling users to easily create and distribute content, users often distribute content full 
of incivility or what regimes have over time claimed is hate speech or inflammatory content 
(see Mäkinen & Kuira, 2008:330; Ligaga, 2012:9; Somerville, 2011:83; Benesch, 2014:6; 
Gagliardone, Gal, Alves, & Martinez, 2015:6; Pohjonen & Udupa, 2017:1174). The 
following two cases highlight the challenge caused by incivility in social media: The Star, 
one of the top three leading Kenyan newspapers by circulation, pre-emptively introduces 
its online discussion forum with the following warnings: “Unwarranted personal abuse and 
defamatory statements will be deleted; strong personal criticism is acceptable if justified 
by facts and arguments; deviation from points of discussion may lead to deletion of 
comments.” The second case is the unknown whereabouts of Dickson Bogonko Bosire, 
the editor of the once controversial blog, Jackal News. It is more than eight years since 
the blogger was reported missing. Although his disappearance cannot be definitively linked 
to government extrajudicial killings (see Freedom House, 2014) or forced disappearance, 
the blogger’s whereabouts is clearly attributable to his controversial online news site.  
Claims by the regime that social media has become a channel for hate speech and 
inflammatory content can be traced to the blame directed at the news media after the 
violence that followed a contested presidential election in 2007. The government’s hate 
speech master narrative has even encouraged comparison of Kenya’s 2007/08 post-
election violence to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, with local language radio stations being 
accused of inciting violence and ethnic hatred in a fashion similar to what Radio Télévision 
Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) did before and during the genocide (Jamal & Deane, 2008; 
VOA, 2008, Somerville, 2011:83).      
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However, even with the prevailing hate speech grand narrative, it seems there is 
institutional ambiguity, Hajer (2003:175) would have said, as social media users, 
policymakers and the political elite have divided viewpoints on how discourteous content 
in social media is a national security threat to justify its censorship. On the one hand, the 
ambiguity is reflected in securitisation of social media by the Executive and Parliament, 
the regime’s actions that have made social media look like a security threat, and, on the 
other hand, the frequent acquittals of social media users accused of spreading hate 
speech. Since the media was accused of fanning the 2007/08 post-election violence, 
several people have been arrested and charged with offences related to hate speech. 
Joshua Sang, a radio journalist, was among six prominent Kenyans indicted by The 
Hague-based International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity. In January 2015, 
blogger Abraham Mutai was charged with what the government claimed was “using a 
media platform to cause public anxiety” after he shared a tweet about what he termed 
mismanagement of public funds by the Isiolo County Government, a devolved unit in the 
eastern parts of Kenya (#FreeSpeechStories: Arrested for a tweet). In the same month, 
Alan Wadi Okengo, alias lieutenant Wadi, a Moi University student, was sentenced to 
serve a one-year prison term after he pleaded guilty to the use of  ‘hate speech’. The 
student had tweeted that Kikuyus, President Kenyatta’s ethnic group, should be confined 
to certain parts of the country and referred to the head of state as an “adolescent 
President” (Kenyan jailed for insulting President Uhuru Kenyatta). Nevertheless, the High 
Court later acquitted him. In December 2014, Robert Alai, a renowned opposition-turned-
government blogger, had been charged with undermining the presidency using the same 
“adolescent President” statement (Kakah, 2016).  
Even with the institutional ambiguity as explained above, the increased role of the juridical 
sphere in solving social conflicts shows how the dominant rationalistic deliberative 
democracy has failed to settle confrontations in social media. It is rational democracy’s 
failure to solve the challenges that came with freedoms in social media that has made the 
legal system take over the responsibility for  
…organising human co-existence and for regulating social relations. 
This displacement of the political by the legal terrain as the place 
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where conflicts are resolved has very negative consequences for the 
workings of democracy (Mouffe, 2005b:54).  
This dissertation challenges the master narrative that equates incivility to hate speech, a 
process that displaces politics from democracy. Instead, it is argued, following Honig 
(1992:3), that theories promising “safety from the disruptions and conflicts of politics 
harbour dangers and violence of their own”. As a master narrative (see Lyotard, 1984: 
xxiv), civility has universalised speech into binary opposition, privileging the side that 
support the maintenance of dominant groups. These privileging marks boundaries for 
acceptable speech, with what is outside the boundaries categorised as part of the crime 
of hate speech and thus displaced from politics. The displacement of unacceptable speech 
from politics to the juridical is assumed to create a rational environment for the impartial 
solution of social conflicts, but as Mouffe (2005:55) contends, it is such displacement that 
makes it difficult for political passions to be channelled through traditional democratic 
parties. Indeed, the juridical avenue cannot provide impartial solutions as there are no 
such solutions in politics. What is needed is a political theory that can account for the 
persistence of conflict and its constitutive nature of power in society (see Mouffe, 2000a: 
125). 
Apart from the regime’s displacement of politics, as is happening in Kenya through the 
regulation of social media, scholars stand equally accused of displacing politics from 
political theory (see Honig, 1993:2). Many political theorists, argues Honig (1993), are 
hostile to theorising politics from its disruptive nature, preferring to develop strategies for 
elimination of dissonance, resistance, conflict, or struggle. Through such theoretical 
displacement of politics, intellectuals have confined “politics to the juridical, administrative, 
or regulative tasks of stabilising moral and political subjects, building consensus, 
maintaining agreements, or consolidating communities and identities” (ibid). With politics 
displaced, political theorists assume that their work is to create a system of resolving 
political conflict and instability or promoting ‘consensus’ as champinoned by Habermas. 
Thus, instead of theorising politics, many thinkers displace it to non-political institutions 
like the juridical that stabilise relations through coercion. 
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If politics, in its conflictual nature, is to be retained in democracy, incivility, as part of 
political practices, should be made as obligatory as kindness or generosity but not the law 
(see Žižek, 2006: xi). Civility is supposed to mediate between uncontrolled private 
fantasies and the strictly regulated forms of behaviour that should never be imposed on 
people. Civility cannot be purposefully enacted, as it is being commanded by the 
government through attempts to convert civility’s unwritten rules into laws. Instead, it 
should come as a by-product, since commands that attempt to enforce it force people to 
engage in fake civility.  
Furthermore, regular arrests on suspicion of hate speech crimes, even if the arrests do 
not lead to convictions, mean politics has been displaced since such freedom is only 
symbolic. A regime can be totalitarian while looking democratic by enacting severe criminal 
laws to scare but not to convict people. In such a regime, Žižek (2008:666) contends, 
“everyone is guilty of something” but the regime can look merciful by withdrawing full 
enforcement of the severe laws while retaining “a permanent threat to discipline its 
subjects”. Contributors in social media political discourses in Kenya are faced with this 
overlap of potential total incrimination and mercy from the regime. The common acquittals 
allow false freedom. As Žižek (2008:667) would say, the fact that social media contributors 
are free does not mean there is freedom, but they are free because of the government’s 
mercy and the benevolence of those in power. In such cases, the totalitarian leaderships 
resemble regimes of mercy since they tolerate violations of laws, yet it is the regimes’ 
securitisation of social media that has made the legal environment so restrictive that 
innocence is unexpected. Therefore, even though only one blogger has been convicted 
for crimes related to incivility (after he pleaded guilty), it does not mean people can freely 
contribute in social media discourses. Contrarily, this freedom should be seen as a “polite 
offer-meant-to-be-refused” (Žižek, 2008:675), given that people have freedom of choice, 
but they can only take the government’s preferred choice.  
This study shares the concerns raised by the hate speech grand narrative, for example 
regarding the 2007/08 post-election violence, but at the same time disrupts the narrative 
through expansion of the boundaries of acceptable speech by looking at incivility as part 
of politics and therefore beneficial to democracy. Hence without proposing a new grand 
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narrative, this dissertation argues that through their affordances, social media are “obeying 
different rules” (Lyotard, 1984: 40), enabling this new media to disrupt the existing grand 
narrative by removing the polarities between incivility and democracy. Indeed, outside the 
grand narrative, hate speech is an elusive term that cannot completely fall within the 
spectrum of acceptable—unacceptable speech. As Gagliardone et al. (2015:10) argue, 
definitions of hate speech are broad, and can sometimes encompass normal political 
practices, like “words that are insulting those in power, or derogatory of individuals who 
are particularly visible”. Such wide definitions, the authors say, are common during critical 
times such as election periods when the concept of hate speech risks being manipulated 
by those in power to curb competition, dissent and criticism. Furthermore, the authors 
argue that regulation of hate speech risks entangling the law with power, as the “law is a 
tool for enforcing mores of the dominant group that controls [its] …content.” An example 
of entanglement of hate speech laws with power is how the Apartheid South Africa regime 
criminalised criticism of white domination, which illustrates the potential political abuse of 
hate speech limitations (Gagliardone, et al. 2015:15). 
Consequently, this study moves away from the binary division of speech into what is 
acceptable and what is not (see Pohjonen & Udupa, 2017:1174) by revealing the benefits 
of conflictual politics, the benefits concealed by the dominant hate speech narrative. The 
binary division is like Saussure’s structuralist tradition that views a linguistic system as 
having a static relationship between a sign and a signifier, ignoring the possible changes 
that happen with time (see Saussure 1981:110). In contrast, poststructuralists, such as 
Derrida (1978) refute Saussure’s binary model accusing it of originating from the tradition 
of conceptualising meanings in oppositional terms. In the structural binary systems, the 
meaning of one term is derived from its opposition to another, implying elevation of one 
term over another. Derrida’s refutation of Saussure’s binary model has been expanded by 
Laclau’s (2012:542) criticism of the linguistic theory’s isomorphism — the assumption that 
a sign only corresponds to one signified. Signifiers, argues Laclau, are open to 
reinterpretation. To solve the weakness in Saussurian structural theory and make it 
relevant when applying it to social analysis, Derrida’s proposal of a “double reading’” of 
binary oppositions is used to reveal disunity within what has been made to look like a 
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coherent thought. This Derridian proposal is what the study advances: double reading of 
extreme speech.     
Thus, following Derrida and Laclau, the study is against the binary division of speech into 
what is acceptable and hate speech, instead it uses the term “incivility” (italicised) to avoid 
the opposition between speech that is anti-democratic and speech that is democracy 
enhancing. The terms offensive speech and extreme speech are used interchangeably 
with incivility where their use does not distort the meaning of incivility but differentiates it 
from the anti-democratic hate speech.  
In close similarity to the works of Pohjonen and Udupa (2017:1174), the study “avoid[s] 
predetermining the effects of online volatile speech as vilifying, polarising, or lethal”, but 
uses ‘double reading’ to reveal the disunity within the narrative of hate speech. It describes 
how incivility can be beneficial to the process of returning politics to democracy in the 
current post-political era. Some forms of extreme speech, such as incivility, are on a 
continuum located in between speech that is injurious and speech that can reinvigorate 
democracy. Therefore, the meaning of incivility should not be confined to its opposite — 
speech that is acceptable. The so called “unacceptable speech” is not always inimical to 
democracy.  
As an alternative to mere opposition against the hate speech grand narrative, which would 
mean repeating the error of privileging one side in a binary opposition, this study follows 
Derrida (1981) to ‘deconstruct’ the logocentric claims that naturalise views that extreme 
speech is anti-democratic. Deconstruction is neither denial nor reversal of the dominant 
meaning. Rather, it is the replacement of logocentrism with nonbinary logic to reveal how 
hegemonic orders have made the extreme speech grand narratives to seem natural. And 
so, incivility has double meanings. To borrow Derrida’s words, just like the pharmakon, 
incivility, “acts as both remedy and poison” because it is ambivalent (1981: 70). The 
contradictory meanings of incivility can only be understood through deconstructive reading 
rather than favouring one side as the grand narrative of hate speech. 
If equated to a pharmakon, then incivility in social media becomes a dislocatory event that 
calls previous deliberative democracy into question by creating what Laclau (1996:78) 
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calls the ‘undecidable’ politics that cannot be explained in terms of rational decision making 
models. Thus, this study avoids presenting incivility in an either/or context. Rather, it blurs 
the boundaries between the opposites to replace either/or with the logic of ‘both/and’ (cf. 
Kakoliris, 2013:225). Hence, incivility is seen as a mutual coexistence of its opposites. In 
other words, instead of being entangled in the binary opposition between acceptable and 
unacceptable speech, the hate speech narrative is shifted by this study by deconstructing 
the validity of the commonsensical reading of incivility in social media, but without 
overturning the privileged into a new binary opposition.   
Using incivility and related concepts, the study moves away from the hate speech grand 
narrative popular in regulatory debates. In place of policy guidelines, the study uses Laclau 
and Mouffe’s work, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, to deconstruct incivility in social 
media. The work of the second wave of deconstructive critics, Laclau and Mouffe, is used 
to enrich double reading of incivility considering that Derrida initially remained apolitical 
even when conditions demanded political interventions (see Norval, 2004:139; Fraser, 
1984:127). In fact, Derrida’s initial works have been faulted for “amoun[ting] to a form of 
nihilism and irrationalism that served no useful political purpose” (Patton, 2007:767). In a 
more unsympathetic condemnation, Wolin (2004:3) claims that poststructuralism invokes 
the counter-enlightenment heritage for criticising democracy as a source of many political 
ills. This tradition of blaming democracy, Wolin (2004:4) alleges, began with the anti-
philosophes whose arguments were similar to the postmodern political critique—the 
“latter-day anti-philosophes.” 
Even though Derrida’s later works introduced some normative dimensions, Laclau and 
Mouffe are more explicitly concerned with politics, especially the failures of both classical 
Marxism and deliberative democracy, not only in the West, but also regarding non-western 
politics. But then, because Hegemony and Socialist Strategy is confined within the field of 
political theory, where ‘the political’ is an undecidable encounter deprived of ‘practical 
prescriptions’, this ambiguity was avoided by reworking Mouffe’s later writings that solve 
the impasse through an agonistic democracy, an innovative normative concept that 
replaces the ‘either/or’ in the ‘acceptable/unacceptable speech’ opposition with ‘both/and’. 
This means that Mouffe does not merely reverse the binary opposition, rather she 
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proposes a normative system outside the binaries. A pluralistic democracy is a paradox, 
Mouffe (1993:8) says, since it is “conceived as a good that only exists as good so long as 
it cannot be reached. Such a democracy will therefore always be a democracy 'to come', 
as conflict and antagonism are at the same time its condition of possibility and the condition 
of impossibility of its full realization.” Agonism is Mouffe’s proposal to tame antagonism by 
converting “the enemy” into an “adversary”. Consequently, the concept of agonistic 
democracy can be used to explain how incivility can enhance a democratic system that is 
consistent with the conflictual nature of politics. Incivility is seen as a part of the conflicts 
that unfortunately cannot be eliminated without risking the democratic project. For 
instance, an excess of consensus pushes those excluded by the consensus to join 
fundamentalist movements. 
This study aims at explaining how the conflict symbolised by incivility in social media can 
reinvigorate a form of democracy that is different from the deliberative democracy, a 
system that stands accused of forging what Mouffe (2005a:1) calls a ‘post-political’, also 
known as the ‘end of ideology’ and ‘end of histoty’ era, in which the ‘free world’ that 
triumphed over communism has evolved into a world ‘without enemies’, a world in which 
partisan conflicts are seen as  things of the past, yet politics is based on articulation of 
differences as observed in the recurrence of partisan politics, albeit in different forms. That 
is to say, the study returns politics to political theory, contrary to theorists who have for 
centuries identified politics with juridical-like settlement (see Honig, 1993:3). Instead of 
displacing politics from politics itself as liberal democracy has attempted, this dissertation 
advances theorisation of politics as a form of agonistic conflict. The displacement of politics 
risks creating an environment where conflicts remain unresolved. It is such environments 
with displaced politics that should be blamed for violent eruptions, for example the violence 
that came after the “end of history” in eastern Europe or even Kenya’s 2007/08 post-
election violence that happened a few years after the end of President Moi’s near-
authoritarian 24-year rule.     
Rather than reduce incivility in social media to hate speech as the regime’s securitisation 
efforts have attempted, the study views incivility as the re-emergence of adversarial politics 
after the purported “dawn of a consensual politics ‘beyond left and right’” (Mouffe, 
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2005b:51). As Laclau (1988:254) would have said, incivility shows that society does not 
exist as, “if it did, meaning would be fixed in a variety of ways,” implying that attempts to 
fix the meaning of incivility through securitisation are merely social rather than “rational 
and intelligible”. Thus, the hate speech narrative is part of hegemony because when taken 
in isolation, hate speech has no meaning, and it must be enjoined to a set of discursive 
relations, with violence for example, for it to have some meaning (cf. Laclau, 1988:254).   
Equating incivility in social media to hate speech is failure on the part of political theorists 
to “double read” signs so as to explain the antagonistic nature of “the political” and the role 
of passions in the constitution of collective identities of an ‘us’ versus ‘them’. Mouffe and 
her followers distinguish between ‘the political’, the antagonistic dimension inherent to 
human societies – and ‘politics’, the practices and institutions that attempt to establish 
order following conflicts generated by ‘the political’ (Mouffe, & Errejon, 2016:38). As such, 
‘the political’ is a constitutive dimension of social order and incivility is symbolic of it.  
The failure to theorise the role of antagonism and emotions in politics, as Mouffe 
(2005b:52) argues, is due to the “triumph of a purely liberal interpretation of the nature of 
modern democracy.” This hegemonic liberal democracy sees conflictual politics as 
archaic, instead commending a consensual type of democracy, which is “completely 
depoliticised”. This study attempts to explain the current happenings as part of an agonistic 
democracy that promotes adversarial politics in contrast to routinized post-political 
consensus practices that attempted to eliminate conflict from politics.  
From this perspective, some forms of extreme speech can be part of the new radical 
democracy antagonisms, the expressions of resistance against existing forms of 
subordination. Taking the concept of “the political” as not limited to doing politics within 
predefined institutional forms, but as antagonism and conflict best symbolised by the 
distinction between friends and enemies (Schmitt 1996:26; Laclau 1990: 172), incivility in 
social media can be seen as reactivation of ‘the political’ that had previously been 
concealed by the hegemony of liberal democracy that took over at the ‘end of history’. 
Seen as different from consensual practices which had become everyday forms of human 
and societal reproduction, incivility can be said to be part of the political practices that 
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challenge “existing norms, institutions and practices – perhaps even the regime itself” 
through the construction and disruption of antagonistic frontiers (Glynos & Howarth, 
2007:105).  
It appears that extreme speech in social media is reactivating ‘the political’ that had been 
eclipsed by social practices and the consensus of deliberative democracy. Reactivation, 
to Husserl (1970:353), is the recovery of the ‘constitutive’ activity, a recovery that re-opens 
social practices that had been sedimented through the “routinisation and forgetting of 
origins”. As explained by Laclau (1990:34), such ‘reactivation’ does not therefore consist 
of returning to the original situation, but merely of rediscovering, through the emergence 
of new antagonisms, the contingent nature of the so-called ‘objectivity’ when antagonism 
makes the undecidable nature of ‘the political’ to become fully visible.  
For the above reasons, in addition to the failure of the economism of classical Marxism, 
the extreme speech common in the social media can be interpreted as counter-hegemonic 
‘agonisms’, a new strategy used by the excluded masses to resist domination. Here, 
extreme speech is an alternative to class struggles as it has reactivated (non-class) 
revolutionary ethos by causing institutional voids within the regime. In addition, extreme 
speech is a challenge to the society’s social practices, thus giving opportunity for new 
political interventions.  
Social media has somehow returned ‘the political’ to politics (see Mouffe, 1993) since it is 
enabling people to participate more rigorously and passionately than they can through 
institutionalised legacy media. As explained by Mouffe (1988:96), such democratic 
antagonisms are polysemic as they are aimed at resisting subordination and inequality but 
can also become right-wing discourses if they widen inequalities. This Implies that extreme 
speech creates new democratic struggles only when it articulates the struggles “of all the 
oppressed” (Mouffe, 1988:96). Therefore, incivility in social media is part of the 
proliferating struggles that are no longer limited to economic issues in the classical Marxist 
sense, but can only be understood as a reformulated democracy that includes conflictual 
politics. Thus extreme speech in social media can have an alternative meaning — the 
possibility of it being beneficial to radical democracy, considering that democracy involves 
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antagonistic struggles for power, regulating power relationships, allocating scarce 
resources and legitimating these processes in the face of struggles against enforcement 
(see Louw, 2010:08-10).  
Therefore, this study assumes that incivility in the social media can have a variety of 
meanings and functions that can become temporarily fixed but can also be renegotiated. 
From this perspective, incivility in social media is seen as a dislocatory event that cannot 
be represented, symbolised, or domesticated as it has disrupted the dominant discursive 
structures (see Laclau, 1990). This study attempts to describe how the institutional void 
created by incivility in the social media has dislocated conventional political practices and 
how the regime is (re)creating the dominant understanding of incivility through what Laclau 
(Laclau, 2014:56) argues from an ontological perspective to be a process similar to 
linguistic metonymic relations of combination and metaphoric relations of substitution used 
to name the unnameable. That is to say, the regime is securitising incivility by making it a 
metonym of hate speech, a process that eventually metaphorises the relationship between 
the two and conceals its ‘metonymical origins’. If the regime succeeds in this 
metaphorisation, the hegemonic substitution of incivility with hate speech makes the latter 
a catachresis as it becomes a figural term without a literal one (see Laclau, 2005b:71).  
This means that the institutional ambiguity is removed when incivility is lifted into the hate 
speech—democracy dichotomy, blocking the listener from ever knowing alternatives to 
this binary opposition. Thus, what looks like the regime’s objective description of extreme 
speech as “a threat to national security” hides the underlying metaphorisation process that 
equates incivility to hate speech, intolerance and other forms of anti-democratic speech. 
It also means that the regime’s securitisation of incivility is not based on ‘brute’ facts but 
regime-created facts, what Searle (1995:2) calls “institutional facts” since they are 
dependent on human agreement, in contrast to ‘brute’ facts that exist independent of 
human institutions.  
Outside the regime facts, incivility in social media has arguably dislocated the dominant 
beliefs and commonly held truths about political discourse in Kenya. Incivility in this sense 
is not perceived to be similar to mere rudeness nor hate speech; instead, it is discursively 
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defined and redefined by the interested actors, adopting wide-ranging meanings, 
challenging the existing discourse and opening up space for its redefinition. In other words, 
outside the regime’s institutions, incivility has a variety of contradictory meanings. For 
instance, from a post-foundationalism perspective, incivility can be understood as counter-
hegemonic antagonism that can play a role in changing the power structure in society. The 
counter-hegemonic understanding challenges the ‘regimes of truth’ that create a binary 
opposition between hate speech and democracy. For this reason, incivility is 
parenthesised in this thesis to show its fluid nature and how its meaning is being shifted 
by social media that has introduced new ways of doing politics in Kenya. 
Incivility in social media can also be understood as what it is not — a negative relation with 
mainstream media civility. Here social media is read as a form of alternative media in 
contrast to mainstream media, which Fleras and Kunz (2001: 40) argue “are framed as a 
contested site of competing agendas whose inner logic, institutional values, and 
commercial imperatives induce a reading of reality at odds with the aspirations of those 
outside a mainstream orbit”. The mainstream media support the dominant construction of 
preferred view of ‘reality’ over the views of disfranchised alternatives. Through such 
construction, the mainstream media naturalises dominant forms of ‘common sense’ 
(Bailey, Cammaerts & Carpentier, 2008:17), but social media as an alternative to 
mainstream media can be used by subordinated groups to contest the hegemonic 
meanings through the production of non-conformist content such as incivility, which can 
denaturalise the status quo.  
Incivility in social media can further be understood as a way of changing how the media 
promotes participation in politics. Unlike conventional media, the social media content is 
generated by citizens with values different from ‘professional’ journalists. In fact, the 
spread of social media has made journalism a ‘floating signifier’ since social media has 
created journalisms that have a variety of meanings. News reporting routines have 
changed, and these changes have created forms of journalism different from conventional 
news reporting. In social media journalism, the audience is at the same time the reporter 
and creator of news content, different from the traditional professional journalism practice 
in which a journalist solely gathered and processed news.  
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Social media networks have reduced gatekeeping, a process of news selection, which is 
prevalent in mainstream media. Through gatekeeping, information is filtered based on 
criteria established by the media system creating a situation where citizens are denied 
some information and excluded from participating in some political discourses, which in 
turn affects the power structure. Structural control of the mainstream media was explained 
well by Althusser (1971:79) who developed the idea of Ideological State Apparatus (ISA), 
the distinct and specialised institutions of the religious system of churches, educational 
institutions, the family, the legal, the political, the trade unions, the media, and the cultural 
institutions that support the ‘repressive state apparatus’ — which are made up of the 
government, the administration, the army, the police, the courts, the prisons, among others 
that function by violence.  As part of the ISA, the mainstream media is not a channel for 
political struggle even though it disguises itself as it promotes the naturalised power 
structure.  
Unrestricted citizens’ access to, and popular participation in democratic politics through 
social media came to the fore during the volatile 2007 elections when Kenyans used 
Facebook and blogs as alternative mass media channels. Since then, social media has 
evolved into an ‘alternative’ public sphere, which has widened the spaces of public 
discussions. These new spaces provided by social media threaten the established political 
order. Within the new spaces, politics is being practised differently. For example, there is 
limited respect for political actors, contrary to the situation in conventional news media. 
Consequently, increased and unrestricted citizen participation in the alternative public 
sphere has amplified incivility in political discourse, a phenomenon dreaded by proponents 
of the hegemonic Western-style liberal democracy. 
The important position of social media in political discourse can be attributed to this new 
media’s user-friendliness. As explained by Conklin and Hayhoe (2011:236), social media 
has enabled users to reinvent the Web, enabling internet users to be more interactive and 
participatory by using a combination of tools like instant Web publishing, social networking, 
user-generated content, communal tagging, rating, and commenting in a user-friendly 
content management system. Besides, these user-friendly tools are easily affordable. In 
Kenya, many users access social media on standard mobile phones (Communication 
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Commission of Kenya, 2012a 27, b 22). The Communication Authority estimates that the 
population with access to internet services reached 85% in the last quarter of 2018, with 
a quarterly growth of 2.5% (Communication Commission of Kenya, 2018:19). Indeed, 
Kenya has made significant advances in internet access enabling the country to have the 
largest international Internet bandwidth per Internet user in the African region (ITU 
2013:47). These developments in infrastructure guarantee increased internet access and 
widen the possibility that social media will continually expand as an alternative to traditional 
media. 
Consequently, social media has set a precedent in citizen participation in political 
discourse. Unlike before when participation was minimal and controlled by gatekeepers 
as explained earlier, social media has enabled Kenyans to participate in political discourse 
under minimal control, even though proponents of liberal democracy wrongfully blame 
uncontrolled participation for providing a fertile ground for political incivility.  
Furthermore, social media is displacing traditional media channels as tools for political 
communication and hence limiting traditional media’s financial revenues as well as their 
social and political influence. This means the state is slowly losing control of the news 
media, which has for many years been used as a powerful component of ISAs. In the 
African context, it also means that the traditional patronage system is under threat as 
social media increasingly becomes part of and provides avenues for new political actors. 
Users of social media are participating in news content generation — a task previously 
reserved for professional journalists. News content generation by users further weakens 
the grip of the state on media as part of the ISA.  As noted by Kaigwa, Madung and Costello 
(2013), Kenyans have entered the age of the “Second Screen” where viewers “no longer 
watch television without a second screen — a phone, tablet, laptop, or desktop – nearby” 
[through which they contribute to the news]. This is a clear resistance to the traditional 
structure of mainstream media. It can be argued that through the “Second Screen” the 
audience has metamorphosed into a ‘viewertariat’, overthrowing the previously powerful 
mainstream media. As mockingly stated by Rosen (2006), the audience is now made up 
of “People Formerly Known as the Audience” who 
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…wish to inform media people of [their] existence, and of a shift in power 
that goes with the platform shift you’ve all heard about…Think of passengers 
on your ship who got a boat of their own. The writing readers. The viewers 
who picked up a camera. The formerly atomised listeners who with modest 
effort can connect with each other and gain the means to speak— to the 
world, as it were. 
 
When the international media flocked into Kenya expecting the worst out of the 2013 
presidential and parliamentary elections, Kaigwa et al (2013) argue, Kenyans used social 
media to create a ‘counter-narrative’ satirical to international media reporters who they 
accused of inaccuracies and bias. By providing an avenue for “satirical counter-narratives” 
against international news reporters, social media defeated the previously powerful and 
biased international news institutions, which has for long painted Africa as a failed 
continent.  
 
Due to the current widespread use of social media, this new medium has become an 
important source of information and communication between citizens and political actors 
in Kenya. Many political leaders have active social media accounts, which they use to get 
and transmit information to the people. In such a situation, argues Strömbäck (2008:230), 
people rely on the news media for information about politics, just as politicians rely on the 
media to receive and disseminate information to citizens. Thus, social media is mediating 
between the citizenry, political actors and institutions involved in government. Politics is 
being mediated through social media because this news media has become the main 
channel through which political actors and the people communicate. Indeed, today’s 
politics is seldom experienced directly through interpersonal communication, except in 
election campaigns. 
 
Beyond mediated politics, incivility in social media is influencing how politics is practised 
by increasing the importance of media to politics, a politics—media relationship referred to 
as mediatisation (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999:248; Hjarvard, 2004: 48). The functions of 
traditional news media are being complemented by social media, for instance, by enabling 
the audience to comment on the news that conventional media channels cover. Social 
media is introducing new ways of collecting and circulating news by maximising audience 
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participation, leading to saturation of news. This has enabled social media to create 
synergy with conventional media where news media is increasingly becoming an important 
influence on politics.  
 
Consequently, mediatisation denotes a takeover of politics by the news media such that 
politics is played in, not just using, the news media. Accordingly, “[m]ediatised politics is 
politics that has lost its autonomy, has become dependent in its central functions on mass 
media, and is continuously shaped by interactions with mass media” (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 
1999:248).  
 
Additionally, social media incivility can be viewed as part of the “Third Age of 
communication abundance” that is changing how people receive politics (Blumler & 
Kavanagh 1999:213). In this age, the media has not completely taken over politics but has 
subverted the power structure in political communication. We are seeing anti-elitist 
populism in the changed public sphere with transposed relationships between political 
communicators and their publics (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999:219). Communication is no 
longer a top-down affair, the issues of the day are no longer discussed by elites — 
politicians, journalists, experts — for onward transmission to voters. Instead ordinary 
members of the public can punish the authoritative communicators. The anti-elitist 
populism earlier theorised by Habermas (1989a) is promising to “refeudalise” the virtual 
public sphere by downgrading elites and empowering subalterns.  
 
To borrow from economics, social media are ‘substituting’ some political activities that 
previously required face-to-face interaction. Because of social media, people no longer 
need to go for public meetings to engage politicians, instead they can participate through 
virtual interaction on social media platforms. Consequently, social media is not only 
substituting traditional media and interpersonal communication but also adapting non-
media activities to media formats. Just as television emphasised politicians’ looks and 
onscreen behaviour at the detriment of the content, creating what has been labelled 
“intimate politics” (see Esser & Strömbäck, 2014:09), social media is bringing politics of 
incivility that was previously restricted to interpersonal communication. Hence incivility in 




1.2 Statement of Problem 
This study attempts to make sense of the politics of incivility in social media in Kenya, 
outside the regime’s preferred binary division of speech into what is acceptable and what 
is not. Indeed, there are many binaries in social media use in Kenya: for example, while it 
has disrupted various institutional orders and practices, Ogola (2015:67) laments that this 
disruption has created ‘indiscipline’ that can be seen in the radical manner of defining and 
writing news (also see Kivikuru, 2018:2 on disruption). It was noted by Bing (2015:168), 
that in the 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary elections, mobile phones were used 
simultaneously to strive for votes before elections and to intensify violence after the 
elections. Even though the Government of Kenya has increased online surveillance and 
censorship, as an outcome of the 2007/8 post-election violence, social media users are 
protecting themselves from the scrutiny by utilising the affordances in online interaction to 
craft pseudo accounts (see Mukhongo 2014: 338), with many formerly voiceless citizens 
actively criticising political representatives and challenging political hegemonies (Bing, 
2015:168). During the 2007/8 violence, argue Mäkinen and Kuira (2008:331), social media 
users were not innocent — while some promoted peace, others used the new channels to 
spread tribal prejudices and hate speech. Furthermore, although the social media 
community has brought together like-minded people, this unity is in turn fragmenting the 
already ethnically divided society.  
 
Previous studies elsewhere have shown that audience participation under unlimited 
editorial control and high levels of anonymity are among the reasons for rampant incivility 
in social media. The problem was identified by Borah (2012:457) who explains how the 
political blogosphere is replete with uncivil discussions, so much so that O’Reilly (2007) 
longs for rudimentary censorship guidelines. Borah (2012, 2013) argues that the political 
blogosphere has become an apt context to examine the influence of incivility on news 
consumption. While Ng and Detenber (2005) argue that in the cyberspace, uncivil 
behaviour and ad hominem attacks are widespread. Furthermore, social reprimands such 
as nonverbal communication can curb incivility in face-to-face discussion, but not in social 
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media because of the lack of offline, interpersonal consequences (see Anderson, Brossad, 
Scheufeke, Xenos, & Ladwig, 2013:3).  
 
Yet the hate speech narratives privilege one side of the story. Little has been written on 
incivility outside the regime’s binary division of speech into what is acceptable and what is 
not. Contrary to the current grand narrative of hate speech, this study uses Laclau and 
Mouffe’s (1985) Discourse Theory to analyse how incivility in social media is a dislocatory 
event that is introducing new political practices, and how the ‘government’ (from a 
Foucauldian perspective) is struggling to extend its hegemonic meaning over incivility 
through ‘articulation’, a process of partially fixing meanings by repairing the dislocation. 
Although the naturalised and taken-for-granted aspects of incivility have repressed its 
alternative understanding outside the regime’s knowledge, with incivility constructed as 
antidemocratic and a threat to national security, a ‘double reading’ can uncover what has 
been concealed. Therefore, the thesis of this study is to reveal how incivility in social media 
is part of the power struggles pitting the regime’s attempt to ‘repair’ changes caused by 
social media on the one hand, and the subalterns utilising social media as a new medium 
for ‘unrestrained’ participation in politics on the other.  
1.3 Questions guiding the study 
The first step was to establish how incivility has become an integral aspect of political 
discourses in social media in Kenya. Although some commentators and social scientists 
assume there is a binary opposition between incivility in social media and democracy, 
assuming incivility is disruptive to politics (see Brooks & Geer, 2007:1; Weinstein, 2009:53; 
Goldwin, 1992:50), this study used Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory to unmask the 
taken-for-granted, commonsensical meanings of incivility by looking it as a dislocatory 
event that can be beneficial to conflictual democracy. Such dislocation, Glynos and 
Howarth (2007:105) would argue, provides an opportunity for new possibilities for the 
subject to reinvent itself by challenging and transforming the existing norms, institutions 
and practices or even the regime itself, but at the same time struggling against efforts by 
elites out to disrupt this dislocation. From a post-structuralism perspective, incivility in 
social media is a dislocatory event contesting existing political practices, an event like what 
Arditi (2007:78) calls disruption of “‘table manners’ of democratic politics”. The overall 
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objective of this study was to dismantle the seemingly objective regime preferred meaning 
of incivility in social media. To this concern, the study was guided by the following central 
research question: How has the privileging of one side in a binary opposition been used 
to give meaning to incivility in social media in order to repair the dislocation of existing 
social practices? The study answered the following sub-questions that together gave the 
answer to the main question:  
1.3.1 . What discourses have shaped the meaning of incivility in social media? 
1.3.2 . How has incivility in social media dislocated hegemonic discourses?  
1.3.3 . How is the regime repairing the dislocation of hegemonic discourses?  
1.3.4 . How has incivility in social media produced new political practices? 
 
The first sub-question was answered through critical reading of Habermas’s (1989a) public 
sphere against Fraser’s (1990) subaltern counter-publics, Cammaerts’s (2007) political 
jamming, Žižek’s (1993) concept of ‘tolerance as ideology’, Mouffe’s (1993) agonistic 
democracy and Bakhtin’s (1984) carnivalesque to identify when incivility in social media 
can be democracy-enhancing or antidemocratic. The second, third and fourth sub-
questions were answered through a Discourse Analysis of performative acts and material 
texts. The use of these two broad categories of ‘texts’ captures Laclau and Mouffe’s 
argument that everything is discursive (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987:108). Government 
discourses, for example, laws, speeches, reports and warnings, are performative acts 
because they ‘do something’ (see Austin, 1965) — they attempt to institutionalise the 
government’s understanding of incivility in social media and displace the contrary. While 
material texts (Latour, 2007:72), for example mobile phones and software, are the non-
linguistic tools through which social media has caused dislocation of routine practices but 
can also be used by the ‘government’ to re-stabilise hegemony by repairing the dislocation.           
1.4 Type of study, methodology and strategy 
The purpose of this qualitative research was to reveal the taken-for-granted, 
commonsensical meanings of incivility in social media by analysing how this meaning is 
produced, contested or subverted in Kenya. The study aimed at explaining how the regime 
has produced the binary opposition of incivility in social media as an antidemocratic 
security threat yet incivility can also enhance democracy. Due to the expected 
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bombardment with essentialist bias that emphasizes rational consensus in politics, the 
study started the methodology by developing an epistemological safety-net to guard 
against the taken-for-granted ideological meanings of incivility. For this purpose, the study 
adopted a poststructuralist view of social media incivility as a critical research strategy. 
This approach was used to deconstruct incivility in social media as a taken-for-granted 
knowledge, often treated as objective truth.  To poststructuralists, meanings in social world 
are constructed by discourse and these meanings can never be permanently fixed due to 
the instability of language. A commonsensical knowledge of incivility has been created 
through social processes which manufacture truths and falsity based on the society’s 
power structure that in turn has naturalised a worldview of politics as being civil and 
incivility as an abnormality in politics. Through critical literature review, this study argues 
that current knowledge about incivility is not a reflection of reality ‘out there’, but rather an 
outcome of hegemonic struggle. 
This study denies that the regime’s definition of incivility is ‘objective’ as this definition only 
deals with surface appearances. Instead, the study locates incivility in a historical context 
and reveals the underlying causes at the ontological level. To achieve this aim, the study 
uses Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) Discourse Theory to develop an empirical discourse 
analysis method for examining how the regime has constructed incivility in social media. 
This means that the study is “a radical combination of theory and empirical research” 
(Carpentier, 2017:2) as Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory is an abstract high theory, 
while Discourse Analysis is an empirical strategy that can be used to discover how existing 
power structures use ‘texts’ to shape immediate social reality. Whereas Laclau and 
Mouffe’s Discourse Theory operates at the ontological level, Discourse Analysis was used 
to examine incivility at the ontic level. As explained subsequently, Laclau and Mouffe’s 
Discourse Theory was used to explain the underlying assumptions about incivility, while 
Discourse Analysis was used as a method for examining ‘texts’.  
In Heideggerian language, Discourse Theory is analysis of the primacy of politics at the 
ontological level, the deep underlying structure of politics, whereas Discourse Analysis is 
the examination of politics at the ontic level, where politics is narrowly understood as 
practices that are linguistically representable (Heidegger, 1962:44). Through this 
ontological/ontical assemblage, the study looks at incivility from both abstract theoretical 
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analysis and empirical analysis of the material reality to bridge the gap between pure 
theory and praxis (see Harvey, 1990:8). The study thus used empirical linguistic and 
material texts, the ontic, to examine incivility from the ontological perspective. Therefore, 
from the adopted ontological perspective, incivility symbolises the true nature of politics as 
a friend-enemy relationship (see Schimtt, 1927), what Lacan calls the Real that cannot be 
symbolised as it is “distinct from reality” (Stavrakakis, 2007:6). However, at the ontic level, 
incivility is part of politics, the out-of-the-ordinary political practices that shape our day-to-
day politics. Thus, through Discourse Theory, incivility was analysed at the ontical level as 
part of the attempt to discover its ontological meaning, what Schmitt (1927) calls ‘the 
political’.   
Discourse Analysis, as understood here is analysis of all the objects and actions that are 
meaningful rather than looking at discourse as speech or linguistic texts. Consequently, 
extreme speech was studied from the traditions of poststructuralist Discourse Analysis 
through the lens of Laclau and Mouffe’s discursive conflict which emphasises the struggle 
between conflicting — or antagonistic — discourses, with each discourse striving to 
impose its own system of meaning. The study solved methodological weaknesses of 
Laclau and Mouffe’s high theory by adapting it to Austin’s textually oriented analysis of 
performative acts and Latour’s analysis of material things. This re-thinking expands 
Discourse Theory by making it relevant to empirical research while retaining its ontological 
logic as a high theory.  
1.5 Structure of the study 
This study consists of nine chapters divided into three sections. The first section has four 
chapters, starting with a background of incivility of social media in Kenya, a statement of 
the problem and purpose of this research, the questions guiding the study, a brief synopsis 
of the methodology and a theoretical framework. Chapter Two is a theoretical review of 
literature, drawing on inspiration from the works of Antonio Gramsci, Althusser, Laclau, 
Mouffe, and Žižek among other radical democracy theorists, to provide a detailed definition 
of the paradoxical nature of incivility, its types and to argue how it can be a tool for a 
counter-hegemonic struggle for people trying to escape the enclosures of the 
contemporary political order. The situation of incivility in Kenyan is also clarified. Chapter 
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Three argues against the unquestioned assumptions that incivility is destructive by 
describing social media as space for activist art, from Bakhtinian carnivalesque 
perspective, and the notion of utani, a joking relationship that Radcliffe-Brown (1940:196) 
calls ‘permitted disrespect’. Chapter Four uses Chantal Mouffe’s theory of agonism to 
explain how incivility in social media mirrors the conflict inherent in politics and how 
denying the productive nature of this type of extreme speech would be similar to proposing 
a democracy without politics. The theory is used to argue against deliberative democracy’s 
attempt to depoliticise democracy by utilising consensus to deny ‘the political’. Incivility in 
social media is viewed as an opportunity to advance agonistic democracy that widens 
spaces previously constrained by consensus. 
The second section has two chapters on methodology, starting with Chapter Five that 
develops ontological and epistemological foundations. Here, Discourse Theory is used as 
a research method that contests the possibility of neutrally accounting for reality, arguing 
that it is through ‘texts’ that reality is created. This chapter clarifies the dissertation’s 
ontological and epistemological assumptions. Thereafter, the chapter uses relevant 
‘sensitising concepts’ from Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) Discourse Theory to propose a 
model for analysing incivility in social media. Chapter Six is the second part of the 
methodology section. The chapter reworks Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory to 
develop a relevant sampling and Post-Foundational Discourse Analysis strategy. The 
chapter proposes a methodological framework for analysing incivility from two 
perspectives: incivility as democracy-enhancing, and, how the ‘government’ is struggling 
to extend its hegemony through ‘repair’.  
The third section has three chapters presenting findings. This section uses the Post-
Foundational Discourse Analysis model developed in the previous section to analyse how 
incivility in social media is dislocating dominant political practices and how this dislocation 
is being repaired by the regime. Chapter Seven analyses the dislocation and repair of 
hegemonic discourses through technologies of representation, the linguistic texts. The 
chapter is a description of how the regime is repairing dislocation by appealing to the 
national security myth to create some objective facts that can sediment dislocation, making 
incivility a national security problem. Chapter Eight analyses the repair of dislocation 
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through technologies of dissemination: physical and software affordances. This chapter 
describes how physical and software affordances are being used by the regime as tools 
for repairing dislocation. The chapter shows how the non-humans have enabled the 
regime to stabilise domination in the face of the dislocation caused by incivility. Chapter 
Nine describes incivility as an encounter with the ‘Real’, an equivalence to what Mouffe 
calls the return of ‘the political’. The chapter moves the study away from the Discourse 
Analysis of empirical material to engage in a process of abstract theoretical analysis. 
Chapter nine explains how the dislocation caused by incivility in social media is producing 
new political practices that are transforming politics into ‘the political’ and moving it outside 
pre-defined liberal democracy institutions. Here ‘the political’ is understood from an 
ontological perspective different from the social practices — the ontic. The chapter 
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…conditions of possibility of the system are also its conditions of 
impossibility.   
Laclau (1996:53). 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a detailed description of the various forms of incivility, and, away 
from the binary oppositions between acceptable speech and hate speech, locates the 
origin of the ‘regime of truth’ behind Kenya’s grand narrative of anti-democratic speech 
and intolerance. The chapter starts by tracing the universal in the recent genealogy of the 
current incivility discourse in social media in Kenya, while the following sections describe 
why this extreme speech problem should not be confined within the spectrum of the hate 
speech grand narrative, but rather be seen as ambivalent speech that is both a “remedy 
and poison” (Derrida, 1981: 70) and therefore suitable for advancing agonistic democracy 
even though it can also be anti-democratic. That is to say, outside the binary oppositions, 
incivility has contradictory meanings that cannot be explained in terms of the rational 
decision making deliberative democracy models. Therefore, the relationship between 
democracy and incivility is more of ‘both/and’, than ‘either/or’, especially if we accept the 
centrality of the friend—enemy relationship and how democracy attempts to domesticate 
this humanity’s inherent enmity. Hence incivility is seen as a coexistence of opposites. 
2.2. Incivility as extreme speech beyond hate speech — the Universalism of 
Particularism in Kenya  
The genealogy of the current incivility in social media in Kenya can be traced to the 
‘dislocation’ (see Laclau 1990: 39) that occurred after the 2007/8 post-election violence 
that was partly attributed to hate speech. The indictment of the news media contrasts the 
2007/8 violence from similar election—related hostilities that happened with the 1992 and 
1997 presidential and parliamentary elections (see the Akiwumi Report on the ‘tribal 
clashes’ of the 1990s, Republic of Kenya, 1999). While the previous violence was 
instigated by the redistributive land allocation policies, both colonial and postcolonial, (see 
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Boone, 2012:76; Frye, 2007:950; Throup & Hornsby, 1998:555), with the Riff Valley and 
the coastal regions as the hotspots, the 2007/8 fighting began as riots on the streets of 
Nairobi, pitting adherents of the Party of National Unity (non-Luo ethnic groups) against 
those of the Orange Democratic Movement (non-Kikuyu groups), following a dispute over 
a flawed presidential vote count. The post-election violence quickly degenerated into a 
near-civil war, leading to the deaths of more than eleven hundred civilians, large—scale 
displacement of people, and other chaos that almost collapsed the Kenyan state.  
 
Fearing the effect of the crisis within Kenya and the eastern Africa region as a whole, the 
international community responded swiftly: The African Union (AU), supported by other 
international bodies, established a mediation team, The Panel of Eminent African 
Personalities, headed by the former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. Other than 
stopping the violence, the panel initiated a process of long-term reforms of political, 
economic, and social problems, the underlying factors, which if left unaddressed, could 
lead to a recurrence of the violence. Although land ownership remained an instigator, The 
Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (2008) uncovered several other causes. 
 
Granted the 2007/08 violence and the resultant ‘hate speech’ grand narrative are unique 
to Kenya, limiting their underlying causes to the Kenyan scenario would be particularising 
what is otherwise universal. Therefore we need to move beyond the binary oppositions 
between what happens in Africa and what happens elsewhere. That is to say, without 
proposing a return to European historical particularisms, the underlying causes of the 
violence that happened in Kenya from early 1990s are equivalents to causes of violence 
that has happened in other parts of the world due to changes in the nature of what Laclau 
(1990:26) calls the ‘constitutive outsider’. For example, the Kenya’s problem is similar to 
the violence that happens after the end of dictatorships or any other clear-cut frontiers 
separating oppressive power from the rest of society. In the case of the East African state, 
the fighting was an outcome of the inability of current liberal democracy to tame hostilities 
between the set of incoming ‘we’ (the anti-regime party that succeeded President Moi), 
against a new set of the ‘them’, the constitutive outsider that developed within the anti-
regime party. Indeed the hostilities peaked after the split of NARC, the ‘anti-system’ team 
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that replaced Moi (cf. Mouffe, 1993:7). It means the underlying reasons for the conflict that 
happened in Kenya has an element of universality even though the conflict looked 
particular to Kenya. Simply put, the 2007/08 post-election violence and the subsequent 
hate speech master narrative, followed logics internal to politics, which is nothing more 
than the universal rules within which politics is played.  
 
The concept of universality of particularity, as advanced by Laclau, can help us to see the 
universal principles behind the grand narratives that followed the 2007/08 events. Outside 
their binary opposition, the universality of particularity can explain the perpetuity of incivility 
in social media in Kenya in two ways: first by deconstructing the binaries between 
universality and particularity of people’s demands (how unity of ‘the people’ is in itself 
causes disunity or conflict), and two, by removing the supposedly dichotomy between 
Euro-American and African politics — so that incivility is taken as part of politics, be it in 
Kenya or elsewhere. From this perspective, the field of political participation is widened, 
with incivility perceived as part of the multiple struggles through which the subalterns use 
social media to question their subordination. In other words, the triggers of incivility in 
social media in Kenya are similar to triggers beyond any particular nation since these 
triggers are universal for the reason that universality is reached when particularity 
transcends itself.   
 
I start by explaining how the 2007/08 events and subsequent hate speech grand narratives 
can be equated to an operation where unity of ‘the people’ climaxes into disunity. In the 
struggle against a regime, people create a joint front by emptying their particular demands 
of particularity so that the demands become signifiers of the universal, although empty 
signifiers in this case, since the universality is represented by what it is not — the coming 
together of particular demands to transcend what each stands for. People’s demands 
become empty signifiers when they are ‘emptied’ of their initial meaning, a resignification 
process that fills previously particular demands with meanings that would otherwise be 
contradictory. It simply means unity of the people is attained after weakening differences 
between their various particular demands to make them express what is “present in all of 
them” (Laclau, 1996:54) — which in the case of Kenya was the universal opposition to a 
regime thought to be dictatorial. This means what is shared by all “cannot be something 
28 
 
positive…but proceeds from the unifying effects that the external threat poses to an 
otherwise perfectly heterogeneous set of differences (particularities)” (57). In addition to 
resignifying each of the particular demands to “acquire a more global perspective” than its 
own particularism, a particular demand can, through hegominc operation, functions as 
universal representation. In short the particular becomes universal either by weakening 
differences through ‘equivalential logics’ to subvert the particularity of the particular, and/or 
by hegemonic operation that makes one of the particularity the universal.  
 
In the Kenya’s case, there was ‘universalisation’ of various anti-Moi demands that were 
particular to different groups, continuously accumulated over his 24-year reign. These 
demands were certainly particular, Laclau (1996:54) would say, as they came from very 
different groups, but the fact that a majority were rejected by the near dictatorial regime, 
made different people to establish a “relation of equivalence”. In other words, people came 
together only on the ground that their different unfulfilled democratic demands were 
rejected by the regime. In this group were university students, informal traders, small scale 
farmers, Green activists, the clergy, trade unionists, the civil society, ordinary politicians 
(the pseudo heads of ethnic communities), just to mention a few groups opposed to the 
regime (cf. Adar, 2000:80). After years of universalisation, Mwai Kibaki led several ethno-
regional opposition parties that united ten weeks to elections to form an anti-regime party, 
the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) that defeated Moi’s preferred successor, 
Uhuru Kenyatta, after reaping 62 percent of the votes, with 132 parliamentary seats 
against Uhuru’s 67.  
 
As explained above, particular demands—from environmental conservation, higher 
education funding, labour rights, to human rights, were hegemonically universalised into 
an overall particular demand — NARC’s demand for a new regime — which became jointly 
expressed as the opposition front. The essentialist classic left-right politics cannot explain 
this scenario. It means the dimension of universality was at odds with the particularism of 
the demands, and had President Moi’s regime dealt with the individual particular demands, 
they  would have remained “a pure particularism” since the regime would have pre-empted 
the equivalential logic (see Laclau, 1996: 54). But by not dealing with the particularities, 
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the regime motivated the “inscription of particular demands in a wider popular language of 
resistance”. 
 
However, since this category of universality, unlike class, does not come from ‘an 
underlying essence’, it cannot survive outside the system of equivalences from which it 
was formed. It implies the universalization of different demands under NARC’s ‘regime 
change’ mantra was itself an ‘impossibility’ because triumph in regime change was a 
condition for its dissolution as it led to re-particularisation of the universality. After all 
NARC’s victory meant there was no common enemy against whom to unite. Although the 
anti-regime party, a symbol a particular group, had become a universal representation of 
the opposition, this universalization was premised on a ‘common outsider’, therefore 
triumph destroyed the universalizing opposition frontier. In any case, as noted earlier, the 
universal was an ‘empty signifier’ created by emptying particularisms of their particularity 
(the specific demands by different people) to create a chain of equivalences that 
represented numerous demands. When the NARC’s ‘regime change’ particularism 
became the universal, it gave hegemonic power to the coalition of political parties, but 
reawakened the particularity in what had become universal demands within the coalition 
and other groups, making the hegemony, to use Laclau’s words, “precarious and 
threatened” (1996:55). This became clear when a few months after Kibaki’s victory saw 
the growth of particular demands from different groups, with the particularisms culminating 
into the divisive 2005 constitutional review referendum and the 2007/08 post-election 
violence.   
 
Therefore, Kibaki’s regime occupied what was previously an empty signifier, but since the 
president had to carry out real politics, he filled the emptiness with specific meanings that 
were not representative of all the particular demands that had been emptied. The chains 
of equivalences, as Laclau (1996:56) would say, were beyond any possibility of control 
since they were “constructed by the different factions of his movements” transcending the 
meaning temporarily imposed by the post-Moi regime. The result, just like it happens to 
post-revolution governments, was the bloody 2007/8 post-election violence. Such an 
events, as Laclau (1996:53) argues, illustrates how what seems universal “sooner or later 
become entangled in their own contextual particularism and are incapable of fulfilling their 
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universal function.” What this means is that the universal is contaminanted and cannot be 
free of all particularity, similar to the particularity that cannot be without some element of 
universality.  As Laclau puts it,  
The dimension of universality reached through equivalence is very 
different from the universality which results from an underlying 
essence or an unconditioned a priori principle. It is not a regulative 
ideal either – empirically unreachable but with an unequivocal 
teleological content – because it cannot exist apart from the system 
of equivalences from which it proceeds (1996: 55). 
 
For the above reasons, election related conflicts should be seen not as a threat to 
democracy but more of a sign of how liberal democracy has failed to tame the untameable 
universalised particularisms since the very condition of universalising particularity is the 
condition of its impossibility (see Derrida, 1996:82). Consequently, ‘hate media’ cannot be 
held solely responsible for causing the 2007/8 violence or sustaining the ever present 
ethnic tensions since these conflicts correspond to an era of re-particularisation of 
universalisms in Kenya. For example, as explained above, the 2007/08 post-election 
violence was part of a process for re-establishment of a new political frontier, six years 
after the exit of President Moi ended the democracy/totalitarianism ‘constitutive outsider’. 
It also means the violence was a symbol that the existing democracy had failed after the 
breakdown of the universalised particularisms — the empty signifiers constructed as 
equivalences of all demands against the long-serving President Moi (the emptiness was 
filled by President Kibaki). That is to say, since particular demands among various 
Kenyans were brought together by Moi as a constitutive outsider, the exit of enemy Moi 
meant a return of particularism. In fact, the need to establish a new ‘constitutive outsider’ 
at the end of Moi’s regime was similar to how the need for a new enemy after the collapse 
of the Communist bloc ended the universalisation of particularism against Communism, 
making the friend/enemy frontier to take a multiplicity of new forms like the return of ethnic, 
national and religious hatred (see Mouffe, 1993:3). We can therefore say that the thesis of 
this is dissertation is to identify outcomes of the failed old universal, and their equivalent 
new universalism, the failures seen in the present-day eruption in virulent particularisms 
of deadly nationalism — from anti-immigration parties in Europe and North America, to 
xenophobia and tribalism in Africa. That is to say, old hatred, xenophobia and anti- 




It connotes the rapid spread of social media in Kenya happened at a time when the East 
African state was redefining its universalism after the re-establishment of new 
particularisms. For instance, Kenya’s internet penetration has reached 85 percent 
(Communication Authority of Kenya, 2019), with over seven million Facebook users 
(Internet Users Statistics for Africa, 2019). Even though this figure means only 15 percent 
of Kenyans are on Facebook, the participation opportunities availed by the affordances of 
social media outmatches participation through conventional media. While newspapers 
circulation stands at approximately one hundred thousand copies per day (Kenya National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2017:252), by their nature, newspaper readers are passive media 
users.  
 
To put it differently, the sophisticated new information technologies have subverted 
policing by older regimes of orders. In addition, the diffusion of digital media has saturated 
the news media industry and provided openings for a new variety of critical communication 
practitioners founded on principles of participatory journalism and user-generated content. 
The outcome is a broadened public sphere and an explosion in public participation that in 
turn is feeding the process Mouffe (1993) calls “the resurgence of old antagonisms—
ethnic, national, religious and others” to fill the absent political frontier in a post-Moi Kenya. 
As Laclau (1996:61) stated: “the universal is certainly empty, and can only be filled in 
different contexts by concrete particulars.” And the 2002 opposition unity only won a partial 
victory for the reason that the unity was created against the “background of an ultimate 
and unsurpassable impossibility.” Therefore, the trouble with 2007/8 was not merely hate 
speech, even though the expansion in independent voices came at a time when Kenya 
was searching for a new constitutive outsider following the re-particularisation of the 
universal in the post-Moi era. 
 
Hence the universalising and particularising actions before, during and after the 2007/8 
post-election violence are the recent historical processes that “gave birth to” (Foucault 
1984: 81) the grand narrative of hate speech in social media in Kenya today. Among the 
key testimonies about the genealogy of the present-day hate speech discourse are the 
Reports by The Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (CIPEV 2008), and The 
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Independent Review Commission (IREC, 2008) by the Justices Philip Waki and Johann 
Krigler respectively, the Constitution of Kenya 2010, the National Cohesion and Integration 
Commission and the law establishing this commission, and the recent overhaul of the 
judiciary and police services, just to mention a few.  
 
The events immediately before and after the 2007/8 presidential election can be seen as 
a construction of ‘truth regimes’ (Foucault, 2008:18) of hate speech in Kenya. It was after 
the 2007/8 dislocation that the government, as already noted in chapter one, constructed 
a particular regime of truth that supports a binary division of speech into what is acceptable 
and what is not (see Pohjonen, & Udupa, 2017:1174). This regime of truth is clear in the 
hate speech laws. 
 
At the second level, universality of the particular is used to explain the universal in political 
events that may seem unique to Kenya. Indeed, the reproduction of binaries between 
Africa and others neither helps in explaining the continent, nor interpreting the applicability 
of principles universalised elsewhere. In fact, the Africa/Euro-America binaries are 
problematic as they remove Africa from the centre and obscure the universality of what is 
happening in the continent. However, by taking human nature as something that is the 
same throughout the world, we can argue that politics, at the ontological level, is universal. 
The ontological, a concept elaborated in Chapter Five, focuses on the ‘the political’—the 
friend/enemy relationship—as the underlying cause of incivility, while the ontic is the day 
to day politics that exposes the ontological.   
 
In this study, ‘the political’, the ontological perspective of politics, is taken as the way out 
of the paradox of the particular, founded on the universal and the universalised 
particularity. This solution to the inconsistency of African politics does not mean we reverse 
the dichotomies so that the particular becomes the universal, rather, it means we avoid 
the appeal to pure particularism independent of any universality (cf. Laclau, 1992:87). 
Thus the use of Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory is not an application of European 
universalism that contradicts Africa’s particularism. On the contrary, it should be seen as 





By using Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory to analyse the media in Kenya, the thesis 
questions the dichotomy between the particularity of Kenya’s politics and the universality 
of liberal democracy. It is argued that the centrality of hostility, the friend–enemy relations, 
makes incivility in social media in Kenya compatible with other forms of anti-democratic 
extreme speech in different parts of the world, such as anti-immigration campaigns and 
xenophobia, which liberal democracy has failed to tame.  
 
Although the universalisation of Kenyan, and Africa’s particularism at large, allows what 
Laclau (1992:90) calls the movement away from Western Eurocentrism, which was itself 
a particularism made universal, a wholesale rejection of European universalism due to its 
particularity, can only lead to a political blind alley. Therefore, through interweaving 
particularism with universalistic ideologies, we can, as Georgiou (2005:485) said, surpass 
exclusive orientalisation and ‘insular particularisms.’ It is “an invitation to break off the 
romanticism and the pathologisation of particularism on the one hand, and the fear and 
demonisation of universalism as the ideology of domination on the other.” 
 
It is within the above universalisation of particularisms that this thesis disputes the binary 
division of speech and the privileging of the hate speech grand narrative. In contrast, the 
study widens the meaning of incivility beyond its oppositional terms. It is argued that as a 
sign, incivility does not only correspond to the one signified, rather it is open to 
reinterpretation, in this case, outside the government’s regime of truth — the binary 
oppositions that privilege acceptable speech over the unacceptable. To achieve this 
objective of defining incivility in social media outside the spectrum of hatred, I adopt a 
discursive approach, drawing inspiration from the universalisms in the works of Antonio 
Gramsci, Althusser, Laclau, Mouffe, and Žižek, among other radical democracy theorists, 
in order to argue that incivility is symbolic of the ‘constitutive role of antagonism’.  I argue 
too that incivility should be taken as part of the approaches for returning ‘the political’ to 
democracy, for example when the otherwise extreme speech acts act as part of 
counterhegemonic struggles by actors trying to escape the enclosures of contemporary 




The thesis advanced in the remaining part of this chapter is that framing incivility in social 
media as anti-democratic speech happens through complex hegemonic interactions and 
assumptions that have naturalised civility. Contrary, incivility can be equated to 
contentious forms of politics which “involve actors critical of and resistant to the dominant 
economic and political discourses [and] operating outside existing structures” (Sullivan, 
Spicer, Bohm, 2011:706). Through this approach, the study is against the possibility of a 
singular understanding of incivility since grand narratives reflect hegemonic relationships.  
 
The following section uses radical democracy concepts to provide a working definition of 
civility and incivility as hegemonic and counterhegemonic strategies respectively. This is 
followed by a section on the political economy of power. The last section of this chapter 
looks at how elites culturalise politics and use civility as a strategy for hegemony. 
2.3. Incivility as Anti-democratic and Democratic, Hegemonic and 
Counterhegemonic. 
Incivility can be productive to democracy if we avoid displacing ‘the political’ from 
democracy to other spheres like the judiciary. To this concern, this study avoids the 
legalese of “hate speech” that constructs conflict in social media as crimes that are better 
dealt with by the juridical. Such legal language denies incivility any further academic 
scrutiny (see Udupa, 2018). Moreover, the regime, through the juridical, can use hate 
speech to legitimise suppression of what is otherwise agonistic views that should be 
endemic in democracy. So instead of equating extreme speech to hate speech that is 
antidemocratic, I look at its counterhegemonic value. That is to say, although a legalese 
bias places incivility in the same category with other forms of destructive speech, such as 
hate speech and incitement to violence, if we emphasise the importance of passion in 
politics, incivility can be seen as a tool for returning politics to democracy (see Honig, 
1993:2). Indeed, instead of threatening democracy, passion can enable those outside the 
hierarchy of power to challenge hegemonic orders and propose alternatives to existing 
‘post-political’ liberal democracy.  
For the above reasons, extreme speech  in social media can hinder or advance 
democracy, akin to what Gitlin’s (1998:173) calls public sphericules, where some forms of 
extreme speech (sphericules) challenge the dominant spheres, while others go against 
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the values of democracy. In the latter category, incivility falls within the continuum of anti-
democratic talk, such as hate speech and incitement to violence, categories of incivility 
that if not well managed can even be a security threat.  
While rampant incivility in social media challenges the Habermasian principles of a unified 
rational and consensual public sphere, it concurs with Mouffe’s agonism — a type of 
democracy that can explain how the multiplicity of voices that social media makes 
available can be managed rather than eliminated (Mouffe’s Theory will be explained in 
details as part of the theoretical framework in Chapter Four from page 104-117). Yet the 
multiplicity of voices risk becoming anti-public sphere, what Cammaerts (2007:73) terms, 
voices that challenge democratic values because they are placed at “political extremes”.   
By looking at extreme speech in social media as destructive speech, regimes can 
securitise incivility and use security strategies to manage political issues, what Honig 
(1993:3) calls displacement of politics to another sphere. For instance, through 
securitisation, politics is moved out of the public sphere of normal politics into the realm of 
security where it can be dealt with outside the rules of democracy (Wæver, 2004: 13). The 
regime can justify securitisation of politics based on its purported benefits to subalterns as 
the primary victims of hate speech. Nevertheless, “speaking and writing about security is 
never innocent” (Huysmans, 1999:5) as transforming hate speech into a security problem 
is an ideology that attempts to maintain the status quo by defending existing political 
practices since security and insecurity do not always constitute a binary opposition.  
Securitisation, a typical example of handing over politics to other spheres, is “the 
discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a 
political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, 
and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat” (Buzan 
& Wæver 2003:491). After identification of threats, securitisation can only succeed if the 
proposed exceptional measures are legitimated and supported by the audience (cf. 
Taureck 2006:55). Thus securitisation is an illocutionary speech act, that is to say, by 
merely uttering the phrase ‘national security’, incivility is removed from politics and placed 
together with other security threats. After all, “it is by labelling something a security issue 
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that it becomes one” (Wæver 2004: 13), which means “if successfully performed, the 
speech act makes a security problem” (Huysmans 1999: 8). 
Whether incivility in social media is part of democratic counter-publics or a security 
problem (such a hate speech), it can be determined by its target. If incivility is directed at 
the dominant groups as a part of efforts to contest the hegemony of an existing democracy 
and power structure, then it is not a national security problem but an example of extreme 
speech that can deepen democracy. In this regard, incivility is part of the “cultural and 
artistic practices” that undermine the hegemonic order by revealing how civility contributes 
to what Mouffe (2014:68) terms construction and reproduction of oppressive social norms.  
To Mouffe, democracy can be revitalised in our post-political societies in which consensus 
is used to remove politics from democracy, by encouraging “multiplication of agonistic 
public spaces where everything that the dominant consensus tends to obscure and 
obliterate can be brought to light and challenged… [through]… a ‘war of position’ aimed at 
transforming the existing institutions and creating a new hegemony.”  
Certainly, the dominant liberal democracy is a post-political paradigm because it attempts 
to minimise politics through hegemonic practices, which have created the current social 
order. Although this is not a ‘natural order’ of things, it enjoys temporary fixity which can, 
however, be challenged by counter-hegemonic practices (see Mouffe, 2014:65-66). If 
existing social order is a hegemonic project, then the alternative should be to “disarticulate 
the existing discourses and practices through which the current hegemony is established 
and reproduced” followed by re-articulation to avoid the chaos that comes with mere 
disarticulation without re-articulation. Disarticulation without re-articulation creates a 
vacuum that can be filled by re-articulation by non-progressive forces, like it has happened 
when previously dominant order is replaced by right-wing solutions (Mouffe, 2014:67). 
It is such re-articulation by non-progressive forces that makes extreme speech anti-
democratic and a national security problem. Specifically, extreme speech is anti-
democratic when it is directed at the powerless — those outside the existing hegemonic 
order of things. In this category are all antagonistic extreme speeches aimed at subalterns, 
such as racist and religiously intolerant speech. 
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In contrast, incivility that disarticulates existing hegemonic discourses is beneficial to 
democracy and can be equated to similar counter hegemonic subversive but progressive 
artistic movements like Dadaism, surrealism, Fluxusism and situationism (see 
Cammearts, 2007:75) or even graffiti, the performative strategies that have been used to 
resist dominant thinking since early 20th Century.  
I am against the binary opposition between incivility and democracy, where incivility in 
social media is viewed as information that can incite violence. Contrary, I go beyond the 
binary opposition to describe incivility’s potential to reinvigorate democracy. The only 
challenge for pro-democracy incivility, as Mouffe (1997:19) would argue, is that it can only 
deepen democratic revolution if subordinate groups establish equivalence in their diverse 
democratic struggles. Doing so can “transform the identity of different groups so that the 
demands of each group [can] be articulated with those of others according to the principle 
of democratic equivalence”. The chain of equivalence brings together different 
disadvantaged groups without making them homogeneous but enables them to work 
together to avoid their neutralisation by the ruling elites (Mouffe, 1997:19). Subordinate 
groups are marginalised in different ways, but the groups can be linked in such a way that, 
neither group’s demands are met at the expense of the other (see Carpentier & 
Cammaerts, 2006:8). According to Mouffe (1997:8), the chain of equivalence can only be 
established when the disadvantaged groups define a common adversary. If the 
marginalised and disadvantaged groups avoid using incivility against one another, but 
instead establish ‘new subject positions’ that can allow them to jointly use their incivilities 
to challenge their common adversary, then incivility in social media can be part of truly 
democratic struggles against power.  
Similar thinking is expressed by Fraser (1990:70) who defends “subaltern counterpublics 
formed under conditions of dominance and subordination.” Incivility in social media is 
comparable to other forms of extreme speech which, Fraser (1990:67) would have called 
strategies used by subordinated groups to create alternative publics, the subaltern 
counter-publics that are parallel discursive arenas through which subordinates invent and 
circulate counter-discourses to counteract their exclusion in official public spheres.  Fraser 
cautions that even though some of the subaltern counterpublics “are explicitly anti-
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democratic and anti-egalitarian”, when these counterpublics emerge as a response to 
exclusions, they can help expand discursive spaces.  
In the context of social media discourses, extreme speech might look anti-democratic at 
face value, yet it is through tough speaking that exclusion in participation in politics can be 
reduced. To Fraser (1990:67), “proliferation of subaltern counterpublics means a widening 
of discursive contestation, and that is a good thing in stratified societies.” 
Furthermore, it is possible for incivility that is seemingly antidemocratic today to later breed 
speech that advances democracy. Such evolution of ‘democracy to come’, as Derrida 
(2005: 82) says, symbolises the aporetic nature of democracy. That is to say, ‘the political’ 
makes democracy an “undecidable” concept since it does not have one way of solving the 
friend-enemy relationship, leaving it open to iteration and reinscription, with its meaning 
‘always still to come’ (Naas, 2016:27). As an aporetic concept, democracy is different from 
coherent regimes such as monarchy, or plutocracy. It means categorisation of speech into 
what advances or undermines democracy or disregards hybridity of democracy itself. For 
instance, the Mau Mau rebellion in the 1950s against the British colonial government was 
interpreted by the ruling elites as undemocratic, yet the rebellion was one of the reasons 
Britain introduced representative democracy and handed over Kenya to the indigenous 
majority. The Mau Mau rebellion was similar to the other self-governance movements in 
Africa, like the African National Congress, whose former leader, the late Nelson Mandela, 
was once denounced on claims that he used terrorist tactics, only for the world to later 
celebrate his achievements in stopping apartheid. 
It is possible for extreme speech in social media to breed similar results by hinting to 
subalterns the maximum they can demand from the dominant groups. Through such 
strategies, incivility in social media can reopen theorisation of the limits of deliberative 
democracy, which without alternatives, Fraser (1990:56) argues, has been touted as the 
ne plus ultra of societies transiting from lesser forms of democracy and military 
dictatorships.  
Proponents of civility reminisce the Habermas (1989a) account of the public sphere, even 
though the public sphere lacked equitable access because it was created by the bourgeois 
who excluded women and plebeian men. Consequently, the idea of the public sphere 
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should be dismantled for observers to understand the limits of existing democracy and 
suggest alternative democracies that can include counterpublics that exist outside and in 
competition with the hegemonic public sphere.   
In Fraser’s terms, the multiplicity of competing publics is a step towards, rather than a step 
away from greater democracy as stated by Habermas. Given these points, extreme 
speech in social media can enhance democracy if it amplifies the voices of the excluded 
or oppressed plebeians, enabling them to counter dominant forces. Therefore, incivility in 
social media can be viewed as efforts by plebeians to claim space in the public sphere, 
even as elites seek to retain the spaces by limiting the definition of ‘legitimate’ speech to 
what maintains the status quo. 
In conclusion, it can be argued that there is a variety of incivility that is both anti—
democratic and democracy—enhancing. These categories of extreme speech are 
illustrated in the model below. The model adapts Habermas’ (1989a) public sphere, 
Fraser’s (1992) subaltern counter-publics and Cammaerts’ (2007) political jamming to 
explain incivility in social media as part of Mouffe’s (1993) agonistic democracy. As 
explained above, incivility that undermines democracy includes all forms of extreme 
speech targeting the non-dominant groups, the subalterns. Such forms of incivility are 
similar to speech categories that form the anti-public sphere used by fundamentalist 
movements to conceal their intentions and make it look like they are part of the public 
sphere (see Cammaerts, 2007:6). While the democracy—enhancing incivility can be 
categorised into three groups: incivility that is aimed at subverting hegemony of the 
currently dominant liberal democracy, a form of agonism; incivility as mere rudeness that 
can also be counterhegemonic; and hegemonic incivility used by dominant groups to 
strengthen their hegemonic order. The three democracy enhancing categories of incivility 





Figure 1. Categories of incivility: democratic and anti-
democratic, counterhegemonic and hegemonic.  
 
The following section explains how the struggle against various types of dominance 
determines whether incivility is democracy—enhancing or antidemocratic. As illustrated in 
the model above, the three categories of democracy—enhancing incivility are separated by 
the source and the target of the incivilities. Because the people as subject have multiple 
identities, they can paradoxically take the dominant/non—dominant positions. As explained 
by Sayyid and Zac (1998:264), people can have various subjectivities “even though a 
particular subject would occupy a place in a hierarchy of some kind”. The following sub-
sections attempt to identify the dominant and non-dominant groups, first from the political 
economy perspective, and then from the discursive subject formation standpoint. 
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2.3.1. The Political Economy of Ethnic Identities: The Dominant, the ersatz and the 
Subaltern in Kenya 
As illustrated above, incivility can enhance democracy if it is used as part of the tools for 
‘shouting at power’, for example, when the otherwise extreme speech is directed at 
dominant groups. But incivility suppresses democracy when used by the dominant groups 
to ‘shout with power’ at subalterns. Therefore, without falling in the trap of binary opposition 
of allowable/restricted speech, we can differentiate democracy—promoting from 
democracy—restraining incivility by identifying dominant and subaltern groups. Concerning 
the dominant/subaltern positions, Kenya is among many other non-Western nations in 
which dominance and subalternity are not binary oppositions since the left—right and the 
materially dominant/subaltern oppositions are inappropriate in structuring power relations.  
 
It means without clear boundaries between the left and the right or the classical material 
dominance, power relations in Kenya refuse to fit into the universalised Western model. In 
fact, imposing the European model on Africa, Laclau (2014:56) would argue, is similar to 
the metaphoric relations of substitution used to name the unnameable. If this 
metaphorisation succeeds, the hegemonic substitution of Africa’s democracy with failed 
liberal democracy makes the later a catachresis as it becomes a figural term without a 
literal one (see Laclau, 2005b:71). Unlike metaphors that substitute by describing one 
thing as another, catachresis transfers “terms from one place to another…when no proper 
word exists” (Parker, 1990:60). In this case no proper term exists, in liberal democracy 
vocabulary, for defining the type of dominance witnessed in Kenya. Rather, the definitions 
given are catachrestical, what Howarth and Griggs (2006:32) call misapplication of words.  
 
Hence it is through strategies of rhetorical re-description that African democracy has been 
named a type of failed liberal democracy, thereby committing a semantic error whose 
erroneousness is difficult to see. In other words, the failure of liberal democracy is a 
catachresis used by scholars applying the European model to Kenya and other African 
states practicing a democracy that is different from the ideal—type Western democracy. 
Some have even claimed that it lies between authoritarian hybrids and “flawed 
democracies” (see Beresford, Berry, & Mann, 2018:1232). For example, using a ‘fair 
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election gauge’ to measure success, Cheeseman (2017:197-198) describes how 
multiparty polls failed to transfer power, with incumbents winning 88 percent of the 
contests between 1990 and 2010, a failure he claims created states with “all of the 
trappings of democracy but…not actually democratic.” An alternative to such 
pathologisation of African democracy, is providing an insightful explanation of power 
struggles in Africa, explanations that can give opportunity to neutral comparisons outside 
the hegemonic liberal democracy.  
 
In place of imposition of the left-right binary or the gauge of fair election, we need to explain 
Africa’s democracy not only as betwixt and between European models, but also as a 
different way of negotiating power and practising politics. Without regressing to the 
fallacies of African intellectual nationalism, we can account for Africa’s politics through 
explanations that are relevant to this region of the world. It means instead of claiming, for 
example as Cheeseman (2017:198) does, that the incumbent president Moi stifled 
‘transitions to democracy’ by exploiting ethnic diversity to literally divide the opposition 
party, Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD), into its two versions — FORD-Asili 
and FORD-Kenya — led by a Kikuyu and Luo respectively, we should see such divide-
and-rule tactics as part of hegemonic tools in the post-cold war era. Despite the 
relationship between elections and increase in civil liberties, civic education and other 
democratic gains, even when the elections are not free and fair (Staffan & Lindberg, 
2006:108), we should avoid seeing elections as the foundation of democracy, rather we 
should identify alternative explanations of political struggles in Africa.  
 
Without a doubt, the left-right binaries and electoral democracy are theories 
conceptualising evolution of politics in Western societies. Unfortunately, it is based on 
these models that comparisons are made between the Western and non-Western ways of 
doing politics. Therefore, as an alternative to using the Western political thought to explain 
Africa, we need to develop more indigenous approaches. Such efforts at indigenising 
theory are what Chabal (2013:2) terms engaging “in the theoretical discussions that can 
provide added value to our understanding of how power is exercised on the continent.” 
However, refusal of European models should not be taken as denial of their validity, rather 
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it should be taken as part of the efforts to find more valid explanations of what is happening 
in Kenya. 
 
Existing outside the universalised left-right opposition, ethnic identity is the most noticeable 
political frontier in Kenya. Both dominant and marginalised ethnic groups have stable 
identities marked by positions that seem cemented on some primordial features of shared 
language, similar cultural norms, shared memory, history, and shared geographic 
concentration. Indeed, Chabal (2013:5-6) argues that ethnicity is at the “heart of the 
everyday realities of morality, accountability and representation and as such needs to form 
the bedrock of any realistic political theory of the continent.”  In Kenya, what looks like 
primordial features — language and cultural norms — eclipse other categories such as 
social-economic class, religion, region and colour. However, with or without ethnic 
differences, there are a variety of hegemonic approaches that cause the dominated to 
“understand, participate in, and even celebrate their domination” (Pitcher, Moran & 
Johnston, 2009:126), meaning without privileging the universalised liberal democracy, 
ethnic identities can be included in the hegemonic power play.  
 
Primarily, it is language that affirms unity of the social groups in Kenya. This can be seen 
in electoral choices. Nevertheless, even though ethnic groups look natural, this study 
avoids the primordial stance that assumes ethnic groups have unique natural features. 
The study is in contrast to arguments by primordialists like Van Evera (2001:20) who claim 
that although “ethnic identities are not stamped on our genes”, once formed, the groups 
tend to strongly endure. Contrarily, I take a constructivist approach arguing that ethnic 
identities are determined by among others, political, economic and historical factors. 
Besides, other than ethnic identities, there are several non-ethnic and non-class identities 
of dominant/subaltern opposition, like men/women, employer/workers, the 
landowner/squatter, adult/youth, able bodied/people living with disabilities, 
investor/consumers, just to mention a few that Laclau (1988:250) would say are a “process 
of overdetermination of popular struggles [that] create social identities not based on class 
identities.” What is common in all the dominated groups are the several ideologies that 
make them understand, participate and celebrate their domination, but not the essentialist 
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class belonging. This constructivist view of identity will be elaborated in Section 2.1.2 
below on discursive construction of subject positions.   
 
Despite the non-essentialism stand above, ethnic marginalisation in Kenya is not mere 
construction of a marginalised position, rather it compounds experiences of inequality and 
rewards since ethnic identities have been used to selectively allocate state resources. This 
clientelism, the personal contact between citizens and politicians, Mueller (2018:1) 
explains, is at play when politicians provide selective benefits for political support. 
Politicians in Kenya, just like in many African countries favour citizens whom they “know 
to be highly responsive to such side-payments and willing to surrender their vote for the 
right price” (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007:2). Biased allocation of resources for provision of 
clean piped water, electricity and medical services, Githongo (2006:19) narrates, is the 
most visible discrimination against ethnic groups outside government. For instance, a 
person born in the former Nyanza Province, a perennially opposition region, has life 
expectancy of 19 years less than a person born in the former Central Province — a region 
that is the birth place of three out of the four presidents who have ruled Kenya since 
independence. Life expectancy in Meru (a county that has been well represented in the 
Cabinet since independence) is double that in Mombasa, one of the most marginalised 
counties (ibid).  
  
In a similar analysis of road maps by Burgess, Jedwab, Miguel, and Morjaria (2010:3), it 
was found out that throughout the post-independence era, roads have been constructed 
to favour “the district of birth and ethnicity of the presidents and the other cabinet 
members.” Regions where the presidents’ ethnicity were well represented had an 
additional 56.77 km of paved roads every three years and the district of birth of the public 
works minister received an additional 8.53 km of paved roads every three years, among 
other favours. Considering these politics of the belly (see Bayart, 1993:51), what Wrong 
(2009) calls “our turn to eat game”, because previous leaders started the game by 
favouring their tribes, 
…current leaders find it "fair" to do the same for their own people…By doing so, 
they encourage the next leaders to act correspondingly, and so on. All 
successive leaders become the main actors of an "our turn to eat" game, which 




As a consequence of clientelism, elites recruit among the dominated by “profil[ing] 
themselves as the defenders of their ethnic group on the national platform, promising a 
piece of the national economic cake, including jobs, favours, and hard cash” (Smedt, 
2009:584). Elites from both dominant and dominated ethnic groups stand equally accused 
of this crime. While the dominant groups marginalise the dominated, elites from the 
dominated groups seem not to aim at changing the mode of resource distribution, but seek 
power to do exactly what the regime is doing. 
Importantly, those not in office but attempting to get there, generally 
view this political system as legitimate. That is, they do not protest 
about a system where politicians ‘eat’ while in power; instead they 
fight for ‘change’ because they are not eating (Cammack, 2007:601). 
 
For instance, after ‘suffering’ 24 years of discrimination under President Moi, a Kalenjin, 
Kikuyu elites continued the tradition under the regime of President Kibaki, a Kikuyu. In fact, 
the discrimination was so rigorous that Kibaki’s regime was accused of fomenting ethnic 
hatred that triggered violence following the disputed 2007 election. In Michela Wrong’s 
(2009) memoir of John Githongo, what the Harper's magazine called a nonfiction political 
thriller of modern Kenya that exemplifies an African dilemma, the author tells a story of 
how resources are corruptly shared among elites from the ruling tribe.  
 
John Githongo, President Kibaki's family friend and his trusted anti-corruption man-at-
arms, narrates the massive corruption among the Kikuyu elites, what he called a Kikuyu 
ethnic mafia around the presidency. Kikuyus believed that, after years out of power, it was 
time for their ethnic group to ‘eat’. To Michela Wrong, the “It’s our turn to eat” philosophy 
was a strategy to camouflage elite corruption as efforts to assist the less privileged Kikuyus 
who had suffered under the leadership of President Moi (see International Peace Institute. 
2009). But Githongo, a dissident member of the dominant group, Van Dijk (998:183), would 
have said, refused to do what his tribe expected, instead he went public with detailed 
evidence of corruption. When his position became untenable, after he was discredited and 




Furthermore, what is unique about the composition of ethnic identities in Kenya, just like 
in other non-Western countries with strong ethnic identities, are situations when subalterns 
adopt dominant ideologies of their economically superior ethnic elites. For example, the 
subalterns support their tribe’s elites merely because of linguistic similarities. In such 
cases, dominant ideologies, as Van Dijk (1998:182) would argue, are adopted even as 
they remain inconsistent with daily experiences of the subalterns. The paradox of 
subalterns adopting ideologies of dominant groups makes it difficult to differentiate incivility 
that enhances democracy from what is anti-democracy based on the target audience, 
given that in any dominant group there is likely to be subalterns. It means incivility aimed 
at a dominant group also targets the subalterns who have become part of the dominant 
group. For example, the subaltern from Kikuyu and Kalenjin tribes, based on the 2013 and 
2017 election results, seem to have adopted dominant ideologies of their ruling class, yet 
what the dominated groups share with the ruling class is not economic privileges but mere 
language, history and memories, fortified by a common enemy image of other tribes 
struggling for similar power. The situation corresponds with the imaginations of subalterns 
from other tribes: they have equally been recruited by their elites and made to perceive 
themselves as marginalised and perceive Kikuyus and Kalenjins (elites and the 
subalterns) as the dominant groups. It implies the concept of ‘constitutive outsider’ 
overrides construction of identities as limited to on class binary oppositions.   
 
Although manipulation of ethnic identity has been blamed for triggering violence, for 
example, Lonsdale (1992:236) calls it “political tribalism”, while Smedt (2009:594) blames 
ethnicity for blocking political ideologies and clear political programmes, ethnic identities 
remain the key ideological division between the dominant and subaltern groups in Kenya. 
Furthermore, ethnicity is not different from other identity markers, for instance, age, class 
and gender or profession, through which ideology is used to organise the society in terms 
of relations of dominance. Thus ethnicity is among strategies that Van Dijk (1998:183) 
would call “mechanisms of manipulation” used to spread elite ideologies that are 
inconsistent yet successful among dominated groups. The shortcoming of ethnic identities 
to act as the centre for power struggles, for example when ethnicity triggered post-election 
violence in 2007, should not be seen as failure of democracy built on African politics, but 




Furthermore, it is incorrect to claim, without a caveat, that a group of subalterns who have 
been manipulated to become part of the dominant group are a real part of this group. 
Although after recruitment by elites through ethic identities, the otherwise subalterns drop 
their alternative identities (for example of worker, female, homeless, low-income earners, 
squatters, unemployed) to acquire a new dominant status, I call this new status ‘ersatz 
dominance’, a term originating from the German word “ersatz” which means an “inferior 
substitution”. Thus an ersatz dominance is not real dominance but only a more inferior 
dominance by subalterns who have been manipulated into occupying positions of inferior 
dominance. Therefore, instead of the clearly marked boundaries creating a dominant-
subaltern binary opposition, like it is in Western Europe, in Kenya, we have three groups, 
the dominant, the subaltern and the third group that I call the ‘ersatz’ dominant group: the 
otherwise subaltern groups that join the dominant groups, even though only symbolically, 
to enjoy second-hand superiority over other subalterns.  
 
Nevertheless, as dominant groups divide the subalterns, they have within them some 
“ideological dissidents” (Van Dijk, 1998:183, emphasis in original), the members of elite 
groups who side with the dominated in rejecting the dominant ideologies. The best recent 
example of ideological dissident in Kenya is John Githongo, an elite Kikuyu by all 
standards, who refused to perpetuate corruption by dominant Kikuyus.  
 
Therefore, given that ideologies are not limited to socio-economic classes as orthodox 
Marxists assume, there is a blurred boundary between dominant and subaltern groups 
since dominant groups always use their ideologies to control the minds of the subalterns. 
The overlap between ideologies of the dominant and subalterns weakens the power of the 
latter by pitting them against one another. In the current Kenyan context, subalterns are 
not able to see their shared feature — lack of power. This lack manifests itself in many 
other ways, in addition to economic factors. Thus the subalterns lack clearly demarcated 
identities, hence they are not able to constitute a collective identity that can unite them 
against elites, like it happens in revolutions emanating from socio-economic class 
domination. It is the ersatz dominance by some subalterns that makes democracy-
enhancing incivility look like hate speech. If the dominant and subalterns were clear binary 
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oppositions, the use of incivility as a tool for power struggles would have been clear to 
discern.    
 
Given the above reasons, incivility stands out as a political problem that emanates from 
power struggles. However, its role in democracy is curtailed when subalterns acquire a 
dominant status, even though such status is mere ersatz domination. About such 
concerns, Laclau and Mouffe (1987:80) argue that the challenge faced by orthodox 
Marxism is the decline of the classical working class resistance and the emergence of 
various “forms of mass mobilisations in Third World countries, which do not follow the 
classical pattern of class struggle”. In other words, instead of lamenting the inability of 
class politics to explain political practices in Kenya, we should look for approaches used 
by ordinary Kenyans to overcome the constraints imposed by a political environment that 
refuses to fit into the right-left divide.  
 
Despite the shortcomings of the politics of ‘personal loyalty’, in which power is controlled 
by ‘big men’ instead of formal institutions, rather than revealing reasons for failure of liberal 
democracy to replace this inefficient system, scholars have blamed the logic of 
neopatrimonialism (see Cammack, 2007; Pitcher et al, 2009:130). They have also 
proposed a rational-legal authority that is based on impersonal bureaucratic logic 
governed by law and reason, yet unless a system relevant to Africa is developed, this 
rational-legal system cannot act as the deus ex machina, the unexpected intervention to 
solve Africa’s challenges with liberal democracy since even the law on which impersonal 
bureaucracies are founded operate at whims of the ruler (see Pitcher et al, 2009:130). As 
noted by Weber (1978[1922]:263), impersonal bureaucratic governance through the law 
is never fully achieved: 
Legal authority is never purely legal. The belief in legality comes to 
be established and habitual, and this means it is partly traditional.  
 
Nevertheless, ideals of rational-legal authority have been invoked — which unfortunately 
have not been achieved anywhere — to identify shortcomings in African political practices. 
For example, Pitcher et al (2009:131) blame neopatrimonialism yet rational-legal regimes 
are a colonial project that have failed to replace the prevailing personalistic logic. What 
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remains clear is that Kenya, just like many African countries, has moved away from 
authoritarianism without replacing personalistic logic with the ideals of liberal democracy. 
Instead of seeing the east African state as occupying an ambiguous position ‘betwixt and 
between’ authoritarianism and liberal democracy, we should take its position as unique 
and on a continuum of democratic directionality.  
 
We can understand Kenya’s position well if we avoid looking at non-Western countries 
that have not adopted liberal democracy as occupying a position of liminality, a temporary 
position for countries moving from authoritarianism to liberal democracy. To 
anthropologists, a liminal position is occupied by individuals who are moving from one 
phase of their lives to another, yet their movement has not been fully realised (see, 
Beresford, Berry, & Mann, 2018:1232). That is to say, a liminal position is a borderline 
status between authoritarianism and democracy, a position equivalent to a rite of passage 
(cf. Van Gennep, 1960:3). Arguing that all non-Western countries are in transition from 
their forms of democracy to liberal democracy is universalising European particularisms. I 
argue that it is possible for the prolonged liminality to mean a type of democracy not in 
transition, but if in transition, the transition is to a non-liberal democracy model.   
 
Secondly, putting democracy on a continuum of directionality towards European ideals 
ignores the agential power of ordinary people in non-European environments. Revisiting 
the structure/agency debate will be in order here. Agency, traditionally, is the capacity of 
individuals to perform independent actions, while structure is the social arrangements that 
limit individual freedom. As explained by Giddens (1984, 25-26), the “structure is not to be 
equated with constraint but is always both constraining and enabling.” The agential power 
of people enables them to solve their predicaments through creativity and resilience. 
According to De Bruijn, Van Dijk, and Gewald, (2007:2)  
…no matter how constraining circumstances can be in 
environmental, economic, political or social-cultural terms, African 
societies have demonstrated time and again numerous ways in 
which such conditions are negotiated in often unexpected ways.  
 
It means even if Kenya’s democracy is at the ‘liminal’ stage, ordinary Kenyans still retain 
the capacity to shape and transform the state. Unlike structuralist scholars who put too 
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much emphasis on the political structure, neglecting the powers of ordinary people over 
the structures, agential power counters weaknesses in liberal democracy. Thus instead of 
the subaltern/dominant opposition popular in classical Marxism, we can talk about the 
‘subject position’.   
 
Contrary to limiting identities to class struggles, Laclau and Mouffe (1985:115) prefer 
subject positions within discourse, the open struggle for hegemony, instead of 
presupposing the working class as privileged political agents in this struggle. To them, 
subjects cannot originate social relations because “every subject position is a discursive 
position” and the infinite positions developed through discourse “cannot be totally fixed in 
a closed system of differences.” For Laclau, struggles should not be limited to workers’ 
struggles, but should also include other forms of ‘Us’ vs. ‘Them’ differences that can be 
formed through discursive practices that are without residues of historical materialism. In 
any case, the evil of the society is not “inherent in the economic system” but on the 
contrary, is found in the abuse of power (Laclau, 2005:90).  
 
Having explained the failure of the universalised class struggle, the following section 
describes how discursive identities in Kenya lead to the creation of dominant groups not 
grounded on class. As explained by Laclau (1994:1), the post-Cold War era has witnessed 
proliferation of particularistic political identities, outside the European universalism of class 
or privileged race. Nevertheless, the crisis of universalism does not mean its absence, 
instead it means universalism is recreating itself in its void, what Laclau (1994:1) calls the 
“presence of its absence” (emphasis in original). In search of a replacement of the 
collapsed European universalism, Laclau (1994:1) believes we should see the void left by 
the collapse as an empty signifier—present through its absence—a new way of 
constructing identity by reproducing what is absent. Section 5.2.3 of Chapter Five 
elaborates the concept of empty signifier, but in brief, it is what emerges when there is an 
interruption of the structure of the sign, creating a “limit to something [that] is the same as 
thinking of what is beyond those limits” (Laclau, 1996:37). It means outside class 
essentialism; identities are empty signifiers since they are created by what is absent: a 
signifier without a signified (34). That is to say, class identity has lost its content but it “is 
present as that which is absent” (44). Therefore, identities are no longer attached to a 
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specific signified but still signify when their absent signifier is filled. As empty signifiers, 
identities are a signifier without a signified and political actors compete to construct the 
signified by filling the emptiness with specific meaning. Therefore, it implies in the post-
political era, identity is an empty signifier since it is signified by its absence, its lack, or the 
void it has created by no longer being available in its Marxist structure. The next section 
uses Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory to describe how identities are discursively 
created and how these identities construct dominant and the subaltern groups in Kenya.  
2.3.2. Against economism: Formation of Subject Positions in Kenya 
Given the weaknesses of historical materialism as described above, we need to reinvent 
Marxist thinking by looking for alternative approaches to resistance other than the 
universalised working-class/elite binary opposition. Although political economy proponents 
aspire for political communities formed to push for material equality, this purportedly 
universal principle has been defeated by particularistic political communities, for example 
with the tribe remaining a strong source of political identities. Despite the fact that working-
class unity brought ‘the people’ together to fight colonialism from the late 1950s, after the 
political independence, unity of the working class was immediately replaced by multiple 
collective identities based on ethnic antagonisms that remain a challenge to liberal 
democracy today. 
Rather than reaching Fukuyama’s ultimate victory, the spread of Western liberal 
democracy is in competition with the reincarnation of conflicts that should have ended at 
the ‘end of history’ (see Mouffe, 1994:103). As Lindberg, Prozorov, Ojakangas (2014:1) 
argue, because universal principles are inapplicable or outright alien to some cultural 
values, their failure demonstrates “that the values presented as universal are in fact also 
particular, arising out of the identities and interests of, for example, white middle-class 
males, Western states”. To revive the Left, we need “to go back to 'real' politics by tackling 
not only ‘redistribution’ but also ‘recognition’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1984: xviii). In this 
dissertation, the western-centric liberal democracy is not universal, and neither is African 
politics particular, what is proposed is the universality of ‘the political’.  For example, it can 
be argued that the diverse forms of politics that have attempt to tame ‘the political’, 
including the idealised working-class–elite dichotomy in orthodox Marxism, are hegemonic 
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since they conceal their particularistic origins as they expose themselves as universal. To 
agree that orthodox Marxism was a 19th century European invention is to agree that 
orthodox Marxism was originally particular. In any case, Marxism is no exception from 
other forms of universalised European particularisms.  
Moreover, Edward Said accuses Marx of racist orientalisation of the non-Western world 
through proposing a Eurocentric model of political emancipation not suitable for the other 
parts of the world, as seen in Marx’s essay on India (Said, 1979:155). Yet a reckless 
demand for African particularism cannot be a solution to the hegemony of European 
universalism since the weakness of the latter has been its particularism (cf. Lindberg, et 
al. 2014:1). What is universal and consistent with ‘the political’, and what the subalterns 
share throughout, is the common problem of unfair distribution of power. Therefore, 
political problems have universal solutions, albeit for solving the local and particular 
problems. In other words, we need universal principles that can talk to Africa, the 
alternatives to existing hegemonic European universalism.  
Among the viable post-Marxist alternatives is Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory 
through which we can explain identity formation as a process of producing meanings that 
stabilise power relations through, not only language, but also non-linguistic actions. In 
particular, the concept of subject position, a line of discourse analysis initiated by Foucault 
provides an alternative to particularistic class identities. To Foucault (1972:55), a subject 
is not autonomous but is created through discourse. This is similar to Althusser’s 
(1971:174) structural Marxist view of ideological subject. Laclau and Mouffe (1985:115) 
eliminate economic residues from Althusser’s interpellation, arguing that subjects should 
be understood as “‘subject positions’ within a discursive structure” as discourses create 
positions for people to occupy as subjects. There are expectations on how to act in 
correspondence with the positions allocated.  
A further difference from orthodox Marxism is the fragmentation of the subject positions 
since the subject is not allocated only one position, but, rather is given many different 
subject positions by different discourses. As such, the subject is an ethnically biased voter 
at election time, a trade union member during labour unrest, a parent during school 
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meetings and mother, wife or daughter during family meetings. Therefore, the subject is 
overdetermined, meaning the subject can be positioned by several conflicting discourses. 
 
Hegemonic processes succeed when subject positions are made stable and conflict 
removed by naturalising particular discourses (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 47–9). Whereas 
orthodox Marxism aimed at uniting all subject-positions into one overarching single class-
position, post-structuralism proposes de-centring the singular class positions into a 
plurality of positions, which can be conflictual. For example, a worker might be a father at 
the same time, but also a racist and male chauvinist. (See Laclau 1977). In the case of 
Kenya, although the state is a colonial project created as an imagined nation-state (see 
Anderson, 1991:6), after the 1884 Berlin Conference, the state has evolved through 
nationalism discourses that have naturalised the Kenyanness subject position. This 
naturalised subject position considers Kenyans as belonging to the same group 
irrespective of their class differences. Hence, just like other African countries, Kenya differs 
from European nation-states, which Lindberg, et al. (2014:1), argue were “founded on a 
myth of a particular language or an ethnically homogenous people”. Like the majority of 
African countries, Kenya lacks a common founding authority but its foundations are many, 
even though ethnic group subject position, in addition to memories of European 
colonialism are key myths of the county’s political identity.  
 
Thus the formation of Kenya is through discourse not economic determination. However, 
this does not mean that reality does not exist since everything is discourse. To the contrary, 
it means both social and physical objects exist, but we understand them through a system 
of meanings. The people who lead the society in making the social world meaningful 
control power for the reason that they create our real world, especially when ‘our world’ 
acquires what Laclau (1990:60) terms objectivity that hides its social constructedness.  
 
The arbitrariness of identity as explained by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) can be understood 
based on Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistic works on how a sign can be interpreted as 
being made up of an arbitrary relationship between a signifier, the acoustic image and a 
signified, the concept the acoustic image refers to. Saussure (1983:100) gives the example 
of the word tree as the sign which identifies the arbitrary relationship between the acoustic 
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image ‘tree’ and the concept of tree even though the concept tree can have different names 
in different languages.  
 
Nonetheless, like other post-structuralists, Laclau and Mouffe, are against Saussure’s 
synchronic study of language. Instead, they argue that signs cannot be permanently fixed. 
However, the two post-structuralists retain Saussurean principles on how signs strive to 
acquire meaning through their relation to other signs. But they argue that since a 
relationship between a signifier and a signified is not permanent, it is ultimately impossible 
for a sign to have a single meaning, even though discourses attempt to fix signs into certain 
positions (cf. Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:113).  
 
When applied to identity formation, it means an individual’s identity only acquires meaning 
in relation to other individuals’ identities and these identities keep changing. It also means, 
that just like linguistic signs, there are no pre-given identities (such as primordial tribes or 
classes). Instead, identities are constructed in opposition to other identities, meaning they 
are ‘relational’ or intersubjectively constructed. In other words, if all signification is 
constructed, so are identities and the relations between them. Not only does identity come 
into existence through signification, but its construction involves its linking to other 
identities, not necessarily the economy as orthodox Marxists claim in the 
base/superstructure framework.  
 
Laclau and Mouffe use the elaborated Saussurean concepts of the sign to give meaning 
to power struggles in post-class societies as hegemonic struggles, an alternative to the 
base/superstructure perspective. Hegemonic struggles are performed through 
construction and stabilisation of nodal points — a privileged sign around which the other 
signs are ordered — by moving ‘floating signifiers’ into an unambiguous set of meanings 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:107). The floating signifier suggests lack of clear relationship 
between the signifier and the signified. For that reason, the floating signifier is able to 
signify different meanings because it is not bonded to a specific signified. In that way, a 




Consequently, the multidimensional nature of identity means it is a floating signifier created 
by a complex discourse without aiming at closure or reaching finality. It can be argued that 
discursive closure can only be achieved if alternative voices are denied access, but such 
situations are rare in society since individuals as subjects can have many subject 
positions, “neither absolute fixity nor absolute non-fixity is possible”, only partial fixations 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:110; also see Laclau,1990:44, on the impossibility of society). The 
polysemous nature of the signified, implies that the “society never manages to be identical 
to itself, as every nodal point is constituted within an intertextuality that overflows it” (Laclau 
& Mouffe, 1985:113). 
 
As stated by Laclau and Mouffe (1987:82), every social configuration acquires meaning 
through discourse. Even the meaning of a physical fact is based on the establishment of 
a system of relations with other physical facts, and “these relations are not given by the 
mere referential materiality of the objects, but are, rather, socially constructed.” 
Consequently, both dominant and non-dominant groups in Kenya are discursive since they 
acquire their positions through discourse. Whereas identity exists, Laclau and Mouffe 
(1987:82) says, “independently of any system of social relations”, people can be part of 
the dominant or non-dominant groups “only within a specific discursive configuration”.  
 
The process through which individuals are helped to recognise their identities in relation 
to others determine their positions as subjects in the society. Hence the positions are 
intersubjective. It is through such subjectivation that individuals create themselves not as  
true selves but  self-related to others — what Foucault (1997:87) calls the “techniques of 
the self,”— the procedures used to determine individual “identity, maintain it, or transform 
it in terms of a certain number of ends, through relations of self-mastery or self-
knowledge.”  
 
According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985:115), people are subjects based on their ‘subject 
positions’ within a discursive structure. It is through discourse that positions are created 
for subjects to occupy. For instance, in Kenya, discourses have created ethnic positions 
to be occupied, and in line with these positions, expectations about how to engage in 
politics. Once established through discourse, identities are further naturalised through 
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production of discourses about the identity, for example, through ethnic naming that is 
made everlasting by formal identity-reminder documents like national identification cards 
and passports, birth certificates and voter’s cards, among other ‘techniques of the self’. 
These reminders covertly make the subject internalise the allocated subject position. It 
means identity and group formation are shaped by discursive practices, consequently 
dominant or non-dominant groups are articulated discursively by linking elements that do 
not have a necessary relation to each other (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985:105).  
 
Contrary to economic dominance in classical Marxism, the ethnic identities of political 
subjects in Kenya are floating signifiers, just like the other multiple positions that Kenyans 
can take. To Laclau and Mouffe (1985:141), it is a dangerous illusion for us to think of 
identities that are floating signifiers as assured once and for all. Instead, we should be 
aware that forces that constituted their discursive conditions of emergence can be 
subverted by alternative forces. Ethnic identities are floating signifiers because discourses 
designate positions for subjects to occupy, meaning the power a group ends up having 
corresponds with the positions occupied, not the social-economic status.  
 
For instance, in Kenya, people within the same ethnic groups occupy similar positions in 
relational to elective politics, but they also occupy different positions in relation to sex, age, 
social-economic status, among others. Indeed, instead of representing the class interests 
of the people, political practices construct interests they represent (see Laclau & Mouffe, 
1985:120). In Kenya, the key interests constructed to be represented, is tribalism. 
Currently, it is around the concept of the tribe that political identities are constituted, but 
this does not mean that it is only ethnicity that can constitute identities.  
 
Furthermore, given that the “subject is fragmented” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:10, emphasis 
in original), it means the subject can take more than one, among the many positions 
created by different discourses. For instance, the subject can be an informed ‘citizen’ 
outside election time, an ethnically biased ‘voter’ during elections, an ‘employee’ in the 
workplace and a ‘mother’ or ‘wife’ in a family setup. For Laclau and Mouffe (1985:47-9) 
there is no objective logic that points to a single subject position, instead, absence of 
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conflict between subject positions is an outcome of hegemonic processes that exclude 
alternative possibilities and naturalise particular discourse.  
 
In regard to discursive formation of antagonistic groups, Laclau and Mouffe (1985:127), 
use the concepts ‘logics of equivalence’ and ‘logics of difference’ to explain how 
antagonistic groups are formed by individuals with multiple identities. This concept of 
logics is derived from Saussure’s syntagmatic equivalence and paradigmatic differences 
between signifiers. The syntagmatic relation between signs is concerned with combination 
while the paradigmatic relations involve differentiation (Saussure 1983, 121). Signs have 
a syntagmatic relation if they can be combined to form a meaningful chain of texts, but 
they can be in a paradigmatic relation when the choice of one sign excludes another. 
Considering that syntagmas are created by the linking paradigms, Saussure argues “the 
whole depends on the parts, and the parts depend on the whole” (Saussure 1983, 126). 
 
While the logic of equivalence involves the expansion of the paradigmatic pole, the logic 
of difference involves the expansion of the syntagmatic pole (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 
130). Thus the logic of equivalence creates an ‘us-them’ axis by weakening differences on 
each side of the frontier, whereas the logic of difference challenges this equivalence by 
“keeping elements distinct, separate, and autonomous” (Glynos, & Howarth, 2007:145).  
 
Through the chain of equivalence, different dominated groups weaken their internal 
differences to create an equivalential chain that is in opposition to dominant groups. The 
chain of equivalence enables the subalterns to realise that although their struggles are not 
exactly the same, they can be linked in such a way that they do not clash. The chain of 
equivalence is thus a discursive tool that brings together heterogeneous oppressed 
subjects by establishing or emphasising their opposition to a common enemy. The 
equivalential logic creates two conflicting camps: ‘Us’— ‘the people’, the underdog, the 
non-privileged, the downtrodden, against ‘Them’ — the establishment tribe, the privileged, 
those up there, the elites.  
 
Hence the chain of equivalence enables the dominated to discover a common enemy.  For 
example, to create ‘Us/the people’ in Kenya, subaltern groups drop other peculiar identities 
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like class, ethnicity (including language), and religion to create a common identity that can 
serve as a reference point in the struggle against the regime. Thus the dominated can 
organise themselves as an alliance of collectively oppressed ‘subaltern tribes’ denied 
access to government resources. The ‘Us’ group is formed on the basis of the subjects 
‘sharing a lack’, which in turn unites them as a negative commonality. In any case, 
democracy depends on a constitutive lack, which can be seen in the inclusion-exclusion 
relations that create a frontier between “us” and “them”’ (Mouffe, 2000a:43). Indeed “no 
political order can exist without some form of exclusion” (Mouffe, 1993:145). 
 
In Kenya, the negative commonality that creates groups is reflected in ethnic patterns of 
political parties and popularity of presidential candidates. In fact, results of presidential 
elections can easily be predicted based on population census. As expected, once the fight 
against that common enemy is over, though, let us say winning or losing elections, the 
chain of equivalence breaks up as differences are re-established (cf. Carpentier & 
Cammaerts, 2006:8). This happens when ethno-political parties fragment after elections 
or periods of heightened political activities. For example, political parties that have 
managed to bring together the majority of the excluded tribes breakup when they lack an 
equivalent outsider to challenge.  
 
Take the case of the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) that in 2002 defeated 
Uhuru Kenyatta, President Moi’s preferred successor, after the party brought together all 
tribes against Moi’s Kalenjin tribe. Afterwards, without a stable outsider to challenge, 
infighting led to split of NARC into three parties; Party of National Unity (PNU), led by 
President Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu; and Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) that 
accommodated non-Kikuyu who were formerly in NARC. Later, ODM split into ODM that 
accommodated non-Kikuyu and non-Kamba, and ODM-Kenya (later rebranded Wiper) 
that accommodated non-Kikuyu and non-Luo. Nevertheless, the membership of the 
parties is not exclusive to the communities mentioned, instead there are common cases 
of defectors — people who prefer to associate with ‘enemy tribes’ even when such 
association is inconsistent with the behaviour of the majority’s. This breakup due to a lack 
of an enemy outsider, has been a common occurrence since independence. For example, 
the independence movement (made up of KANU and KADU) was non-white but after 
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KADU joined KANU in 1964, there was no ‘outside other’ to fight. This led to infighting 
within KANU, forcing Oginga Odinga to resign and form the Kenya People’s Union, KPU 
(a mainly non-kikuyu party). Similarly, after pressurising the state to reintroduce multiparty 
politics, Forum for Restoration of Democracy, FORD, a non-Kalenjin party, split into 
FORD-Kenya, a non-Kikuyu party and FORD-Asili, a non-Luo party.   
 
In contrast, the ‘logic of difference’ dissolves the equivalence chain, thus preventing the 
discursive formation of the two antagonistic groups. The logic of difference disarticulates 
identity created by the logic of equivalence. Through this strategy, the regime attempts to 
break down the chains of equivalence by creating internal divisions — class, ethnic, or 
religious — to prevent construction of a common identity that can challenge the dominant 
regime. Considering that there are many subject positions that can be occupied, it means 
the multiple identities spread out people’s allegiances creating what Mouffe (1998:108) 
terms “a truly ‘agonistic pluralism’… [b]ecause where identities are multiplied, passions 
are divided.”  
 
The paradoxical formation of antagonistic groups through ‘equivalence’ and ‘difference’ 
shows that identity is always challenged by difference. When the logics of difference 
challenge attempts to achieve complete equivalence, the resultant conflict makes 
democracy an empty signifier — an ‘impossible good’ that exists because it cannot be 
perfectly achieved (Mouffe, 1994:109). We should, therefore, see the difference/identity 
paradox as the condition needed for promotion of political pluralism in multi-ethnic 
communities.  
 
It is the tension between identity and difference that makes agonistic democracy suitable 
for multi-ethnic countries like Kenya. The agonism between different groups prevents 
stabilisation of identities of the dominant groups or development of ‘dictatorship of the 
proletariat’ due to permanent unity of non-dominant groups. For example, in the agonism 
against white minority colonial government, the dominant group attempted to dissolve the 
chain of equivalence among the dominated by empowering ‘Home Guards’ to fight the 
Mau Mau. Although the insurgency was led by Kikuyu, the regime fought using 
collaborators — the auxiliary Home Guard force and other loyalists recruited from the 
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same ethnic group. The loyalism, as Branch (2007:291) found out, was “a product of the 
same intellectual debates that had spawned the Mau Mau insurgency.” The Mau Mau 
wanted access to land but the British created differences by denying the Mau Mau while 
allowing elite Africans, the Christians and government employees to access land.  
 
In fact, by forcibly recruiting through oaths, it can be argued that the Mau Mau movement 
had failed to create equivalence among the colonised and, in its place, relied on violence 
to get endorsement. In addition, unlike in South Africa where the ‘fighters’ succeeded the 
apartheid government, history has been suppressed and the role of the Mau Mau in 
Kenya’s fight for independence is yet to be recognised (see Elkins, 2000:9-10). After 
independence, the Mau Mau did not get the land they fought for, but it was the loyalists 
who inherited land and other properties formerly owned by white settlers.  
 
The second example is political alliances among tribes living around Mount Kenya. 
Although the tribes are ‘cousins’ due to the mutual intelligibility of their languages, even 
having once come together to form the Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association (GEMA), the unity 
of the ethnic groups has not been permanent as it would have been if the tribalism was 
primordial. On the contrary, the GEMA tribes often defected to support non-Kikuyus. For 
example, the Embu supported Moi’s Kalenjin-dominated government during the second 
wave of multiparty politics (1992-2001).  
 
Based on the above examples, it can be argued that the logics of equivalence and 
difference describe the process through which frontiers between the dominant and the 
dominated are “constructed, stabilised, strengthened, or weakened” (Glynos & Howarth, 
2007:144). Nevertheless, the discursive nature of the identity does not mean that identity 
is mere discourse and it does not have external existence. Contrarily, it means ethnic 
identities exist ‘external to thought’ but we can only access them through discourse. Just 
like:  
...a stone does exist independently of social classification systems, 
but whether it is understood as a projectile or a work of art depends 




Based on Laclau and Mouffe’s explanation, primordial views of ethnicity are totally 
superimposed by the social. It is the social that enables us make meaning of ethnicity. For 
this reason, whether or not extreme speech is democracy-enhancing depends on how 
dominant and non-dominant groups use it to challenge or perpetuate the unequal 
distribution of power. From this perspective, it is clear that the meaning of extreme speech 
in social media is fixed through discourse that excludes other meanings. As stated by 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985:112), “any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate 
the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre”. Extreme 
speech entails a structured totality resulting from articulatory practices that initiate a 
hegemonic struggle. However, these hegemonic discourses appear so natural that people 
fail to see that they are the result of hegemonic practices; instead they see them as 
objective and commonsensical. Thus: 
What is at a given moment accepted as the “natural order”, jointly 
with the common sense that accompanies it, is the result of 
sedimented hegemonic practices (Mouffe, 2008:4). 
 
Nevertheless, because no discourse can permanently fix meanings, the field of discursivity 
makes possible the articulation of multiple discourses. In spite of objectivity closing the 
discursive field, this closure is not permanent because power is so dispersed that no single 
group continuously closes the discursive field. Every hegemonic order is susceptible to 
being challenged by counter-hegemonic practices which attempt to disarticulate it in order 
to install another form of hegemony (Mouffe, 2008: 4).  
 
The following section is a critical reading of Žižek’s (1993:141) concept of ‘tolerance as 
ideology’ to describe how elites in Kenya culturalise incivility to tame ‘the political’ by 
making it a cultural issue of intolerance. Through culturalisation of politics, civility hides 
ideology by attempting the impossible: removing politics from politics itself. As explained 
in the previous sections, Kenya has both dominant and ersatz dominant groups while 
marginalisation is as material as it is symbolic. Therefore, incivility against the dominant 
group is political rather than a cultural problem. Yet culturalisation has been used to 
elevate culture into a dominant framework for analysing the political problems of injustice, 
inequality, marginalisation, violence, distribution of power among other forms of political 
practices (see Mamdani, 2004:23), a process that can be equated to removing politics 
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from politics itself by converting political problems into cultural problems. This hegemonic 
operation can be compared to liturgical transubstantiation, but in this case not of bread 
and wine into the body and blood, but of politics into culture. Successful culturalisation 
would make what is clearly politics be viewed as the cultural problem of intolerance. 
2.3.3. Culturalisation: the Depoliticization of Politics. 
Considering the inherent conflict in politics, demands for civility in social media political 
discourses are strategies towards depoliticising politics by privileging one side of the binary 
to make it look like incivility is a cultural problem of intolerance rather than symbolic of 
political struggles against inequality, exploitation and injustice—what Mouffe would call 
‘the political’ problem. This demand for tolerance is what I term hegemonic strategies for 
displacing politics from politics itself. To put it differently, by privileging one side in a binary 
opposition of acceptable/unacceptable speech, demands for civility are hegemonic orders 
that make incivility to be perceived as a problem of intolerance rather than normal power 
struggles that are integral to politics.  
 
Depoliticisation of politics is not a recent phenomenon, in fact Marx’s own utopian grand 
narratives were a proposal for a dystopian democracy since they implied achievement of 
a finality, the centralised control system, rather than a free society. Many contemporary 
forms of depoliticisation exclud the spaces of contestation by proposing a framework of 
decision-making that conceals, instead of questioning or disrupting the existing power 
structure. Through depoliticization, politics is replaced with technocratic mechanisms and 
consensual procedures, for example, ‘the people’— as a potentially disruptive political 
collective — is replaced by the population whose problems are seen as technical issues 
that can be solved by experts (Japhy & Swyngedouw, 2014:6; Mouffe, 2005:10).  
 
Through culturalisation, incivility as a part of power struggles has been cut off from ‘the 
political’ and transubstantiated into a separate sphere of culture. This transubstantiated is 
similar to the metaphoric relations of substitution through which one thing is called another. 
If metaphorical substitution succeeds, the hegemonic transubstantiation of politics into 
cultural problem of intolerance makes the latter a catachresis as it becomes a figural term 
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without a literal one (see Laclau, 2005b:71). Different from metaphors that substitute by 
describing one thing as another, catachresis transfers “terms from one place to 
another…when no proper word exists” (Parker, 1990:60). Through transubstantiation, 
culturalisation of politics becomes a misapplication of politics as political differences are 
termed problems of intolerance and therefore repressed intead of being sublimated. The 
immediate outcome of the culturalisation of politics has been to naturalise and neutralise 
political differences into cultural differences, converting the differences into some given 
that cannot be overcome but should be tolerated (see Žižek, 1993:141). This to Laclau 
(1990:160) is like depoliticization through systematic absorption of political struggles by 
social struggles. As explained by Brown (2006:89): 
The cultivation of tolerance as a political end implicitly constitutes a 
rejection of politics as a domain in which conflict can be productively 
articulated and addressed, a domain in which citizens can be 
transformed by their participation.  
 
Due to culturalisation of politics, we tend to assume that civility in social media is an 
innocent tolerance practice that guarantees respect, yet hidden within civility are efforts to 
displace politics to the sphere of culture. Without a doubt, our knowledge of civility is socio-
culturally constructed, yet undisputed and taken-for-granted, what Van Dijk (1998:111) 
terms “ideologically based ‘scientific facts’” that support interests of dominant groups. Non-
dominant ideologies expressed through incivility, some form of ‘shouting at power’, are 
condemned by dominant groups that claim this category of extreme speech is part of the 
expression of intolerance1.  
                                                          
1 Since civility is linked to tolerance (see Brown, 2006:11), this study links incivility to intolerance. 
To tolerate is to acknowledge others’ autonomy by refraining from disapproving their wrongs and 
allowing them to pass without condemnation or reproach, while to be civil is not based on the value 
of autonomy but on claims about how others’ behaviour affect our well-being (Owens, 2015:1).  
The doctrine of civility guides us on how to appropriately express ourselves towards others while 
the doctrine of tolerance tells us when it is (in)appropriate to express disapproval, where 
disapproval is blame which counts (emphasis in original, ibid p.7) — it is only expression of blame 
that counts that constitutes injury to the person blamed. This study associates incivility with 
intolerance, arguing that the two are forms of inappropriate expression either towards others or in 
disapproval of others. However, even as it links them, the study attempts to turn incivility and 
intolerance on their heads by explaining how they can promote instead of threatening democracy. 
With this clarification, the terms civility/tolerance and incivility/intolerance will often be used 




Therefore, civility is part of dominant ideologies, albeit presented as non-ideologies, in any 
case, the idea of post-ideology or end of ideology is an ideological idea par excellence 
(Žižek, 1989: xxiv). Moreover, even though it was speculated that the fall of the ‘Iron 
Curtain’ would initiate the end of ideology, what came out of it was the end of the classic 
concept of ideology as ‘false consciousness’, a form of ideology with clear hard 
boundaries. The triumph of liberal democracy after the fall of the Iron Curtain has seen 
ideological struggles shift from political parties to individual participation, protest and other 
forms of individualised opposition, albeit more episodic than the Left-Right ideologies of 
the past. This should not be mistaken to mean the emergence of a post-ideological or non-
ideological politics as was wrongly predicted by Fukuyama’s (1992:xi) claim that because 
liberal democracy was flawless, it had conquered rival ideologies and we should not expect 
any further “ideological evolution” after the “end of history.” What we currently have is 
reincarnated ideologies which cannot be easily fitted within the framework of the traditional 
ideologies of Left and Right, even though the Left-Right antagonism remains an unfinished 
project.  
 
Using the new culturalisation ideologies, dominant groups are attempting to tame conflict 
in politics with the culture of tolerance. Thus, politics has purportedly been moved away 
from the traditional political struggles to struggles over culture. This means that politics is 
no longer politics but culture. In The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World 
Order, Huntington (1993:29-30) claims after the end of the Cold War, the fundamental 
source of conflict is not ideological or economic but cultural conflicts “between the West 
and non-Western civilisations”. To him politics is no longer a clash of ideologies, but a 
clash of civilisations since the “iron curtain” has been replaced by “a velvet curtain of 
culture”.  This is what Mamdani (2004:23) calls culturalisation of politics, a strategy used 
by dominant groups to construct politics as a consequence of the tangible essence of 
culture.  
 
It is for the above reasons that I claim culturalisation of politics creates a post-political 
condition. Transubstantiation politics into culture has made radical democracy in Kenya to 
like it emanates from essentialised ethnic differences, when on the contrary, ethnic 
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differences are socially constructed, even though with some residues of historical 
materialism.  
 
Civility has been invoked as part of depoliticisation tools, a strategy for managing political 
struggles by making them look non-political. Through the depoliticisation strategy, the 
dominant groups make it look as if they are cultured and civil, while blaming the subalterns 
for impeding democracy through their barbarism and uncivil culture.    
 
Elites have attempted to remove politics from democracy by using the culture of civility to 
spread tolerance as a way of avoiding political conflicts, yet political struggles are 
inherently conflictual. To the elites, the culture of civility is the solution to problems that 
cause intolerance, yet intolerance is a political not a cultural problem. Despite the prospect 
of civility being a superficial solution to intolerance, Žižek (2008:660) argues that 
intolerance is a political problem caused by inequality, exploitation and injustice, therefore 
it requires a direct political solution and not superficial tolerance.  
 
Consequently, incivility is a strategy for emancipation, like other political struggles on a 
continuum, from non-violent protests to armed struggles. But just like armed struggles, 
incivility has been delegitimised through the culturalisation of politics, an ideology that has 
naturalised and neutralised politics into cultural differences that appear as if they cannot 
be overcome but should instead be tolerated. Instead of providing direct political solutions, 
tolerance has become what Žižek (2008:660) calls the “post-political ersatz” presented as 
a genuine answer to the question of intolerance. He asks:  
Why are so many problems today perceived as problems of 
intolerance, rather than as problems of inequality, exploitation or 
injustice? Why is the proposed remedy tolerance, rather than 
emancipation, political struggle, even armed struggle? The 
immediate answer lies in the liberal multiculturalist’s basic 
ideological operation: the ‘culturalisation of politics.’ Political 
differences—differences conditioned by political inequality or 
economic exploitation—are naturalised and neutralised into ‘cultural’ 
differences, that is into different ‘ways of life’ which are given, 
something that cannot be overcome. They can only be ‘tolerated.’ 




Depoliticisation of politics through tolerance, Brown (2006:89) argues, has been achieved 
through “promulgation of tolerance” and the rejection of the idea of politics as a field of 
struggles, which can productively transform conflict through citizen’s participation. But 
even with this promulgation of tolerance, it is only dominant forms of civility that are 
privileged, this produces what Brown (2006:196) terms intolerance that denies individuals 
of other cultures freedom to choose from their cultures which are thought to be barbaric, 
while allowing individuals from the dominant cultures to choose from what is equally 
‘barbaric’. For instance, the proposed solutions to ethnic conflicts in Kenya seem to be 
nonmaterial solutions, with civility in form of tolerance being one of them. Take the case 
of “discrimination” as defined under Sections 3 and 4 of the National Cohesion and 
Integration Act, 2008. The law criminalises discrimination that is ordinarily prejudice, rather 
than discrimination emanating from unequal resource-distribution. This is despite findings 
by judicial commissions indicating that ethnic violence originates from competition over 
power to distribute political and economic resources, not mere prejudice between 
members of different groups. If unfair distribution of resources, what Mbembe (1992:4) 
terms the “grotesque and the obscene” through which state power dramatizes its own 
magnificence, is to be seen as a form of incivility, albeit hidden by the practices of 
domination, then to be civil towards such hegemonic incivility is to support (tolerate) the 
incivility.   
 
In another case, it was through the “our turn to eat” philosophy that President Kibaki’s 
government left Kenya divided into what Jessop (1990) would call a ‘two-nation’ rather 
than ‘one nation’ hegemonic project. This division was reflected in the peaking of incivility 
in political discourses prior to and after the 2007 election campaigns and resultant post-
election violence. Although elections provided the spark for escalation of incivility and 
ignition of violence, it is an oversimplification to remove politics from incivility and see the 
2008 (post)election violence in Kenya as a cultural problem. Several authors warned that 
we should not overlook underlying precipitating political factors like historical grievances 
over resources (land), deliberate weakening of government institutions (like the judiciary), 
and the gradual loss of the state’s monopoly of legitimate force, allowing the large-scale 
proliferation of militias and gangs, which were in turn used and mobilised by politicians in 
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their pursuit of electoral victory (see Branch & Cheeseman 2008; Githinji & Holmquist, 
2008; Muller, 2008; and Smedt, 2009). 
 
For the above reasons, instead of tolerance through civility, I argue, we should transform 
political conflicts that cause incivility. Transformation of conflicts in multi-ethnic developing 
nations, Sriskandarajah (2005:64) argues, succeeded in Malaysia, Mauritius and Trinidad 
because real and perceived inequalities were resolved by adopting suitable “distributional 
struggles between constituent ethnic groups” to ensure these countries’ rapid economic 
development facilitated ethnic accommodation and creation of “one nation” hegemonic 
project.2 Contrarily, Kenya has since independence adopted a narrow economistic “two 
nations” hegemonic project following the failure of its first political economy statement: 
African socialism and its application to planning in Kenya, number 10 of 1965, a policy 
framework that aimed at developing a “one nation” hegemonic project. The policy 
framework was a plan for Kenya to manage its broader political economy by solving real 
and perceived ethnic inequalities to create a “one nation” project.   
 
Years later, the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (2008:220) identified 
marginalisation and underdevelopment of some regions by successive governments since 
independence as the cause of deep-rooted feelings that flamed the 2007/08 (post)election 
violence. The Commission argues the “issue of land at the Coast[al regions of Kenya] has 
specially been problematic” deemed a ticking time bomb. The situation at the Coast, the 
commission found out, was complicated by competition for resources among different 
ethnic groups, with some ‘migrant’ groups seen as benefiting at the expense of the 
                                                          
2 The idea of “one-nation” or “two nations” hegemonic project was developed by Jessop 
(1990:211-212), on inspiration of Gramsci’s ideas on hegemonic political struggles. A “one 
nation” project is created by expansive, welfare-oriented policy aimed at winning support 
of the entire population (like Tanzania under Julius Nyerere). While a “two nations” project 
can either be deliberate (like Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta and successive presidents, see 
Republic of Kenya, 1965:46) or follow periods of economic crises when the government 
supports important sectors of the population with the aim of passing the costs of the project 
to other sectors, sometimes requiring repression of the ‘other nation’ in the process of 




indigenous people. Under these circumstances it is clear that civility cannot solve the 
problem of ethnic divisions that are rooted marginalisation. This is to say, instead of solving 
the political problem of margination, civility as tolerance is used to displace politics from 
political struggles.  
 
The following chapter resumes the discussion of the paradox of incivility using Bakhtin’s 
model of mediaeval carnivalesque. From this perspective, I argue that extreme speech in 
social media can be a form of art activism similar to folk humour that was used to break 







Utani as a return of the carnivalesque 
…elements of the old ritual of fraternization were preserved in the 
carnival and were given a deeper meaning. Some of these elements 
have entered modern life but have entirely lost their primitive 
connotation.       
Bakhtin (1984:16).  
 
Whether by catastrophe or design, what is needed…is a “future 
primitive” that restores the nature of humans and the nature of the 
lifeworld simultaneously…. only a return to primitive culture can 
restore authentic human dignity. 
Michael Becker (2012: x).  
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter continues arguments against the unquestioned assumptions about the 
destructiveness of extreme speech by describing social media as space for activist art. 
Like it was explained by Mouffe (2013:89), since ‘common sense’ is formed, diffused and 
reproduced through cultural and artistic practices, confrontation between hegemonic 
forces also happens in a multiplicity of places instead of being limited to traditional political 
institutions. Indeed, in addition to traditional political spaces, hegemony projects are 
concealed in public spaces that do not reflect their hegemonic characteristics. Therefore, 
what political theorists need to do, as Mouffe (2008:10) says, is to find out how art activism 
is fomenting dissensus and making “visible what the dominant consensus tends to obscure 
and obliterate.”  
 
Contrary to the hate speech grand narrative, the main thesis in this chapter is that incivility 
in its artic forms subverts dominant forces in a democratic society by evening out 
hierarchies created by rational consensus. While remaining aware of the dangers of hate 
speech, democratic politics should find ways of converting us/them relation into forms 
compatible with pluralistic order (Mouffe, 2005:111). Against the civil communication 
tradition that advocates for building a Habermasian public sphere that is not entangled 
with power, this chapter advances an alternative proposal on how the contemporary world 
70 
 
resembles Medieval Age when seasons of extreme speech allowed a breakdown of the 
power hierarchy. To this concern, I use Bakhtin’s concept of the carnivalesque to describe 
how current rancorous communication is acknowledgement that antagonism is 
ineradicable from politics. Thus, incivility in social media is a challenge to the liberal 
democracy model that has failed to account for the productive role of conflict that is 
inherent in politics. Instead of deliberative democracy that attempts to eliminate power 
from politics, the productive nature of extreme speech, from the carnivalesque perspective, 
places power at the centre of politics.  
 
The insults and curses common in social media embody, on one hand, what people fear 
— the violence related to political events — and on the other hand, some primitivistic 
political practices thought to have disappeared with the coming of modernity. Considering 
that conflict is inherent in politics, the strategies used by primitive societies to solve these 
conflicts can be viewed as the untainted ways of solving our political antagonisms since 
ancient days. Without a doubt, primitive societies live a more uncontaminated lifestyle than 
we do. To this concern, this work utilises Bakhtin’s concept of the carnivalesque, a concept 
developed through interpretation of the works of Rabelais on the use of the primitive 
culture of folk humour to resist established power. Social media may have just given us an 
opportunity to go back to how we used to behave.   
 
However, by utilising Bakhtin’s carnivalesque, this study does not totally advocate 
anarcho-primitivism (see Zerzan, 2012), considering the impossibility of returning to 
primitive existence. Rather, it suggests a primitive solution to what Mouffe (2013) says, 
following Schmitt (1927), is the permanent existence of antagonism in modern politics. In 
fact, primitivists, from the perspective of Bakhtinian carnivalesque, would face the dilemma 
of adapting to a non-consensual democracy, or infusing liberal democracy with jocular 
extreme speech made possible by social media, while at the same time rejecting the 
technological advancements that have given rise to this new media.  
 
With a Bakhtinian background, but outside anarcho-primitivism, I use this chapter to 
describe the potential of incivility to disrupt established power structures through 
conversations located between extreme speech and the jocular. In other words, this 
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chapter explains the productivities of negativity from the perspective of non-seriousness 
of incivility, following Bakhtin’s concept of folk humour. I argue that Bakhtin’s idea of the 
carnivalesque can be utilised to build a non-consensual notion of democracy as contended 
by Chantal Mouffe. With the productivities of the carnivalesque, democracy is practiced as 
a paradoxical dialogue that resists consensus, but at the same time promotes better 
interaction by evening out participants’ hierarchies in the political struggle (see, 
Koczanowicz, 2011:554). 
 
After outlining Bakhtin’s concept and its relevance in explaining how social media is 
advancing non-consensus democracy, I link this concept to utani, the folk culture of joking 
relationships common in East Africa. Utani is a contemporary folk humour practice that is 
similar to the Bakhtinian concept of carnivalesque as it allows unrestricted insulting among 
people in the utani relationship. However, I remain aware of the possibility of the regime 
appropriating transgressive humour, and to avoid mere reversal of the single truth 
advocated by the hate speech grand narrative, the last section of this chapter discusses 
how the carnivalesque can be used to bolster existing hegemonies, a process Achille 
Mbembe baptised ‘mutual zombification’. 
 
3.2. Bakhtinian Approach to Incivility in Social Media  
 
In Rabelais and His World, Mikhail Bakhtin gives a genealogical account of how folk 
humour was transformed since the Renaissance (Bakhtin, 1984). He argues that folk 
humour enjoyed a positive corporeal and collective significance but was over time 
marginalised with the reorganisation of cultural practices that placed emphasis on the 
privatised, eliminating carnival practices that were enacted within the public sphere. The 
pre-modem carnival (Bakhtin, 1981) utilised rants and madness in folk humour to subvert 
existing power structures by vilifying, degrading and ridiculing the most respected. The 
carnival played an important role of enabling ordinary people to inhabit a dual world – one 
with “serious official, ecclesiastical, feudal and political” institutions and on the other “a 
second life outside officialdom, which offered a ‘completely different, nonofficial, extra—
ecclesiastical and extrapolitical” view of life (Bakhtin, 1984:6). This Bakhtinian thesis on 
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the encounter between official, serious side, consisting of the ruling elites and the unofficial 
under-belly practices of the carnival, provides us with a framework from which to situate 
incivility in social media today. 
 
It is as if, just like the carnival, incivility in social media is inverting official values, which as 
Lachmann, Eshelman, and Davis (1988:118) explain, envisions a “utopian world in which 
anti-hierarchism, relativity of values, questioning of authority, openness, joyous anarchy, 
and the ridiculing of all dogmas hold sway, a world in which syncretism and a myriad of 
differing perspectives are permitted.” 
 
Bakhtin divided folk humour into three distinct forms: ritual spectacles (carnival pageants 
and comic shows of the marketplace); comic verbal compositions (parodies both oral and 
written); and various genres of billingsgate — curses, oaths, and popular blazons (see 
Bakhtin, 1984:5). Although the three forms are interwoven, the concept of ritual spectacles 
is not literally applicable to extreme speech in social media. Different from Bakhtin’s 
carnival that had verbatim ritual spectacle, social media is an opportunity for virtual ritual 
spectacles even though it has acted as a site for organising real (offline) ritual spectacles. 
The second and third categories of folk humour have verbatim equivalents of extreme 
speech in social media. It is in these two categories, the comic verbal compositions and 
genres of billingsgate, that the division between official and individualised nonofficial folk 
humour and abuses become more prominent. At the literal level, the first category, the 
ritual spectacle, is more prevalent in public events than extreme speech in social media. 
Therefore, this study will be concerned with the virtual ritual spectacle than public 
performances.  
 
Through ritual spectacles, comic verbal compositions and billingsgate, the carnival, as well 
as similar events like the ‘feast of fools’, the ‘feast of the ass’ or the traditional ‘Easter 
laughter’ temporarily suspended social hierarchies of everyday life by overturning the 
officialdom solemnities, pieties and etiquette, creating a ‘world-upside down’ in which ‘the 
jester was proclaimed king, a clownish abbot, bishop or archbishop was elected at the 
‘feast of fools’, and in the churches directly under the Pope’s jurisdiction a mock pontiff 




To temporarily allow subversion of the established order, tradition sanctified and the 
church tolerated parodical liturgies, the so-called parodia sacra, or “sacred parody”, such 
as “The Liturgy of the Drunkards,” “The Liturgy of the Gamblers”, parodies of the Lord’s 
Prayer, litanies, hymns, psalms, and even gospel sayings (Bakhtin, 1984:14). These were 
indeed forms of extreme speech as they degraded what was sacred.  
 
Furthermore, during the carnivore, “a special form of free and familiar contact reigned 
among people who were usually divided by the barriers of caste, property, profession, and 
age. Since the hierarchical background and caste divisions of the medieval social order 
were exceptionally strong, such free, familiar contacts were deeply felt and formed an 
essential element of the carnival spirit. People were, so to speak, reborn for new, purely 
human relations. These truly human relations were not only a fruit of imagination or 
abstract thought; they were experienced. 
 
The Bakhtinian carnival represents a utopian political atmosphere that allows the 
oppressed to contest and momentarily displace the established order. The carnival, 
Bakhtin (1984:10) writes, is “celebrated temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and 
from the established order [through]…suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms 
and prohibitions.” The liberation is achieved through demystification of values that 
establish the prevailing order by countering them with transgressive obscenities. The 
anarchic carnival is, therefore, an oppositional culture which operates, Jones (2002:26) 
argues, at the interface of the frictions and periodic collisions between official and popular 
discourses acting as “the privileged arm of the weak and dispossessed” (Stam, 1989:227).  
 
Extreme speech in social media is equivalent to Bakhtin’s understanding of the 
carnivalesque as it involves a temporary suspension of order with reversals of hierarchy, 
equality and mass participation that deprivileges and contests the authorities. As Bakhtin 
(1981:7) argues, in the carnival, 
…there is no other life outside it. During carnival time life is subject only to its 
laws, that is, the laws of its own freedom 
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Thus, the transgressive qualities and grotesqueness of offensive speech in social media 
is reminiscent of Bakhtin’s countercultures that are equivalent to agonism (see Mouffe, 
1993). Through the current social media carnivalesque, audiences can unmask and 
subvert existing hegemonies through indecent expressions. Therefore, rather than looking 
at online vitriol as hate speech, we can see it as tools used to turn the dominant upside 
down by speaking the unspeakable. Such speech is an asset to non-consensual 
democracy advocated by Chantal Mouffe.  
In today’s dissensus politics, the concept of the carnivalesque can be useful in interpreting 
transgressive practices in social media. The carnivalesque here constitutes the struggles 
against established order and spaces for venting criticism. In this sense, transgressive 
content in social media creates its own world in a struggle against the official world.  
 
Therefore, extreme speech in social media is equivalent to Bakhtinian carnivalesque as it 
creates an alternative world using outrageous speech. Extreme speech has a striking 
resemblance with Bakhtinian carnivalesque because the speech is similar to “marketplace 
speech and gesture, frank and free, permitting no distance between those who came in 
contact with each other and liberating them from norms of etiquette and decency imposed 
at other times” (Bakhtin, 1984:10). Like Bakhtin’s carnival, social media “combines the 
sacred with the profane, the lofty with the low, the great with the insignificant, and the wise 
with the stupid” (Bakhtin, 1984:123).  
 
Through obscenities, the carnivalesque inverts the elite’s ‘backstage’ by allowing the weak 
and dispossessed to talk freely in the otherwise restricted world order. Just like Goffman’s 
(1956:68) stage performance concept, what actors perform in the backstage contradict 
their frontstage performance. It is in the backstage that actors do what they would not want 
the public to see. However, as explained by Hjarvard (2013:32), illegitimate forms of 
communication such as ridicule, gossip, and scolding can assume new forms when 
performed in the frontstage. Thus, it can be argued that social media has removed the 





Hjarvard (2013:32) gives the example of users of interactive media making “insidious 
forms of ridicule, and even outright bullying, via websites, text messages, and camera 
telephones” due to the de-linking of interaction that has complicated relations between the 
“stage” and “backstage”. This has resulted in the emergence of norms that would 
otherwise be “perceived as illegitimate and, possibly, even gross violations of others’ 
integrity, if they were applied in a face-to-face situation.” Many of the current social media 
incivilities would not be made openly in face-to-face encounters but they are being spread 
because social media is like Goffman’s “backstage”.  Unlike the mainstream news that is 
edited by professional journalists, social media user-generated content goes through 
limited gatekeeping if any, raising the possibility of the content being more uncivil. The 
gates in the original concept by White (1950) have been opened because journalists are 
no longer solely in control of what is worthy of passing on to the community. In social 
media, the audience is partly the content producer and plays a major role in opening the 
gates. This environment is what I call the return of the carnivalesque, even though it is a 
mediated form of carnivalesque. 
 
Therefore, incivility in social media, just like the carnivalesque, is enabling people to 
unmask the sacred and subvert existing power structures through indecent words and 
expressions provided by the “atmosphere of freedom, frankness and familiarity” (Bakhtin, 
1984, 15–16). Although the Bakhtinian idea of the carnivalesque no longer exists, social 
media is able to provide a similar atmosphere of societal transgression that can use hostile 
speech to reveal an alternative world order. Social media undoubtedly provides an 
environment that encourages offensive content in a manner similar to transgressive 
speech in Bakhtin’s carnivalesque. 
 
The following section relates Bakhtin’s concept of carnivalesque to the joking relationship 
in Africa. While the carnival happened in mediaeval Europe, joking relationships are an 
equivalent practice that subverts established hierarchies through carnival-like speech.  
3.3. Utani Culture 
Through the emic concept Utani, this study moves away from the common assumptions 
on hatred in regulatory debates, preferring to follow Bakhtin and locate traditions of joking 
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relationships found in some East African ethnic groups within the continuum of extreme 
speech. Inspired by Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of transgressive speech, the study interprets 
joking relationships as speech that is important in subverting the dominant ideologies 
“through play, ridicule, and seeming obscenity” (Bakhtin, 1984:273). 
Although Bakhtin's theory provides a historicised account of how the culture of folk humour 
temporarily breaks hierarchy, an Utani relationship is an equivalent practice that 
permanently liberates folks from the established order. As such, Africa has significant 
continuities with the pre-modern carnivalesque. Furthermore, the existence of joking 
relationships in Africa is a sign that the carnival spirit is inherent in humans and that on the 
continuum of extreme speech in social media, there is a point where offence does not 
offend but expands the ingrained carnival spirit.  
As indicated earlier, the Swahili term utani is used in this study to describe joking relations 
between persons (called watani or singular mtani). Words similar to utani are used Africa 
in reference to joking partners in a reciprocal joking relationship, even though jocularity is 
only one aspect of these relationships (see Beidelman, 1966:357). While each ethnic 
group with such joking relationships has a unique term used in reference to this power 
subverting jocular speech, I chose the Swahili word utani because the language is the 
most widely spoken local language in eastern Africa and captures a regional rather than a 
particular ethnic community practice.  
Moreover, extreme speech in social media resembles the notion of the joking relationship, 
practices that permit a variety of jokes, from verbal teasing to horseplay, or even obscenity 
— a relationship Radcliffe-Brown (1940:196), calls ‘permitted disrespect’. Joking 
relationships, Radcliffe argues, are a combination of friendliness and antagonism as the 
behaviour can arouse hostility if taken seriously but becomes friendly when taken lightly. 
Thus, a joking relationship is friendship bonding that functions through pretence of hostility.   
As explained by Radcliffe-Brown (1940:198), conflicts are solved by maintaining “complete 
avoidance” of any social contacts or taking no offence at insult, tolerating mutual 
disrespect through “playful antagonism of teasing”. Tolerance of mutual disrespect is the 
conflict resolution approach that is in tandem with conflictual democracy. Complete 
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avoidance or giving extreme respect to others to avoid conflicts is a strategy that cannot 
reinvigorate democracy since people are given no other option apart from keeping away 
from potential conflict. In clear difference, taking no offence at insults and tolerating mutual 
disrespect creates a speech environment that is in tandem with agonistic democracy. In 
fact, Heald (1990:382) brings to mind how joking relationships originated from a prior state 
of hostility, while Smith (2004:157) argues that joking relationships are used to resolve the 
“tension between ethnocentrism and tolerance, hierarchy and conflict, which lies at the 
core of the encounter with the ‘other‘” in Africa. Instead of keeping off conflict, joking 
relationships teach people to take no offence at insults, which in turn acts as jocular 
confirmation of otherness and establishment of closeness.  
For example, among the Gisu of eastern Uganda, utani was a mechanism for finishing 
feuds within groups that had weak kinship relations but living in close proximity. As 
explained by Heald (1990:382): 
Abuse may run from relatively innocuous remarks over personal appearance 
('big head', 'shrivelled body', 'unkempt hair' and the like) to more direct 
accusations of witchcraft and the types of animal and sexual obscenities which 
would in other circumstances undoubtedly precipitate fighting…many such 
exchanges are taken in apparent good heart and often accompanied by 
considerable jocularity, they can also be 'played for real'. In such cases, for the 
unsuspecting observer, they may be indistinguishable from a real conflict.  
In addition to verbal abuses, utani or bukulo among the Gisu includes symbolic thefts that 
begin with small items but can progress to goods of higher value, culminating in snatching 
a cow from each other. To the Gisu, tolerating such progressive snatching of property is a 
way of testing the strength of the bond between people in a joking friendship (cf. Heald, 
1990:382). The argument by Heald is like Bakhtin’s view of how the carnivalesque was 
used to solve conflict through fraternisation. Bakhtin (1984:16) says,  
…when two persons establish friendly relations, the form of their verbal 
intercourse also changes abruptly; they address each other informally, abusive 
words are used affectionately, and mutual mockery is permitted. (In formal 
intercourse only a third person can be mocked.) The two friends may pat each 
other on the shoulder and even on the belly (a typical carnivalesque gesture). 
Verbal etiquette and discipline are relaxed and indecent words and expressions 




Although anthropologists have recorded various forms of utani culture between 
family members, such as those that arise out of marriage, it is the joking relationships 
between clans or tribes that can easily reproduce Bakhtin’s carnival. The relations 
between clans is not familial and as Radcliffe-Brown (1940:199) says, it is an alliance 
of friendliness “combined with an appearance of hostility”. While family utani falls 
within the private sphere, inter-clan or tribe utani is definitely part of the public sphere. 
Indeed, the jocular relationships are between a clan and its outsiders, a relation that 
“involves possible or actual hostility” (ibid, 200). Just like Bakhtin’s carnivalesque in 
mediaeval Europe, an utani relation is an alliance between potential enemies, an 
alliance that creates stability by converting antagonism into what Chantal Mouffe 
(1993) calls agonism. As will be explained in the theory part of this dissertation, 
agonism emphasises the positive aspects of political conflict since conflict 
permanently exists in politics.  
 
Despite Bakhtin’s warning that we should not use our “limited and reduced aesthetic 
stereotypes of modern times” to understand the art of the past ages in Rabelais 
works, this study attempts to relate the carnivalesque to joking relationships common 
in African tribal societies. Bakhtin (1984:224) cautions that it would be especially 
inadmissible to modernise Rabelais' images by attempting to fit them to the 
differentiated. However, on this caution, Bakhtin was addressing Europe where the 
primitive had been replaced by the modern. Africa has many practices that exist 
outside the primitive/modernity binary. For instance, unlike the creative events that 
are mere spectacle, such as the Mardi Gras parade, that separates participants and 
spectators (see Bakhtin, 1984), joking relations are part of the art of the past ages 
that survived modernism. Therefore, joking relationships in Africa can be taken as 
indigenous ways of solving the tensions caused by hierarchies in modern society.  
 
Furthermore, rather than see the utani relationship in social media as part of the private 
sphere, we need to deconstruct this dichotomisation to see the private sphere as a place 
for political practices as well. Indeed, conventional media had assigned subalterns the 
private sphere and made them invisible, but social media has dissolved the boundaries 
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between private and public spheres to reassign the subaltern to the public sphere. As 
explained by Haraway (1985:48), traditional dichotomies of public/private sphere are 
dissolved by new communication and information technologies. It is argued that social 
media has made the binary oppositions between public and private spheres fluid and 
ambivalent.  
The following section is a description of social media as utani-carnivalesque, a form of 
reawakened primitive practice of politics in modern society.  
3.4. Incivility as Utani-Carnivalesque?  
As has been discussed above, extreme speech in social media is similar to the 
performance of utani, a folk culture reminiscent of medieval carnivalesque. From a 
carnivalesque perspective, extreme speech in social media eludes binary classifications 
within the discourse of allowable speech but can be grouped together with other speeches 
that Radcliffe-Brown (1940) says, allows mutual disrespect through playful antagonism of 
teasing as seen in joking relationships. However, unlike utani, the carnival has limitations 
arising from its confinement to a specific time of the year and space limits. Social media 
carnival is not constrained by time as users can exchange ideas and opinions 
continuously. Therefore, the term utani-carnivalesque is used to address how 
contemporary social media has revived carnival-like practices that are similar to joking 
relationships since they are permanent unlike the classic Bakhtian carnivalesque. 
Although Bakhtinian carnivalesque encouraged transgressive mass participation in public 
events, utani is more equivalent to a never-ending ritual theatre than organised 
performances. People in an utani relationship are expected to be tolerant to rude jokes on 
all occasions. 
 
Analogous to the mediaeval carnival and utani relationships, extreme speech in social 
media is taken as performative folk humour; the use of, in a broad sense, jokes, sarcasm, 
irony and mockery to ‘do things with words’, in the Austinian sense (see Austin, 1962). 
Although Bakhtin gives a historicised account of the culture of folk humour, social media 
has characteristics that make it the 21st-century reincarnation of carnivalesque— speech 
that “brings together, unifies, weds, and combines the sacred with the profane, the lofty 
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with the low, the great with the insignificant, and the wise with the stupid” (Bakhtin, 1984, 
123).  
 
Despite the dominance of the hate speech narrative, extreme speech in social media 
should not be confined to fit into the dichotomy of acceptable/unacceptable speech, as 
this dichotomy ignores the permanent entanglement of speech with power. For example, 
when subalterns retweet the President of Kenya with ridiculous comments, the power 
entanglement of such comments moves the tweet more to the domain of utani than hate 
speech. In democracies, ridiculous comments targeting people in power demand that such 
people take no offence, rather than expecting what Radcliffe-Brown (1940:198) calls 
“complete avoidance” which is suitable in an authoritarian environment. In this sense, 
extreme speech in social media reflects the utani carnivalesque idea of equality as elites 
are made ordinary through transgressive speech. 
 
Interactions through social media are examples of how this new medium is providing 
opportunities for direct contact between subalterns and the ruling elites in an environment 
reflective of the carnivalesque. Often, tweets and Facebook comments by prominent 
people attract ridiculous comments from subalterns reflecting an utani-carnivalesque. As 
Bakhtin explains, carnivals were typically public events held in open areas such as town 
squares and marketplaces to permit free contact among people who were otherwise 
separated by hierarchy barriers. Like the carnivalesque and utani relationships, social 
media seems to have suspended restrictions and rules regulating everyday life. For 
instance, Facebook and Twitter are doing what the carnivalesque did and what utani does 
by providing public spaces for the subalterns to mix with elites and interact without fear of 
authorities and official conventions. 
 
In one example, when President Uhuru Kenyatta wished Kenyans a Merry Christmas on 
his Twitter handle, many of the retweets were ridiculous. He had written: 
Once again, we celebrate the birth that changed the world. 
We Christians believe that on this day, God sent his son for 
our salvation. (@UKenyatta, 5:54 AM - 23 Dec 2016). 
 




then God sent you to us as punishment. (@mwazo_peter). 
 
hehehe .... God sent us a real punishment in the name of Uhuruto. 
Kenya [should] be liberated 2017. (@sangura_julius). 
 
yes and unfortunately the devil sent you our way, please wake up and 
find your way back to sanity for the sake of the country. (@Obaremoni 
2016). 
 
where will Kenyan mothers give birth this xmas season with Drs on 
strike? In your stable?? (@AmAkenyan,) 
  
In another example, when President Kenyatta congratulated the Liberian President-elect, 
George Weah, a few months after his election had been nullified by the Supreme Court, 
retweets from Kenyans on Twitter were evocative of the billingsgate market speech. The 
president had tweeted:  
President-elect Weah’s victory is a triumph of democracy. 
Kenya will stand with Liberia, for we believe that Pan-African 
cooperation will win every African the prosperity and freedom 
they deserve. I look forward to working with President Weah in 
the service of those ideals (Uhuru Kenyatta @Ukenyatta, 28 
Dec 2017)   
 
Among many billingsgate replies were: 
 
ona achievement za Weah alaf uniambie vile unafeel 
ukimcongratulate. wewe ni joker flani [see Weah’s 
achievements and tell me how you are feeling congratulating 
him. You are a common joker].  
-2X African Player of the year 1995  
- Ballon d'Or winner 1996  
- FIFA world player of the year 2004  
- Arthur Ashe Courage Award 2008 
- CAF Award for Best 10 Players 2017  
- President of Liberia  
(Hansen Inganga @hanseninganga, 28 Dec 2017). 
 
Moses Chacha added to what Hansen Inganga had written: 
 
Hehehe he will come up with his own merits my brother 
[referring to Hansen Inganga] such as;  
2013 - IEBC CERTIFICATE [this was in reference to Uhuru 




2015 - ICC CERTIFICATE OF GOOD CONDUCT [this was 
in reference to the dropping of the crime against humanity 
charges by the International Criminal Court).  
2017 (part 1) - IEBC CERTIFICATE 2017 [this was in 
reference to the nullified 2017 presidential elections] 
(Part 2) - IEBC CERTIFICATE [this was in reference to the 
second presidential election which was absconded by Raila 
Odinga, Uhuru Kenyatta’s nemesis]. 
Despot trying to bring legitimacy to himself kwa kudandia [by 
hanging on] George Weah achievements lol. (¢ρα ¢нα¢нα 
@moses_chacha, 29 Dec 2017). 
 
While #Justice254 wrote: 
 
Please don't work with him [addressing President-elect George 
Weah], you'll teach him bad manners of electoral theft and how 
to rape democracy. Congratulations are in order anyway to 
Mr.weah (#Justice254@online_vampire). 
 
In a similar case, Kenyans on Twitter (KOT) started a Twitter challenge mocking President 
Kenyatta for allegedly launching non-existent ‘development projects’. The twitteriat had 
claimed frequent media appearances by the President while inaugurating ‘development 
projects’ were mere publicity stunts (Kamau, 2017). Many of the tweets in this challenge 
were simulations, what from a Bakhtinian perspective reflects non-official unveiling of 
projects, such as washing dishes, opening gifts, switching on a television, among others. 
Therefore, these simulations and retweets were more of utani than hate speech. From the 
tone of the message, the retweets are transgressive speech entangled more in power play 
than the destructive hate speech.  
 
The above tweets and the ‘mock development project challenge’, are only a few examples 
of how social media platforms are opportunities for direct contact with authorities. The 
tweets are similar to carnivals held in open areas that permit free interaction. Social media 
is making available public spaces where subalterns can interact with the president without 
fear of official conventions. 
 
As has been illustrated above, carnivalesque participation reverses hierarchy, a process 
that ‘de-thrones’ powers-that-be, just as the religious or secular authorities were mocked 
during medieval carnival (MacMillan, 2017:7). Social media users are reversing the 
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hierarchy by attacking political elites, breaking down the ‘superior’ elite vs subaltern 
dichotomy. Laughter is another important aspect of the carnival in this reversal of 
hierarchy. Here the carnival laughter is comparable to what Bakhtin (1984:4) states is a 
“boundless world of humorous forms and manifestations’ which ‘opposed the official and 
serious tone of medieval ecclesiastical and feudal culture”. In the examples above, humour 
directed at the president is expression of resistance to authority considering that folk 
laughter was used as transgression against oppression. Bakhtin (1984, 92) wrote:  
…folk laughter presents an element of victory not only over 
supernatural awe, over the sacred, over death; it also means 
the defeat of power, of earthly kings, of the earthly upper 
classes, of all that oppresses and restricts.  
 
In addition to the social media platforms providing opportunities for direct contact with 
authorities, another carnivalesque feature that reflects power of transgressive speech is 
the idea of not acknowledging differences between actors and spectators (Bakhtin, 
1984:8) since the carnival, just like utani encourages active participation by the masses. 
Regarding the tweets and the ‘mock development projects challenge’ mentioned above, 
there are no differences between actors and spectators as content is produced by the 
audience, a process that has been christened “citizen journalism”. Active citizens are 
engaged in user-led content creation, what Bruns (2009:119) calls ‘produsage’, a 
portmanteau of the words ‘production’ and ‘usage’. With this freedom, ‘beggars can 
become kings’, as “figures of official culture lose their elevated status” in an environment 
with an intense spirit of egalitarianism (see Platter, 2006:1). As seen above, the president’s 
persona is directly linked to production of content unlike in conventional media where such 
messages are produced by public communication or propaganda offices.  
 
Furthermore, social media can itself be seen as organised public events since these new 
media bring masses together to create an equivalent of a public event, albeit a virtual one. 
Through the spirit of produsage, a user-led content creation model (Bruns, 2009:119), and 
technologies that provide multimodal resources — texts, sound, spatial, and visual 
resources — social media is bringing together millions of people to participate in what can 
be seen as a more expanded public event from where the carnival is performed. Instead 
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of the public meetings taking place in squares and streets, social media has given a virtual 
meeting place.  
 
Considering the spirit of egalitarianism in social media as content is created by subalterns 
and not professional content producers, there is bound to be a difference in the allowable 
levels of extreme speech. As argued by Van Dijk’s (1989), professional journalists are 
“symbolic elites” who conceal the voices of their corporate or institutional paymaster and 
influence of their professional norms. While to Chomsky (1989:80), professional journalists 
are ideologically shaped to support the ruling elites, contrary to traditions of professional 
journalists, participation by subalterns facilitates their direct contact with the ruling elites 
as opposed to the alienation created by conventional media. It is like social media is the 
carnival pageants and comic shows of the marketplace (cf. Bakhtin, 1984:5). 
 
Similarly, there is utani-like mockery of the ruling people when subalterns use affordances 
innate in memes to replace subtitles and captions of original dialogue with the outrageous. 
The term meme was conceptualised by biologist Richard Dawkins (1976:203-215) as a 
cultural analogue to a gene. To Dawkins (1976:206-209), memes resemble genes, the 
molecular unit that maintains cells and pass hereditary data, as they have similar structure, 
mechanisms of distribution and survival, productivity and fecundity. Like genes, social 
media memes survive processes of constant replication and transformation even though 
they can also get damaged through mutation (cf. Dawkins, 1976:30-33). As digital images 
with superimposed text, memes are viral grassroots productions that mutate and spill over 
to diverse online channels. Because of space limitation, this study avoided the debate on 
genealogy of the term memes but focused on Internet memes as a techno-aesthetic 
carnivalesque transgressing the existing power structure. That is to say, memes have a 
longer history than social media but the term is used here within the confines of this study’s 
overall objectives. In this regard, memes are looked at as ‘texts’ that are different from 
iconic images and viral linguistic texts that do not experience much alteration. Hence 
memes are taken as a guerrilla storytelling practice by individuals who use carnivalesque 




Comparable to what Goriunova (2013:54) called digital media’s entrenchment of “aesthetic 
morphogenesis”, users of social media are creating memes as a way of initiating viral 
cultural protests. Messages in such carnivalesque are created through a process that 
Dwyer (2017:110) has called ‘guerrilla subtitling’, to mean a “practice that rebels against, 
or resists legal media and translation frameworks” (2017:123). However, the criminality 
element is ignored, and the term is used as Cintas (2018:134) did, to refer to subtitling and 
captioning of memes produced by individuals who use the carnivalesque strategies to 
counterargue narratives spread by elites. As strategies for re-narration, guerrilla subtitling 
and captioning are exemplary practices of what Fraser (1997:81) calls subaltern counter-
publics, that is, “parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups 
invent and circulate counter-discourses, which in turn permit them to formulate 
oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs.” Thus, guerrilla 
subtitling of memes is a strategy used to contest and challenge hegemonic practices. 
 
Memes reflect the carnivalesque as they protest through humorous and nonsensical 
messages. The proliferation of memes parodying elites reminds us of Bakhtin’s (1984:8) 
carnivalesque as a “second life, organised on the basis of laughter”. These transgressive 
memes expand spaces previously restricted by the hegemonic conventional media. Like 
Bakhtin’s marketplace, social media provides spaces where participants can create nasty 
jokes without disclosing their identities, rather by simply creating online personas that can 
hide their personal information. Indeed, it is hard to identify the person circulating memes 
unless specialised identification programmes and hardware are used. This is because 
memes are not bound to their creators and even if they were, many social media users 
avoid potential harassment by government agencies by creating online personas. Similar 
to the masking that takes place in the carnival, the majority of social media users hide their 
identities, for example by using creative aliases (see Cintas, 2018).  
 
Just like in medieval carnivore, anonymity in social media is equivalent to the 
carnivalesque practice of wearing masks to conceal identity. Some social media networks 
like Facebook are against the carnivalesque traditions of wearing masks, instead the 
network demands its clients to use real names on justification that it will be “harder for 
bullies to anonymously smear the reputations of others, or anyone else to use an 
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anonymous name to harass, scam or engage in criminal behaviour” (Osofsky & Gage, 
2015). Although the social media network claims anonymity encourages antisocial 
behaviour, it is this antisocial behaviour that revives the carnivalesque. In the “real name” 
vs anonymity debate, the carnivalesque is on the side of the latter. Indeed, anonymity 
enables users to express themselves in a way that would be rendered impossible under 
real names.  
 
The masks used to conceal identity online can be either visual or discursive (Scott, 2004). 
While visual anonymity refers to the removal of visual representation of the source, 
discursive anonymity is the removal of any signs that can attribute verbal communication 
to a particular source. Unlike visual anonymity that requires mere removal of the author’s 
images, discursive anonymity is difficult to achieve as writing always reveal the message 
source to a certain degree, even though, as Scott (2004) argues, people feel anonymous, 
provided their personal information like name and email are withheld.  
 
The affordances of social media networks, despite the ‘real name’ policies of the networks, 
offer users a number of options: they can choose to be totally anonymous, pseudonymous, 
or identifiable. For example, when a user registers a Facebook account, s/he is required 
to provide a username, mobile phone number, date of birth, residency, job, gender and 
interests, among others. But only the username is displayed by Facebook. Users choose 
the profile information that can be shared. It is difficult if not impossible for Facebook to 
find out if the user registered with pseudonym or a real name as there is no real identity 
database to compare with. Thus, social media is a place where people can mask 
themselves to unmask others. As Bakhtin (1984:40) said, by hiding behind masks, 
subalterns can violate natural boundaries and mock authorities in a playful way. In fact, 
use of various carnivalesque elements, such as “parodies, caricatures, grimaces, 
eccentric postures, and comic gestures are per se derived from the mask.” 
 
Another feature of the carnivalesque that has reawakened productivity of extreme speech 
in social media is fraternisation. This is a socialising function of the otherwise extreme 
speech. Moreover, the carnivalesque elements of fraternisation, argues Bakhtin (1984:16), 
were preserved and given a deeper meaning in the modern carnivals although without 
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their primitive connotation. Abusive language is therefore “a special genre of billingsgate” 
as abuses have various functions that are similar to those of the billingsgate in primitive 
communication. Hence, social media is the modern billingsgate in which abusive 
exchanges symbolise more of fraternisation efforts than plain enmity. Bakhtin (1984:16) 
gives the example of changes of verbal intercourse among people in friendly relations, 
who address each other informally, use abusive words affectionately, with mockery 
permitted”. 
 
From this fraternisation perspective, abusive language in social media can be democracy, 
just as it did in Rabelais’ novel (see Bakhtin, 1984:28). Extreme speech can cause 
fraternisation when it acts “as a leveller between its members” (Robson, & Robson, 
2006:82). 
Each member of the group, through his acceptance of the use 
of taboo words, makes a tacit admission to the basic bodily 
urges and functions common to everyone…. each member 
experiences a form of ‘exposure’- albeit a non-violent, non-
libidinous kind- and what is more, he sees other members of 
the group ‘exposed’…. In Bakhtin’s terminology, obscenity 
‘degrades’- it strips away the politeness involved in the social 
contract (Robson, & Robson, 2006:82).  
 
As explained by Žižek (2009a), true human ties and genuine friendships are forged when 
people hurl extremely rude statements at one another, statements such as “I want to sleep 
with your mother,” or “Your sister isn’t as good as your brother in bed” (see Alexender, 
2011:18). Obscenities, argues Žižek (2009a), “breaks the ice” to get people together. The 
Slovenian philosopher gives the example of fraternisation that happened during his days 
in the army when his friend one morning told him “I f**ked your mother,” and he answered, 
“After I’ve f**ked your sister.” Doing this ritual every morning acted as fraternisation as 
Žižek and his friend became really good friends despite simmering ethnic animosity in the 
Balkans.  
 
Furthermore, insults, argues (Conley, 2010:116), have been used as a method of 
“motivating military recruits and athletes to “shape up” … [a]nd every year, thousands of 
young people aspiring to belong to a fraternity or sorority willingly subject themselves to 
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humiliating hazing practices.” Young people, just like recruits and sportsmen accept insults 
as a way of becoming “part of the team.” As such, extreme speech is a fraternisation tool 
which plays more of an agonistic than deliberative function, Chantal Mouffe would say. 
Here, extreme speech is used to break down hierarchy and enable subalterns to access 
elites. Taken this way, extreme speech in social media is equivalent a carnivalesque that 
is dislocating conventional political practices by merging the official with non-official.       
 
3.5. Incivility as Mutual Zombification  
Claiming utani is always counterhegemonic would be falling into the trap of privileging one 
dimension over the other in a binary relation: in this case privileging the counterhegemonic 
over hegemonic use of utani. Although joking relations are transgressive, just like 
Bakhtinian carnivals, they are not identical to utopian radicalism because regimes can use 
similar approaches, to achieve what Mbembe (2001:103) calls the ‘mutual zombification’. 
It also implies when elites use utani, instead of the carnival inverting hierarchies, it guides, 
deceives, and toys using power to avoid direct confrontations. Through carnivals, the state 
can dramatize its own magnificence, make manifest its majesty, and create a spectacle 
for ordinary people to watch (Mbembe, 2001:104). Rulers and the ruled become entangled 
by intimate tyranny, and the politics of obscenity creates “mutual zombification”—the 
impotence or the state of powerlessness of the ruler and the ruled as “each has robbed 
the other of vitality and left both impotent” (104). Hence:  
The question of whether humour in the postcolony is an 
expression of ‘resistance’ or not, whether it is, a priori, 
opposition, or simply manifestation of hostility toward authority, 
is thus of secondary importance (Mbembe 2001:108).  
Whereas Bakhtin claims the counter-culture obscenities were located in ‘non-official’ 
spaces, Mbembe argues that these cultures are intrinsic to all systems of domination and 
to the means by which those systems are confirmed or deconstructed. The ruling elite’s 
carnivalesque is not merely linguistics, but several ‘wrongdoings’, the ‘excess and lack of 
proportion’ seen in the public display of grandiosity, sycophancy, ostentatious corruption, 
flamboyant violence, and coercive ceremonialism, the sub-Saharan ‘aesthetics and 
stylistics of power’ (Karlström, 2003:58). The carnivalesque is a state’s   
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…unusual and grotesque art of representation, its taste for the 
theatrical, and its violent pursuit of wrongdoing to the point of 
shamelessness. Obscenity, in this context, resides in a mode of 
expression that might seem macabre were it not an integral part of 
the stylistics of power. (Mbembe, 2001:116).  
  
Nevertheless, the dominated poach these ‘wrongdoings’ to “tame or shut it up and render 
it powerless” (Mbembe, 2001:109). For example, the while the ruling elites are 
extravagant, they must also feed their clientele and display their prestige to turn “prodigal 
acts of generosity into grand theatre.” Consequently, Bakhtin errored, argues Mbembe 
(1992:29), by attributing the carnivalesque only to the dominated. It means the state can 
only dramatize its carnivalesque if the dominated act as a witnessing crowd, without it, the 
fete lacks glamor. It is the crowd that gives the state obscenities a carnivalistic sense. Like 
in Bakhtin’s case, the official carnival does not differentiate the spectator from the 
performer, rather all people live it, not as the ‘real world’, but as ‘the world standing on its 
head’.   
 
Through incivility in social media, the dominated act playfully with, and make fun of the 
regime, enabling them to achieve a status Mbembe (2001:105) calls “homo ludens par 
excellence,” the playful statuses in which the split subjects are neither in confrontation with 
the regime nor absolutely dominated, nor in any other conventional binary oppositions 
against the state. Utani becomes hegemonic when it acts as spaces for play and fun 
outside officialdom to allow the subalterns to jokingly obey what they would not obey under 
an environment of seriousness. For example, it is through play and fun that people adhere, 
with amusement, to what Mbembe (2001:109) calls the “innumerable official rituals” in the 
postcolony. Seriousness risks causing a confrontation, for instance, when the “rulers 
compel obedience and define, in a constraining manner, what they prefer the ruled to 
simulate” (1992:11). To put it differently, the regime becomes a simulacra by allowing 
incivility only within the very limits set by officialdom, so that ordinary people can simulate 
adherence to the carnivalesque of innumerable official rituals, such as wearing political 
party uniforms, carrying party card, performing support for the autocrat, or even posting 
portraits of the despot in their business premises and homes: thus a space is created for 
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ordinary people  “to say the unsayable and to recognise the otherwise unrecognisable” 
(2001:109).   
 
Hence, if we consider utani as a regime-endorsed form of transgression, it means some 
obscenities in social media can validate regimes through permitted mockery and act as a 
safety-valve for accumulated anger. Put another way, permitted disorder is a collusion 
between the “people” and the “State” to maintain harmony by allowing merely the periodic 
reversal of hierarchy—which is not an alternative structure, but a distorted reflection of the 
dominant structure (Presdee, & Carver, 2000:42).  
 
Although Mbembe identifies conviviality through mutual zombification, the lack of hostility 
does not contradict the nature of politics, which from a Schmittian perspective is equivalent 
to the friend-enemy relationship. Rather, ordinary people zombify themselves with state 
obscenities to conceal their grievances, but at the same time demystify the superhuman 
image that ruling elites inspire. According to Mbembe, “[t]his explains why dictators can 
sleep at night lulled by roars of adulation and support only to wake up to find their golden 
calves smashed and their tablets of law overturned” (111).  
 
This paradoxical nature of utani positions it within the locus of ‘agonistic confrontation’ 
rather than a counterhegemonic tool in agonistic politics, since the joking relations can be 
employed by both the dominant and the subaltern. It implies mutual zombification through 
the obscene and the grotesque opens up confrontations that do not have a final victory for 
either side. Even with social media encouraging utani, to imagine a pluralist democracy as 
the finalist, Mouffe (2000a:16) warns “is to transform it into a self-refuting ideal, since the 
condition of possibility of a pluralist democracy is at the same time the condition of 
impossibility of its perfect implementation.” 
 
It is therefore incorrect to interpret incivility in binary terms as either a tool for absolute 
domination or resistance, rather like it should be seen as equivalent to what Derrida 
(1981:78) terms as being both a remedy and poison at the same time. Whereas on the 
one hand it is being used by the dominated to invert hierarchies, it is also the tool that is 




3.6. Conclusion:  
Frequent attacks on the political elite are reminiscent of the carnivalesque since the 
humorous insults are a way of breaking down hierarchies, but at the same time, it is 
possible for the ruling elite to use similar incivility to legitimise their bizarre reign. Thus, I 
argue that although the carnivalesque in social media is breaking hierarchies through the 
confrontation between official cultures, it is through display of similar transgression that 
the ruling elites acquire their superior positions. To this concern, social media texts have 
become an important opportunity for transgressive speech, but it is this allowable 
transgression that makes the otherwise obscene activities of the state invisible. Therefore, 
the free social media space can be a site of resistance, but also, just like in conventional 
media, a site of ideological state apparatuses.  
 
Despite its mediaeval origin, Bakhtin’s carnivalesque remains relevant in explaining the 
productive nature of extreme speech in social media. The theory provides a framework for 
explaining extreme speech associated with social media, showing how the dichotomy of 
allowable/restricted speech neglects the potential of extreme speech to not only 
breakdown hegemony, but also work for it. Although obscene engagements in social 
media contribute to development of counter-publics that diverges from the Habermasian 







Returning ‘the political’ to politics: From deliberative to agonistic democracy  
The political in its antagonistic dimension cannot be made to 
disappear simply by denying it, by wishing it away. 
Mouffe (2000:03). 
4.1 Introduction 
This dissertation is an attempt to explain how extreme speech content in social media 
mirrors the conflict inherent in politics so that denying the productive nature of extreme 
speech would be like proposing a democracy without politics. Although deliberative 
democracy has made it look like it has finally depoliticised politics by creating a ‘post-
political’ consensus without antagonism, continuing the tradition of “political displacement 
of politics”, in preference for establishment of ‘order’ (see, Marchart, 2007:159), political 
practices retain inherent antagonism as seen in the various fundamentalisms like right-
wing and racist politics in the West and ethnic cleansing in Africa.  
 
In this chapter, I follow Mouffe in returning politics to political theory by proposing how 
extreme speech is suitable for an agonistic model of democracy that advocates a 
‘conflictual consensus’ and seeks to come to terms with the political rather than disavowing 
it as deliberative democracy has attempted. The objective of this chapter is to explain how 
extreme speech expressions in social media are part of the disagreement that returns 
politics to the rather depoliticised democracy, using Mouffe’s concept of agonism. From 
this perspective, extreme speech in social media are viewed as an opportunity for 
advancing agonistic democracy by breaking deliberative democracy’s traditions of 
displacing politics with consensus. A fundamental argument made here is that extreme 
speech in social media political discourses is equivalent to disagreements that can widen 
the democratic spaces that are otherwise constrained through consensus. 
 
The chapter uses the agonistic democracy theory to answer the flowing question: What is 
the role of extreme speech in political discourse and how does it transform participation in 
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politics?  To answer this question, theories of democracy are viewed as a dichotomy 
between those advocating agreement and those pushing for maintenance of 
disagreement. The agreement or consensus enhancing theories are inspired by 
Habermas’s models of deliberative democracy while the disagreement models are 
inspired by among other agonists, Mouffe’s post-structuralist model of radical democracy. 
This chapter gives a critical overview of deliberative democracy and proposes an agonistic 
democracy enriched by current antagonisms in social media. The first part of the chapter 
describes democracy as a floating signifier with a variety of meanings. The second part 
brings back politics to democracy, starting with Carl Schmitt’s concept of ‘the political’ and 
how this notion has been used by Mouffe to develop a post-structuralist model of agonistic 
democracy.  
4.2 Democracy as a Floating Signifier 
If democracy is ‘a government by and for the people’, it means there are many 
democracies. Thus, democracy is a contested concept due to its multiplicity of meanings. 
In other words, democracy is a ‘floating signifier’ waiting to be allocated meaning since it 
lacks a clear relationship to what it means. In this regard, the shortcomings of current 
democracy theories, both in established and emerging democracies, have made many 
theorists — led by Laclau and Mouffe — to show disappointment with liberal democracy, 
the hegemonic type, as illustrated in their attempt to develop more viable alternatives. 
In relation to the role of the social media in enhancing democracy, the various versions of 
deliberative democracy are at the centre-stage as alternatives to aggregative democracy.  
The idea of deliberation has been the key in the deepening of democracy since its 
invention in Athens, but what has changed or is being revived is how deliberation can link 
liberal values to democracy. Through deliberation, political decisions are freely made after 
reasonable discussion and debate among citizens. This type of democracy enables 
citizens to reason together through a process of exchanging information without 
endangering liberal values. Through reasoning, deliberative democracy transcends the 
dichotomy between liberal emphasis on individual liberties and the democratic principles 
of collective decision-making. Thus, deliberative democracy solves the tension in liberal 
democracy by moving away from the aggregative models, the individualist or economic 
views of democracy in which citizens make decisions through voting, a process that 
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endangers liberal values. Deliberative democracy moves politics toward ‘talk-centric’ 
decision-making processes as a replacement of the individualistic voting-centric systems 
that can be illiberal. As explained by Chambers (2003:308), deliberative democracy is 
focused on communicative processes, the opinion and will-formation that precede voting, 
unlike vote-centric democracy in which preferences and interests compete via fair 
mechanisms of aggregation. Hence deliberative democracy functions through exchange 
of information and justifications of positions and not competition between conflicting 
interests or views that are not publicly justifiable. Instead of numerical superiority being 
used in decision-making, citizens should ideally make decisions based on 
reasonableness. Hence the use of social media can enhance deliberation in political 
discourses as the platform provides a channel through which interlocutors can easily 
engage, making democracy more talk-centric.  
Yet the hegemonic status occupied by deliberative democracy overshadows its 
alternatives. In fact, deliberative democracy has become so hegemonic that it seems 
irrational to oppose it because on the surface, deliberation seems to be the best approach 
for resolving disagreements through the presentation of reasonable arguments. “Hence 
deliberation has become a standard for the accomplishment of democracy: it is what 
democratic theorists aim for, our ideal and our aspiration” (Sanders, 1997:347).  
To proponents of deliberative democracy like Rawls and his followers, democracy is a 
process of public reasoning that should give birth to an ordered society. To them, the basic 
feature of democracy is “reasonable pluralism” that can enable citizens reach rational 
consensus on conflicting doctrines through, if need be, replacement of “comprehensive 
doctrines of truth or right…by an idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as 
citizens” (Rawls, 1997:766). A well-ordered society as conceived by Rawls does not have 
room for dissenting views as democracy is able to create a society with neither political 
nor economic conflicts. If conflicts arise, they are resolved smoothly within the framework 
of public reason, with the persons who remain irrational, states Mouffe (2005: 226) “forced, 
through coercion, to submit to the principles of justice”. Hence political liberalism gives the 
impression of a well-ordered society, in which antagonism, violence and power have been 
eliminated, even though in reality these conflicts have only been made invisible. Exclusion 
in deliberative democracy is justified for being a product of the ‘free exercise of public 
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reason’. Thus, the exercise of public reason is a clever way of “eliminate[ing] adversaries 
while remaining neutral” (ibid, 227). 
The Habermas inspired version of deliberative democracy takes a strictly procedural 
approach in which there are no limits on the scope and content, provided the deliberation 
follows the institutionalised procedures. The success of deliberative democracy depends 
not on the reasonableness of the “citizenry but on the institutionalisation of the 
corresponding procedures and conditions of communication, as well as on the interplay of 
institutionalised deliberative processes with informally developed public opinions” 
(Habermas, 1996:298). The institutionalised procedures and conditions are the formal 
(legislated) spheres specifically designed to take decisions — such as parliament and 
courts, while the informal sphere is the civil society, such as voluntary organisations and 
media institutions. In the civil society, citizens participate in making individual opinion and 
will-formation, whereas in the formal political sphere, designated representatives take 
decisions on behalf of citizens. 
To Habermas, democracy is achievable if the procedures of the deliberation are impartial, 
provide equal opportunity, openness and are without coercion. Such procedures when 
agreed by all participants produce legitimate outcomes (see Mouffe, 2000:89). As 
explained by Habermas’s follower Benhabib (1996:70), the decision-making in deliberative 
democracy is through participation governed by the norms of equality and symmetry. This 
deliberation is supposedly happens in an environment where all citizens have the right to 
question the issues assigned for discussion; and initiate reflexive arguments about the 
very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied and carried 
out. In deliberative democracy, there are no prima facie rules limiting the agenda or identity 
of the participants. Thus, legitimacy derives from the fact that decisions are made as an 
outcome of equal participation by all interested parties. As such, democracy best functions 
in the absence of any barriers that exclude some people or groups from participating; 
where persuasion is through rational arguments and not coercion; and when interlocutors 
maintain respect and impartiality (Chambers, 1996: 208).  
In conclusion, the idea behind deliberative democracy, it can be argued, is that political 
decisions can only be valid if they are outcomes of agreement by all affected people, and 
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the outcomes are believed to be the most reasonable. However, these conditions are 
difficult to achieve because deliberative democracy does not take into consideration the 
ever present and ineradicable character of power and antagonism that politics entails. 
Although deliberative democracy aims at reaching a rational consensus, such a consensus 
does not exist, instead what is achieved is consensus “as a temporary result of a 
provisional hegemony”, which is a form of power stabilisation that always entails some 
exclusion (see Mouffe, 2000:104). The following section identifies weaknesses in 
deliberation democracy and how incivility in social media makes this model inadequate in 
explaining the current deficiencies in democracy.   
4.3. Politics as Disagreement.   
Despite proponents of deliberative democracy making it look like their model can enable 
citizens to reach rational agreement by promoting reason over power, this reason-centric 
model achieves agreement through concealed exclusion as all attempts to construct a 
reasonable ‘we’ involves an exclusion of ‘unreasonable’ ‘them’. Furthermore, even if the 
procedures for deliberative democracy are designed to promote rationality and eliminate 
the influence of economic or political domination, it remains difficult to remove the rampant 
internalised devaluation of some citizens due to structural inequalities in capitalist 
societies. The relationship between status and critical public scrutiny is more complex than 
Habermas intimates when he declares a deliberative arena as a space where extant status 
distinctions are bracketed and neutralised (Fraser, 1990:60). Thus, deliberative 
democracy is in conflict with not only the inequalities in capitalist societies but more so 
with pluralism, a political environment in which individual are free to organise their lives as 
they wish without being seen as unreasonable. As noted by Mouffe (1990c:58) if 
democracies find ways of coming to terms with pluralism, they will discard attempts to 
achieve perfect consensus and accept permanence of conflicts.  
The recurrent political conflicts in Kenya, such as ethnic violence and religious 
fundamentalism are a challenge to liberalism in deliberative democracy: the inability of 
democracy to tame liberalism. Instead of using rational consensus to solve such conflicts, 
what the deliberative democracy project has failed to achieve, radical democracy, Mouffe 
(1994c:109) argues, should make conflicts compatible with pluralist democracy. In this 
regard, social media, unlike conventional media, is providing an opportunity for people to 
97 
 
engage in agonistic politics contrary to Habermas and Rawls deliberative democracy 
ideals. Indeed, Habermas’s idea of neutral procedure and Rawls’s public reasonableness 
are inadequate in explaining the permanence of antagonism in social media. As an 
alternative to the traditional rationalist public sphere, Fraser (1990:58) argues that “[s]ome 
new form of public sphere is required to salvage that arena’s critical function and to 
institutionalise democracy.” Furthermore, Habermas ignores other types of public spheres, 
the non-liberal, non-bourgeois, competing public spheres. These contempt of other 
democracies, to Fraser (1990:61), is what makes Habermas idealise the bourgeois public 
sphere. Indeed, there is a multiplicity of arenas and more to politics than “political 
incorporation through suffrage” since public life can be accessed through a variety of ways. 
Contrary to Habermas, Fraser (1990:61) mentions a plurality of competing and conflictual 
counterpublics like nationalist publics, popular peasant publics, elite women's publics, and 
working class publics that provided alternative political behaviour and alternative norms of 
public speech.  
Attempts to eliminate antagonism are the dark side of deliberative democracy as removal 
of antagonism is used as a strategy to contrarily block broader participation by excluding 
‘unreasonable” publics. In particular, from a Gramcian perspective, deliberation is used to 
legitimize an emergent form of class rule (see Fraser, 1990:62) since deliberative 
democracy does not give people the opportunity to struggle against hegemony but instead 
conceals political domination by replacing coercion with consent.  For instance, Habermas 
envisages the bourgeois public sphere as open and accessible to all, but this claim was 
not realised since women were excluded from official political participation on the basis of 
their gender, while both men and women were excluded for their working-class status and 
racial grounds. Yet the bourgeois conception of the public sphere requires that inequalities 
be bracketed to create an arena in which interlocutors speak to one another as if they were 
peers (Fraser, 1990:63). 
To this end, we need to juxtapose deliberative democracy with an alternative post-
bourgeois account to interpret how unlimited participation through social media can 
deepen radical democracy. By constituting an alternative public sphere, what Fraser 
(1990:67) calls subaltern counterpublics, subordinate social groups can invent and 
circulate counter discourses, which in turn permit them to formulate oppositional 
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interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs. This can enable the subordinate 
groups to reinvent social reality, reducing the extent of their domination in the official public 
spheres. The subaltern counterpublics function as spaces for withdrawing the dominant 
groups’ ‘reasonableness’ and become training grounds for agitation directed to dominant 
groups. This enables the subordinate groups to offset the unjust participatory privileges 
created by the regime (Fraser, 1990:68).  
It should be noted that both stratified and egalitarian societies need multiple public spheres 
since even egalitarian societies can be classless but not necessarily culturally 
homogeneous (Fraser, 1990:68). When egalitarian societies permit freedom of expression 
and association, they are likely to be divided into social groups with diverse values, 
identities, and cultural styles. In egalitarian societies, it is cultural heterogeneity and not 
structural inequality that creates the need for multiple publics. A single public sphere would 
privilege norms of one cultural group over others through discursive assimilation which 
can end multi-culturalism and ultimately lead to the demise of social equality (Fraser, 
1990:69). Therefore, for a society to be truly egalitarian in discourse, it must have multiple 
public arenas to allow debate within and between groups with diverse values. 
Since both Rawlsian and Habermasian deliberative democracy theorists propose a public 
sphere in which “power and antagonism would have been eliminated and where a rational 
consensus would have been realised” (Mouffe, 1999:752), this type of democracy 
eliminates politics from democracy as it recommends a type of democracy that is without 
its conflictual dimension. Consequently, deliberative democracy merely hides exclusion 
given that political order can only be achieved through exclusion. Rationality conceals 
these oppressive exclusions instead of establishing institutions through which oppression 
can be contested. Furthermore, if a society can achieve rational consensus not based on 
any form of exclusion, it means such consensus cannot be legitimately challenged (see 
Mouffe, 2005c:227). The alternative to consensus is what the Mouffe (2005c:228) calls 
conflictual consensus in which there is consensus on ‘ethico-political’ principles of liberty 
and equality for all, but there remains “the possibility of serious dissent about their 
interpretation, dissent that can never be overcome thanks to rational procedures” (228). 
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Prioritising deliberation can lead to undemocratic consequences such as delegitimation of 
the political activities of others, among them demonstrations, mobilisation, bargaining, 
lobbying, among other direct actions. Definitely, the aim of participating in politics is not 
always to talk with opponents as participation in politics can also be aimed at contesting 
power structures through myriad ways. Given that those who hold power in Africa are 
rarely persuaded by mere reason(s) to give up their power, deliberative democracy 
theories remain unsatisfactory. In addition, in a world of structural inequalities, deliberative 
democracy is biased towards powerful agents as it conforms to existing power structures. 
Consequently, meaningful participation in societies with structural inequalities can be 
promoted by engaging in “critical oppositional activity, rather than attempt(ing) to come to 
agreement with those who support or benefit from existing power structures” (Young, 
2001: 671). Unless inequality is eliminated, powerful people will continue controlling 
deliberations and thus deliberation can be undemocratic. It is unreasonable to adopt a 
reasonable stand in the face of structural inequalities.  What is required is for the 
subalterns to use passionate political action as deliberation often fails them in the face of 
inequalities. As advised by Young (2000:49), deliberation is reasonable communication 
but where there are problems with structural positions of privilege and disadvantage, the 
subalterns:  
…do not violate norms of reasonableness if they engage in seriously disruptive 
actions or express their claims with angry accusations. Disorderliness is an 
important tool of critical communication aimed at calling attention to the 
unreasonableness of others — their domination over the terms of debate, their 
acts of exclusion of some people or issues from consideration, their use of their 
power to cut off debate, their reliance on stereotypes and mere derision. 
The issues discussed in the public sphere, what objectively affect everyone, are 
ambiguous. This is because matters recognised as common concern by one group of 
participants, might not be common concern for outsiders. Fraser (1990:71) mentions 
issues of domestic violence against women as examples of matters that were not of 
common concern and were not legitimate topics of public discourse since the majority 
considered these issue to be a private matter among what was assumed to be a fairly 
small number of heterosexual couples. However, feminists formed a subaltern counter-
publics and “after sustained discursive contestation...succeeded in making it a common 
concern.” Therefore, there are “no naturally given, a priori boundaries” along which the 
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public sphere should be delimited. The boundary between public and private issues is 
hazy and therefore should be decided through discursive contestation. As emphasised by 
Fraser (1990:71) 
...no topics should be ruled off limits in advance of such contestation. On 
the contrary, democratic publicity requires positive guarantees of 
opportunities for minorities to convince others that what in the past was not 
public in the sense of being a matter of common concern should now 
become so.  
A singular public sphere is a sphere of the powerful under which the “less powerful cannot 
discover that the prevailing sense of ‘we’ does not adequately include them” (Fraser, 
1990:72). In its place of presumed existence of a common good, Fraser (1990:72) writes, 
the topics, interests, and views admissible in deliberation should remain open. This is what 
social media incivility has achieved: avoiding the pretence created by the myth of 
consensus. After all, civility creates an environment where subordinate interests and topics 
are delegitimised. However, Fraser (1990:67) warns of the possibility of subaltern 
counterpublics that are anti-democratic and anti-egalitarian. In this category, there are 
antidemocratic counterpublics such as hate groups that should not be mistaken for 
subordinate counterpublics. 
 
This study rejects the rationalist consensual democracy theories that became hegemonic 
after the late 20th Century victory of liberal democracy over its adversaries (see Mouffe, 
2000:80). Due to the widespread presence of extreme speech in social media, it is clear 
that the theories that can best explain the role of social media in deepening democracy 
are not the agreement-enhancing deliberative democracy theories, but the radical 
alternative that views of democracy as a disruptive and dislocatory force in politics. Such 
radical democracy theories emphasise the role of politics in democracy by looking at how 
power relations, hegemony, and disagreement are central to pluralist democracy (see 
Norval, 2007:39). For instance, the consistent ethnic nationalistic conflicts in Africa can 




The following section describes Schmitt and Mouffe’s theories of democracy, theories that 
fall outside the rationalist perspectives that stands accused of displacing politics from 
politics itself. These theories can help us explain how extreme speech in social media can 
retain ‘the political’ in politics and thus reinvigorate democracy in this seemingly post-
democracy era. ‘The political’, (Schmitt, 1927), is a method of describing the specificity of 
politics without wishing away the inevitability of conflict like economics, law, psychology, 
sociology and other disciplines attempt to do. Without wishing away conflict, the political 
explains politics in a constitutive rather than transcendental sense. It means by including 
‘the political’, we views politics in its own right without reducing it to its part. To Schmitt 
(1927), politics is deeply existential, essentially involving real possibility of violence, even 
though deliberative democracy theorists eliminate this danger using explanations outside 
politics. Whereas to Mouffe (2005a:9), ‘the political’ is the antagonism constitutive of 
human societies, while ‘politics’ is the set of practices and institutions through which an 
order is created and human coexistence organised “in the context of conflictuality provided 
by the political.” Although ‘the political’ is inherent in all human societies and can never be 
eradicated, ‘politics’ are the “practices, discourses and institutions which seek to establish 
a certain order and to organize human coexistence within the conditions that potentially 
conflicting due to the dimension of ‘the political’.” In simple terms, using the concept of ‘the 
political’, we can explains how politics has become alienated from itself through 
consensual democracies and other efforts that attempt to suppress instead of taming the 
ineradicable violence. Agonism is therefore a proposal of how politics can be returned to 
itself (see, Valentine, 2018:198). The following section starts by explaining how passion in 
politics can be used to rescue democracy. This is followed by the description of Carl 
Schmitt’s concept of ‘the political’ and how this concept has been appropriated by Mouffe 
to develop the theory of agonistic democracy through which politics can be returned to 
itself, albeit in a more domesticated form.  
4.4 Returning Politics to Democracy: From Schmitt to Mouffe  
Proponents of deliberative democracy ignore the role of emotional rhetoric, the unthinking 
public, and the rage against opponents among other uncivil strategies that are symbolic of 
‘the political’, the antagonism constitutive of human beings, which are supposed to be 
tamed by politics — “the set of practices through which an order is created’ (Mouffe 2005: 
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9). By sideling passion, the contemporary language of deliberative democracy relegates 
politics from democracy by prioritising the consensual part of the conflictual nature of 
politics.  
To proponents of deliberative democracy, politics “is a matter of calm deliberation” 
(Walzer, 2002:618) and if not ignored, emotions are deemed important only to the realm 
of citizens, not to the realm of power (David, 2004:229). From this perspective, emotions 
are a problem that the working class must deal with, not part of politics of the regime. Yet 
even with this popular imagination, both the proletariat and the ruling people throughout 
the world are engaged in passionate politics as evidenced by various forms of 
disagreements between regimes, such as broken negotiations, interrupted debates, 
storming out of meetings on the one hand, and severe forms of disagreements among the 
subalterns like violent ethnic and religious conflicts that have resulted in ethnic cleansing, 
and massacre on the other hand. It is important to realise that it is severe political 
differences that have caused war between nations. 
Therefore, the role of incivility in social media on democracy can be interpreted better if 
the definition of democracy returns ‘the political’ by emphasising the antagonistic nature 
of politics. Such definitions stresses the power struggles as the key foundation of politics. 
As stated by Louw (2010:8-10), politics is a process of organising and regulating social 
power relationships, making decisions about the allocation and distribution of scarce 
resources and legitimating this process in the face of struggles against enforcement. To 
this concern, the study uses Carl Schmitt’s (1927:26) friend/enemy principle in which 
politics is part of ‘the political’—differences that on the extreme can cause war and Laclau 
and Mouffe’s (1985) adaptation of the theory into agonistic democracy.  
4.4.1 Carl Schmitt’s ‘the political’ 
Extreme speech in social media is a reincarnation of politics that had been concealed by 
the consensual deliberative democratic traditions supported by regime-preferred 
mainstream media that is used to conceal disagreements. In relation to these theories 
about the reawakening of politics, Carl Schmitt’s (1927) work, The Concept of the Political¸ 
a criticism of liberalism, is a milestone and a key reference today. Regrettably, Schmitt’s 
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work remained unexplored for over a century because of his association with the National 
Socialist Party.  
Through the concept of ‘the political,’ Schmitt rejects the depoliticised deliberative 
democracy’s consensus achieved through rational discussions that relegate emotions 
from politics. Using his friend/enemy principle, Schmitt attempts to discover the essential 
nature and characteristics of politics which distinguishes it from other realms of life, the 
private spheres of the economy and the civil society. The friend/enemy rule is evident in 
“all political concepts, images, and terms [that have] a polemical meaning” (Schmitt, 
1927:30). Thus, the role of extreme speech in social media as a tool for enhancing 
democracy can be explained best by relating extreme speech to ‘the political’. But such 
radical descriptions of democracy, as explained earlier, are challenged by the hegemonic 
deliberative democracy that has naturalised rationalism in political practices, thereby 
presenting democracy without politics.   
Schmitt (1996) was against the belief by liberal democrats that a rational consensus can 
be arrived at on the basis of free discussion and relegation of disruptive issues to the 
private sphere. Instead, Schmitt (1996:37) argues against the annihilation of politics since 
“the political” derives its energy from a variety of sources, such as religious, economic, 
and moral sources, among other antitheses which can turn the previously non-political 
antithesis into a political one, by pushing aside the non-political situation.  
The right-wing political thinker, who developed his concepts during the dark days of the 
Nazi dictatorship, defines politics based on a friend-enemy dichotomy. He argues that, just 
like the final distinction in morality is between good and evil; beautiful and ugly in 
aesthetics; and profitable/unprofitable in economics, “the political” distinction to which 
political actions can be reduced is that between friend and enemy” (Schmitt (1999:26). 
Despite this, the political enemy is not necessarily morally evil or aesthetically ugly, 
contends Schmitt (1996:27), but is nevertheless the “other, the stranger” so that conflicts 
with him are possible. Nevertheless, the ‘enemy’ is treated “emotionally” as evil and ugly 
because political distinctions are supported by other autonomous distinctions even though 
these autonomous distinctions retain autonomy even when used to amplify the otherness 
(Schmitt, 1996:27). Therefore, the “the reverse is true: the morally evil or aesthetically ugly 
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or economically damaging need not necessarily be the enemy”, and vice versa (ibid). 
Hence the friend-enemy dichotomy is not based on eternal demographic features as it 
keeps changing.    
Moreover, Schmitt (1996:28) warns that the enemy is not a private adversary, arguing that 
the enemy “exists only when, at least potentially one who is fighting the collectivity of 
people confronts a similar collectivity... solely the public enemy.” In the friend-enemy 
dichotomy, the most extreme form of enmity is war, it remains a possibility “as long as the 
concept of the enemy remains valid” (Schmitt, 1996:33). However, to Schmitt, war is not 
politics but a continuation of politics by other means because in war “political adversaries 
confront each other openly [in] uniforms and the distinction of the friend and enemy is no 
longer a political problem”. Additionally, war uses strategies and tactics different from 
those of politics even though politics remains the “brains” behind war and war happens 
after a political decision has been made (Schmitt, 1927:34).  
The political, therefore, is a continuous struggle with a real possibility of physical killing at 
its “most extreme consequence of enmity” (Schmitt, 1927:33). It can be argued that war is 
not the purpose of politics, but it remains a possibility in politics and this possibility is the 
premise that creates political behaviour (Schmitt, 1927:35).  Therefore, people are always 
in a struggle and there is a possibility that on the extreme these struggles can result into 
soldiers fighting real war, causing the physical killing of the enemy.  
In other words, “the political” sphere is characterised by the antagonistic contestations 
which are different forms and acts of contestation of war characterised by killing: this is to 
say that the political is where politics is conducted by antagonistic contestations which are 
‘other means’ than those used for war. Schmitt (1975:17) argues that if there were no 
enemies, there would be no politics since the political world is not a universe where people 
have similar views but a ‘pluriverse’ where people have differences.  
The political enemy, to Schmitt, is synonymous with an ‘opponent’ who threatens one’s 
way of life. Further, the political enemy is not necessarily “morally evil or aesthetically ugly’ 
nor an economic competitor, since these are not considerations for political enmity. 
However, the political enemy can be treated as an evil and ugly competitor to strengthen 
and intensify the political distinction by drawing the support of the other differences. Slomp 
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(2009:26) notes, following Schmitt, that our enemy is not an enemy because he is bad, 
but he may become bad in our eyes because he is our enemy.  
The antagonistic nature of social media discourse can be explained by the Schmitt’s 
friend/enemy principle. Users of social media see others as enemies threatening each 
other’s way of life. Furthermore, social media subscribers create the enemy in other users 
who are not necessarily a threat but because the other users are different in some aspect. 
For instance, based on tribal differences, social media users see one another as enemies. 
This matches what Slomp (2009:26) described as an enemy who is not an enemy because 
he is bad but has become bad in our eyes because he is our enemy. 
When read in the context of Kenyan politics, Schmitt’s enemy-friend dichotomy is a 
suitable interpretation of the regularly changing friend-enemy relationships between 
various tribes which are foundations of political parties. As explained previously, the 
Kikuyu–Luo dichotomy, with other tribes on either side, is the friend-enemy complex 
shaping Kenyan politics. Yet this friend-enemy relationship between the Kikuyu and the 
Luo is not permanent, in fact major political changes, for instance the struggle for self-
governance in the 1950-60s and multiparty democracy in 1990s, were achieved when the 
Kikuyu and the Luo were ‘friends’. 
When Schmitt is read in the Kenyan context, the tribal cleavages are “sufficiently strong to 
group” Kenyans in the friend-enemy dichotomy. Without a doubt, tribal identities are 
significant to politics in Kenya, even though there are other antitheses like religion, age, 
regional and economic factors. Although tribes are natural, unlike political parties that are 
a human creation for political association, the tribe as a non-political antithesis has 
undergone what Schmitt (1996) terms as pushing aside the non-political by the political 
antithesis. Subsequently, the otherwise non-political tribal identities have become political, 
making the tribe the most extreme political antithesis.   
Schmitt (1996:39) argues: 
If...the economic, cultural or religious [or even tribal] counterforces are so 
strong that they are in position to decide upon the extreme possibility from 
their viewpoints, then these forces have in actuality become the new 
substance of the political entity.  
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Ethnic groups in Kenya are, therefore, the true composition of ‘the political’— the friend 
enemy relationship that is the foundation of politics. Because ‘the political’ is enshrined in 
ethnic groups, democracy in Kenya is a struggle between different ethnic groups, not 
political parties as imagined by proponents of liberal democracy.     
The Schmittian description of politics leaves us with the challenge of domesticating hostility 
by defusing antagonism that permanently exists in society. One approach of achieving this 
is through democracy which Pantaloni (2010:1-2) contends is widely regarded as the most 
effective means of political decision-making. Democracy, argues Louw (2010:10), is a rule-
based mechanism guiding competition for gaining and using power. Erman (2009:1042) 
writes how a democratic system should be designed to provide arenas for citizens to 
express their disagreements and confront their differences (see also the works by Chantal 
Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau, William Connolly, and Bonnie Honig).  
4.4.2 Chantal Mouffe’s Agonistic Democracy  
The Concept of the Political (Schmitt, 1927), was resurrected, without Nazi dishonour, in 
post-communist Europe when liberal democracy’s ‘consensus at the centre’ not only failed 
to maintain consensus but also acted as the ‘constitutive outside’ that created 
fundamentalisms. Mouffe borrows Jacques Derrida’s notion of the ‘constitutive outside’, to 
describe how the outside is “incommensurable with the inside, [is]…at the same time, the 
condition of emergence of the latter.” This means what is ‘outside’ is not simply negation 
of the inside but something which questions it. As such, our antagonism against ‘them’ is 
not the constitutive opposite “but the symbol of what makes ‘us’ impossible” (Mouffe, 
2000:13). As such, antagonism cannot be eliminated. Therefore, the task of democratic 
politics is to create the conditions for absorption of the conflict.  
Mouffe eliminated Schmitt’s inclination towards violence by dissolving the binaries 
between ‘the political’, the antagonisms inherent in human being, and politics, the “set of 
practices and institutions through which an order is created, organizing human coexistence 
in the context of conflictuality provided by the political” (Mouffe, 2005a:9). This argument 
is against attempts to remove conflict from politics, like liberal democracy has attempted, 
but at the same time taming the violence in Schmitt’s proposal. In fact she warns against 
developing methods for arriving at a rational consensus since the agreements can only be 
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achieved through exclusion of powerless voices. Without a doubt, attempts at attaining 
consensus without exclusion faces the impossibility of constructing an ‘us’ that does not 
have a corresponding ‘them’ (Mouffe, 2009:8). Instead of removing conflict, democratic 
politics should develop a mechanism of seeing others not as enemies to be destroyed, but 
as adversaries whose ideas are fought. To put it in another way, instead of exclusionary 
consensus, politics should convert conflict into struggles between adversaries rather than 
allow antagonism between enemies.  
Acknowledging that the conflict and antagonism in the political can never be completely 
eradicated, but only controlled, means accepting that democracy is paradoxical. Although 
democracy is a channel for taming antagonism, achieving a final resolution to conflict puts 
the democracy at risk: “the very moment of its realization would see its 
disintegration…conflict and antagonism are at the same time its condition of possibility 
and the condition of impossibility of its full realization.” (Mouffe, 1993:8). Democracy is 
both at risk when there is insufficient consensus, and when its agonistic dynamic is 
hindered by an apparent excess of consensus which risks pushing the excluded, Mouffe 
(1993:6) argues, towards joining fundamentalist movements or antiliberal, populist forms 
of democracy.  
To Mouffe (2005a:10), “it is the lack of understanding of ‘the political’ in its ontological 
dimension which is at the origin of our current incapacity to think in a political way.” That 
is to say we can only return politics to itself if we develop strategies for taming, rather than 
denying ineradicability of ‘the political’ — the conflicatual nature of politics. Since ‘the 
political’ is always potentially antagonistic, it means every social order is a hegemonic 
intervention that does not depend “on any a priori social rationality” but functions by 
concealing itself (Mouffe, 2005a:17). Simply put, every order is acheived by exclusion of 
other possibilities. Therefore, although sedimented social order makes it looks like 
antagonism has been eradicated from ‘the political’, order means hegemony has 
succeeded in excluding some possibilities. It is order through exclusion not consensus. 
That is to say social order  
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…is the realm of sedimented practices, that is, practices that conceal 
the originary acts of their contingent political institution and which are 
taken for granted, as if they were self-grounded. (Mouffe, 2005a:17).  
It is the political upheavals that followed what was otherwise thought to be the ‘end of 
history’ that motivated Chantal Mouffe to adjust Schmitt’s concept to create a non-
rationalist theory that could explain why the Left-Right consensus had initiated nationalism 
uprisings and growth of new antagonisms. Although the ‘end of history’ created an illusion 
of the end of antagonisms, what followed was widespread emergence of particularisms 
that challenged Western universalism, events that could not be understood under the 
liberal democracy paradigm (see Mouffe, 1993:1). The agonistic democracy project was 
proposed to fill the gap created by liberal democracy’s inability to explain the antagonisms 
that trailed the end of history.  
Agonistic democracy is Mouffe’s (1993) reconceptualisation of Schmitt’s concept of “the 
political” to describe a type of democracy that returns ‘the political’ to politics by providing 
a solution to the inherent violence, a democracy critical of mainstream deliberative 
democracy that was accused of attempting to eliminate politics at the end of history. 
Through the concept of agonistic democracy, Mouffe (1993) revises Schmitt’s concepts of 
“the political” and antagonism to propose a way of transforming the ineradicable 
antagonism in the friend-enemy relationship into agonism, a process through which the 
society can manage conflict inherent in politics and avoid transforming differences into 
violence or war.  
The term agonism is derived from the Greek word agon, meaning contest or strife 
(Wenman, 2015:25), while agonistic democracy is a form of alternative democracy 
modelled along the antagonistic nature of human beings, who Kant (2006:6) states, have 
“unsociable sociability”. Agonism, according to Wenman (2015:33), is the rebirth of tragedy 
that has created “a world without hope of redemption from suffering and strife.” However, 
tragedy in agonistic democracy is neither a neo-classical revival nor ‘a nostalgic appeal’ 
to the Greek past; but as clarified by Kalyvas (2009:13), tragedy should be understood as 
“a ‘de-Hellenisation’ of the agonism” from its ancient signification. 
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The re-introduction of small-scale face-to-face politics through social media is reminiscent 
of the Greek past. Like the ancient and post-modern agon, there is “conflict, suffering, and 
strife...endemic in social and political life and not a temporary condition on a journey 
towards reconciliation or redemption.” Social media incivility can be seen as what Wenman 
(2015:35) characterised “as an impossible contest between two or more rivalries but 
nonetheless legitimate powers, between incommensurate conceptions of the good, where 
neither has unqualified right or virtue on their side”, like the rivalry between Antigone and 
Creon in Antigone. Rather than closure, the play demands open-ended discussion with 
regular shifts in the antagonist/protagonist dichotomy. 
Therefore, incivility in social media discourse is the tragedy in agonistic democracy that 
does not signify danger to human life. Conversely, it should be viewed from Wenman’s 
(2015:38) hypothesis that “removal of conflict is not the goal of politics”, suggesting that 
conflict can be displaced by contending parties in ways that are mutually beneficial. This 
line of reasoning is what Nietzsche (1998:22) emphasises in the value of having enemies, 
because self-preservation is best served if the opposition does not lose all strength.  
Just like Schmitt, Mouffe sees antagonism as inherent to human relations but proposes 
ways of dealing with it through sublimation of the antagonism. To Mouffe (1993:04), to 
manage antagonism: 
It requires that, within the context of the political community, the 
opponent should be considered not as an enemy to be destroyed, 
but as an adversary whose existence is legitimate and must be 
tolerated. We will fight against his ideas but we will not question his 
right to defend them. 
It means agonism is contestation not a ‘struggle-to-death’, a form of rivalry between equal 
forces. Mouffe (2000:100-103) contrasts agonism with antagonism (mutually destructive 
forms of hostility) arguing that the challenge is how to transform contemporary forms of 
antagonism — like fundamentalism — into constructive modes of conflict.  It is Mouffe’s 
concern with solving antagonism that differentiates her theory from those of other neo-
Schmittian opponents of liberal democracy. 
Following Schmitt’s friend-enemy principle, Mouffe (2002:03) cautions against any attempt 
to eliminate antagonism from politics as antagonism forms politics. The attempt to 
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eliminate antagonism from politics ends up replacing the political with the “juridical and the 
moral”, thereby attempting to achieve impartial decisions as alternatives to antagonism 
(Mouffe, 2000:03). The author believes liberalism’s rejection of “antagonism is what 
prevents liberal theory from understanding democratic politics.”  
Since it is impossible to arrive at rational consensus at the centre without exclusion, as the 
constitution of the ‘Us; is based on the existence of ‘Them’, the important issue in 
democratic politics is, therefore, to develop a strategy to establish the ‘Us-Them’ 
relationship in which the ‘Other’ is not seen as an enemy to be destroyed but as an 
adversary whose ideas can be fought, but who retains the right to defend the adversarial 
ideas. By doing so, conflict is converted from ‘antagonism’— the struggle between 
enemies, to ‘agonism’— the struggle between adversaries (Mouffe, 2002:09). 
Consequently, 
The ‘agonistic struggle’ – the very condition of a vibrant democracy 
– consists of this confrontation between adversaries. In the agonistic 
model the prime task of democratic politics is neither to eliminate 
passions nor to relegate them to the private sphere in order to 
establish a rational consensus in the public sphere; it is, rather, to 
‘tame’ these passions by mobilizing them for democratic ends and 
by creating collective forms of identification around democratic 
objectives (Mouffe, 2002:09). 
 
Proponents of agonistic democracy propose how to ‘tame’ passions by mobilising them to 
reinvigorate democracy (see Mouffe, 2002:10). Agonistic democracy is characterised by 
a constant struggle between opposing hegemonic projects, struggles which cannot be 
stopped rationally. However, this confrontation, opines Mouffe (2012:11), is played out 
under conditions regulated by a set of acceptable democratic procedures. 
 
To Mouffe (2000:104) “[a] well-functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of 
democratic political positions” without which there is the danger of the suppressed 
democratic confrontation  being replaced by “confrontation among other forms of collective 
identification…and an explosion of antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility.” 
The exclusion caused by consensus has been naturalised by conventional media–the 
traditional newspapers, radio and television–through gatekeeping, what Mouffe (2000:05) 
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argues was a status quo that has been “made into the way ‘things really are’.” By contrast, 
social media is denaturalising exclusion by allowing users to continuously disagree, a 
reflection of “multiplicity of voices [in] contemporary pluralist societies” (ibid, 104).  
 
Extreme speech in social media indicates that this new channel is encouraging dissensus 
instead of consensus. Dissensus should be seen as a source of progress because it 
denaturalises what has hegemonically been made to look natural. The shortcoming of 
agonism is how to avert discord, what Rescher (1993:165) termed keeping temperatures 
low and limiting discord to the verbal arena.  It is agonistic democracy’s strategy of allowing 
vibrant clash of political positions to block possibilities of extreme antidemocratic political 
identities that make the concept of agonism relevant in explaining how extreme speech 
can reinvigorate democracy in the post ‘end of history era’. What seems extreme speech 
in social media can block the emergence of fundamental ethnic, nationalist or religious 
identities when opponents in social media are adversaries to contend with, but not 
enemies to be destroyed (cf. Mouffe, 1993:5-6). 
 
Mouffe (2012:632) cautions that “the political” is the antagonistic dimensions inherent in 
all human societies and cannot be eliminated even though democracy can keep this 
antagonism at bay by providing the institutions, practices, and language games, thanks to 
which antagonism can, so to speak, be sublimated and transformed into “agonism”. 
Instead of keeping the possibility of antagonism at bay by solving these underlying causes, 
and in fear of the negative consequences of politics, deliberative democracy attempts to 
eliminate politics through consensus. Yet consensus cannot eliminate politics since 
Kenyan politics revolves around ethnic identities. As Mouffe (2012:262) suggests, there is 
no way antagonism could ever be totally eliminated without also requiring the 
disappearance of collective identities.  
Likewise, Mouffe (1993:06) rejects attempts to remove conflict from politics arguing that: 
When there is a lack of democratic political struggles with which to 
identify, their place is taken by other forms of identification, of ethnic, 
nationalist or religious nature, and the opponent is defined in those 
terms too. In such conditions, the opponent cannot be perceived as 
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an adversary to contend with, but only as an enemy to be destroyed. 
This is precisely what a pluralist democracy must avoid; yet it can 
only protect itself against such a situation by recognising the nature 
of the political instead of denying its existence.... Democracy is in 
peril not only when there is insufficient consensus and allegiance to 
the values it embodies, but also when its agonistic dynamic is 
hindered by an apparent excess, of consensus, which usually masks 
a disquieting apathy. 
While the dominant liberal democracy has eliminated the adversarial practices in politics, 
emphasising consensus beyond the Left and Right, politics always entails the us/them 
relationship (Mouffe, 2005b:56). To put it differently, the consensus encouraged by 
guardians of the liberal ‘non-partisan’ democracy cannot exist as consensus is in itself 
created by “drawing a frontier and defining an exterior, a ‘them’ which assures the identity 
of the consensus and secures the coherence of the ‘us’”. Thus, the consensus advocated 
by proponents of post-political democracy cannot exist because “[t]here cannot be an 'us' 
without a ‘them’, and the very identity of a group depends on the existence of a 'constitutive 
outside” (Mouffe, 2005b:61). 
To avoid situations where the friend/enemy frontier explodes into violence, Mouffe 
(1993:4) proposes that the opponent in agonistic democracy should be displaced from 
being an enemy to be destroyed, into an adversary to be tolerated in order to bring back 
to politics what Schmitt had pointed out as antagonisms that can never be eliminated but 
can be given a political outlet to defuse hostility. For example, parliamentary systems are 
structured as struggling armies with the counting of the vote ending the battle. Contrary, 
the illusion of consensus is fatal for democracy as the absence of a political frontier opens 
up possibilities of the extreme to articulate antidemocratic political identities such as 
fundamental ethnic, nationalist or religious identities: here the opponent is not an 
adversary to contend with, but an enemy to be destroyed (Mouffe, 1993:5-6).  
A healthy democratic process calls for a vibrant clash of political 
positions and an open conflict of interests. If such is missing, it can 
too easily be replaced by a confrontation between non-negotiable 
moral values and essentialist identities. 
Agonistic democracy can be an alternative to liberal democracy despite the current 
imbalances in geopolitical structure which have made liberal democracy hegemonic. 
Mouffe (2009:557) cautions that because other societies deal with the question of 
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democracy in a different way, we need a model following a non-Western path, even 
though: 
... all those who want to develop vernacular models of democracy 
face the same problem with respect to the West: its refusal to 
acknowledge forms of democracy different from the liberal 
democratic one. Western powers are adamant that the only 
legitimate democracy is their current interpretation: multi-party 
electoral democracy, accompanied by an individualistic conception 
of human rights, and of course by free market policies. This is the 
model that they claim to have the moral duty to promote, or impose 
if necessary. 
 
At the same time, Mouffe (2009:557) accepts the universality of Western deliberative 
democracy and suggests that it is worthy of our allegiance, but notes that there is no 
reason to present it as the only legitimate way of organising human coexistence and to try 
to impose it on the rest of the world. She highlights the fact that the kind of individualism 
dominant in Western societies is alien to many other cultures [like sub-Saharan cultures], 
“whose traditions are informed by different values, and democracy is understood as ‘rule 
by the people’ and can, therefore, take other forms in which, for instance the value of 
community is more pregnant than the idea of individual liberty”. 
 
Liberalism romanticises a well-ordered society “from which politics has been eliminated” 
(Mouffe, 2005c:226), a world without conflict and violence. But Mouffe (2005:226) urges 
against this Habermasian view of democracy as the absence of domination or violence, 
instead suggesting the establishment of a set of institutions through which domination or 
violence can be contested. Habermas argues that communication should bring about a 
rational/reasoned agreement through “reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, 
mutual trust, and accord with one another” that leads to agreement based on recognition 
of the corresponding validity of claims of comprehensibility, truthfulness, and rightness 
(Habermas, 1979:3). In other words, rational consensus is grounded in communicative 
rationality which is based “on the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, 




Contrary to Habermas’ rational agreement, discussion in social media cannot be explained 
from a communicatively rational, consensual, and harmonious perspective. Instead, 
extreme speech is a common occurrence in social media; meaning that conflicting 
differences between social media users should not be viewed as negativities to be 
eliminated but rather as diverse values to be recognised in political discourse. This 
demands alternative thinking and renouncing of the rational view of politics that suggests 
consensus not based on any form of exclusion since reaching consensus without 
exclusion is contrary to agonistic democracy. Even the rationalist Habermas (1989b:94-6) 
argues that the growth of the press and propaganda expanded the public beyond the 
bourgeoisie, fragmenting the public’s social exclusivity and cohesion. Consequently, 
conflicts entered and made the public sphere “a field of competition among interests in the 
cruder forms of forcible confrontation.”  To solve these confrontations, suggests Habermas 
(1989b:96), social organisations started taking over political functions of the public sphere 
leading to “refeudalisation” of the public sphere where “large scale organisations strived 
for political compromises with the state...behind doors if possible; but at the same 
time...secured at least plebiscitarian approval from the mass of the population through the 
deployment of a staged form of publicity.” This is in line with Althusser’s (1979) description 
of the mass media as an ideological state apparatus that interpels the people.  
 
Unlike the conventional media channels, — the newspapers, radio and television — social 
media is not controlled by the ruling class, at least for now. Thus, the social media have 
given an opportunity to the plebeians to express views without going through traditional 
ruling class-controlled media structures. These traditional media structures have been 
socialised to eliminate conflict thus enhancing the hegemony of the ruling class.      
 
Mouffe’s (2005:226) critique of Habermas asserts that consensus without exclusion 
implies once such consensus has been obtained, it cannot be legitimately challenged. 
Conversely, the kind of consensus needed in a democracy is a ‘conflictual consensus’.  To 
Mouffe (2005), ‘conflictual consensus’ on the ‘ethico-political’ principles of the liberal 
democratic regime on liberty and equality for all, gives a chance to the possibility of serious 




Rather than attempt to eliminate dissent, Mouffe (2005) identifies contest as the central 
dynamic of any democratic politics since the “adversary” is central in democratic politics. 
However, the author revises Carl Schmitt’s principle of friend/enemy relationship, by 
stating that contrary to the “enemy” who does not have any shared principles and whose 
confrontation is of an antagonistic nature, “adversaries” have different interpretations of 
shared principles and they fight for their interpretation to become hegemonic.  
 
Mouffe (2005) refers to democratic politics as the fight between adversaries – the 
“agonistic” struggle, and argues that one should never try to put an end to the agonistic 
confrontation. Additionally, antagonism, which is converted into agonism in pluralist 
democratic models, cannot “disappear by simply denying and wishing it away, which is the 
typical liberal [democracy] gesture” instead, denial of antagonism in the political only leads 
to a situation where liberalism cannot explain various forms of antagonism and forms of 
violence, which liberalism assumes were part of the past age when reason had not yet 
managed to control the supposedly archaic passions in politics (Mouffe 2009:550). 
 
If we acknowledge the dimension of ‘agonism’, social media can offer an avenue for 
legitimate, ‘agonistic’ forms of conflict by providing a platform for unlimited public 
discussions. Instead of achieving the idealised public sphere and rational political 
unification of the public as proposed by Habermas, social media can support an agonistic 
public sphere organised around different identities in friend/enemy relationships. This is 
what Mouffe (2009:553) refers to as legitimate agonistic forms of conflict – which is the 
legitimate political contest -- that would not bring about the end of conflicts, but would make 
conflicts less likely to take an antagonistic form (i.e. turn in to real violence or war) than in 
a world with a single legitimate economic and political model imposed on all because of 
its supposedly superior rationality and morality, like it is practiced in liberal democracy 
models. 
 
Mouffe (1993) contends that it is impossible to have rational agreements in democracy 
without excluding part of the public; instead, disagreement leads to true democratic 
emancipation. According to Mouffe (1993:8): 
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For a radical and plural democracy, the belief that a final resolution 
of conflicts is eventually possible, even if envisaged as an asymptotic 
approach to the regulative ideal of a free and unconstrained 
communication, as in Habermas, far from providing the necessary 
horizon of the democratic project, is something that puts it at risk. 
 
It is Mouffe’s view that politics is not “conflict resolution”, rather it is balancing the play of 
power and, therefore, the heart of true democracy is a contest or agonism. Mouffe asserts 
that contrary to popular assumption, liberal democracy is essentially not a democracy but 
more of tyrannies that attempt to remove contentions and political contestations from 
politics. In other words, liberal democracy attempts to sanitise politics by outlawing it: it 
tries to create “politics without politics” by replacing political debate and political decision-
making with decision-making by “rational” bureaucrats and technicians who are not 
accountable to the public. 
 
Habermas’s proposal of creating a rational consensus through free discussion, Mouffe 
(1995:334) argues, conceives politics “through a model elaborated to study economics as 
a market concerned with the allocation of resources where compromises are reached 
among interests defined independently of their political articulation. In many cases rational 
consensus has meant the rejection of alternative views when disagreement needs to be 
permanent in politics. Indeed, Mouffe (1995:335) notes: 
The political has to do with the dimension of antagonism which is 
present in social relations, with the ever-present possibility of an “us–
them” relation to be constructed in terms of “friend–enemy.” To deny 
this dimension of antagonism does not make it disappear; it only 
leads to impotence in recognizing its different manifestations and in 
dealing with them. This is why a democratic approach needs to come 
to terms with the ineradicable character of antagonism. One of its 
main tasks is to envisage how it is possible to defuse the tendencies 
to exclusion which are present in all constructions of collective 
identities.  
 
Mouffe’s criticism of liberal democracy is, in particular, relevant to Africa where the tenets 
of liberal democracy like fair/free elections are lacking. For instance, power is not 
necessarily acquired through winning elections nor does losing elections lead to a loss of 
power. With failed electoral processes, rulers who lose refuse to hand over power, while 
the opposition often does not accept defeat and some of them turn to violent means to 
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acquire power. It is as if rigging and contesting elections are poll strategies. This is the 
status of the political in Africa, and it is outside liberal democratic principles. 
Although Mouffe’s work is tied to the left-right politics, especially in relation to the collapse 
of the communist bloc, her ideas are equally relevant in the interpretation of politics in 
Africa. For instance, the crisis witnessed after the re-introduction of multipartism in 1992 
and the 2007 elections can be linked to the need for “redrawing the political frontier 
between friend and enemy” after consensus, considering that it is impossible to have a 
world without antagonism (Mouffe, 1993:2). It is the emphasis of consensus as a 
replacement of political frontiers between adversaries that causes violent explosions. The 
violence that comes out of periods following agreements is what Mouffe (2005:60) terms 
the “negative consequences of consensus politics”.  
Unity of a political grouping is secured by identification of ‘them’, the ‘constitutive outside’. 
However, unlike in Western democracies where ‘them’ was constituted by the right or left 
wing, before the ‘end of history’, this dichotomy does not create the constitutive outside in 
Kenya. While the collapse of the communist bloc vanished the friend-enemy frontier in 
Western countries, leading to resurgence ethnic, national, religious antagonisms, the 
friend-enemy frontier in Kenya does not fit the right-left Western model. Instead, there are 
an amalgam of groups that create frontiers based on their diverse subject positions. For 
instance, during the struggle for multiparty democracy in early 1990s, the ruling party Kanu 
acted as the constitutive outside for the opposition. But when this constitutive outside 
disappeared after consensus about the return of multiparty democracy, there was a rapid 
breakup of the opposition party, FORD, with some former adherents joining Kanu. This 
was in addition to the growth of ethnic nationalisms. In fact, the first election-related ethnic 
violence occurred in 1992, soon after multiparty democracy was reinstated, a situation that 
can be seen as a process of creating a new frontier from enemies found in the ethnic other. 
It can be argued, following Mouffe (1993:5) that the end of single party dictatorship in 
Kenya, just like the blurring of political frontiers between left and right, was harmful to 
democratic politics as it impeded the constitution of distinctive political identities, but 
encouraged growth of “collective identities around religious, nationalist or ethnic forms of 
identification” (see Mouffe, 1993:5). 
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The violence that followed the end of single party dictatorship in Kenya in 1992 and the 
fallout of the Mwai Kibaki-Raila Odinga Narc coalition that took over from long serving 
President Moi, can be understood, Mouffe (1993:2) would say, as part of the “crisis of 
political identity that confronts liberal democracy following the loss of the traditional 
landmarks of politics”, in this case the end of single party dictatorship that acted as the 
constitutive outside. President Moi’s Kanu fizzled out of active politics after the former 
president’s preferred candidate Uhuru Kenyatta lost to Mwai Kibaki in 2002. The party 
supported Kibaki’s Party of National Unity in the controversial 2007 elections. 
Consequently, the 2007/08 post-election ethnic violence was an outcome of the 
consensus that brought the constitutive outside inside, creating a democracy without 
political adversaries.    
Considering the fact that social media has increased extreme speech, Mouffe’s theory of 
antagonism can provide a suitable grounding from which to explain extreme speech as 
part of political practices rather than a juridical problem. From Mouffe’s perspective, 
extreme speech is a new tool for creating a “constitutive outside.” Thus, instead of 
proposing juridical solutions, the concept of agonism can be used to explain how elements 
of antagonism, such as extreme speech, reinvigorate democracy by returning politics to 
democracy considering the fact that “the political” in its antagonistic dimensions cannot be 
eliminated from politics but can at best be given fissure by being transformed into agonism. 
Furthermore, the concept of agonism can enable us to explain the failure of deliberative 
democracy in Kenya by providing an alternative to the binary opposition of deliberative 
democracy and extreme speech.  
Moreover, consensus does not always yield to the most rational decision. In fact, there 
can “be good as well as bad consensus”— an agreement that is evil or stupid as well as 
an agreement that is benign and wise, 1,000 people can be just as wrong-headed (or 
wrong-minded) as a single individual (Rescher, 1993:15). This means that bad consensus 
is a weakness of liberal democracy. For example, decisions made through elections have 
led to bad consensus that legitimises corrupt and ineffective governments. In many cases, 
the consensus in liberal democracies is an outcome of propaganda, brainwashing, 
coercion and even election rigging, not necessarily rational persuasion. For example, 
President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto were elected in 2013 while indicted 
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by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague for crimes against humanity. In 
fact, it is the ICC indictment that acted as the constitutive outsider to energise their ethnic 
identities. Their election was more of successful propaganda than rational persuasion as 
proponents of deliberative democracy would want to say. This means we need alternatives 
to deliberative democracy.    
Since politics is divisive by its nature, deliberations between different ethnic identities in 
Kenya have been confrontational, meaning that ‘the political’ defines the relationship 
between different ethnic groups in Kenya. After all, the state arose as a means of keeping 
class [ethnic] antagonisms in check, even though the state later became a powerful ruling 
class that held down and exploited the oppressed (Mentan, 2010:06). Therefore, political 
hostilities are fundamental and pre-existing and not necessarily created by incivilities in 
social media debates. Indeed, when it comes to the creation of a collective identity, the 
creation of an “us” by the demarcation of a “them,”  always has the possibility of the “them 
and us” relationship becoming one of “friend and enemy,” that is, becoming antagonistic 
rather than agonistic (Mouffe 2009:335). In such situations, the dichotomy of friend-enemy 
antagonism, which defines pre-political state of war needs to be transformed into agonistic 
debating adversaries.  It is this agonistic nature of political discourse that leads to incivility, 
“speech that may be readily regulated or even suppressed, consistent with core precepts 
of [liberal] democracy” (Weinstein 2009:36), or the category of negativity that is 
“excessively harsh” (Brooks & Geer, 2007:1). Contrary to liberal democracy ideals, Mouffe 
(2012) states that antagonism can be turned into agonism if adversaries share a common 
symbolic space and recognise at least to some degree, the legitimacy of the claims of their 
opponents leading to a form of “conflictual consensus”.  
 
Although in Kenya, like in most of the sub-Saharan countries, political competition is based 
on ethnic identities, it does not mean there are no alternative identities. It only means that 
for the time being, ethnic identities are the modus operandi of national politics. In fact, the 
controversial 2007 presidential elections were partly structured on alternative identities like 
socioeconomic promises for the underprivileged, the youth and devolution through 
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majimbo.3 In addition, even as ethnic identities shape national political discourse, 
competition within ethnic groups has been shaped by alternative identities like age, 
socioeconomic status and education, among others. 
 
The function of extreme speech in reinvigorating democracy has been blurred by the 
nostalgia for past forms of political engagement that idealise civic iterations in a public 
sphere imposed on people by representative democracy models (Papacharissi, 2010:12). 
This nostalgia, emanating from previous forms engagement, is based on the assumption 
that conversation reflects a healthy democracy. Yet conversational democracy has 
supported the exclusive and elitist mainstream media. Contrary to the nostalgic 
democracy, social media has reduced levels of public conversation, but provided new 
avenues for individualised participation in politics outside the formal channels of 
engagement (see Papacharissi (2010:14). Unfortunately, democratic societies have failed 
to appropriate new the opportunities provided by social media due to their rationalistic 
frameworks that ignore ‘the political’ (cf. Mouffe, 2000:60). For example, although social 
media have increased commodification of private spaces into political spaces thereby 
creating newer political practices that are different from the nostalgic civic public 
engagement, we must relinquish the rational framework of democracy to appreciate how 
the private sphere can play a role in politics. To Mouffe (2000:62), the crucial task is to 
acknowledge that there might be forms of political organisation, therefore, liberal 
democracy should renounce its claim to universality. This study is a push for the 
renunciation of universality and an attempt to develop particularistic concepts that can 
explain current antagonistic engagements without tailoring them to fit hegemonic liberal 
democracy. In other words, this is a project in the family of others out to challenge the 
triumphalism of the liberal democracy model.  
                                                          
3Jimbo (majimbo plural) is a Kiswahili word meaning region. Majimboism (regionalism) 
was a key identity that differentiated KADU (proponents) from KANU, the two parties 
involved in first election after independence. The Constitution of Kenya¸ 2010 is modelled 
along this regionalism thinking. The debate remains relevant in contemporary Kenya. 
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4.5. Relevance of Agonism to the Kenyan Context 
Despite Mouffe having developed her project to explain the growth of right-wing parties in 
the post-political Europe, to some extent being applicable in South America, and 
explaining the positive outcome of dissensus, the agonistic model of democracy has less 
acceptance not because it is less coherent or underdeveloped but “because agonism is 
less conventional, in terms of both the modes of argumentation typically invoked by 
agonistic democrats and the prescriptions they offer for the renewal of democracy” 
(Wenman, 2015:03). The situation is worse in Africa, considering that a review of literature 
indicates neither Mouffe’s work nor other agonistic democracy works have been used to 
interpret African politics. This study attempts to mainstream agonistic democracy in Africa 
by using it to explain how extreme speech in social media can be an asset to democracy. 
Undeniably, liberal democracy has been supported by mainstream media which has 
traditionally been hostile to dissenting voices, but social media is amplifying alternative 
voices parallel to aspirations of Mouffe’s agonism.   
 
Secondly, the work of Mouffe attempts to universalise European particularism when she 
equates consensus to the post-communist European era. Although agonism is a suitable 
description of the growth of right-wing parties and the violence that followed the collapse 
of communism, African democracy has experienced consensuses outside the blurring of 
the left-right divide. As Ajulu (1995:230) argues: 
…the concept 'the left' is ambiguous in Kenyan context. …For 
historical reasons, the so-called left has not existed as an organised 
political force. If it exists at all, it has been characterised by 
organisational weak-ness and numerical insignificance. 
 
The formation of the left can be traced to trade union movements of the 1940-50s, which 
later morphed into KANU in early 1960s (Ajulu, 1995). Even though the leftists — urban 
working class, traders, lumpens, the peasantry, and of course, the embryonic indigenous 
bourgeoisie— were an instrumental force behind KANU's capture of state-power in 1961, 
soon after, the “embryonic bourgeoisie” took over the party and expelled left leaning 
members. The first post-colonial regrouping of the left was the formation of Kenya People 
Union in 1966 by radical politicians who had been expelled from parliament. The party was 
banned in 1969. The next were attempts in the late 1970s and early 1980s by anti-
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government radical students and the intelligentsia (ibid, 231). Moi used state apparatus 
after the 1982 attempted coup to clamp down on the second regrouping, forcing it into 
underground operation. This brief history shows that the concept of leftist politics, the 
politics traditionally understood to be advocating for Marxist political ideas, “is probably 
inappropriate [when defining]…traditions and political practices” in Kenyan politics (Ajulu, 
1995:231). 
 
Mouffe’s concept of agonistic democracy would have been more useful if she included 
consensus in societies transiting from other forms of democracy or even dictatorship. 
Thus, the challenges facing liberal democracy, a democracy that has since gained 
universal acceptance, should be properly situated, instead of limiting it to the collapse of 
the left. For example, in Kenya, the challenge to liberal democracy has been the era 
following the end of single-party rule, while South Africa’s challenges are in the post- 
apartheid period. These two examples show that consensus can happen between other 
contending actors other than the left-right divide. As a matter of fact, the left-right divide in 
Kenya and many other African countries ended years before the ‘end of history’. 
 
Rather than returning the left-right divide, reactivation of ‘the political’ through extreme 
speech in social media is reminiscent of democracy in Ancient Greece. As Dover (1972:34) 
explains, historically, democratic speech was rough, vulgar and insulting beyond what we 
consider acceptable today. For example, in Ancient Greece, the birthplace of modern 
democracy, politicians were often smeared with offences of taking bribes and involving in 
prostitution; they were accused of being: 
 ...ugly, diseased, prostituted perverts, the sons of whores by 
foreigners who bribed their way into citizenship... it seemed to be the 
business of comedy to grumble and slander, and to speak fair of a 
politician or general would have been discordant with its functions as 
means by which the ordinary man asserts himself against his political 
and military superiors (Dover, 1972:34-35).  
Like in Ancient Greece, extreme speech in social media can be seen as a struggle to 
contest the established power relationship outside the universalised left-right divide. In 
relation to Kenya, a country that did not go through the left-right divide before the “end of 
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history”, extreme speech is a threat to liberal democracy as it provides an opportunity for 
non-class identities to replace classical class struggles to change power relations. More 
so, increased participation in social media comes years after confirmed failure of the 
classical working class struggle through what Laclau and Mouffe (1987:80) describe as 
the emergence of proletariat dictatorship that discredited ‘socialism’. But failure of the 
working class only concealed but did not mean the end of the ‘political’. Thus, incivility in 
social media is productive as it re-invigorates ‘the political’ by providing an alternative to 
classical class struggle that previously symbolised it.   
Therefore, even with some shortcomings related to conceptualisation of ‘political’ as a left-
right antagonism, Mouffe’s work remains a suitable alternative to deliberative democracy 
and is among leading descriptions of how consensus can serve as a catalyst for the 
emergence of violent conflicts. Indeed, Mouffe’s agonism project is a critique of 
deliberative democracy’s inability to acknowledge that power and antagonism are 
ineradicable characters of politics. With this elaboration, the next section utilises Laclau 
and Mouffe (1985) book to develop a Discourse Analysis method for critiquing the taken-







PART II: Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory as a Method 
In the last chapter of the previous section, Chantal Mouffe’s concept of agonism, a concept 
she developed by transforming Carl Schmitt’s friend-enemy principle, was used to discuss 
how incivility in social media, as part of ‘the political’, can promote radical democracy. 
When used by the subalterns in their daily struggle against the ruling elites, incivility in 
social media becomes a counter-hegemonic strategy that can advance agonistic 
democracy, but when used against the subaltern, incivility is antidemocratic. Here incivility 
is similar to subversive but progressive counterhegemonic artistic movements like 
Dadaism, Surrealism, Fluxus and Situationism (see Cammearts, 2007:75), the bizarre, 
nonsensical and beyond reason performative practices that have been used to subvert 
dominant thinking since early 20th Century.  The purpose of this section is to develop a 
method for empirical Discourse Analysis from Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) book, 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy:  Towards a Radical Democratic Politics and use the 
method to critique the taken-for-granted understanding of incivility in social media. Since 
Laclau and Mouffe did not develop a strategy for using Discourse Theory as a method for 
empirical research, this study advances the theory by transforming it into a post-
foundational research strategy. It can be argued that Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) book is 
more of a theoretical framework for an ideological critique rather than a method for 
empirical analysis of ‘text’. Even as a research orientation, Laclau and Mouffe’s concepts 
of ‘text’ and ‘discourse’ analysis, for example as used in analysis of metaphors, metonymy 
and catachresis at the ontological level, is different from how the concepts are used by 
other discourse analysts (cf. Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, Wodak & Meyer, 2001). For 
instance, the latter’s Critical Discourse Analysis separates the discursive from non-
discursive structures in contrast to Laclau and Mouffe’s ontological views that everything 
is discursive, even though they do not give guidelines about how to empirically study the 
discursive world ontologically.  
 
Considering that social media is the medium that has popularised present-day incivility, 
discourse analysis of incivility in social media should examine both the medium (as text) 
and the conventional linguistic ‘texts’ in line with Laclau and Mouffe’s views that everything 
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is discursive. Without doubt, it is the adoption of a new medium — social media — by 
subalterns that led to widespread mediatised incivility, therefore, Discourse Analysis 
should include the medium as material text. 
 
In this section Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) Discourse Theory is transformed into a method 
for Discourse Analysis by using the theory to explain how the various practices of including 
and excluding meaning — the linguistic and artefacts — are being used in the struggle to 
partially fix the meaning of incivility, a process that can be likened to the impossible attempt 
to construct a centre. The partial fixation of meaning through exclusion of other possible 
meanings is not only achieved through language, but also other articulatory practices 
outside linguistic signs. Although Fairclough (1992) argues that social practice can either 
be discursive or non-discursive, to Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 108), everything is discursive 
as “every object is constituted as an object of discourse”, even non-linguistic ‘texts’ that 
seem non-discursive have a discursive and signifying nature. Therefore, dislocation and 
struggle to partially fix the meaning of incivility is through inclusion and exclusion of other 
possible meanings and means, both linguistic texts and extra-linguistic material ‘texts’, 
although linguistic texts are more overt. For this reason, the study analysed the various 
means of representation, both linguistic texts (with other semiological systems) and extra-
linguistic materials (the medium) that are used by the regime to partially fix the meaning 
of incivility and how subalterns are contesting this partial fixation of meaning as part of the 
struggle against hegemony.  
 
The Discourse Analysis method in this study is enriched by materialist theoretical elements 
(Carpentier, 2017:289), and the medium in particular. Consequently, the study extended 
CDA by including material-semiotic approaches to interpret the medium as ‘text’. In 
conventional CDA, the medium is non-discursive but through material-semiotic 
approaches, the medium is viewed as a discursive part of the non-human agency 
participating in the struggle to centre incivility. Material-semiotic approaches assume 
material practices generate the social, therefore, the social and the technical are 
embedded in each other, meaning that it is impossible to analyse the social without 
analysing its materiality (see Law, 2009:148). Discourse Analysis of social media as text 
follows McLuhan’s (1964/1994:7-15) argument that “the medium is the message” and an 
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“extension of ourselves". From this perspective, social media has become, what Wittes 
and Chong (2014) would have called ‘a common feature of human anatomy’.  In the words 
of Law and Mol (2008), while “linguistic semiotics teaches that words give each other 
meaning…[m]aterial semiotics extends this insight beyond the linguistic and claims that 
entities give each other being” (Law & Mol, 2008: 58). Therefore, researchers should return 
the medium to media studies and avoid privileging content since content is a creation of 
the medium.  Indeed, in the method of Discourse Analysis, discourse is “constituted as 
[any] attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to 
construct a centre” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:112).  
 
The post-foundational discourse analysis method developed from Laclau and Mouffe’s 
Discourse Theory can be differentiated from other categories of discourse analysis, 
Alvesson and Karreman (2000:1127) writes, by defining it as ‘Discourse’ with upper 
case‘D’, the Discourse Analysis of stuff beyond linguistic texts. This is like Foucault’s 
concept of ‘discursive practice’, while discourse with lower case ‘d’ refers to the linguistic 
sense of studying text and talk in social practices. Henceforth, this study uses the terms 
Post-Foundational Discourse Analysis to mean discourse analysis of how stuff beyond 
texts have been used to naturalise the social world although not fully, leaving fissures in 
the dominant discourse. Therefore, the other discourse analysis is taken as being only a 
small part of Discourse Analysis.   
 
To differentiate Post-foundational Discourse Analysis from other forms of discourse 
analysis, the study follows Carpentier and De Cleen (2007) who transformed Laclau and 
Mouffe’s Discourse Theory into Discourse Theoretical Analysis (DTA), thereby creating a 
research method similar to CDA but wider, given that DTA is a post-foundational method 
in which nothing is outside the discursive field since discourse includes within itself the 
linguistic and the extra-linguistic components (cf. Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:100). However, 
this study improves Carpentier and De Cleen’s (2007) DTA by transforming Laclau and 
Mouffe’s (1985:128) suggestions on hegemonic role of tropes into a method for Post-
Foundational Discourse Analysis. Just like Alvesson and Karreman (2000:1127) and 
Carpentier and de Cleen (2007:266), this study uses caps to show the distinction between 




Part II has two chapters: Chapter Five borrows from Carpentier and de Cleen’s (2007) 
DTA to develop Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) Discourse Theory into a methodological 
framework and strategy for analysing incivility in social media from two perspectives: How 
incivility as a democracy-enhancing subversive speech has caused ‘dislocation’ in politics 
by providing an alternative strategy for participating in public discourses; and how the 
wider ‘government’ (from Foucauldian perspective) is struggling to extend its hegemonic 
meaning of incivility through ‘articulation’. Chapter Five proceeds in three main steps: it 
starts by giving a philosophical perspective of the study, followed by the design of a Post-
Foundational Discourse Analysis model from Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) Discourse 
Theory and explanation of the model’s key sensitising concepts. Chapter Six describes 




5.0 Chapter Five   
Applying Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory as a method 
Laclau and Mouffe’s texts aim at theory development, they do not 
include so many practical tools for textually oriented discourse 
analysis. As a result, it can be fruitful to supplement their theory with 
methods from other approaches to discourse analysis. 
Jørgensen and Phillips (2002:24). 
5.1 Ontological and epistemological considerations 
Discourse analysis research approaches contest the possibility of people neutrally 
accounting for their life-word surrounding, arguing that ‘texts’ create and maintain power 
relations that shape society.  Researchers using discourse analysis aim at finding out how 
meaning is produced and circulated in the society through various means of 
representation. By choosing Post-foundational Discourse Analysis as a research method, 
this study makes the following assumptions on ontology, epistemology and axiology 
respectively: extreme speech is experienced as political contestation with no objective 
reality, but what has been naturalised to look like objective reality is just one among many 
other realities; it is not possible to access unmediated knowledge to explain extreme 
speech in an objective way because knowledge is constructed therefore we can only 
understand and interpret the socially constructed meanings of extreme speech but not 
unmediated knowledge; therefore, values have a role in the research process since there 
are no ‘real’ facts ‘out there’ that can be revealed about extreme speech. As stated by 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985:4), there is no discourse “through which the 'Real' might speak 
without mediations”.  
 
The above assumption places this dissertation into the constructionist tradition, in which, 
as Burr (1995:110) argues, ‘objectivity-talk’ claimed by scientists is seen as “part of the 
discourse of science through which a particular version (and vision) of human life is 
constructed” considering that human beings cannot step outside their humanity and view 
the world from no position at all. The study interprets social media incivility as part of the 
‘Real’ world of ‘the political’ (see Schmitt, 1927) rather than the world of politics that has 
been created out there and can be accessed through ‘objective’ research methods 




Hence, my interpretation of how incivility is playing a role in the dislocation of hegemony 
is anchored on particular ontological presuppositions about political reality. In this study, 
incivility is understood as symbolising the true nature of politics as a friend—enemy 
relationship (see Schimtt, 1927) and following Lacan, the Real that cannot be symbolised, 
or rather, the unsymbolisable human experience – “in short, the real as distinct from reality” 
(Stavrakakis, 2007:6). Indeed, the political reality is indeterminate. As such, ‘reality’, Lacan 
(1973:17) says, is only ‘the grimace of the real’ because the real is placed firmly on the 
side of the unknowable. Denying incivility is part of banal political experiences conceals 
how it can be a moment of disruption able to dislocate the dominant ways of doing politics. 
The presupposition then is not that political reality shaping our understanding of incivility 
is unsymbolisable, but that it can only symbolise reality that is already constructed and, 
therefore, it misses the Real human experience that falls outside constructed reality. We, 
then can only use symbolic reality to interpret incivility as part of the Real.  
 
Consequently, the ontological perspective of this study focuses on the underlying causes 
of incivility. To use a Heideggerian term, the study describes incivility as ‘that-being’, some 
given thing that determines incivility as a specific type of political activity in our everyday 
politics. At the ontic level, we are concerned with types of political practices, the taken-for-
granted practices that shape our day–to-day politics. But at the ontological level, we 
question those assumptions by enquiring into the Being of political activities to understand 
the nature of politics (Mulhall. 2005:58-58). That is to say, the study uses the ontic to 
explain the ontological. To Heidegger (1962:44), the ontic is concerned with the open 
existence of matter that can be observed, while the ontological is concerned with the 
underlying deep structure that creates the ontic.  
 
The ontological perspectives of this study has both the ontic and the ontological: the former 
analyses actual existence of incivility in social media as part of political reality, while the 
latter uses the former to describe the nature of politics, what Laclau and Mouffe (1985), 
following Schmitt (1927), call ‘the political’. Politics is thus split into the traditional idea of 
politics (meaning the banal political practices that constitute society), the ontic, and ‘the 
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political’ (referring to the impossibility of society due to indeterminacy of politics — the 
‘ontological’ dimension of political practices). The problem of this ontological difference is 
that it confines the political to the field of political theory where political differences cannot 
be described empirically (see Marchart, 2007:6). However, since the political is “one of the 
forms in which [we can] encounter the real”, so that “political reality is the field in which the 
symbolisation of this real is attempted” (Stavrakakis 1999:73), this study attempts to 
describe the unsymbolisable Real by reading incivility at the ontical level to describe it at 
the ontological level, even though such description is only a gesture as: 
…we cannot access the ontological level directly that—if we want to 
approach it at all—we will have necessarily to pass through the ontic 
level, in order to ‘wave’ at something which will always escape our 
grasp because of the irremediable gap between the ontological and 
the ontic, beingness and beings, the ground and what is grounded. 
(Marchart, 2007:24). 
 
In this study, incivility is analysed from the ontological level as part of ‘the political’, that is 
core to politics. As explained in the previous chapter, the concept of the ‘the political’ 
developed by Schmitt (1927:30) emphasises the underlying role of emotions in politics and 
rejects consensus achieved through rational discussions since consensus depoliticises 
democracy. To Schmitt, it is the friend—enemy relationship that distinguishes politics from 
other realms of life. It is only through transformation of Schmitt’s (1927) friend—enemy 
antagonism to agonism, Mouffe (2000) argues, that that democracy can retain politics. As 
Sayyid and Zac (1998:251) point out, post-foundational discourse theorists should work 
from the perspective that political processes cannot be explained a priori, therefore 
analysis of politics should not rely on that which is ‘outside’ politics itself as doing so would 
achieve the impossible — stepping outside ourselves in order to explain the world from a 
non-human point view. 
 
Furthermore, incivility in social media is one of the symptoms of the impossibility of society 
(see Laclau (1990: 44), since in the place of harmonious discourses, society is made up 
of people in constant conflict. As explained by Jørgensen and Phillips (2002:34), to Laclau 
and Mouffe, “‘Society’ is our attempt to pin down the meaning of society, not an objectively 
existing phenomenon.” Due to the ‘overlapping identities’, it is not possible to pin down 
‘society’ because the multiple competing discourses arising from overlapping identities 
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make it impossible for a single discourse to establish itself and become the sole discourse 
structuring the social. For instance, in addition to the dominant antagonism between ethnic 
identities that shape national politics, every individual simultaneously has overlapping 
identities that create multiple antagonistic discourses. Politics is shaped by, antagonistic 
discourses between employer-employees, government-religion, the central government-
county governments, residents-county governments, youths-adults, women-men, trade 
unions-employers, consumer-producer, among other antagonisms that instead of creating 
a society, to use Laclau’s words, “prevents it from being” (1990: 44).  
 
However, to exercise power, the regime is struggling to give incivility in social media a 
fixed meaning through temporal closure of the discursive field by establishing rules for 
social media users. But this ontical attempt is opposed by the ontological practices 
symbolised by social media users who are utilising incivility, to repeat Laclau’s (1990:44) 
words, ‘to prevent the society from being’. Consequently, increased incivility in social 
media is a product of ontological fissures as it is an attack on various sedimented ontical 
positions, thus it is part of the contest in daily political struggles against attempts to 
constitute society by domesticating the Real. Hence, incivility has no true essence - the 
fixed properties that can define it outside discourse. Instead at the ontical level, incivility is 
a socially constructed hegemonic project even though its hegemonic meaning disguises 
itself as objective. As emphasised by Sayyid and Zac (1998:262), hegemonic projects can 
be judged successful when they achieve two things: success in making hegemonic rules 
the ‘natural’ rules and its limits - the ‘natural’ limits of the community; and success in 
contributing to ‘forgetting’ other projects against which it was struggling 
 
Considering that both nature of reality and knowledge are constructed, and values have a 
role in discovering these constructions, Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) Discourse Theory was 
utilised as a research method within interpretivist research traditions. To Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985:108), denial of the existence of objective reality and knowledge does not 
mean denial of material existence of objects, rather it means there are diverse meanings 
attributed to objects and events. What can be said is that “natural facts are also discursive 
facts…[because]…nature is not something already out there to be read from the 
appearance of things, but is itself the result of a slow and complex historical social 
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construction” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:84). Therefore, there is no objective knowledge that 
can provide an ‘Archimedean point’ from which to understand the ‘Real’, rather, objectivity 
is constructed through the discursive production of meaning (see Jørgensen & Phillips, 
2002:33). As an interpretative approach, Discourse Theory can enable us to understand 
and interpret how the production of everyday meanings is discursive, since we make our 
own world rather than live in a world that we find ‘out there’. However, unlike classical 
hermeneutic arguments that can be accused of being mere self-interpretations, Discourse 
Theory enables researchers to make interpretations based on theoretical concepts and 
perspectives, which, according to Howarth (2005:320), act as “external vantage point to 
detect partialities and distortions”.  
 
Having embraced a constructionist perspective, the study views the dominant meaning of 
incivility as a creation of the regime through favouring one part in a binary opposition. 
Constructionism, Walsh (1972:19) argues, does not “take for granted, as the natural 
scientists do, the availability of a pre-constituted world of phenomena for investigation [but] 
must instead examine the processes by which the social world is constructed.” Therefore, 
the study participates in what Bhaskar (2008:183) terms “radical revision of knowledge” 
due to a new level of crisis induced by the proliferation of anomalous facts of a particularly 
disturbing kind. Indeed, by returning citizens’ ability to participate in politics, social media 
has created a new level of crisis to the established hegemonic order.  
 
However, to avoid the mere reversal of the regime’s favouritism of a pair in a binary 
opposition, this study utilises double reading to identify the second meaning outside the 
binary—the elements of incivility which, to use Kakoliris (2017:) words, “have refused to 
be incorporated” within the binary opposition. That is to say, the study is concerned with 
the meaning of incivility that is different from the dominant meaning. Consequently, the 
second reading moves away from the government’s definition of extreme speech, to 
propose an incompatible definition outside the logic of favouring one side in the binary 
opposition between acceptable and unacceptable speech. This study therefore engages 
in “critical” productive reading to discover not the ‘difference’ between acceptable speech 
and incivility, but the ‘deferral’, what Derrida (1982:3) would say is the presently denied 




Considering that truth is produced and not necessarily discovered, this study rejects 
objectivism, the idea that politics can be understood as facts external to individuals. 
However, the rejection of objectivism should not be mistaken for a denial of the material 
existence of objects, rather the interest here is to use Discourse Theory to make visible 
the possible meanings that are ‘presently impossible’. Incivility in social media has a 
variety of possible meanings, just like Laclau and Mouffe (1985:108) explain how the falling 
of bricks can be “God’s wrath” or some ‘natural phenomenon’. In this dissertation, incivility 
in social media is read as part of the cracks in the dominant deliberative democracy, cracks 
that are making visible the ‘presently denied’ forms of democracy.  As explained by Laclau 
and Mouffe (1987:82): 
If I kick a spherical object in the street or if I kick a ball in a football 
match, the physical fact is the same, but its meaning is different.  The 
object is a football only to the extent that it establishes a system of 
relations with other objects, and these relations are not given by the 
mere referential materiality of the object but are, rather, socially 
constructed.  
Just like the spherical object that can also be a football, the meaning of extreme speech 
in social media is based on its relations with other objects that deny are allow the 
meanings. Although the regime has attempted to securitise extreme speech in social 
media by constructing it as hate speech, incitement to violence, a threat to national security 
or at best, rudeness, away from the binary division of speech into what is acceptable and 
what is not (Pohjonen, & Udupa, 2017:1174), extreme speech can also mean revolutionary 
speech, just like a ‘spherical object’ on the street which can be a football or a projectile 
based on the system that defines its relation with other objects. From a post-foundational 
perspective, there are no foundations to rely upon in understanding the world other than 
the socially constructed system of relations.  
To deconstruct hegemony that enforces a binary division of speech as part of attempts to 
create a society without antagonism, this dissertation adopts a ‘problem-driven’ approach 
to expose how the regime has made incivility in social media a security problem. The 
problem-driven approach is similar to Foucault’s (1985:11–12) problematisation, which is 
more than a matter of analysing “behaviour or ideas, nor societies and their ‘ideologies’, 
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but the problematisations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought — 
and the practices on the basis of which these problematisations are formed”.  
Through problematisation, the study analyses incivility in social media as part of the 
processes through “which one tries to see how the different solutions to a problem have 
been constructed [and] how these different solutions result from a specific form of 
problematisation” (Foucault 1997: 118–19).  The problem—driven approach used in this 
study contrasts with problem-solving research that assumes there is ‘a world out there’ 
from where problems can be discovered and solved. Because ‘objective reality’ is 
impossible, Cox (1981: 129–30) and Howarth (1998:167) argue, problem-solving research 
operates within the dominant theories of reality. Problem-driven research is also different 
from method-driven research that is motivated more by techniques of data-gathering and 
analysis than by a concern with the empirical phenomena under investigation, or theory-
driven approaches which aim “to vindicate a particular theory rather than illuminate a 
problem that is specified independently of the theory” (Shapiro 2002:601).  
Through problematisation, the study avoids the authoritarianism of inductive and deductive 
methods in social science research. Inductive approaches generate knowledge through 
discovery of empirical generalisations while deductive approaches test hypotheses and 
theories to find out their predictive success.  However, Discourse Theory can be used to 
generate knowledge through abduction — a process through which empirical facts are 
discovered first and then theories constructed to explain those facts, a ‘facts-before-theory’ 
approach (see Haig 2005:371). Through Discourse Analysis, incivility in social media is 
“explained rather than (made to) serve as the objects of prediction in theory testing.” Using 
this approach, the study overcomes the dualism between inductive and deductive 
reasoning, bearing in mind that ‘the political’ is a form of permanent contestability and 
neither inductive nor deductive reasoning can predict it. Consequently, to explain ‘the 
political’, the sphere where politics is performed, researchers should reason through 
probabilities or fair guess, making inference of a case from a rule and result (cf. Peirce 
1992 [1878]:188). 
An abductive reasoning explanation is satisfied if its postulated mechanism can explain 
the phenomenon being investigated, with good reasons for believing in the existence of 
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the mechanism; and without the possibility of thinking of any equally plausible alternatives 
(Glynos & Howarth, 2007:32). Explanations then begin with the encounter of “a 
phenomenon that needs to be rendered intelligible” which leads to the constitution of a 
problem – or an explanandum (Glynos & Howarth, 2007:34). The logic of an abductive 
explanation and theory construction is a to-and-fro movement between the phenomena 
investigated and the various explanations used to sieve the initial concepts, logics, 
empirical data, and self-interpretations to produce an account which can constitute a 
legitimate candidate for truth or falsity. Unlike the positivist justification which involves 
subjecting statements to predictive tests in order to determine their truth or falsity, 
abduction as a post-positivist justification accepts an account “as a valid explanation only 
if it produces insights and greater illumination according to criteria which can be publicly 
articulated, criteria concerning evidence, consistency, exhaustiveness, and so on” (Glynos 
& Howarth, 2007:38). A post-positivist justification, therefore, is elastic as it is accepted 
based on theoretical and critical interventions, in addition to winning persuasion among 
the agents being studied and the epistemic community.  
It can then be summarised that Post-Foundational Discourse Analysis draws its power 
from the fact that there is no one ‘how-to-do-a-discourse-analysis’ method since 
discourses can only be understood if relevant approaches are used to discover what is 
possible, but is presently made to look impossible through the society’s hegemonic 
powers. Thus, a universal empirical Discourse Theory recipe: 
…does not exist and should not be developed. For, whereas there is 
a great need to develop our critical reflections on how to apply 
discourse theory in concrete studies, we should not aim to solve the 
methodological question once and for all. Discourse theorists must 
remain methodological bricoleurs and refrain from developing an all-
purpose technique for discourse analysis (Torfing, 1999: 292). 
 
This study followed Torfing’s suggestion by using relevant concepts from Laclau and 
Mouffe’s Discourse Theory to develop a suitable method for analysing incivility in social 
media as part of wider hegemonic struggles. The following section begins the 
‘methodological bricolage’ by using some concepts from Laclau and Mouffe’s book to 




5.2 Design of post-foundational Discourse Analysis model  
This study used relevant ‘sensitising concepts’ from Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) Discourse 
Theory to design a model for analysing incivility in social media. The term sensitising 
concepts was first used by Blumer (1954:7) to contrast the empirical world’s definitive 
concepts from social concepts. Blumer explained that while definitive concepts refer to 
“what is common to a class of objects” as illustrated by the object attributes, sensitising 
concepts lack clear attributes and consequently do “not enable the user to move directly 
to the instance and its relevant content” but can give the user a general sense of direction. 
He added that “Whereas definitive concepts provide prescriptions of what to see, 
sensitising concepts merely suggest directions along which to look.” Sensitising concepts, 
according to Ritzer (1992:365), can guide researchers about “what to look for and where 
to look”. 
Discourse, the partial fixation of meaning through exclusion of other possible meanings, is 
the primary sensitising concept in Discourse Analysis (see Carpentier & De Cleen, 2007: 
273), while the theory’s key concepts are the secondary and tertiary sensitising concepts. 
Discourse Theory’s key concepts explain ‘the articulatory practice’, what creates 
‘discourse’ (cf. Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 105, italics in original). The excluded meanings in 
discourse (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 111), are reservoirs of ‘surplus meaning’ produced by 
the articulatory practice. This means extreme speech stands on a continuum of meanings, 
but through discourse, some meanings are excluded in order to create a unity of meaning 
that can serve the purpose of the dominant elites. Nevertheless, it is not possible for 
extreme speech to achieve unity of meaning because, as Laclau and Mouffe (1985112) 
argue, it is impossible for “any given discourse to implement a final suture”, to fix the 
ultimate meaning as only partial fixation of meaning is possible. In this study, dislocation 
acts as the key secondary sensitising concept. The theory’s tertiary sensitising concepts, 
what happens after dislocation, were: articulation, moments, elements, empty/floating 
signifiers, nodal points, hegemony, ‘the political’, objective discourse and ideology. 
The secondary and tertiary sensitising concepts selected for this study are what Laclau 
and Mouffe (1985) refer to as logics, the complex rules of the game of politics that make 
possible the political practices as well as its vulnerabilities. To Laclau (2000:183), these 
‘rules of the game’ are similar to rules of chess, which make the logic of chess playing. 
137 
 
Borrowing from Wittgenstein, Laclau (2000:183) differentiates logics from grammar which 
works to “produce a set of use-based meanings that no purely logical analysis can 
uncover.” Unlike grammar which is a set of rules governing the ‘language game’, logics 
are the type of relation between entities that make it possible for a system of rules to 
operate (Laclau, 2000:283-4). Laclau refutes the possibility of there being a general logic 
of politics like grammar of language which can “establish the foundation of any possible 
language” insisting on the contrary, that logics are context dependent. The logics in 
politics, just like the rules in a game of chess, are internal to the language game of politics, 
and as Laclau (2000:384) explains, “do not depend on any aprioristic foundation.” 
Consequently, because politics has its own internal logic — the contextual rules of the 
game — it can only be explained based on the rules within which it is played.  
The model developed in this study operationalises Discourse Theory by mapping the 
theory’s secondary and tertiary sensitising concepts on a diagram that uses blocks and 
arrows supported by written descriptions of the concepts’ relationships. By selecting 
sensitising concepts relevant for this study, the model represents an incomplete but 
relevant mechanism of Discourse Theory following Craver’s (2006:360) suggestion that a 
model should be a representation of some parts, activities, and features with gaps masked 
by ‘acknowledged fillers’ to indicate the kind of activity between parts of the models. 
Indeed, if the model was to be a complete description of Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse 
Theory, it would have included too many concepts some of which are irrelevant for this 
study. Craver (2006:360) recommends that theoretical models should drop details that are 
irrelevant to the context under which the model is to be used. The selected sensitising 
concepts narrow the otherwise extensive theory, after all Discourse Theory is like a multi-
head wrench which can be used to open nuts and bolts of different sizes but only when 
the user selects fitting heads. Since ‘everything is discursive’ according to Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985), researchers using Discourse Theory need to focus only on the relevant 
sections of the theory in order to limit the research to manageable levels, otherwise a 
complete operationalisation of the theory would demand illustration of too much 




The model starts with dislocation as the key secondary sensitising concept in Discourse 
Analysis. Dislocation, as Blumer (1954:7) would have said, gives “directions along which 
to look” for how incivility in social media is decentring conventional practices by enabling 
the audience to construct new radical subjectivities different from their previous docile 
state. Three discursive routes, the resultant secondary sensitising concepts, come out of 
dislocation: antagonism which causes public contestation and leads to ‘the political’; 
consensus which repairs and absorbs the dislocation into existing institutions and power 
structures; and articulation which changes the dislocation into elements, moments, empty 
signifiers, and nodal points. Dislocation and the resultant sensitising concepts are 
explained in detail below:  
5.2.1 Dislocation: The institutional void created by Incivility in Social Media 
To dislocate, in a layman’s terms, is to disturb something by moving away from its routine 
in a manner likely to prevent it from functioning ‘normally’. From an ontic perspective, 
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incivility in social media causes dislocation when it creates a moment of interruption of a 
subject’s symbolic world (cf. Glynos & Howarth, 2007:14). But from an ontological 
perspective, any structure of social relation is always already dislocated (see Laclau 1990: 
39) as every symbolic order is an impossibility that has been concealed for it to constitute 
itself.  This study views incivility in social media as a dislocation at the ontic level that has 
disrupted existing hegemony, what Laclau (1990:39-40) would have called dislocations of 
the structure due to the ‘surplus’ signified that creates an excess of meanings in discursive 
structures. The amount of incivility experienced in social media is unprecedented because 
the platform is a field for ‘unlimited’ content creation, unlike legacy media which have 
ingrained systems of editing. It is this freedom that has enabled social media content 
creators to dislocate the myth of a stable society that was covertly supported by legacy 
media.  Indeed, the rampant incivility in social media is a form of dislocation as the incivility 
cannot be integrated into existing consensual liberal democracy.  
 
Since dislocation is abstract and therefore difficult to see in texts, this theory-praxis gap 
was filled by the more descriptive notion of institutional void. By interpreting institutional 
void as a symptom of dislocation, it was possible to identify moments of dislocation from 
the breakdown in “rules and norms according to which politics” was previously conducted 
(see Hajer, 2003: 175). Dislocation causes institutional ambiguity by making the existing 
rules and norms irrelevant in resolving issues “in a manner that is perceived to be both 
legitimate and effective” (Hajer, 2003:176), this gives opportunity for the creation of new 
ways of doing things. The objective of this Discourse Analysis project was to examine how 
incivility as a dislocatory moment with traumatic as well as the productive elements has 
caused an institutional void — an absence of a clear authority and set of accepted rules 
of engaging in politics.  
 
To Laclau (1990:40), dislocation is the process of ‘decentring’ the structure by making 
visible the contingency of discursive structures. Decentring shatters the existing identities, 
inducing an identity crisis for the subject and leading to constitution of new identities. 
Hence in the structure-agency debate, “agency is only possible given the ‘failure’ or 




Dislocation creates unevenness that opens possibilities for decision-making by those who 
were previously not part of the dominant social order, as seen in the accompanying 
antagonism. But because discourse is a site of struggle, dislocation also generates 
reaction from the dominant social order, the attempts to create consensus through repair 
and absorption of the dislocation into existing social practices.  Laclau (1990:39) gives the 
example of dislocatory effects of capitalism as leading to destruction of traditional 
communities and the reaction of workers who are never passive to capitalism’s dislocation 
of their lives, — workers react by resisting capitalism through various forms of trade 
unionism.  Thus, dislocatory relations give “rise not only to negative consequences but 
also to new possibilities of historical action.” Dislocation threatens dominant identities but 
on the other hand acts as the “foundation on which new identities are constituted” (Laclau 
1990: 36). In relation to this study, it means mediatised incivility is not only threatening 
dominant ways, but also creating new ways of doing politics.  
 
The dislocation caused by social media is similar to what Laclau (1990:40) terms 
dislocation stemming “from presence of antagonistic forces” that decentres the structure 
creating a plurality of power centres. Yet, because of the plurality of power centres, 
dislocation cannot achieve totality, instead it leads to “recomposition around particular 
nodal points”. Thus, as argued by Laclau (1990:40), “dislocation is both the condition of 
possibility and impossibility of the centre at the same time” and it can be the basis for 
analysing antagonistic relations that prevent the “society from being” (ibid, 44). 
Consequently, dislocation provides a suitable ‘Archimedean point’ from which to begin 
making sense of incivility in social media.  
 
The logic of dislocation was used as the key sensitising concept to describe how incivility 
in social media is denaturalising political practices and how this denaturalisation is being 
resisted by hegemonic forces. Logics such as dislocation, according to Glynos and 
Howarth (2007:137), are “the rules or grammar of the practice, as well as the conditions 
which make the practice both possible and vulnerable” (emphasis in original). Logics of 
dislocation shift subjects from their prevailing subject positions and distance them from the 
taken-for-granted discourses (see Marttila, 2015:59).   
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In clarifying the concept of dislocation, Torfing (2005:16) argues that “a stable hegemonic 
discourse becomes dislocated when it is confronted by new events it cannot explain, 
represent, or in other ways domesticate.” This is what social media has caused: 
mediatised extreme speech which has disrupted the way of representing politics in Kenya 
by allowing articulation of alternative discourses that were previously suppressed. What 
social media has enabled people to do cannot be domesticated in a similar way the 
mainstream media was domesticated. In fact, it is only through such disruptions that the 
mass media switches from being an ideological state apparatus (see Althusser, 1971:79) 
to a tool that can, from a Lacanian perspective, represent the unrepresentable ‘real’ politics 
that stands in opposition to political reality. Political reality is our unachievable attempts to 
symbolise the real. This is well explained by Mouffe (1993:3) who argues from an 
ontological perspective that:  
The political cannot be restricted to a certain type of institution, or 
envisaged as constituting a specific sphere or level of society. It must 
be conceived as a dimension that is inherent to every human society 
and that determines our very ontological condition.  (Mouffe, 1993:3) 
 
Although political reality attempts to symbolise (or cover-up) ‘Real’ politics, it is in the 
failure to achieve this symbolisation, as seen through dislocation, that we encounter ‘Real’ 
politics. This productive failure initiates another round of efforts to symbolise real politics 
and so on and so forth. In a Lacanian sense, this is the moment of the political par 
excellence (see, Stavrakakis, 1999:74), even though “[t]he political is not the real per se 
but one of the modalities in which we experience an encounter with the real” (ibid, 75). 
Since the real is unrepresentable, it can “only be conceived negatively, in terms of 
disturbances of the imaginary and the symbolic” (Boothby 2001:295). Hence dislocation 
as a negative index of the real can be interpreted as the limit of signification, a point of 
interruption or breakdown of signification (see Laclau 1996: 37). In Lacanian terms, 
dislocation can be described as “encounters with the real”, different from ‘antagonism’ 
which falls in the struggle between the imaginary and the symbolic orders of reality — the 
relation between different discursive projects fighting for hegemony. As explained by 
Laclau (1996:39), dislocations: 
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signify the limits of signification – the real, if you want, in the Lacanian 
sense – and there is no direct way of doing so except through the 
subversion of the process of signification itself. We know, through 
psychoanalysis, how what is not directly representable – the 
unconscious – can only find as a means of representation the 
subversion of the signifying process.  
 
Consequently, the interruption and breakdown as an encounter with the real is not only 
traumatic, from the negativity experience, but also a condition of possibility for new political 
creations. This means dislocations ‘threaten identities’ while producing others (see Laclau 
1990: 39). As shown on the Post-foundational Discourse Analysis figure above, dislocation 
has two outcomes: it is met with efforts to repair it through consensus on the one hand 
and an ‘encounter with the real’ that turns politics into ‘the political’, on the other. While 
consensus attempts to limit ‘the political’ through repair and repression of the dislocation 
into existing social practices, encounter with the real leads to ‘the political’, which frees 
politics from being restricted to “certain type of institution, or envisaged as constituting a 
specific sphere or level of society” (Mouffe, 1993:3). 
 
To repair the dislocation, the regime is securitising extreme speech to repress the use of 
social media in order to rearticulate the signifiers of democracy, freedom, the role of the 
executive and legislature, equality, sovereignty of the people among others. In this regard, 
several social media activists have been harassed by security agencies: bloggers 
Abraham Mutai, Alan Wadi Okengo, alias lieutenant Wadi, and Robert Alai, were arrested 
and charged for posting incivilities, while Dickson Bogonko Bosire apparently disappeared 
in 2012 or thereabouts (see Freedom House, 2014).  This strategy of solving dislocation 
by absorbing it into existing structures, as Gramsci argued, is hegemony as it is a 
combination of repressive forces and consensus.  
 
Now that the hegemonic discourses in Kenya are facing a crisis, they are attempting to 
secure their preferred meanings on the continuum of extreme speech by securitising the 
dislocation into moments or nodal points. The regime is countering the dislocation through 
what Glynos and Howarth (2007:104) would term “channelling and reshaping the 
grievances into the existing institutions and structures of power”. In particular, the regime 
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is knotting extreme speech to the nodal point of national security4 so that incivility is pushed 
out of normal politics and instead controlled using security tools.  
 
However, when dislocation leads to the ‘the political’, actors free themselves from 
restrictions imposed by institutionalised politics and positivise the disruption caused by 
incivility. This is to say, the social media has enabled people do what cannot be 
domesticated in a way similar to the manner in which the mainstream media was 
domesticated. For instance, many popular bloggers in Kenya have risen outside the 
traditional journalism career progression structure, with their career growths being credited 
to tough online stances. Among them is Denis Itumbi, the director of Digital, New Media 
and Diaspora Affairs at the presidency, who the Daily Nation, the country’s leading 
newspaper, reported to be among 50 other Kenyans unsuitable to serve in sensitive 
government offices like the presidency due to their questionable academic qualifications 
(Musambi, 2014). But even as the newspaper identified Itumbi’s purportedly dubious 
qualifications, what seems forgotten is the fact that Mr Itumbi was not hired to work for the 
presidency based on his academic qualifications or newsroom experience as has been 
the tradition of hiring ‘advisers’ to the president. Contrary to the legacy media newsroom 
tradition, Mr Itumbi, just like other government or opposition bloggers, was hired based on 
popularity and to some level, incivility of his social media accounts. Here, dislocation is 
positive because it has been used to create new ways of accessing ‘the political’ not mere 
politics at ontical level. These are some of the possibilities that have come out of 
dislocation through incivility in social media.   
                                                          
4The concept of national security in Kenya is viewed as protection of the state from internal more 
than external enemies since the country’s encounter with armed conflicts has mainly been internal. 
Hence the ‘Westphalian’ understanding of national security cannot explain security threats 
between populations or even against an oppressing regime (cf. Hentz, 2010:632). With ethnic 
fragmentation competing national identities, states are not unitary institutions, meaning national 
security in Kenya can pit the state (as an ethnopolitical structure) against the people who are not 
always innocent as they sometimes use “informal, local, powers that are normally more trusted 
than the central power” (Menocal, 2011:1726) to undermine state security. The concept of 
securitisation will therefore be used to refer to how the regime is defending itself against threats 
from its own people’s counterhegemonic acts. 
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5.2.2 Elements and Moments  
Dislocation results from the antagonism between signs whose meanings are not yet fixed 
(therefore can take multiple meanings), which Laclau and Mouffe (1985:105) argue are 
any differences that are not articulated discursively. Based on the polysemic nature of 
elements, dislocation is repaired by the discourse that attempts to transform elements into 
moments by reducing their polysemy to a fully fixed meaning thereby establishing closure, 
a temporary stop to the fluctuations in the meaning of the signs. But this closure is never 
permanent: “The transition from the ‘elements’ to the ‘moments’ is never entirely fulfilled” 
(Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 110). Thus, discourse can never be so completely fixed that it 
cannot be undermined and changed by the multiplicity of meanings in the field of 
discursivity. In this study, incivilities in social media are viewed as elements in the field of 
discursivity because there are competing ways of understanding it, ranging from mere 
rudeness or hate speech to democracy enhancing speech. Borrowing from the description 
of elements by Jørgensen and Phillips (2002:28), incivility must be positioned in relation 
to other signs in order to get meaning. This positioning happens through articulation. Thus, 
the objective of discourse is to reduce elements into moments through articulation to make 
the discourse authoritative and ‘natural’. Yet this final condition cannot be achieved 
because of the permanent antagonism originating from the “constitutive impossibility of 
society” (Laclau, 1996:44). Hence, all elements that have been transformed into moments 
through articulation are under the constant threat of being rearticulated to elements due to 
the permanent antagonism in the discourse trying to establish different meanings to 
elements. 
To Laclau and Mouffe (1985:113), “the transition from ‘elements’ to ‘moments’ can never 
be complete because ‘elements’ are floating signifiers that cannot be wholly articulated to 
a discursive chain. As a floating signifier, incivility is ambiguous, but it acquires meaning 
when articulated against different signifiers, like hate speech and a completely different 
one when articulated with a signifier like freedom of expression or even civic participation. 
Yet the government is attempting to make its hegemonic meaning natural by articulating 
the meaning of incivility around the nodal point of hate speech and related undemocratic 
speech. For example, the National Cohesion and Integration (NCIC) Act, 2008, attempts 
to fix the meaning of incivility by articulating it against hate speech. The Act defines hate 
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speech as “speech or expressive conduct which insults an ethnic, racial or other 
identifiable group”. This definition articulates incivility from an element into a moment (a 
crime of hate) by positioning incivility in relation to ethnic and racial differences, these 
being the other signs that are used to fix the meaning of incivility. Yet this articulation is 
not final because of the permanent antagonism that threatens to rearticulate moments 
back to elements. As noted in the previous chapter, the National Cohesion and Integration 
Act, 2008 exists more in law than practice because the courts have not convicted even a 
single person based on this Act. In fact, the National Cohesion and Integration 
Commission has blamed the courts for what it terms not convicting ‘reckless politicians’ 
spreading hate speech (see Kajilwa, 2015). 
As shown in the above examples, articulation of a discourse attempts to transform 
“elements” into “moments” through the exclusion of some possible meanings of elements 
and selection of a preferred meaning from the “field of discursivity” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985: 
111). Such processes, Laclau (2014:49), would say, are processes of metaphoric 
substitution that create relationships between dissimilar things. Here metaphors, as 
explained by Laclau’s (1988), are not ordinary linguistic metaphors, but “metaphoricity” of 
language at the ontological rhetoricity level. Thus, this study followed the tropological turn 
to analyse incivility, at the ontological level, with “metonymy corresponding to combination 
and metaphor to substitution” (Laclau, 2008:66).  
Articulation functions like a metonym or metaphor by substituting or combining one 
signified with another signified. Hegemony succeeds when discourses use metaphoric 
substitution or metonymic combination to turn elements into moments. Hence the aim of 
a discourse is to achieve “closure” in which the polysemic signs are fixed with preferred 
meanings through metonymic and the metaphoric transformation of elements into 
moments. Hegemony is achieved when consensus removes polysemy in signs, making 
them to have fixed meaning. For example, the utterances by courts, police and the 
Communications Authority of Kenya have attempted to give incivility a fixed meaning by 
naming it hate speech, which justifies the use of coercive tools on people. Such hegemonic 
practices, Laclau would call catachresis as they fix the meaning floating by naming 
unnamed things. Alternatively, the process can be seen as metonymic as state organs 
have attempted to fix the meaning of incivility by giving it the name of something related 
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(see Laclau 2005:71). Such hegemonic practices, according to Torfing (1999:101), work 
by expanding discourses “into a dominant horizon of social orientation and action by 
means of articulating unfixed elements into partially fixed moments in a context 
crisscrossed by antagonistic forces.” In this case, there is an attempt to fix the unfixed 
meaning of incivility by attaching fixed moments through securitisation so that it is equated 
to hate speech and incitement to violence. Nevertheless, such closure can never be 
permanent since hegemony is always at risk of being displaced by rival discourses that try 
to break it down by rearticulating the meanings of elements into empty or floating signifiers.   
5.2.3. Empty signifier/floating Signifier 
After dislocation, regime discourses attempted to fix the meaning of floating signifiers by 
creating competing empty signifiers. Floating signifiers, Laclau (1996:36) argues, are 
“equivocal”— they are arbitrary signs that “can be attached to different signifieds in 
different contexts — or “ambiguous” because they have excess or deficiency of meaning 
that prevents the signifieds from being fully fixed. Indeed, incivility has meaning but this 
meaning is difficult to fix. For example, the meaning depends on who uttered the 
statement.  If it is one of ‘us’, it is not uncivility, it is only incivility if it is one of ‘them’.  
Different from floating signifiers, empty signifiers emerge, argues Laclau (1996:37), if there 
is an impossibility that can signify an interruption of the structure of the sign, creating a 
“limit to something [that] is the same as thinking of what is beyond those limits.”  The limits 
of a signifying system cannot be themselves signified “but have to show themselves as 
the interruption or breakdown of the process of signification” leaving us with the 
paradoxical situation of the condition of possibility of a signifying system also being the 
condition of its impossibility. Incivility, as a floating signifier, can have different signifieds 
depending on the discourse in which incivility is being articulated. But incivility can be an 
empty signifier if meaning is created by what is absent.  
The concept of empty signifiers explains how absence is in itself a signifier. Laclau 
(1996:34) defines an empty signifier as a signifier without a signified. Such signifiers are 
not attached to any specific signified but still signify when their absent signifier is filled. 
Laclau’s concept of empty signifier is derived from Saussure’s concept of sign as 
consisting of a signifier and a signified. The signifier is the sign’s physical/visible/tangible 
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image, like marks or sounds, while the signified is the mental concept to which the sign 
refers. The mental concept referred to by the signifier is common to members of a 
language sharing group. Saussure, Baskin, and Meisel (1960/2011) explain the arbitrary 
relationship between the signifier and the signified. While Fiske (1982:44) summarises 
similar principles argued by semiotician Peirce (1931–58) and Ogden and Richards 
(1923). Laclau and Mouffe (1985:113) lament that these linguistic structuralist models of 
the signifier/signified “became a new form of essentialism”. The two post-structuralist 
authors propose that a signifier does not always have a fixed signified due the “impossible 
suture between signified and signifier” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:113).  The empty signifier 
suggests the possibility of a signifier without a signified since absence is in itself a signifier 
of presence. For Laclau (1996: 53):  
In a situation of radical disorder, order is present as that which is 
absent; it becomes an empty signifier, as the signifier of this 
absence. In this sense, various political forces can compete in their 
efforts to present their particular objectives as those which carry out 
the filling of that lack. To hegemonise something is exactly to carry 
out this filling function” 
As explained by Laclau (1996:41, 2005: 105), the idea of empty signifiers explains the 
means by which the “unachievable fullness and universality” constituting the social is 
discursively represented. But this does not mean that the social has no meaning; it only 
means there is a continuous struggle over meaning. As stated by Laclau and Mouffe 
(1985:112), “a discourse incapable of generating any fixity of meaning is the discourse of 
the psychotic.” Thus, empty signifiers represent ‘being’ that is constitutively unreachable 
(Laclau, 1996:39).  
 
To repair the dislocation caused by social media, the regime has emptied the concept of 
security and is metonymically filling it with content that makes incivility a security problem.  
As such, security has lost content, Laclau (1996:44) would say, as it “is present as that 
which is absent; it [has become] an empty signifier, as the signifier of that absence.” 
Various political actors are competing in presenting their definition of (in)security to fill the 




From a poststructuralist approach, security is an empty signifier with a performative 
character as it is self-referential considering that it can constitute itself without referring to 
an external reality (Huysmans, 1998:232). Even if we accept that increased incivility in 
social media can incite people to violence, how the regime is governing this problem using 
security tools is a political process because it is possible to see incivility positively as an 
outcome of increased freedom. That is to say that, as an empty signifier, security becomes 
a nodal point that can be used as ‘a technique of government’ to respond to a political 
problem. Moreover, incivility can have other meanings if it is not defined as a threat to 
society.  
 
Repair and stabilisation of new discourses that emerge from dislocation is achieved by 
creating empty signifiers as new meaningful totalities, what Howarth and Griggs (2006:29) 
say is hegemonisation “via articulation and replacement of previously existing formations.” 
In this study, the emptied concept of national security is being used to signify some form 
of universal need for respect and order in politics. Thus, as a hegemonic tool, the national 
security myth is being used to unify people around what is perceived to be lacking or under 
threat from social media users. The need for security is a point of agreement that the 
majority can unite around but without agreeing how to identify it. Consequently, as an 
empty signifier, national security can be defined by being filled with content in many ways, 
with dominant discourses controlling this filling while alternative political forces attempt to 
fill it with their preferred content. 
 
The meaning of empty signifiers is almost incomprehensible until they are filled with new 
meanings through combination with other signs in a chain of equivalence. That is to say 
that national security has become a political construct through its metonymic combination 
with other signs, both linguistic and non-linguistic, such as limits to freedom of speech, 
dangers of hate speech, crime, violence and tribal hatred, among others. Hence, as an 
emptied signifier, national security can be filled with any other signs to represent ‘anything’ 
— a hegemonic struggle to stabilise a dislocated discursive field. Consequently, by 
identifying the chains of meanings around national security, we can identify how 




As an empty signifier, the concept of national security is important to politics and there are 
on-going hegemonic struggles to (re)establish its definition. After all, hegemony succeeds 
when objectives of one group, in this case one group’s definition of national security, 
becomes the universal definition, making alternatives definitions unthinkable. That is to 
say that to be transformed into the universal representation, signifiers have to empty their 
particularity. This means a signifier becomes empty when it is detached from its 
particularity to become autonomous from its former self and creates an empty space to be 
allocated universal content.  As made more intelligible by Wullweber (2015:80), “an empty 
signifier arises out of a specific political process in which a particular statement, signifier 
or practice is transformed into a universality.” This is the state of political struggle over 
social media as a threat to national security in Kenya – various groups are out to make 
their definitions universal. But since the process of emptying is never completely finished, 
empty signifiers are hybrids of both particularities that they deny and the universality that 
they desire. As such, they are tendentially empty (Laclau 2000:304) as they create 
meaning in relation to what they are not.  
 
National security is an empty signifier because it is signified by its absence. To rephrase 
Laclau (1996:44), in a situation of radical incivility, ‘national security’ “is present as that 
which is absent; it becomes an empty signifier, as the signifier of this absence. In this 
sense, various political forces can compete in their efforts to present their particular 
objectives as those which carry out the filling of that lack. To hegemonise something is 
exactly to carry out this filling function”. What is represented through empty signifiers is a 
being that is constitutively unreachable (Laclau, 1996:40). In defining the concept of 
national security, we are faced “with a constitutive lack, with an impossible object which” 
shows itself through the impossibility of its representation. Since national security lacks 
the means of direct representation, its signifier is constitutively inadequate as it cannot 
represent it.  
This relation by which a particular content becomes the signifier of 
the absent communitarian fullness is exactly what we call a 
hegemonic relationship. The presence of empty signifiers - in the 
sense that we have defined them — is the very condition of 
hegemony….hegemonic operations would be the presentation of the 
particularity of a group as the incarnation of that empty signifier which 
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refers to the communitarian order as an absence, an unfulfilled 
reality (Laclau, 1996:43-44).  
 
Mouffe (2000:100-103) transforms antagonism in the friend-enemy dichotomy into 
agonism, contestation between adversaries and not a ‘struggle-to-death’ within a 
democratic polity. From agonistic democracy perspective, politics can be reduced to 
incivility in the agonistic relationship, more specifically, incivility is political agonism, which 
is the essential hearth of democracy but by eliminating it from politics one tends to 
introduce the enemy-friend antagonism, which becomes struggle to death as there are no 
possible ways to contest agonistic positions by debate within democracy. Therefore, 
attempts being made to remove incivility, for example, through its securitisation, can be 
equated to attempts to remove politics from itself.  Since both the government and the 
people know that civility is at the core of ‘peaceful’ politics but at the same time know civility 
means nothing because it only exists outside politics, or the stagnant politics of consensus. 
Yet people are united around the demand for politics without insecurity, attempting to fill 
the empty signifier with content. Such processes of competing to create signifiers out of 
lack, Laclau (1996:44) are called hegemonisation. For this reason, efforts by various actors 
to enforce civility in politics can be seen as efforts to reinforce hegemony over others. 
 
As a floating signifier, incivility is not just filled by linguistic content that, for example, 
securitises incivility by uttering security statements, rather it is the meaning that is fixed by 
‘security practices’, the security rationalities used to govern. From a Foucaldian point of 
view, security practices are the rationalities “embedded in governmental knowledge, skills, 
technologies…that traverse both linguistic and non-linguistic non-governmental practices 
as well as artefacts” (Huysmans, 2006:147). Considering Laclau and Mouffe’s argument 
that everything is discursive, it is not only linguistic tools that are used to stabilise the 
meaning of incivility, but many other ‘techniques’, which according to Huysmans (2006:9), 





Articulation is recomposition by antagonistic forces around particular nodal points after 
dislocation (Laclau, 1990:40), what Glynos and Howarth (2007:117) call misrecognition 
through rearticulation of the dislocatory event. To Laclau and Mouffe (1985:105), 
articulation is “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity 
is modified as a result of the articulatory practice”. Although all objects and actions are 
meaningful, the process of rearticulation changes relations between objects and actions 
such that their meaning and identity becomes temporarily fixed in a particular way.  
Even though it is impossible to close the social field, attempting to close the field is an 
impossible ideal. Reaching the impossibility is attempted through ‘empty signifiers’ that act 
as the impossible ideal for the society. Emptiness is an essential quality of nodal points as 
a condition for possibility of hegemonic success (Howarth, Norval & Stavrakakis, 2000: 9). 
Yet hegemonic forces attempt to ‘fill’ the empty signifiers so that the social field is closed, 
but this closure remains impossible. To Laclau (1996:44), politics “is possible because the 
constitutive impossibility of society can only represent itself through the production of 
empty signifiers.” It is because of its emptiness that different hegemonic projects are 
attempting to confer meanings on freedom in social media.  
Through articulation, incivility in social media achieves temporary fixation of the meaning. 
This can be conceptualised as aimed at:  
…removing ambiguities by turning the elements into moments 
through closure. But this aim is never completely successful as the 
possibilities of meaning that the discourse displaces to the field of 
discursivity always threaten to destabilise the fixity of meaning. 
Therefore, all moments stay potentially polysemic, which means that 
the moments are always potentially elements. Specific articulations 
reproduce or challenge the existing discourses by fixing meaning in 
particular ways. And because of the perpetual potential polysemy, 
every verbal or written expression ... is also, to some extent, an 
articulation or innovation; although the expression draws on earlier 
fixations of meaning (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002:29). 
 
This study explains how discourses fix the meaning of incivility in social media by 
identifying two categories of practices of articulation: those that reproduce and sediment 
governmentalities; and those that reactivate subjectivities and make people to rethink their 
political practices. This is in line with Foucault’s (1986: 12-13) thought on how government 
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policy articulation, the “practical texts”, create ‘subject positions’, which are either taken or 
rejected by political subjects.  
 
Taking government created ‘subject positions’ means adopting policies that construct 
government inspired way of thinking about oneself. This is what Foucault (1980:98) claims 
is non-repressive power that instead of stopping us from doing something, encourages us 
to do certain things. Here ‘government’ is the full array of knowledge that supports 
governments by producing governable subjects, what Foucault calls ‘governmentality’.  In 
contrast, some articulation reactivates subjectivities and makes people rethink their 
political practices due to what Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 111) claim is a lack of finality in 
discourses making it impossible for a society to exist. Unlike in classical Marxism in which 
historical materialism sees society as an objective totality demarcated by the economy into 
antagonistic classes, Laclau and Mouffe contend that society does not exist as an 
objective totality, but only as temporary closures whereby other possibilities for 
identification are marginalised or excluded. Through closures, we continuously produce 
society, yet this society remains an imaginary entity. According to Laclau (1993b: 287), 
terms for totality of society are myths (floating signifiers) invested with a different content 
by different articulations. It is these floating signifiers that establish an imaginary society.  
 
In this dissertation, elements of rearticulation that reproduce and sediment 
governmentalities about incivility in social media are: floating signifiers and empty signifiers 
that are transformed into nodal points through articulation, giving meaning to a chain of 
signifiers of incivility in social media by partially fixing their meanings. Articulation of 
floating and empty signifiers into nodal points attempt to reach an impossible ideal of a 
society without politics. While articulations transform nodal points into elements, floating 
or empty signifiers reactivate subjectivities and make people rethink the existing 
hegemony.  
5.2.5. Nodal point 
Nodal points are the privileged discursive points that fix the meaning of signifying chains 
since “a discourse incapable of generating any fixity of meaning is the discourse of the 
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psychotic” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:112). The concept is borrowed from Lacan’s (1977:302) 
point de capiton, the privileged-master signifiers used to anchor or quilt signifying chains 
by knotting the signifiers to the signified to create an illusion of a fixed meaning (see Laclau 
& Mouffe 1985:112). Other signs acquire meaning from their relationship to the nodal point. 
Although the nodal point gives meaning to a chain of signifiers by partially fixing their 
meaning within those chains, this meaning arises from the play of differences instead of 
being a priori privileged (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:112). Rearticulation gives new meaning 
to the dislocatory event by constructing nodal points, the signs that occupy a privileged 
status in discourse. But this privileged status is not permanent as meaning can never be 
completely fixed, since discourses are always vulnerable to the exterior that they exclude 
as they attempt to fix meaning. 
This study identified how the regime is using the empty signifier of (in)security as a nodal 
point to fix the meaning of incivility in social media. The national security myth is an empty 
signifier but when filled with regime preferred content it becomes a nodal point that can fix 
the meaning of incivility, which is otherwise a floating signifier. To use Lacan’s words, 
securitisation ‘quilts’ incivility so that it stops sliding, and acquires a specific meaning. 
Through this ‘quilting’ by the national security nodal point, the regime creates a fixed 
meaning of incivility as a threat to the nation’s wellbeing, placing it outside politics. But 
before it is quilted, incivility is a floating signifier made up of what Žižek (1989:96) would 
term “non-bound, non-tied elements… whose identity is 'open', overdetermined by their 
articulation in a chain with other elements”. What is at stake in this securitisation process 
is freedom as a floating signifier: securitisation demonstrates how freedom due to social 
media is dangerous to the nation as it can lead to violence. Since nodal points are only 
temporarily fixed, the competing ascriptions between nodal points and floating signifiers 
will be used to identify the struggles taking place over the meaning of incivility in social 
media discourses.  
5.2.6. Objective Discourses/ideology, Hegemony vs. ‘the political’ 
Discourses that have been sedimented to a singular meaning and seem natural are 
‘objective’ discourses, the opposite of ‘the political’ (Laclau, 1990:34). Yet earlier 
sedimented discourses remain fluid and can, at any time, enter the play of politics and be 
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problematised through new articulations (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:36). Hegemony is 
located between ‘objectivity’, a naturalised status and ‘the political’, the contested field. 
Sedimentation of discourse to a naturalised status is a hegemonic struggle through which 
alternative understandings of the world are suppressed, creating a single perspective that, 
without contest, is viewed as natural.  
 
Discourse Theory equates objectivity to ideology since what has become naturalised 
through objectivity appears as given and unchangeable and seems not to derive its 
meaning from its difference from something else (Laclau, 1990:89). Ideology hides the 
fluid nature of meaning, thereby masking the alternative possibilities that would otherwise 
have presented themselves (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002:37). In addition to masking 
alternative possibilities, objectivity is also a form of sedimented power; it hides the traces 
of power making us forget that the world is politically constructed (Laclau, 1990:60).  An 
important precondition of post-Gramcian hegemony is the unsettled nature of ‘the political’. 
Since elements have no relation, they can be re-arranged and placed in different 
relationships by hegemonic projects (Norval, 1996:309). 
 
Post-foundational Discourse Analysis as a method provides strategies for looking at 
possibilities that have been excluded in order to point out the consequences of particular 
discursive constructions of social media incivility. Besides, the method provides a strategy 
for analysing how some myths about social media incivility have come to appear as 
objectively true while others as impossible and how some myths have been allocated 
different contents by diverse social actors in the struggle to make their particular 
understanding of social media incivility the naturalised one. 
 
From the above Discourse Theory model, multimodal Post-foundational Discourse 
Analysis and Discursive Material Analysis models were developed to operationalise 
Discourse Theory into a method for analysing how social media incivility is denaturalising 
dominant narratives. Based on the questions guiding this study, processes associated with 
absorption of dislocation include government policies on incivility and dominant texts 
naturalising the meaning of incivility, while processes associated with public contestation 
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utilise social media incivility to create counter-publics and reinvigorate citizens’ 
understanding of freedom of expression.    
5.3 Conclusion 
The above proposed model for Post-Foundational Discourse Analysis is a strategy of 
transforming Discourse Theory into a method for discourse analysis. The model uses 
dislocation as the key sensitising concept that can be used to deconstruct incivility in social 
media. However, strategies for creating a method out of Discourse Theory, as Phelan and 
Dahlberg (2011:13) warn, should not lead to method-led studies instead of critically 
exploring Discourse Theory’s value, and limitations, as a “critical theoretical framework for 
focusing methodological attention on the ‘radically contingent’ and ‘contextualised’ nature 
of social and media practices (Laclau, 1990: 22–3)”. Whereas “method-driven” studies are 
done within firm guidelines of scientific methods of data-gathering, Post-foundational 
Discourse Analysis is a “problem-driven” approach that is guided by “problematisation” of 
social practices (Glynos & Howarth, 2007:167). The proposed Post-foundational 
Discourse Analysis model identifies the blind spots and silences in the existing social and 
media practices to make visible a different regime of social media order (Phelan & 
Dahlberg, 2011:13). The suggestion by Phelan and Dahlberg (2011:13) acted as a 
reminder about the need to bring this study as close as possible to Gylnos and Howarth’s 
(2007:167) “problem-driven, rather than method or purely theory-driven research”. The 
study strived to balance between theoretical and procedural issues in developing a method 
for Discourse Analysis. The Discourse Theory model developed in this chapter is used in 







6.0 Chapter Six 
Design of a research strategy for Discourse Analysis   
Discourse does not refer to linguistic or signifying systems, 
grammars, speech acts, or conversations. To think of discourse as 
mere spoken or written words forming descriptive statements is to 
enact the mistake of representationalist thinking. Discourse is not 
what is said; it is that which constrains and enables what can be said. 
Discursive practices define what counts as meaningful statements.  
(Barad, 2007:146)   
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the second part of the methodology section. The chapter uses concepts 
from Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory as explained in the previous chapter to 
develop a sampling and Post-foundational Discourse Analysis strategy. Developing a 
sampling and analysis strategy was important since, as explained earlier, Laclau and 
Mouffe’s (1985) discourse analysis lacks analytical frameworks, despite their important 
contribution to the ‘discursive turn’ and their continued suitability for analysing mediatised 
power relations. In this chapter, I develop a post-foundational strategy for sampling and 
analysing incivility in social media based on Laclau and Mouffe’s logics of dislocation as 
illustrated in the previous chapter.  
As explained in Chapter Two, incivility can either be democracy-enhancing or anti-
democracy, based on the target of the incivilities.  If incivility is directed at the dominant 
groups as a part of the efforts to contest the hegemony of existing democracy and power 
structure, then such incivility is democracy-enhancing. It is only when incivility challenges 
dominant discourses and encourages counter-hegemonic discourses that itfalls in the 
category of communication that promotes agonistic democracy. Such incivility is akin to 
democracy-enhancing subversive performative movements that started in early 20th 
Century, like Dadaism, Surrealism, Fluxus and Situationism (cf. Cammearts, 2007:75). 
These subversive movements reject logic, reason, and aestheticism of art in the modern 
capitalist society, preferring ‘nonsense’ and ‘irrationality’ as tools for not only overturning 
traditional bourgeois notions of art but also overturning dominant thinking (cf. Hopkins, 
2004: xiv). But incivility can be anti-democratic when directed at the powerless — those 
outside the existing hegemonic order of things. Such anti-democratic incivility expresses 
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feelings of intolerance against the proletariat, such as hate speech and incitement to 
violence, categories of speech that can be counter-hegemonic but at the same time anti-
democratic, and if not countered, can create a dominant anti-public sphere. The challenge 
for agonistic democracy-enhancing incivility, as Mouffe (1997:8) would argue, is the 
difficulties of subordinate groups establishing equivalence in their diverse democratic 
struggles, equivalences that can enable them to define a common adversary. If the 
marginalised and disadvantaged groups establish ‘new subject positions’ that can allow 
them to jointly use incivility to challenge their common adversary, then incivility in social 
media can be part of truly democratic struggles against power. Sampling was done among 
what can be categorised as agonistic democracy-enhancing incivility; the incivility that is 
dislocating dominant democracy.   
6.2. Sampling strategy 
Discourse Analysis constitutes a corpus whose ‘texts’ can be analysed in detail when a 
small sample is selected because discourses operate within enormous symbolic material 
that is impossible to survey in entirety (see Angermuller, 2014:58). In this study, sampling 
was guided by the following question: What are the boundaries within which the meaning 
of incivility in social media can be analysed given that Laclau and Mouffe (1985:107) reject 
the distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices, affirming that “every 
object is constituted as an object of discourse”. To Laclau and Mouffe (1985:107), there is 
no distinction between “the linguistic and behavioural aspects of a social practice”, this is 
not to deny that “objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that 
they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of 
emergence” (p108). This means, “…[d]iscourse is not a mental act in the usual sense. 
Material things, external objects as such, also participate in discursive structures” (Laclau, 
1988:254). As explained by Griggs and Howarth (2017:2), discourse is made of words and 
things — the human and non-human agents and actions. Thus, to capture all discursive 
practices, this study analysed linguistic and material texts through which the meaning of 
incivility is fixed or contested. Additionally, Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of dislocation of 
current liberal democracy acted as the boundary within which sampling of incivility in social 
media was done, otherwise sites for struggles over incivility in social media are infinite and 
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it is impossible to demarcate clear boundaries, considering that every object is an object 
of discourse.  
 
Furthermore, unlike in positivist studies that assume the existence of an objective ‘world 
out there’ that should be sampled, sampling pursues different goals in Discourse Analysis. 
For instance, the major reason for sampling was to locate the most relevant case for 
researching the phenomenon of incivility in social media (cf. Flick, 2007:29). The author 
asserts that researchers should ensure that the sample is representative of the issue 
unlike in positivist studies in which samples are statistically representative of the 
population. Indeed, in Discourse Analysis, sampling is not based on the logic of statistical 
generalisation derived from the selection of the most representative part of the population, 
rather, as Flick (2007:27) states, sampling is a way of selecting cases, materials or events 
for properly constructing a corpus for studying the phenomenon of interest in the most 
instructive way. Therefore, the selected sample is not statistically representative as 
positivists would argue but is made up of relevant cases that ‘represent’ the entirety of 
incivility in social media. In reference to Discourse Analysis, Howarth (2005:19) proposes 
that the criteria for sample selection should be the specific problem being investigated 
since it is the problem which strongly determines the appropriate context and limits of a 
particular research project even though the data must be explicit, consistent, and justified. 
Furthermore, Flick (2007:28) recommends that samples should be selected “according to 
the intensity with which the interesting features, processes, experiences” occur in them. 
Due to the above considerations, the sample was selected as explained in 6.2.1.   
6.2.1. Multimodal samples  
Multimodal samples were used to capture both linguistic and other material texts bearing 
in mind that ‘everything is discursive’ (see Laclau & Mouffe, 1987:108). To avoid what 
Barad (2007:146) calls ‘representationalist thinking,’ the sample included the ‘full 
repertoire’ of resources used by social media audiences, linguistic texts being only one 
mode among several others. Moreover, because new media has changed the nature of 
the written text by combining text with other modes, this change needs to be matched by 
changes in Discourse Analysis strategies. For instance, social media has enabled users 
to combine linguistic texts with other semiotic modes, continuing the tradition of new media 
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complementing conventional media texts, thereby intensifying conventional media’s 
multimodality. Leeuwen (2015:447) identified how the following media innovations 
increased multimodality: magazines and comic strips use of images and graphics in the 
1920-30s; the influence of film’s nonverbal communication on how people talk and smile; 
the influence of the microphone on voice quality and intonation; and how television 
increased the influence of nonverbal communication in politics. Current innovations in 
social media are likely to have similar effects. 
 
Multimodality is a suitable response to the call by Laclau and Mouffe for Post-foundational 
Discourse Analysts to avoid differentiating discursive and non-discursive practices since 
every object is constituted as an object of discourse. Thus, the corpus for Discourse 
Analysis should be “all identifiable communicative modes, embodied and disembodied’ 
with the modes loosely defined without clear or stringent boundaries and often overlapping 
with other modes (Norris, 2004:101). Through the multimodal sampling strategy, the study 
evades the weakness of Critical Discourse Analysis, which differentiates discursive from 
non-discursive practices by analysing linguistic texts and neglecting material ‘texts’ or 
objects, yet according to Laclau and Mouffe (1985:108), no object can constitute itself 
“outside the discursive condition”. Therefore, to properly apply Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) 
Discourse Theory, we should look for how incivility has caused dislocation through 
linguistic and extra-linguistic modes — the material texts and objects that avail social 
media. 
 
Considering that ‘texts’ in social media can be viewed as technologies of representation 
(modes) or technologies of dissemination (medium as the second mode), this dualism 
formed the two categories of modes that were selected for inclusion in the multimodal 
sample. Similar duality is proposed by Lievrouw (2011:7) who categorises new media into 
“material artefacts or devices”, their use (social practices) and institutions that people 
create around the artefacts. In this study, the medium as artefacts are the extra-linguistic 
modes (texts), while use of artefacts enables transmission of various linguistic and non-
linguistic texts (the social practices). Although mode is the semiotic system, a grammatical 
system that functions as a regular means of representation and communication through 
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some medium, the physical means of inscription and dissemination of textual modes is 
also a mode (see Jewitt, 2004:184).  
 
From Laclau and Mouffe’s view that every object is an object of discourse, the medium is 
another mode, although this mode is also used to transmit linguistic modes. In the 
dissemination/representation dichotomy, the medium is the material technology for 
disseminating ‘texts’, while mode refers to any regular means of representation, a symbolic 
system, such as photographs, written texts and various forms of sounds or their newer 
forms. The new mode encouraging incivility in social media is the technologies of 
dissemination (the medium) — the Internet-enabled dissemination whose major 
affordance is its ability to function not only as technology of dissemination but also as 
technology of production, enabling the audience to produce as they consume. Therefore, 
the medium in social media is also a new mode, but the technologies of representation in 
social media are the longstanding modes — written texts, images and sound — which 
have been appropriated by social media to offer more affordances of dissemination and 
production.  The transformation of mass media from static technologies of dissemination 
like newspapers, radio and television to Internet-based social media provides audiences 
with affordances of dissemination, making possible different kinds of communication 
activities, among them, increased incivility. 
 
By sampling both technologies of representation and dissemination, the study avoids 
foregrounding representational modes at the neglect of affordances of the medium, a 
common weakness Jewitt (2004:184) identified in studies of new communication 
technologies. Consequently, the multimodal sample selected for this study captures the 
meaning of ‘signs’ not only as linguistic texts but also as material ‘texts’ or objects that are 
used in the struggle to partially fix the meaning of incivility through exclusion of other 
possible meanings.  
6.2.1.1. Technologies of Representation: Government Linguistic Texts 
The technologies of representation, the linguistic symbolic system of representation used 
by social media audiences was sampled to enable the author to answer research 
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questions two to four. The sample enabled the researcher to locate linguistic settings 
under which democracy-enhancing incivility can be observed, what Flick (2007:30) termed 
locating places where the practices which the researcher is looking for happen. Sampling 
of technologies of representation enabled the author to select the regular means of 
presenting incivility in social media. Two categories of technologies of representation were 
sampled: government texts and social media texts.  
 
All texts that enable governments to function are government texts. Governments function 
through governmentality, a strategy of creating “rules, opinions, and advice on how to 
behave as one should [creating] a framework of everyday conduct” (Foucault 1985:12). 
Government documents are those that covertly give governments power to govern, by 
naturalising a ‘regime of truth’, in this case the government’s naturalisation of its meaning 
as the only meaning of social media incivility. Purposive sampling was used to capture 
texts that can explain how governmentality has influenced the partial fixation of the 
meaning of social media incivility. The voice of the government can be found in documents 
used to indirectly control and encourage forms of governing the self. The population of 
government texts included all texts created by what Althusser (1971:79) called state 
Apparatus and Ideological State Apparatus (ISA). Based on Althusser’s argument, texts 
from repressive state apparatus are those created by the government tools that function 
through violence: the administration, the army, the police, the courts, and the prisons, 
among others. The repressive state apparatus texts are the most forceful, according to 
Austin (1962:153), since they are supported by violent tools. While ideological state 
apparatuses (ISAs) are texts from specialised institutions of the religious system of 
churches, educational institutions, the family, the legal, the political, the trade-unions, the 
media, and the cultural institutions. Unlike the repressive state apparatus that are unified 
and belong to the ‘public domain’ the larger part of the ISAs is part of the ‘private’ domain 
(Althusser, 1971:79). Yet this private ISAs work for the state since the repressive and ISAs 
are of the ruling class. Nonetheless, the difference between the two is their double 
functioning: the repressive state apparatus functions openly and predominantly by 
violence and secondarily by ideology, whereas ISAs function predominantly by ideology 
but secondarily by violence (Althusser, 1971:80).  However, the author declares that the 
ruling class cannot control the ISAs as easily as it controls the repressive state apparatus 
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because of the influence from the former ruling class and resistance from the exploited 
classes. The inability to fully control ISAs is the reason for the existence of social media 
incivility, which happens at the displeasure of the government, a form of hegemonic 
struggle. The sample of documents created by repressive state apparatuses was selected 
from various government policies, while the sample for documents created by ISAs were 
selected from the mainstream media institutions.  
6.2.1.1.1. Government Policies  
The following policy texts by the Government of Kenya were sampled to analyse how the 
government is repairing the dislocation caused by democracy-enhancing incivility in 
social media: the report by The Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election 
Violence (CIPEV); annual reports and publications from the following administrative 
organs — Communications Authority of Kenya, the Media Council of Kenya and National 
Cohesion and Integration Commission.  
 
The CIPEV report was selected because it implicated the media as a source of incitement 
that led to the 2007 post-election violence. The report was identified as one of the 
‘dislocatory’ events when shifts in practices occurred to initiate changes in the 
government’s understanding of social media incivility. The selection of annual reports and 
publications from the administrative organs was necessitated by the fact the authoring 
bodies were created by administrative laws with a positivist thinking, just like the majority 
of Kenyan laws. Kulundu (2013:123-129) argues that Kenyan laws are “patently modelled 
on the legal positivist doctrine” as verified by the primary data from legal professionals and 
secondary data in the form of case-law and comparative law. The legal positivism 
philosophy of the above administrative bodies has given them power to naturalise the 
government’s understanding of incivility in social media. With a legal positivist background, 
the administrative bodies view all types of incivility, be they directed at the dominant groups 
or subordinate groups, as detrimental to democracy when this should not be the case. 
After all, administrative bodies are part of ‘governmentalities' through which natural laws 





Laws are part of ‘mentalities of government’ used to conceal power relations, as 
exemplified by Foucault (1996:332) who genealogically describes how modern laws are 
based on innovations in ancient feudal law, in which épreuve — a trial by ordeal —“does 
not name…the one who told the truth… [ra]ther it establishes that the strongest one is, at 
the same time, the one who is right.” To Foucault, the juridical process is a way of 
ritualising war so that the stronger one is, he is designated as the one who is right. In 
juridical processes, the burden of proof (an equivalent of épreuve) “does not have the 
function of showing the truth, contesting the truth, or revealing it... [instead it] is an operator 
of the law and not an operator of truth nor an apophantic [logic] operator.” In any case, 
laws function based on their inherent judicial powers bestowed by the political powers. 
Foucault (1996:339) shows how power penetrated juridical processes by giving the 
example of transmutation of wrongs against an individual to wrongs against the 
sovereignty, the law, and power. From this perspective, the juridical process is a political 
form of exercising power through judicial institutions (ibid, 341). 
 
The above government policy texts were selected purposively given the endless variety of 
texts in existence. As suggested by Bacchi (2009:20), choosing texts is part of the 
interpretive exercise reflecting the researcher’s interests and the possibility for the texts 
being used to develop a particular argument. 
6.2.1.1.2. Mainstream Media Texts 
The mainstream media are part of ISAs, which act as a site for knowledge construction. 
The news media does not just report news or reflect audience preferences (Bacchi, 
2009:242), they actively engage in interpretation of ‘problems’ such as incivility in social 
media.  By participating in knowledge construction, the media plays a significant role in 
governing (Bacchi, 2009:243). In this regard, the study selected samples from the 
following: News and opinions on incivility carried by leading national newspapers — the 
Daily Nation, Standard (and their Sunday editions), and the Star; editorial policies of 
mainstream media organisations — the Nation Media Group, the Standard Media Group, 
Royal Media and Radio Africa and the government broadcaster, KBC. These documents 
can help show how mainstream media have naturalised understanding of incivility in social 
media. Analysing media texts is relevant because the texts are drawn from “existing ways 
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of making sense of the world” (McKee, 2003: 46), therefore, they are important cultural 
resources that tell us something about the broader discursive framework in which they 
operate (Van Brussel, 2014:23).  
 
Media texts make visible existing discourses, rather than being the creators of discourses. 
The process of bringing to the fore the existing discourses works like ‘a feedback loop’ 
with the media texts drawing on existing ways of sense making which are interpreted by 
people and fed back into texts which they produce and are  fed back into mediated texts 
(McKee, 2003:46). Analysis of media texts was aimed at showing how the dominant forces 
are engaged in a hegemonic struggle to renew their hegemony, which is threatened by 
incivility that deepens agonistic democracy.   
6.2.1.2. Technologies of Representation: Social Media Texts as Alternative Media 
Conventional media like ISAs tools are part of government texts, but social media can be 
both inside and outside government. Social media networks that have provided an avenue 
for democracy-enhancing incivility are similar to other forms of alternative media such as 
underground newspapers and pirate radio that struggle to provide divergent opinions. 
Unlike the traditional alternative media, the common of them being underground 
newspapers and pirate radio that could not compete mainstream media, social media are 
part of the “inexpensive, powerful tools [that are] challenging the givens of mainstream or 
popular culture (Lievrouw, 2011:2). According to the author, new media tools have enabled 
“people to work around the fixity of traditional media technologies and institutional 
systems, and to negotiate, manipulate, and blur the boundaries between interpersonal 
interaction and mass communication.” New media are, to use Lievrouw’s (2011:2) words, 
the “latest incarnation” of alternative media, the various forms of “oppositional, radical, 
underground, or anarchist media”. 
 
The major challenge in sampling social media texts is the infinite information available. 
Appropriate selection criteria were developed by starting the data collection process on a 
pilot basis in order to identify social media sites with incivility. As explained in Chapter 
One, the researcher ended up selecting Facebook Groups and Pages of Ghafla.co.ke, 
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Kenyan-post.com and Nairobiwire.com. These sites were by then ranked by Alexa.com 
and news.google.com as the most visited. Alexa.com, a subsidiary company of 
Amazon.com provides commercial web traffic data, in the provider’s own admission, 
Alexa.com is the world’s leading provider of free web metrics (www.alexa.com). The 
second ranking site, news.google.com is a news aggregating site.  Additionally, these sites 
were selected since the use of search engines and commercial ranking is a common 
selection criterion in online studies. For instance, Kelly, Bochynska, Kornman, and 
Chapman (2008:1881) selected sites based on Nielsen/Net ratings, Boulos and Bath 
(2003) used several search engines to select a purposive sample, Ostry, Young, and 
Hughes (2008:649) sampled popular websites based on data bought from a web-tracking 
company, while Ninaweyman, Martin, Dirmaier (2014:6) used Alexa.com.  
 
The second major reason for selecting the sites was their editorial independence. As 
alternative media channels, the selected sites provide an opportunity for citizens to 
participate in production of news as amateurs, or citizen journalists without enforcing 
‘professional’ norms, and beliefs, common in the hegemonic mainstream media news sites 
that are part of the ISAs. The study avoided social media sites owned by conventional 
media outlets like newspapers, television and radio stations, whose content is influenced 
by work practices based on an institutionalised understanding of truth, objectivity, and the 
use of journalistic formats and language, which exclude ‘others’ from giving alternative 
frames to news.   
 
The researcher and research assistants documented incivility in selected sites. They 
looked for information that can match the following: User’s understanding of incivility; 
reactions to incivility (commenting or not commenting on the uncivil comments), comments 
participants gave about uncivil comments, and demographic background of participants 
posting or reacting to uncivil comments. 
6.2.1.2. Technologies of Dissemination: Social Media Artefacts as Material Texts 
Technologies of dissemination, the artefacts that can be read as texts, were sampled to 
underscore the importance of looking for communication not only in regular means of 
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representation but also the technologies for producing, storing, and disseminating 
meaning. To reiterate, if Discourse Analysis is to follow Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) 
suggestion that everything is discursive then the analysis should include material texts, 
with ‘text’ signifying “anything that can be read and thus interpreted, or to which meaning 
can be ascribed” (Allen, Griffin, & O’Connell, 2011:2). Technologies of dissemination 
represent through material modes, what Lievrouw and Livingstone (2006:8) call “the tools 
and techniques of communication rather than …content, meaning, interaction or shared 
understanding.” By using material texts, the study avoided the ‘blackbox’ effect, where the 
representational mechanism of artefacts remains hidden from those using the artefacts 
and those analysing the medium.  
The first categories of technologies of dissemination selected were hardware, the social 
media artefacts that carry meanings beyond their immediate function. What distinguishes 
hardware as artefacts from technologies of representation is the fact that the main function 
of technologies of representation is to inscribe and distribute texts, while the main functions 
of hardware are different from representation, even though Discourse Analysis can enable 
us to discover how hardware conceals their representation. As pointed out by   Latour 
(2007:71), agential power of artefacts can be proven by the fact that “anything that does 
modify a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor”.  As Latour (2007) would have 
argued: if there is a difference between acting with or without an artefact then the artefact 
is an actor or participant in the action. This does not mean that the artefacts ‘determine’ 
the action, rather, explains Latour (2007:72), it means artefacts “might authorise, allow, 
afford, encourage, permit, suggest, influence, block, render possible, forbid, and so on.” 
To Johnson (1988:299), the agency of artefacts can be identified by imagining what 
humans would have to do in the absence of the object. It is possible that dislocation caused 
by incivility in social media would have happened in the absence of current 
telecommunication objects, but the dislocation would not be as it is today. In this regard, 
the sample of artefacts included all the hardware: the mobile phone, personal computers 
and other technologies used to access social media sites.   
The second category of technologies of dissemination was software, artefacts that fall in 
the category of the material substrate of digital texts (see Casemajor, 2015:7). Digital texts 
were analysed as material artefacts, an approach pioneered by Katherine Hayles who 
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reinvigorated materiality in seemingly immaterial literary production. She proposed a way 
of analysing effects of change in methods of inscription on the reader’s interaction with the 
text, how texts change in meaning due to their physical changes. To Hayles (2002:25) “the 
physical form of the literary artefact always affects what the words (and other semiotic 
components) mean” (emphasis in original). Instead of texts, she proposes “technotexts” in 
reference to the influence of technology on the texts it produces (Hayles, 2002:25). 
Popular social media sites, Facebook and Twitter, were sampled but not for analysing 
meaning of their content but to find out how the software as material texts is influencing 
dislocation. Here, software is seen as ‘prosthesis’, to use McLuhan’s (1964/1994) term, 
the extensions of producers and users’ abilities.  
6.3. Data analysis 1: Technologies of Representation 
Based on the Post-foundational Discourse Analysis model developed in the previous 
chapter, the analysis of linguistic texts was done to show how the regime is rearticulating 
dislocation caused by incivility in social media. In particular, the analysis was aimed at 
finding out how government texts are absorbing dislocation into existing social practices. 
These texts — the laws, policies and mainstream media texts — as explained above, are 
the nodal points attempting to rearticulate the meaning of agonistic democracy-enhancing 
incivility, which is otherwise a floating signifier that can be attached to different signifieds 
in different contexts. Although incivility in social media can be either democracy-enhancing 
or anti-democratic based on its target, government texts attempt to rearticulate 
democracy-enhancing incivility as subversive anti-democratic speech that is a threat to 
national security, the epitome of this being NCIC Guidelines for Monitoring Hate Speech 
(cf. NCIC Act, 2010). Through such attempts to fix the meaning of incivility, government 
texts are doing what Foucault (1985:12) calls actions that make people govern 
themselves. But since it is possible to have a signifier without a signified, an empty signifier 
existing as a signifier that is emptied of meaning still signifying through absence (Laclau, 
1996:34), attempts by the regime to fix the meaning of incivility are through empty signifiers 
that have no specific meaning. Laclau (1990:40) would have said that the government is 
attempting to create the ‘possibility and impossibility’ at the same time. Thus, there is a 
struggle between government texts that attempt to securitise incivility and social media 
users’ democracy-enhancing incivility. For instance, although the National Cohesion and 
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Integration Commission regularly initiates prosecution of social media users for offences 
related to incivility, what the commission terms hate speech, the prosecutions have not 
achieved a single conviction. The commission further agrees that as it monitors hate 
speech, the Constitution of Kenya guarantees freedom of expression (Mohammed, 2014).   
 
By attempting to make incivility a threat to national security, the government is limiting 
democracy-enhancing subversive speech. Instead of agonistic democratic struggles, the 
government prefers reasoned public debate. This means the public sphere has been 
rearticulated into a form of repression which, drawing on Gramsci, Fraser (1990:62) argues 
acts as a vehicle for the transformation of a repressive mode of domination into a 
hegemonic one, securing the ability of one section of the society to rule the rest. The 
government-preferred public sphere is a site for the construction of the consent but not 
critical scrutiny of the state.  
 
Dominant groups, the state, media owners and other elites, indirectly control the mass 
media content (re)production through selective investments in media institutions, financial 
control, employee selection, as well as statutory regulation, and directly through editorial 
influence. Even though conventional mainstream media journalists perform the actual 
process of freely shaping content as ordinary people, they are “symbolic elites”, to use 
Van Dijk’s (1989) words, people who exercise power on the basis of their “symbolic 
capital”. Journalists seem to have relative freedom to shape content, but this conceals the 
fact that their voices are voices of the corporate or institutional masters who pay or support 
their work. Van Dijk (1989:23) argues that professional norms, the news value system and 
assumed freedom of expression ideologically conceal the journalists’ position as symbolic 
elites who are dependent on political elites. Therefore, the mainstream media creates an 
environment where the minds of the people can be controlled symbolically rather than 
through physical coercion.  
 
The following question guided the analysis of government text: How is the government 
absorbing the dislocation caused by democracy-enhancing incivility in social media into 
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existing social practices? This question was answered by looking for how the regime is 
using threats to national security as articulatory linguistic and material texts. 
 
From this perspective, securitisation of social media discourses limits how we talk about 
politics. This means the language we use determines the fundamental assumptions that 
we adopt about politics, and how these assumptions guide our civility or incivility in social 
media discourses. Thus, securitisation tends to minimise, if not remove, ‘the political’ from 
politics by constructing limited subject positions. Positioning of the people through 
language, the process of producing peoples’ identities through socially and culturally 
available discourses, allocates people a set of expected behaviours, masking their real 
selves (see Burr, 1995:96). This is to say, people are products of the prevailing discourses, 
even though they also have agency to manoeuvre and choose or resist the prevailing 
discourses. 
 
Following post-structuralists’ conceptions of language elaborated by Foucault (1991:63), 
government texts can either be statements (énoncé) or the act of saying the statement 
(énonciation). In a statement (énoncé), ‘what is said or written’, ‘the subject of the 
enunciation’ is a finished product through which language speaks, what Foucault 
(1991:63) calls ‘things said’ — the “conditions and rules that must be satisfied in a given 
order of discourse for a statement to qualify as meaningful and thus to constitute a 
candidate for truth and falsity”, like the subject’s training and specialisation, institutional 
affiliation, and the ‘subject position’ (Howarth, 2005:343). While the act of saying, 
énonciation, constitutes or subverts a subject through the intentions of those uttering 
statements — ‘the intended force with which the utterance is issued’ (Skinner, 2002:82). 
It is not only what writers say in a statement but what they are doing by uttering the 
statement, which is determined by the historical contexts within which the statement is 
uttered. This study used these two strategies to describe how the regime is repairing 
dislocation by (re)creating subject positions through statements, that is, the regime’s 





From a genealogical perspective, truth moved from the enunciation (énonciation), like 
force of speech acts, to the statement (énoncé), where the struggle is over conditions and 
rules that determine meaning rather than the mere force of the speech act. This moved 
hegemonic struggles from resistance against government statements, like resistance to 
speech acts, to resistance against government conditions and rules that create regimes of 
knowledge. The mutation of truth means discourse is no longer linked to direct exercise of 
power as “truth does not impose itself on a pure, receptive human mind: it is sought after” 
(Sheridan, 1980:121). It is this “will to truth” power of discourses that is least apparent as 
it operates most effectively only when masked. The masking is so concealed that, as 
explained by Foucault (1971:9), people who unmasked this will to truth through speeches 
that did not “form part of the common discourse of men” were viewed as mad. 
Consequently, to identify how the regime is repairing dislocations by knotting incivility to 
threats to national security, I looked for texts which gave authority to the regime’s way of 
thinking.  
 
For instance, the report by the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, is an 
institutional report that was produced by trained subjects, occupying commanding ‘subject 
positions’. The report cemented the regime’s securitisation of incivility by attaching it to the 
nodal point of hate speech, which it blamed for instigating the 2007-08 post-election 
violence. Through this report and other public documents by “technicians of different 
sorts”, the traditional and organic intellectuals respectively engaged in the practice of 
articulation to construct hegemony of the regime (see Gramci, 1989:113; Laclau, 
2000:286). That is to say, the intellectual function is the practice of articulation aimed at 
creating a partial fixation of the otherwise floating signifier of incivility. The intellectual is, 
therefore, a subject position that emerges from articulation, which detaches the intellectual 
from the identity of the actor (see, Sunnercrantz, 2017:69). 
 
From a constructivist perspective, documents created through intellectual functions are 
the ‘regime’s truths’ (Foucault, 2008:18) used to control subjects by encouraging the 
formation of the self through techniques of living, rather than repression through prohibition 
and law (Foucault, 1971-72:89). Intellectual functions invent authoritative documents that 
are ‘technologies of the self,’ able to make subjects govern themselves by accepting 
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regime created knowledge. This study describes how knowledge about incivility in social 
media is reproduced, regulated, and legitimated by epistemic communities (see Van Dijk, 
2008:04). 
 
The following part describes the strategy used to identify how the regime is using linguistic 
texts to construct subject positions by transubstantiating incivility into a national security 
threat. (The strategy for analysing material texts is described in the second section of data 
analysis, the analysis of ‘technologies of dissemination’).  
 
6.3.2.1. Speech Acts  
The study looks at performative speech acts as articulations, which transform elements, 
moments, and floating signifiers into nodal points to (re)define incivility. From a speech act 
perspective, I examine the struggles over institutionalised meanings of incivility by 
modifying Austin’s (1962) performative speech theory to take ontological presumptions of 
poststructuralist rhetorical practices. Performative speech acts are not utterances which 
could be true or false, but utterances which by being said, do something. Although any 
utterance is performative since it acts to the least by saying words, Austin (1962:99) 
differentiated performance of illocutionary acts, acting by saying something, from 
locutionary acts in which performance is the act of saying something and perlocutionary 
act, the consequences of an utterance. All utterances are locutionary acts because by 
uttering words, one will be performing the saying of those words. While perlocutionary acts 
bring about or achieve by saying something, the action is through consequences of the 
utterance. As pure performatives, illocutionary acts do something by saying something. 
The study was interested in pure performatives, the texts through which the government 
is securitising incivility in order to absorb dislocation.  
 
However, in line with the study’s ontological assumptions, this study takes speech acts not 
as linguistic acts at micro-textual level, the type of discourse analysis labelled by Philips 
and Jorgensen (2002: 62) as discourse-as-language. Instead, the study takes speech acts 
from a macro-textual approach in which the definition of text is broader than its linguistic 
texts. At the macro-textual level, discourse analysis is the analysis of “ideologies 
embedded in the text, and not so much on the language used” (Carpentier, 2017:16). 
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These are what Foucault (1981:61) calls speech acts that produce serious truth claims. 
As explained by Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982:48), they are serious performative speech 
acts, “what experts say when they are speaking as experts.” However, I revised Foucault’s 
view of speech act to remove the structuralists’ residues, especially his reference to 
experts. In this study, as it will be clarified later, experts are both traditional and organic. 
That is to say that this study did not look for individual speech acts but was more interested 
in mini narratives articulating the concept of incivility in social media. Here, I looked for the 
all the sources of rules that shape the production of statements about incivility in Kenya 
today.  
  
Indeed, Laclau and Mouffe (1985:108) proposed the theory of Speech Acts as a strategy 
for analysing power concealed in discourses, while to Laclau (2014:63), it is only when 
tropes such as metonyms become metaphors that regimes achieve hegemony. These, I 
guess, are the clearest empirical methodological suggestions by Laclau and Mouffe — 
how metaphors, metonyms and catachresis as speech acts can be used to analyse 
sedimentation of hegemony.  
 
Before the language turn, tropes were seen as linguistic expressions that deviate from 
normal literal language use by changing the usual meanings of words. Unlike the literal 
language in which words ‘mean what they say’, tropes ‘say one thing to mean another’. 
However, from a poststructuralist perspective, tropes at macro level are ways of creating 
reality as they limit how we construe reality. Following Laclau’s methodological 
suggestions, the study attempts to analyse how the speech acts make incivility a metonym 
by associating it with hate speech and then eventually substituting this particularity with 
universality through metaphorisation that conceals its ‘metonymical origins’. If left 
undisturbed, substituting incivility with hate speech makes the latter a catachresis as it 
becomes a figural term without a literal one (cf. Laclau, 2005:71). Such distortion of 
meaning is due to the “need to express something that the literal term would simply not 
transmit.” Hate speech has been made the name of something that cannot be literally 




Just like Laclau (2014:49) and Fiske and Hartley (1978:32), my use of tropes to analyse 
hegemony is influenced by Jakobson (1958) who broadened the meaning of tropes by 
using them as a twofold description of aphasia with: metaphoric patients, through 
substitution, expressing similarity between dissimilar things, while metonymic patients, 
through combination, suppress the contiguity between things. Thus, tropes are not simply 
devices for poetic imagination through extraordinary language but can also be used as 
tools for hegemonic intervention in everyday life as they are used to influence thought and 
action at the macro level. As explained by Lakoff and Johnson (1980:5), since “our 
conceptual system is largely metaphorical…what we do every day is very much a matter 
of metaphor.” In other words, metonyms and metaphors are used here at the conceptual 
level to describe how discourses form practices within ‘the political’, different from their 
narrow linguistic understanding as poetic language tools.  
 
At the conceptual level, a metaphor is a signifier that creates new meanings by substituting 
one signified with another signified to construct the equivalence between the sign and the 
reality it represents. From this perspective, a metaphor uses one thing to mean something 
else (see Miller 1979: 156). Hence unlike Saussure’s signifiers whose relationship with the 
signified is arbitrary, metaphors signify by convincing us that the signifier is equivalent to 
the signified even though the two are unrelated. For example, the conceptual metaphor 
“AN ARGUMENT IS WAR” limits us to construing argument in war-like linguistic 
expressions, shutting out alternative understandings (cf. Kovecses, 2010:6). Thus, the 
metaphoric real “does not display the actual real world, but displaces it” (Fiske & Hartley, 
1978:32), this is how metaphors play a hegemonic role. In any case, everything can be 
similar to everything else in some respect, only that “relative importance of any specific 
relation of similarity depends on context and purpose” (Lopes 1996:18). On the other hand, 
metonyms are made of two closely related elements that can stand for each other 
(Kovecses, 2010:6). While the signifier and the signified are unrelated, metonyms use a 
signified to stand for a directly related or closely associated signified. For example, through 
metonymic displacement, the regime uses one signified to signify another by associating 
the somewhat hatred aspect of incivility with hate speech and risk to national security. This 
association modifies people’s perception of incivility, making it difficult for them to see 
incivility’s other attributes. Consequently, metonyms play a hegemonic role when they 
174 
 
make objects signify abstract concepts through association. In any case, there are always 
“many parts that can stand for the whole” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980:36), but the part 
selected is the most important in the hegemonic struggle.  
 
For instance, when actors take tasks such as security organs taking up policing of civility 
that are not natural even though they can be associated with them, this ‘taking up’ Laclau 
(2014:54) would argue, is metonymic as it is not natural but only ‘a part’ is used to signify 
a whole. When such “‘taking up’ continues for a long period of time… people… get 
accustomed to it and tend to think that it is a normal part” within the confines of the security 
organs. This is when the metonym of securitisation of civility is transformed into a 
metaphor as it creates an unexpected similarity between incivility and disparate things like 
security, making people construe incivility in terms of (in)security. At this level, what was 
particular, the taking up of civility by security organs, becomes universal.  After people get 
accustomed, what began as contingent practice is metaphorically taken to be part of what 
security organs are supposed to do: henceforth the identity of particularity becomes 
difficult to pinpoint (cf. Sunnercrantz, 2017:305). To Laclau, it means “‘contiguity’ shades 
into ‘analogy’, ‘metonymy’ into ‘metaphor’… this is inherent to the central political operation 
that we call ‘hegemony’: the movement from metonymy to metaphor, from contingent 
articulation to essential belonging.” How incivility has been named or is regulated is, 
therefore, a metaphorical crystallisation that conceals its metonymical origin. In Laclau’s 
words, “the partial object ceases to be a partiality evoking a totality and becomes… the 
name of that totality” (2005:115). Such dislocation of “hegemonic formation involves the 
reactivation of that contingency: the return from a ‘sublime’ metaphoric fixation to a humble 
metonymic association” (Laclau, 2014:55). That is to say that dislocation involves a return 
to the metonymic meaning by making ‘taking up’ civility by security actors particular.  
 
A related trope is catachresis, which plays a hegemonic role by misapplying terms through 
what Parker (1990:60) calls transfer of a word “from one place to another …when no 
proper word exists.” Catachresis is a figural term which has no corresponding literal term. 
Laclau (2006:107) states that catachresis does away with “the complementarity 
literal/figural…present in all tropes. The literal would simply be a term which conceals the 
traces of its own rhetoricity, so that rhetoricity would be constitutive of language.” Thus, 
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catachresis is different from metaphor and metonym, which transfers or substitutes where 
a proper term already exists but is displaced by a term transferred from another place. 
Metaphors and metonyms simply, but correctly, describe one thing as another, while 
catachresis abuses metaphorical transfers by misapplying words, what Howarth and 
Griggs (2006:32) call “double relegation” a catachresis is not only figurative, but also 
figurative in abhorrent form. In analysing the repair of dislocation, looking for catachrestic 
terms is important as they play a constitutive role by naming through maiming. As 
explained by Laclau (2005:100), after the failure of an institutional order and the 
emergence of demands that cannot be represented within it, “the name becomes the 
ground of the thing”. So, in this study, how mediatised incivility is named is hegemonic as 
no proper word in existence can perfectly substitute the mass incivility being experienced 
in social media today.    
 
As clarified above, linguistic relations between the signifier-signified and syntagm-
paradigm when theorised outside language can be used to define ontological relations 
(see Laclau, 2014:58). Syntagmatic (metonymic) relations exist where institutional forms 
prevail by combining different positions to create a stable and unchallenged social order. 
Confrontation divides the society into syntagmatic positions of ‘us’ and ‘them’, with all 
social elements identifying themselves on either pole through relations of equivalence, 
whereas ‘institutionalist political discourse’ multiplies differential positions created through 
antagonistic discourse, rupturing the syntagmatic differential positions and enabling 
“identities to establish paradigmatic [metaphoric] relations of substitution with all the others 
in each of the two poles” of equivalence and difference (Laclau, 2014:58). 
 
While guarding against linguistic reductionism, this study uses linguistic expressions in 
political discourses, the ontic level, to show how tropes constitute objective discourses at 
the ontological level, considering that the ontic is informed by the ontological (cf. Howarth 
& Griggs, 2006:31). Linguistic expressions operate at the ontical level as symbolic 
representations that can be used to access the primacy of politics at the ontological level. 
For example, in creating nodal points of hate speech through securitisation, the regime is 
using empty signifiers to represent the irrepresentable ‘real’ through combination and 
substitution, which is not a replacement of positive terms like traditional metonyms and 
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metaphors do, but is a process of “giving a name to something which is essentially 
‘nameless’, to an empty place” (Laclau, 2014:56). That is to say that representation of the 
impossible is achieved through the discursive production of the empty signifiers which 
signify “the blind spot” at the ontological level. Hence, the irrepresentable ‘real’ can only 
be represented through tropological combination and substitution. For instance, hate 
speech and national security are catachresis when misused to represent the 
unrepresentable, but once accepted after continuous misuse, become hegemonic 
formations and lose their catachresic nature. This chain of three tropes, conceptual 
metaphor, metonyms and catachresis, are the analytical tools used to identify how the 
regime is hegemonically shaping struggles over incivility in social media discourses. As 
noted above, this study uses tropes for the ontological analysis of incivility in social media, 
not the linguistic expressions that act at an ontical level, even though it is only through the 
latter that we can access the former.  
 
To trace hegemonising tropes at the ontological level, the study adopted Austin’s 
(1962:150) taxonomy of five illocutionary acts based on the force of their actions, ranging 
from verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives to expositives. Among the five, 
verdictive acts are the most forceful speech acts because they result from judgement 
made by a judge, jury, arbitrator or umpire but can also be appraisals that give findings — 
verdicts as the name implies. Exercitive acts result from exercising power, like ordering, 
warning, advising and urging, among others. Verdictives are judicial acts while exercitives 
are executive or legislative acts. Even though the force of the verdictives comes from the 
official position of the speaker, verdictives “purport to be correct or incorrect, right or wrong, 
justifiable or unjustifiable on the evidence”, not as a favourable or unfavourable decision 
(Austin, 1962:153). The author urges that a judicial act is executive but is uttered 
differently, making the resultant action look as if it is not part of executive power. 
Commissives act by making commitment through the speaker’s utterances. They also 
include declarations of intentions from the speaker. Through verdicts, a speaker commits 
others to a certain future conduct, while through interpretation of verdicts, others can 
commit themselves to a certain estimated verdict. Behabitive acts are among the 
miscellaneous illocutionary acts because their actions are only through attitudes and social 
behaviour, for example, acting through “apologising, congratulating, commending, 
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condoling, cursing and challenging” (Austin, 1962:151). Expositive acts clarify reasons, 
argument, or communication and are expository in general.  
 
The mere utterance of performative acts cannot absorb dislocation into existing social 
practices nor articulate social media incivility into a nodal point unless the utterances are 
made correctly. Austin (1961:13) warns that besides uttering performatives, many other 
things must go right for the performative to perform action. He called the things that can 
go wrong infelicities. The following are necessary for the smooth functioning of 
performatives (Austin, 1962:14-5): accepted conventional procedure, appropriate persons 
and circumstances, the participants performing the act correctly and completely,  the 
hearer reacting to it in a certain way, the speaker having certain thoughts, feelings, or 
intentions, and the speaker executing tasks in the future (cf. Oishi, 2006:2). A lack of these 
felicities prevents performatives from acting.  
 
The following subsection identifies sites for the regime’s performative speech actions — 
by both repressive and ideological state apparatus — used to repair dislocation through 
metonymical displacement and metaphorical substitution to create a regime preferred 
meaning of incivility in social media. 
 
First, the law: In this category is the most forceful speech act, the texts that act “by 
convincing others that a certain rule is indeed “the law” (Fletcher, 2003:85). The law is 
among other speech acts categorised by Austin (1962) as verdictive acts, the actions 
originating from judicial orders, which create institutional forms of allowable behaviour (see 
Searle, 1969:35). Laws and judicial rulings make incivility mean one thing and not the 
other, creating a nodal point of an otherwise floating signifier. To paraphrase Searle’s 
(1969:35) ‘counts-as locution’, laws act as constitutive rules that make ‘incivility’ count as 
insecurity or hate speech in a context stated by the regime5. As such, I left out ‘regulative 
                                                          
5 Searle describes how institutional facts are created by constitutive rules with the of structure X counts as 
Y in C, where Y does not necessarily have physical relationship with X. Instead, the collective agreement 
enables the Y term to get a new status that is not an outcome of satisfying the X term. The physical features 
specified by X are insufficient to guarantee the functions assigned to Y, but its new status is by collective 
agreement or acceptance. We “simply count X things as Y things” (Searle, 1995:44-45). Like Searle, I 
attempted to describe how X (incivility) has been made Y (security threat).  
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rules’, the laws which can be “paraphrased in the form… “If Y do X” (34). These are laws 
that inform us what to do if, let us say, we are ridiculed or abused.  
 
Second are institutions of knowledge creation: These are the mainstream media and the 
regime’s public discourses. Within mainstream media institutions, dislocation is repaired 
through two strategies: editorial policies and knowledge discourses. Editorial policies 
constitute the power of media institutional discourses. These rules act in a similar way as 
verdictives and exercitives in convincing mainstream journalists, as Fletcher (2003:85) 
would argue, “that a certain rule is indeed “the law”, but in this case not the law of state 
but the law of the newsroom. In any case, it is editorial policies as constitutive rules that 
prevent dislocation in legacy media content. 
 
In the category of knowledge discourses are Austin’s (1962) expositive acts that clarify 
reasons, argument, or communication. The study describes how the regime is constructing 
truth that can sediment its securitisation discourses in the face of the dislocation caused 
by incivility. Intellectuals play a major role in shaping dislocatory events like incivility in the 
social media since hegemony operates through spreading the truths of the regimes. To 
this concern, I describe intellectuals as sources of truths used to dislocate or sediment the 
regime’s truth about incivility. To achieve this objective, I adopt a non-essentialist stand by 
defining intellectuals as not only experts in the academy but also those playing intellectual 
roles outside the academy, the divisions Gramsci calls traditional and organic intellectuals 
(see Gramsci, 2005:49). Organic intellectuals are specialists in political economy, 
industrial technicians, organisers of new culture and legal system — the experts created 
to support the “capitalist entrepreneur’s” activities, while traditional intellectuals are those 
bounded to the regime, on the one side what he calls the ‘noblesse de robe’, the 
government administrators and on the other, scholars and those with non-ecclesiastical 
authority (Gramci. 2005:49-50).  
Following Gramci (2005:51), Laclau (1990) argues that the role of the process of building 
unity by organic intellectuals is “not about the function of the intellectual but about the 
intellectual function” which can be located in any social group other than the society’s 
specialists. Therefore, what matters is the intellectual function, not the intellectual’s 
specific mandates in the larger society. For emphasis, it does not “matter if they are priests, 
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physicians, notaries, lawyers, teachers, nurses, dropouts, or gang members”, what 
matters is the subject position that enables them to play the intellectual function in society. 
What matters is for the functioning organic intellectuals to adopt a subject position 
advancing the transformation of the world through the creation of a new regime of truth 
production (cf. Foucault, 1980:133). In this sense all people who contribute in public 
discourses through the media — professional journalists, writers of letters to the editors, 
opinions and columns writers, play an intellectual function (cf. Laclau, 2000:286-288). As 
Gramsci said: “All men are intellectuals…but not all men have in society the function of 
intellectuals.”  
 
Last are warnings: These are constitutive discourses used by the regime to securitise 
incivility through threats. Searle (1995:44-45) would say that they order people to ‘count X 
is Y’. Warnings are in the category of what Austin (1962) called exercitives, texts that act 
by exercising executive power through ordering, warning, advising, urging, among others. 
Exercitives make decision in favour of or against, a decision that something is to be so, 
which is different from verdictives that make a decision that something is so. The study 
describes how the government used warnings, orders, commands, requests and 
recommendations to constitute incivility as a national security threat.  
 
The above sites for speech acts form the constitutive rhetoric that set up the institution of 
politics by creating contexts that make us regard some information as uncivil. I follow 
Searle in arguing that “constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they create or define new 
forms of behaviour.” That is to say, constitutive rules, just like rules of football, create the 
very possibility of playing the games of politics (cf. Searle, 1969: 33). In this case, 
hegemony is achieved when the above constitutive rhetoric ‘tropologically’ displaces 
incivility from being mere unpleasant speech to make it a national security threat.  Such 
tropes can become sedimented after a period of tropologisation when they become part 
of the society’s common sense that does not require clarification. Therefore, to discover 
tropological sedimentation, it demanded that I look for tropes at the macro level — how 
the regime is making parts to represent the whole — that is, using what people know about 
hatred to explain the meaning of mediatised incivility. Consequently, this study, as I said 
earlier, was keen on metaphorical ideology constructions and not tropes as plain linguistic 
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expressions that represent one thing as another. Observing Laclau’s warning, the study 
avoids reducing discourse to speech and writing but expands it to “any kind of signifying 
relation” (1988:254). 
6.4. Data Analysis 2: Technologies of Dissemination   
The analysis of material agency of social media was aimed at answering the following 
questions:  
How are material things participating in repair of dislocation caused by incivility in social 
media?  
How is the regime using material things to maintain consensus by converting incivility in 
social media into nodal points?  
Answering these questions demands a wide definition of texts, what differentiates 
Discourse Theory from other discourse analysis methodologies. As noted in the previous 
chapter, McLuhan’s (1994:7) argument that the medium is the message becomes the 
overriding principle guiding Discourse Analysis in this subsection. Social media has 
become the prosthetic technological extension of the common persons’ ability, amplifying 
their nature and ability to communicate. To McLuhan (1994:9): 
…the medium is the message because it is the medium that shapes 
and controls the scale and form of human association and action. 
The content or uses of such media are as diverse as they are 
ineffectual in shaping the form of human association. Indeed, it is 
only too typical that the "content" of any medium blinds us to the 
character of the medium.  
In relation to incivility in social media, it can be argued that the media is a key determinant 
in the creation and circulation of incivility. It is through the affordances of social media, as 
will be discussed later, that the audience is able to easily engage in incivility. This is 
contrary to conventional news media in which editing limits incivility.  This study moves 
away from the tradition of adopting Critical Discourse Analysis when using Discourse 
Theory, a tradition that often ignores the medium assuming it is non-discursive and 
humans have liberty to use the medium the way they want (see Jørgensen & Phillips, 
2002; Fairclough, 2003; Carpentier & De Cleen, 2007; Carpentier, 2010; Carpentier, 
2017). Although a linguistics orientation lures researchers into assuming that the medium 
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is non-discursive, since it looks linguistically, we should view the medium as discursive to 
maintain the Discourse Theory tradition. Despite Laclau and Mouffe (1985) not 
distinguishing the discursive from non-discursive dimensions of the social practices, this 
lack of distinction does not mean nothing but texts exist, on the contrary, it means 
discourse itself is material and that entities such as the medium are parts of discourse. 
This study attempts to fully operationalise Discourse Theory as a method for analysing 
‘everything’ by developing a strategy for interpreting artefacts in addition to linguistic texts. 
In fact, Latour (1991:103) argues that we can only understand domination by turning away 
from the exclusive concern with social relations and start looking at the non-human actants 
that are used by elites to hold the society together. 
 
Analysis of social media artefacts treats technologies that provide social media as 
discursive ‘texts’, the material or objects, written by designers and influenced to take the 
hegemonic meanings but which ‘readers’, the social media users, can challenge through 
creative interpretation. According to Latour, 1991:237) “nothing in a given scene can 
prevent the inscribed user or reader from behaving differently from what was expected” 
(emphasis in original). For this reason, it can be argued that the relationship between 
humans and social media artefacts is political.  Product designers and dominant groups 
have not been able to close dissemination technologies, instead they have structured them 
to allow ‘readers’ to engage in what Eco (1979:4) calls the making of “…a series of 
interpretive choices, which even though not infinite are, however, more than one”. 
Therefore, social media artefacts are texts similar to Barthes’ (1970/1974:4-5) ‘writerly 
texts’ which encourage the readers to produce new texts instead of forcing them into 
idleness by closing the meaning of texts.  
 
Analysis of social media material things attempted to implement Foucault’s (1980:1994-
95) dispositifs, the influence of “the said as much as the unsaid”. Foucault (1978:203) 
describes dispositif as a conglomeration of discursive and non-discursive practices other 
than language, the various tactics around which “little by little a discourse” is formed and 
in the long run becomes “a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer 
possible to identify a person who conceived it.” To Rabinow and Rose (2003:10-11), 
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dispositif is a “device oriented to produce something – a machinic contraption… [used 
for]… management of certain characteristics of a population”.  
 
As part of Foucault’s dispositifs, the agency of social media devices can be understood 
from three perspectives: realist, social constructivist, or hybrid constructivist. From a realist 
perspective, (see Sclove, 1995; Winner, 1980), artefacts have inherent properties and 
agency. For instance, Winner (1980:125) claims that some technologies are inherently 
political because they make their users to “choose a particular form of political life.” But by 
emphasising the physicality of artefacts as the source of agency, realists downplay the 
importance of social representation in determining the agency of objects.  
 
To analyse the agency of artefacts in the context of other agents, social constructivists 
(see Pfaffenberger, 1992; Woolgar, 1991) recognise the colonisation of artefacts by 
human agency. To them, social representations determine the constitution of agency of 
artefacts (Brey, 2005:64). As texts, artefacts allow different readings even though they can 
acquire a dominant meaning making alternative reading difficult. The case of mobile 
phones and personal computers suits this explanation: although these gadgets have many 
uses — from calling and Internet access to money transfer services — their dominant 
meaning is still bounded to making calls. To Brey (2005:64), based on social constructivist 
conception of affordances and constraint, the agency of artefacts is not “constituted by 
inherent design features of artefacts themselves, but rather by dominant social 
representations or ‘readings’ of them. Design features of artefacts that seem to be 
responsible for constraint are actually social constructions.” What artefacts can do or not 
do, the artefacts affordances, is determined through social constructions, not the objective 
features of artefacts. Yet pure social constructivism ignores the role of the physical 
features of artefacts. For example, previous new communication technologies caused 
dislocation but not to the extent caused by social media. It appears that social media has 
some unique affordances and constraints due to its physical features even though social 
constructionism is playing a major role in determining the affordances and constraints. The 
weakness of social constructivists is denying non-human objects agency, assuming only 
humans act, while the weakness of realists is taking a technological determinism stand 




Instead of alternating between realism and social constructivism, Callon and Latour 
(1992:356) provided a third alternative that redistributed agency between humans and 
non-humans. Scholars in this school deny the division of artefacts into either objective 
physical artefacts or socially constructed artefacts (cf.  Woolgar, 1991; Grint & Woolgar, 
1992), instead, they propose a midpoint, suggesting artefacts should not be seen as 
‘objective’ even though there are clear cases of uncontroversial physical features that 
should be considered when evaluating the artefact’s affordances and constraints (Brey, 
2005:9). For instance, it seems clear that printed newspapers cannot afford readers instant 
response and participation in creation of news.  As Brey (2005:68) explains, some 
constraints imposed by artefacts seem self-evident, but to Woolgar (1991:32) such claims 
of ‘self-evidence’ are socially constructed truths used to avoid the possibility of questioning 
accepted truths. We should remain suspicious of the self-evident objectivity of artefacts 
without being fixated on social construction. This is the perspective taken by hybrid 
constructivists, (cf.  Brey, 2005:10), working within the actor-network theory to analyse the 
workings of objects as part of other activities in a heterogeneous network of entities 
(actants), human and non-human, working symmetrically to co-construct each other. In 
the actor-network theory, there is no distinction between physical objects and human 
actors — differences in their physical capacities and behaviour disappear allowing actants 
to form associations.  
 
From a hybrid constructivist perspective, this study proposes a strategy for 
analysingmateriality of social media by underscoring the importance of looking for 
discursive practices in the affordances of artefact, the action possibilities artefacts make 
available. The concept of affordances takes the middle ground between technological 
determinism and social constructivism, an approach in which technology is not a mere 
‘blank slate’ that can be interpreted by society as it pleases since different technologies 
have different affordances which “constrain the ways (in which) they can possibly be 
‘written’ or ‘read’” (Hutchby, 2001:447, emphasis in original). This is to say that affordances 
are the actions that are made possible by a physical object, what people can do under 
specific conditions based on the person’s relationship with a physical object (Norman, 
1990:11). An artefact’s affordances are the attributes of both the artefact and the human 
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actor that determine their interaction. It is the affordances that determine how people can 
use the artefact.  According to Gaver (1991:3), “affordances are properties of the world 
that make possible some action to an organism equipped to act in certain ways.” It is the 
relationship between the artefact and the human actor that determines their agency.    
 
Gibson (1979:127) developed the concept of affordances to describe what the 
environment offers or permits, the opportunities and possibilities given by the environment. 
What the environment permits is not its objective features but rather social constructions 
shaped by a selective reading of the environment. Affordances, according to (Hutchby, 
2001:444), are what constrain or enable the possibilities of objects’ agential action. 
However, obvious affordances ignore the objects’ concealed qualities since the “special 
combination of qualities into which an object can be analysed is ordinarily not noticed” 
(Gibson, 1979:135). In his masterwork on affordance, Gibson argues that instead of 
perceiving objects based on their objective physical properties or qualities, we perceive 
the affordance of objects to make the perception process simpler, a process that neglects 
affordances that are not easily perceivable. In many cases, what is noticeable are those 
features of a thing that distinguish it from other things “but not all the features that 
distinguish it from everything that it is not” (Gibson, 1966:286). This conceals  “[t]he special 
combination of qualities into which an object can be analysed” (Gibson, 1979:135). 
 
Therefore, to be utilised, affordances have to be perceivable so that the agents can know 
what the objects allow them to do. Where affordances are not perceptible, some signalling 
technology should be used to make the affordance perceivable because it is through 
visibility that affordances provide clues to the operations of things (Norman, 1990:12). 
Making affordances perceivable is similar to labelling instructions on objects to enable 
people figure out what can be achieved through the objects, yet in most cases it is the 
perceptible affordances that are labelled. Take the example of mobile phones which afford 
(are for) transmitting a voice — phones afford calling. This affordance is the most 
perceptible but not the only affordance, yet millions of instruction manuals explain in details 




Gibson (1979) limits affordances to those that can be seen, but Gaver (1991:2) argues 
that affordances exist with or without there being information that can enable people 
perceive them. In addition to perceptible affordances, Gaver identified two other types of 
affordances: hidden affordances and false affordances. Affordances can remain hidden if 
there is no information that makes them perceptible, while false affordances are created 
when information makes people to perceive a non-existent affordance (Gaver, 1991:2). 
Because mobile phones were not designed to provide news broadcasting nor banking 
services, these affordances remained hidden for some time. The affordance to money 
transfer was discovered by unbanked populations in third world countries. The various 
journalistic functions, from word processing to photography are the other less visible 
affordances provided by mobile phones. Consequently, affordance is jointly determined 
by the qualities of the object and the abilities of the agent to realise these qualities (see 
Norman, 1990:11).  Based on Gibson’s (1979) hypothesis, the study argues that 
dislocation has been enabled by both perceptible and hidden affordances provided by 
social media artefacts. Through Discursive Material Analysis, this study traced both 
perceptible and hidden affordances that have enabled social media artefacts to cause 
dislocation in political practices in Kenya.  
 
The chapter uses a Discursive Material Analysis strategy to develop ‘tricks’ to make the 
objects talk, “to produce scripts of what they are making others — humans or non-humans 
— do”, otherwise objects “have no visible effect on other agents” (Latour, 2007:79). 
Agency of objects remains hidden because often, there is no direct resemblance between 
objects and actions afforded by the objects. Therefore, hidden behind the dislocation 
caused by the social media, incivility are the affordances that do not have open 
resemblance to the actions (incivility) they cause or prevent. Affordances remain hidden 
when researchers using Discourse Theory privilege linguistic texts over material texts. But 
with an appropriate discursive material analysis strategy, it is possible to discover the 
hidden activities performed by artefacts as tools supporting or weakening hegemony.  
 
The material text analysis strategy in this dissertation followed Latour (1991:105) in 
dividing texts into hegemonic and counterhegemonic material texts, which is in line with 
Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985:108) argument that everything is discursive since every object 
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is constituted as an object of discourse. Latour (1991:105) referred to hegemonic activities 
by both linguistic and nonhuman texts, as programs, and their counterhegemonic 
equivalent, as anti-programs. In the sensitising concepts of this study, programs are 
equivalent to efforts aimed at reaching consensus by repairing dislocation, while anti-
programs are the public contestations that lead to ‘the political’. It is when programs 
completely counter anti-programs, Latour says, that they can be said to have become 
predictable, making subjects to obey orders from nonhuman actants with only a few 
exceptions. In this study, predictable programs are those that have achieved hegemony 
while anti-programs are resistance strategies adopted by subjects. The most forceful 
statements that achieve predictability, Latour (1991:106) points out, are not uttered 
sentences but the extra-linguistic statements which he calls material apparatus that 
emerge from a “gradient that carries us from words to things and from things to words.” 
Consequently, when analysing dislocation by incivility in social media, linguistic texts are 
“naked statements” that are weak in enforcing hegemony, but it is the “loaded statements” 
(cf. Latour, 1991:106), a combination of linguistic and nonhuman texts that are at the 
centre of hegemonic discourse.  
 
To discover the agency of material actants, this study adopted Latour’s (1991:229) thinking 
to trace actions of actants in networks. Through delegation, difficult activities that are 
ideally supposed to be done by humans are shifted to non-humans which easily perform 
the activities. Without a doubt, governments can control people more effectively by 
delegating the process to nonhuman actors since it is easier to ‘discipline’ nonhumans 
than humans. But as the government seeks to dominate by using the artefacts’ ‘perceptible 
affordances’ (cf. Gaver, 1991:3), users can challenge such dominance through 
oppositional use of the same artefacts.  
 
The study traces how the regime is struggling through artefacts to repair the dislocation 
caused by spread of incivility. This regime struggle is being perpetuated by artefacts ‘who’ 
have acquired human agency from delegated authority. The study identifies artefacts that 
act on behalf of hegemonic groups to restrict participation in social media discourses and 




6.4.1. Dislocation and Repair through Physical and Software Affordances: Forcing 
Functions and User Excluding Constraints 
Artefacts can enhance or limit dislocation based on their affordances, the features 
designed to encourage desired behaviour and those features that remain hidden even 
from the designers. Instead of analysing how perceptible affordances encourage ‘desired 
behaviour’, a taken-for-granted and technological deterministic perspective, this study 
analyses affordances from a Post-foundational Discourse Analysis perspective. Here, 
even the perceptible affordances are not mere ‘objective’ physical features as they 
innocently look, but what they afford people to do can be contested. As it was noted earlier, 
it is only through the establishment of a system of relations with other objects that the 
meaning of a spherical object stops being a projectile and becomes a football even though 
the spherical physical fact remains the same (see Laclau & Mouffe 1987:82). Creators of 
the social media artefacts make some affordances perceptible to encourage users to use 
artefacts in preferred ways. However, the creators cannot close off all affordances, some 
of which remain hidden, yet these hidden affordances can be discovered by users through 
their day-to-day experience with the artefacts. The designer’s lack of total control over the 
artefacts they design is reminiscent of the plurality of power centres which, as Laclau 
(1990:40) argues, is the “constitutive impossibility of society” (Laclau, 1996:44). Neither 
the designer, the dominant partner in production of social media artefacts, nor the user is 
in control of the social media artefact’s affordances.  
Since the majority of human-computer interactions are enabled by metaphoric objects and 
processes, the study identified affordances metaphorically. Through metaphors, the 
nature of social media artefacts can be described as if they are something else. Because 
social media is intangible, with ‘material substrate’ that hides its materiality, the best way 
of explaining social media affordances is through the use metaphors that describe social 
media’s hidden materiality as something else which we already know. Through this 
approach, metaphors were used to open the ‘black box’ of social media interaction by 
borrowing from our daily life experiences when using artefacts. Indeed, in the “real world, 
metaphors allow users to transfer knowledge about how things should look and work 
(Mandel, 1997:69). After all, a majority of electromagnetic human-computer interactions 
are hidden although their mechanisms are made visible through metaphoric objects and 
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processes. Even the ‘zeros’ and ‘ones’ are metaphorical, since computers work by 
recognising different voltages, not ‘zeros’ and ‘ones’ (see Boomen, 2014:12).  
The metaphoric affordances offered by social media were derived from similar affordances 
offered by physical mechanisms and artefacts (see Norman, 1988: 132-38, 204-6). Here 
social media artefacts, both software and hardware, are treated as if they are physical 
mechanisms for directing activities of their users. The physical mechanism metaphors 
identified in this study are what Blackwell (2006:491) describes as generic “tools” 
designers use to produce specific products. The products here are the medium of social 
media and the gadgets used to access this medium. Contrary to the many perceptible 
metaphoric objects that purport to provide an interface to enable users operate 
telecommunication gadgets easily, but which Boomen (2014:15) accused of channelling 
users’ attention away from the inner working of the machine and its software in the name 
of user-friendliness, this study identified both hidden and perceptible metaphoric 
affordances by re-reading the metaphoric software objects and the physical artefacts used 
to access social media. The study adapted forcing functions and users excluding 
constraints, the “constraints that force …desired behaviour” (Norman, 2013:141) to 
analyse social media artefacts.  
In industrial design, forcing functions (Norman, 2013:142), are physical “constraints  that 
can prevent inappropriate behaviour.” The affordances require users to first perform 
actions not directly related to the intended use of the artefact before using the artefacts. 
The study used the metaphor of forcing functions to identify how artefacts can prohibit use 
or demand users to perform other actions before allowing them to access social media. 
These forcing functions are described metaphorically as interlocks, lock-ins and lock-outs 
(Norman, 2013:141) 
a. Interlocks: These are affordances that force “operations to take place in proper 
sequence” (Norman, 2013:141. The interlocks metaphor is derived from car 
interlocks that force a driver to fasten the seatbelt before igniting the car (see Brey, 
2005:67). To put it in another way, interlocks are prerequisite procedures that 
prepare artefacts for ‘safe’ use.  Brey (2005:70) gave the example of a safety pin of 
a rifle that requires certain actions performed before the rifle can be used. In this 
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study, the metaphor of interlocks refers to actions by dominant groups to force 
subjects to follow a predetermined sequence before using social media artefacts. 
Even though a social media artefact can properly work without going through the 
predetermined sequences, prerequisite procedures related to use of the artefacts 
are designed to demand the user to go through some sequences before using the 
artefact. Some interlocks are justified in the name of assisting users to avoid making 
mistakes but it is such justification that hides their hegemonic purposes, considering 
that social media artefacts have “political qualities” (cf. Winner, 1980:121) unlike 
near ‘objective’ artefacts such as household artefacts for which interlocks are for the 
users’ safety. The study identified how both physical and software interlocks are 
used hegemonically by the regime that demands social media use to ‘take place in 
specified sequence’. For example, the study identified the regime’s lock-in-like 
technologies in the registration of users through subscriber identification module 
(SIM) databases and Internet Protocol addresses. This registration, on the one hand 
makes it easy for subscribers to routinely access the Internet but on the other hand 
allows artefacts to control Internet access. SIM cards contain credentials used to 
identify and authenticate subscribers. As such, they lock-in users and allow them to 
easily connect to the mobile network and hence access social media services. The 
spread of Internet use in Kenya can be credited to lock-in features of SIM cards: 
they are microprocessors operating systems, with storage and built-in security 
features that prevent the unauthorised. As removable microprocessors, SIM cards 
can be used in different mobile phones different from the fixed landlines.   
 
b. Lock-ins: The metaphor of lock-ins is derived from the features that ensure 
continuous operation or prevent someone from prematurely terminating the activities 
of the artefacts (see Norman, 2013:143). Thus, lock-ins are designed to keep 
operations going by ensuring artefacts are always functional. Brey (2005:70) gives 
the example of a computer’s “soft” on-off switch that avoids disconnecting power but 
instead starts by shutting programmes, saving files and finally turning off the 
computer — these ensure that programmes and files are safely shut before power 
is disconnected. Although lock-ins seem helpful to ordinary users, they become 
hegemonic technologies when used by the regime to deny ordinary people the ability 
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to fully control artefacts. The study looked for how lock-ins are being used by the 
regime to deny users the ability to fully control social media artefacts by preventing 
alternative uses of social media technology. Here, alternative uses utilise hidden 
affordances that designers either failed to make perceptible or the regime has no 
control over (cf. Shaw, 2017:6). The second category of lock-ins are software: social 
media applications that lock in users by being incompatible with other applications. 
For instance, the two sites popular in Kenya, Facebook and Twitter are incompatible, 
which means each site’s users are locked-in. As explained by Norman (2013:143), 
lock-in designs have been used as a business strategy by providing internal 
consistency to motivate customer’s loyalty. The study analysed how lock-ins have 
been used to make social media users dependent on particular social media sites, 
making it hard for them to leave, even when there are several other sites. Here the 
study analysed the social media software as a source of user loyalty, which becomes 
hegemonic when users ignore alternative software.   
 
c. Lock-outs: The metaphor of lockouts is derived from features of artefacts that 
prevent users from using artefacts dangerously. Brey (2005:67) explains how 
lockouts in industrial designs prevent a person from entering dangerous places, or 
the occurrence of unwanted events by ensuring that people enter only safe places 
or only use devices for the right reasons (also see Norman, 2013:144). However, to 
Winner (1980:121), artefacts that have “political qualities” that prevent users from 
accessing ‘dangerous places’ are clearly part of ‘the political’. Analysis of social 
media artefacts and software was done by identifying how lockouts become 
hegemonic when they prevent people from using social media to access the 
purportedly dangerous content or prevent them from using devices ‘wrongly’.  
 
 
d. User excluding physical constraints: these are artefacts that exclude certain 
users from making proper use of social media (cf. Brey, 2005:71)). The artefacts act 
as physical limitations on the use of social media when they “require users to have 
certain physical attributes or be in possession of certain physical competencies” 
(ibid). It is easy to see the hegemonic ability of perceptible affordances that exclude 
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users as domination is achieved when subjects are denied access to the public 
sphere. The study looked for how artefacts physically exclude by prequalifying users 
based on some physical attributes or competencies. Like physical user excluding 
features, the study looked for hidden affordances in software features that prevent 
users from properly using social media. Concerning the oppositional use of user-
excluding affordances, the study looked for how the user manoeuvred around the 
user-excluding constraints in artefacts by taking advantage of hidden or even false 




The Post-foundational Discourse Analysis strategy proposed in this chapter improves 
previous attempts to apply Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) Discourse Theory as an empirical 
research method by complementing linguistic textual analysis with material analysis. The 
chapter is a methodological transformation that proposes how to analyse every text used 
in discourse texts meaning both linguistic and material texts. Analysing extra-linguistic 
texts enabled the study to capture what Sprenger (2015:2) argues are the macro-
decisions that take place away from the traditional avenues of politics like parliaments 
and other political hotspots. Indeed, the new political hotspots in social media discourses 
are software, mobile phones, personal computers, and the various affordances through 
which these devices are used to access the Internet. The chapter develops a strategy for 
analysing the struggle over incivility in social media by looking at how linguistic texts and 
affordances of social media artefacts as discursive ‘texts’ are utilised by subalterns in 
hegemonic struggles against the regime. Thus, linguistic texts and social media artefacts 
make up the corpus of texts analysed in this dissertation. The next chapter uses the 
strategy developed in this chapter to analyse specific cases of struggle over incivility in 




PART III: Dislocation, repair and return of ‘the political’. 
 
This section utilises the Post-foundational Discourse Analysis model developed in 
Chapters Five and Six to analyse how the dislocation caused by extreme speech is being 
followed by three events: repair and absorption of the dislocation into existing social 
practices to maintain the society’s objective discourses, transformation of the dislocation 
through articulation into nodal points to create new hegemonic practices and encounter 
with the ‘real’ political ontology in which politics is a struggle against existing hegemonic 
practices.  
The dislocation of political practices due to incivility in social media occurs when 
antagonistic groups forget their differences in order to unite against a common adversary 
with the aim of reworking sedimented imaginaries that support the existing social order. 
That is to say that the struggle over composition of new subject positions is the new left’s 
perspective that sees the struggle against domination not only as a struggle against 
material deprivation, violence and brute force but more importantly, as a struggle to control 
the production of subject positions. To understand how mediatised incivility is dislocating 
the existing social order, we should try to see how incivility is disarticulating and replacing 
previously sedimented subject formations. 
Chapter Seven describes how the first two events, repair and absorption of the dislocation 
into existing social practices, through technologies of representation, the linguistic 
symbolic system of representation is used by the regime to repair and transform 
dislocatory events by creating a binary view of incivility as hate speech and substituting it 
with the nodal point of insecurity. This is what regimes do: fix meanings by repairing and 
absorbing dislocation through nodal points — the discursive points that construct new 
common sense through partial fixations (see Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:105). 
Chapter Eight looks at how the regime is attempting to repair and absorb the dislocation 
using non-anthropocentric agency: the physical and software affordances participating in 
the struggle to give incivility a binary meaning. Non-human agency is categorised into two: 
the dominant-hegemonic and counterhegemonic artefacts. The dominant social media 
artefacts are those working for the regime to stabilise the hate speech narrative, while the 
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counterhegemonic objects are those playing an oppositional role by contradicting 
governmentalities.  
Chapter Nine is an overview of the findings and a description of the implications of extreme 
speech in social media on radical democracy. The chapter traces the productivity of 
extreme speech by looking beyond the era of consensual politics when the mainstream 
media acted as ideological state apparatuses. It is argued that the emptiness created by 
the fall of dictatorships after the end of history is being filled by new political frontiers that 
are neither right nor left like ethnic, national, and religious antagonisms which are reflected 









7.0 Chapter Seven 
Repair of Dislocation through Technologies of Representation 
 
This chapter describes technologies of representation, the linguistic symbolic system of 
representation used by the regime to repair dislocatory events by associating incivility with 
hate speech and substituting it with the nodal point of national security. This is how incivility 
in social media has been taken up in Kenya: the discourses that inform the overall incivility 
narrative are located in regulatory bodies, the courts of law, legacy media, and traditional 
knowledge intellectuals. The chapter describes how the regime is utilising linguistic 
hegemonic tools to recreate dominant practices through the combination and substitution 
of incivility with other things. This is what regimes do: fix meanings by repairing and 
absorbing dislocation by means of nodal points — the discursive points that construct new 
common sense through partial fixations of the otherwise floating signifiers (see Laclau & 
Mouffe, 1985:105). 
7.2. Repair of Dislocation through National Security Myth  
The discourse of national security is part of efforts to achieve discursive closure and repair 
the institutional void created by incivility in social media. That is to say, the regime is 
repairing dislocation by appealing to the national security myth to make incivility a national 
security problem. Securitisation discourses, Laclau and Mouffe (1985:97) would argue, 
are metaphorical acts “established by analogy with the physical world”. At this level, tropes 
articulate competing demands when they act as empty signifiers trying to fill their lack by 
creating nodal points to fix the meanings of floating signifiers (see Laclau 1995, 171). 
Therefore, securitisation narratives are tropological speech acts attempting to transfer or 
substitute existing descriptions of incivility (as part of politics) with hate speech, which is 
outside politics or simply put, the narratives are describing incivility as something else. 
Instead of explaining the multitude meanings of incivility, the security metonym tells us not 
what incivility is, but rather what incivility is like. 
Such tropological facts are only facts “by human agreement” as they are brought into being 
by people who believe the facts exist (see Searle, 1995:1). The facts are what Searle calls 
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“institutional facts” that are in contrast to “non-institutional, or ‘brute’ facts”. To recall, the 
overall aim of this study was to make sense of incivility in social media without relying on 
the regime’s truth. Considering that institutional facts can only exist through human 
institutions, I argue that the regime is creating its preferred objective facts about incivility 
through security tropes that covertly place incivility within the confines of security 
institutions. By describing incivility in social media through objectivity constructed by hate 
speech discourses, the regime restricts how incivility can be constructed as democracy 
enhancing speech. 
Yet the metonymic directionality of the hate speech rhetorical figures is not universal. For 
example, although the regime wants to make incivility in social media the source domain 
(more accessible) used to talk about hate speech (the target domain), the other way round 
is also possible (see Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). As explained previously, the discriminative 
allocation of national resources was identified as one of the key triggers of the 2008 post-
election violence. From this perspective, hate speech should be the source domain (as it 
is more visible) used to explain incivility. Thus, it can be argued that the security metonym 
is being used hegemonically to displace incivility from normal politics, allowing the regime 
to use emergency as a means to solve the ‘problem’. This is how the hate speech metonym 
is reproducing and subverting power relations. Indeed, instead of looking at metonyms as 
ways of cognitive grasping, we should see them as constitutive of the political world (see, 
Mottier, 2008:189). That is to say, the metonym of hate speech is a ‘mini-narrative’ that 
can only be understood after understanding Kenya’s historical, social or political context 
of incivility, otherwise the meaning of metonymic mini-narratives becomes hegemonic 
when they are presented as a myth, a new stabilising meaning given to a dislocated space 
where previous myths no longer have meaning (see Laclau, 1990: 61). 
From this perspective, the meaning of myths is broader than false belief or statement as 
is commonly used. As clarified by Barthes (1973:149-150), myths ‘transform history into 
nature’ by neutralising or ‘depoliticising’ intentions of the bourgeoisie. Hence myths can 
repair dislocations by depoliticising events, texts and utterances (Roslyng, 2011). When 
myths succeed in repairing dislocation, new objectivity is formed and subjects are eclipsed 
and absorbed into the structure, taking them to new subject positions (Laclau, 1990:61).    
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The national security tropes are returning sedimented discourses by transforming incivility 
from an element into moments with a fully fixed meaning. Outside the national security 
myth, incivility in social media is a floating signifier as it can take several 
meanings.Therefore, the national security myth supports objective discourse through 
transubstantiation of incivility from a floating signifier into moments by knotting it to security 
narratives that seem authoritative and natural. 
 
Several nodal points were identified. These are the discourses that form the basis for filling 
the empty signifier of national security with meaning to limit its slippage (Lacan, 1993:268). 
These discourses are metonyms, metaphors and at worst, catachresis tools that attempt 
to name incivility that is essentially unnameable. The following section analyses linguistic 
discourses, the technologies of representation that have caused dislocation or are being 
used to repair the dislocation by fixing the regime preferred meaning of incivility.  
 
7.3. Technologies of Representation: Performative Speech Acts   
 
The regime is using linguistic tools, the speech acts to metonymically substitute incivility 
with hate speech and construct it as a national security threat. To reiterate, since society 
is constructed through “language, as a partial and metaphorical incorporation into a 
symbolic order”, efforts to repair events that question these constructions use metaphors 
to (re)sediment the constructions (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:126). These linguistic texts are 
either statements (énoncé), or the act of saying the enunciation — énonciation (Foucault, 
1991:63). Statements are strategies for truth creation while acts of enunciating 
(performative texts) are the actions through force of utterances. This means the regime’s 
strategies for truth creation and performative texts are the nodal points that attempt to fix 
the meaning of incivility, by displacing, substituting or misapplying concepts that are 
otherwise floating signifiers. In this study, securitisation efforts are viewed as strategies for 





The most stringent securitisation has been through the performative speech act of the 
statutory bodies, the police and courts. Although not a single person has been convicted 
for offences related to incivility, save for, Alan Wadi Okengo, alias lieutenant Wadi, a 
university student, who was jailed after pleading guilty but was later acquitted on appeal, 
mere court cases metonymically securitise incivility. As explained earlier, by not 
implementing the strict laws, the government allows symbolic freedom under which 
“everyone is guilty of something” and yet the regime looks merciful for not enforcing the 
severe laws (Žižek (2008:666). Thus, even without convicting, the law is a tool for 
securitising politics through the control of ideas, even as it retains possibilities of being 
used for coercion. The following four privileged sites were identified as sources of regime’s 
securitisation discourses: regulatory bodies (the National Cohesion and Integration 
Commission and the Communications Authority of Kenya); the judiciary and the police; 
and the knowledge nodal point (traditional intellectuals and the legacy media).  
7.3.1. Regulatory Bodies Nodal Point: CAK and NCIC  
The hate speech discourses by the Communications Authority of Kenya and the National 
Cohesion and Integration Commission have been key in shaping the meaning of incivility 
in social media. Based on their regulatory functions, the CA and NCIC are using hate 
speech discourses to displace and substitute incivility from politics to security practices. 
As explained by Buzan et al. (1998:23), securitisation “takes politics beyond the 
established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or 
as above politics.” In this case, the two state agencies have attempted to metonymically 
displace incivility in social media from being in the spectrum of political practices to 
security, where incivility is viewed as an existential threat that requires emergency 
measures outside the normal politics. When people get used to the metonymic meaning 
of incivility as a threat to national security, the regime can deal with the problem through 
violation of normal political practices. Thus, through CA and NCIC, the regime aims at 
universalising its hegemonic views by converting its metonymic association of incivility with 




The Communications Authority of Kenya was established in 1999 through the Kenya 
Information and Communications Act, 1998, as the government agency in charge of the 
information and communications industry. Its key functions include licensing, managing 
the nation’s frequency spectrum, approving equipment for use in the country, protecting 
consumers, monitoring and managing competitions among industry players. The NCIC is 
a statutory body that was established by the National Cohesion and Integration 
Commission Act of 2008 with the overall objective of “constructing nationhood, national 
cohesion and integration” among Kenyans. In particular, the commission was established 
to resolve the long-term issues agreed on as Agenda 4 of the National Accord and 
Reconciliation Act 2008, a power-sharing peace agreement signed by Mwai Kibaki and 
Raila Odinga on February 28, 2008 to end post-election violence. The Agenda 4 issues 
were identified as: 
…constitutional, legal and institutional reforms; land reform; tackling 
poverty and inequality as well as combating regional development 
imbalances; tackling unemployment, particularly among the youth; 
consolidating national cohesion and unity; and addressing 
transparency, accountability and impunity (NCIC, 2016). 
 
Indeed, it is the dislocation by the 2008 post-election crisis that brought to the surface long 
standing divisions in Kenya. However, instead of solving these deep-seated causes of 
ethnic antagonism, the NCIC has been associating incivility with insecurity by knotting 
incivility to the hate speech nodal point. When state bodies take up such activities, Laclau 
(2014:63) says, they initiate a process of converting metonyms into metaphors that in turn 
stabilise the regimes’ hegemony. The relationship between the 2008 post-election 
violence and incivility in social media is metonymic as the violence was closely associated 
with incitement. However, the incitement metonym was metaphorised to hegemonic levels 
through the creation of the NCIC with the mandate of monitoring hate speech. Although 
the NCI Act gives a wide mandate to the commission, including stopping various forms of 
discrimination and harassment, victimisation, denial of membership to organisations, 
access to public resources, and property ownership, it seems the organisation is more 
interested in stopping hate speech than structural threats to nationhood. As noted in 
Chapter Two, the rampant marginalisation of minorities in the allocation of national 
resources like roads, clean piped water, electricity and medical services was identified as 
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the underlying cause of the 2008 post-election violence. Yet the NCIC and CA have 
ignored these underlying causes of antagonism and are using performative speech acts 
to securitise incivility by ‘quilting’ it to hate speech as seen in the following advertisement 
warning citizens during the 2017 presidential and parliamentary election campaigns:  
“Hate Message” means a message designed to degrade, intimidate 
or incite to violence or prejudicial action against a person or group of 
people based on their race, gender, ethnicity, nationality, religion, 
political affiliation, language, ability or appearance….It shall be the 
responsibility of the political content author to authenticate, validate 
the source and truthfulness of their content prior to publishing to limit 
information that might spread rumours, mislead or cannot be 
supported by facts (Communication Authority of Kenya/National 
Cohesion and Integration. 2017:4). 
 
The offence of hate speech as constituted by the National Cohesion and Integration Act 
No. 12 of 2008¸ includes “threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or displays 
any written material…public performance of [plays]…visual images; or … programmes” 
that can stir ethnic hatred. This description is a verdictive speech act that establishes the 
official nodal point created by the regime’s truth. By being knotted to this regime-created 
nodal point, the otherwise empty security signifier is filled with meaning.  
 
It means the NCI Act (2008) definition of hate speech takes some political issues out of 
normal politics by securitising categories of speeches considered to have features of 
existential threat. The Act aims at encouraging “national cohesion and integration by 
outlawing discrimination on ethnic grounds”. This type of performative speech act is what 
Austin (1962:153) calls verdictives, the judicial acts that “purport to be correct or incorrect, 
right or wrong, justifiable or unjustifiable on the evidence” (Austin, 1962:153). Hence, the 
NCI Act is a verdict on the form of incivility in social media that can be interpreted as 
discriminatory on ethnic grounds. The Act bans some forms of speech considered hate 
speech, making the Act a nodal point used to stabilise prevailing objective discourses in 
the face of dislocatory elements. The commission has demanded to increase its 
securitisation moves by requesting for stricter rules than what the NCI Act provides 
currently. The commission complains that:   
Of late, the political class has also learned about incitement to 
violence, so they use foul language that constitutes insults that are 
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not covered in any penal statutes. To address such challenges, the 
Commission proposed significant amendments to the Act that will 
help to seal all the existing loopholes. But that notwithstanding, NCIC 
has continued to collaborate with the police to investigate and take 
to court people arrested with incitement to violence offenses. These 
include cases related to the use of vulgar language (NCIC on the 
Fight against Hate Speech in Kenya, 2018).  
 
In addition to verdictives, the NCIC and CA regularly securitise incivility through exercitives 
such as warnings, orders and advisories. For example, in a joint statement, the NCIC and 
CA warned administrators of social media groups that they would be held liable for any 
hate speech posts (Daily Nation, 28 July 2017). The two bodies warn that “Persons who 
knowingly spread undesirable political content via social media networks shall be 
penalised according to the NCI Act, the Penal Code and other relevant laws.” Such threats 
are used by the regime to repair dislocations caused by social media. 
 
The two agencies, the NCIC and CA, used exercitives because they have appropriate 
authority over the realm of civility. In the public warning to social media users, the two 
commissions start by reminding readers that they have authority to enforce civility (Joint 
statement on user…2017): 
…CA is vested with the responsibility of regulating ICT services…as 
well as safeguarding the interests of ICT consumers, CA draws its 
mandate from the Kenya Communication Act, 1998, as amended by 
the Communication (Amendment) Act, 2009 and the Kenya 
Information and Communication (Amendment) Act, 2013….[NCIC] 
on the other hand, is mandated to facilitate and promote equality 
opportunity, good relations, harmony and peaceful co-existence 
between persons of different ethnic, religious and racial 
communities.  
  
By attaching incivility to the nodal points of hate speech, performative speech acts 
formalise civility norms. Although incivility is a normative informal practice, the regime has 
put in place rules that have made it a security threat. As an informal normative practice, 
incivility is vague, but through the regime’s speech acts, incivility has been substituted with 
a performative insecurity threat. This means civility has become imposed on the people 
as it is no longer mutually voluntary co-operation. For example, in a ‘Joint statement on 
user generated content on social media platforms during the electioneering period’, both 
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the Communications Authority of Kenya and the National Commission for Integration and 
Cohesion listed guidelines on how to safely use social media (Joint statement on 
user…2017). The two commissions claimed they wanted to protect users by curbing 
“misuse of social media platforms”. 
Based upon CA’s mandate to protect consumer interests, and 
NCIC’s mandate to promote national cohesion and integration, CA 
in consultation with the NCIC and other relevant 
stakeholders…issues these Guidelines to prevent the transmission 
of undesirable political content via SMS and Social Media platform 
(Guidelines on prevention of dissemination …,2017:1). 
These guidelines are attempts to repair dislocation which, as Torfing (2005:16) argues, 
are signs that stable hegemonic discourses can no longer “explain, represent, or in other 
ways domesticate” the events. The CA and NCIC guidelines are attempts by the regime 
to resediment previous political practices which incivility in social media is disrupting. What 
state agencies like CA and NCIC are doing is to limit the return of ‘the political’ through the 
repair and repression of incivility into existing social practices.  
The suggested solutions reflect the CA and NCIC’s deployment of logics of difference to 
activate internal differences within groups, especially the conventional differences 
between tribes, to (re)create regime preferred subject positions for social media users. To 
recall Laclau (2000:192-3), the logic of difference sediments particularities through 
metaphoric substitution. The repair of dislocatory events is achieved by reducing “the 
equivalential movements that are possible within a certain social formation” (Laclau 2000: 
192-3). The hate speech metaphor is used to stabilise the regime preferred meaning of 
incivility by defining it as what it is not, in this case content that is detrimental to “consumer 
interests” and can damage “national cohesion and integration”.  
In addition to exercitives, CA and NCIC are using persuasive discourses, what Austin’s 
(1962) calls expositive acts to knot incivility to the nodal point of hate speech, an act that 
transubstantiates incivility into a security threat. Through persuasive acts, the regime is 
attempting to repair dislocation by providing knowledge that fills security with meaning. 
Persuasive technologies of governance, Huysmans (2006:10) says, “contribute to 
adequate governing of insecurities by developing knowledge about security problems and 
training people in enacting it.” Among key expositives used to expound the regime’s views 
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and arguments are the NCIC and CA’s training and ‘how-to’ manuals. These are strategies 
used by the two government agencies to expound the regime’s views of incivility in social 
media by teaching people the regime’s truths. 
The Communications Authority of Kenya has pushed its persuasive discourses through a 
national cyber security management system, christened the “National Kenya Computer 
Incident Response Team Coordination Centre (National KE-CIRT/CC)”, a centre for 
coordinating the management of cybersecurity incidents established based on the 
authority granted to the CA by the Kenya Information and Communications Act, 1998 (see 
The National KE-CIRT/CC…, 2018). As part of its ‘proactive activities’, the centre offers 
‘how-to’ security tips on reporting abusive social media content. For example, it provides 
Facebook procedures for reporting hate speech, nudity, abusive chats, bullying, violent 
and graphic content (see National KE-CIRT/CC Information…2018). Similarly, the centre 
provides information on how to flag YouTube videos (YouTube Abusive Content…2018b), 
Instagram (Report Harassment….2018), and Twitter (Twitter Abusive Content, 2018).  
Through these securitising speech acts, the CA makes incivility the referent object. The 
‘how-to’ security tips highlight how free social media is a threat to its users. For instance, 
the CA argues that social media is “a very powerful tool that needs to be monitored and 
governed to protect the security and rights of the users and non-users” (Twitter Abusive 
Content, 2018).  
 
Regarding the NCIC, one of its core functions is peace training aimed at enhancing 
harmony among ethnic communities and racial groups (Republic of Kenya, 2008). An 
example of using training to securitise incivility is special workshops for police officers on 
the enforcement of hate speech criminal law and training of journalists about conflict 
sensitive reporting and monitoring of hate speech. As explained in the Police Training 
Manual, such workshops are “intended to better prepare police officers…investigators and 
prosecutors to deal with incidences of hate crime” (NCIC, 2011:7). In one of the training 
manuals for journalists, Guidelines for Monitoring Hate Speech (2010), the commission 
securitises incivility by blaming the media for “promoting stereotypes and perpetuating 
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hate messages, misreporting events and general misrepresentations” that resulted in the 
2008 post-election violence.  
 
NCIC gives a broad definition of hate speech to include cultural stereotypes, general 
negative depictions; abusive, insulting, provocative language; imagery, poems, metaphor, 
proverbs; pictures, ridicule, and alarming language. In addition to training journalists and 
police officers, the commission has also trained judges and magistrates (see Ministry of 
Justice and National Cohesion, 2011: xvii). It is through such regime persuasions that 
incivility in social media is constructed as a national security threat.  
7.3.2. The juridical Nodal Point   
The justice nodal point may not be seen in the consequences of a particular case but 
how the judicial system participates in elevating incivility discourses to national security. 
Once the securitisation metaphors appear, they become institutionalised to judicial 
reasoning, which in turn affects other securitising actors.As a result, this section did not 
deal with individual laws securitising incivility, but the legal discourses — what Foucault 
would call the judicial knowledge regime that is shaping the struggle for discursive order 
in the face of dislocation.  
 
The court’s major securitising act against dislocation identified in this dissertation was the 
sentencing of a university student to one-year imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to 
charges of insulting the President. Mr Alan Wadi Okengo was convicted after he was 
accused of publishing information on his Facebook Page that the government claimed was 
aimed inciting the public and undermining the authority of the President, contrary to 
Section 132 of the Penal Code. Okengo published information: 
…which denigrated the person of the President of the Republic of 
Kenya, which message was calculated to bring into contempt the 
lawful authority of the President of the Republic of Kenya (Alan Wadi 
Okengo vs Republic).  
 
However, the sentence was quashed after Mr Okengo successfully appealed his 
conviction. The Appellant raised several grounds challenging his imprisonment, among 
them the errors in trial and the fact that he was not of sound mind at the time he was 
204 
 
convicted (Alan Wadi Okengo vs Republic). Based on verbatim statements of the appellant 
when he was called upon to mitigate before being sentenced, the Court of Appeal found 
him to have “mental issues which the [lower] court ought to have investigated to establish 
if indeed the appellant had the requisite mental capacity to plead guilty to the charges that 
were brought against him”. Wadi had said: 
Since last year I have been having mental problems. I have came of 
my problems (sic). I have an ailing grandmother. My mother left. I 
have one cousin. I am traumatised, in a way I expected for school 
fees to be paid. Those things have been disturbing my mind. I missed 
two graduations. I am waiting to do exams. I do not know if my sanity 
is on trial. I have mental disorder. I apologies for the same (sic). I 
would wish to meet the concerned party and apologies (sic). The 
devil had time to my mind (Alan Wadi Okengo vs Republic). 
 
The judge desecuritised incivility, at least for people with ‘mental issues’ who lack capacity 
to plead guilty. This ruling shows that the dislocation caused by incivility in social media is 
visible in institutional ambiguity between the Executive and the Judiciary. The void of 
institutional ambiguity can be seen in the absence of clear rules and norms according to 
which politics is to be practiced (see Hajer, 2003:175).  
 
As a desecuritising actor, Justice Mwita of the High Court of Kenya created an institutional 
void when he declared Section 132 of the Penal Code unconstitutional after a successful 
petition by an opposition-turned-government blogger who had been charged with insulting 
the president. Robert Alai had tweeted that “Insulting Raila is what Uhuru can do. He hasn’t 
realised the value of the Presidency. Adolescent President. This seat needs maturity” [by 
then Raila Odinga was the leader of Opposition and a fierce critic to President Uhuru 
Kenyatta’s reign].  
 
The prosecution stated that Alai’s tweet was aimed at bringing “into contempt the lawful 
authority of the President of the Republic of Kenya” (Robert Alai vs Attorney General and 
Director of Public Prosecution, 2017). But Justice Mwita said “continued enforcement of 
Section 132 of the Penal Code … is unconstitutional and a violation [of Alai’s] fundamental 




The judge quoted the case of Andrew Mujuni Mwenda & 2 Others vs Attorney General, 
petition Nos. 12/2005 and 3 of 2006 (CCU), in which the petitioner challenged 
constitutionality of Sections 39 (1) (a) and 40 of the Penal Code, which were contrary to 
Article 29 (1) (a) of the Ugandan constitution. In this case, the Constitutional Court of 
Uganda stated that how people express their thoughts depends on their childhood 
environment, with the elite and those living in God fearing environments training their:  
children to address an elder or a leader politely, [while their] 
counterpart brought up in a slum environment may make annoying 
and impolite comments, honestly believing that, that is how to 
express himself/herself… [therefore people] … have a right to 
criticise their leaders rightly or wrongly. That is why…leaders should 
grow hard skins… 
 
The Justice Mwita traced the genealogy of Section 132 of the Penal Code to the pre-
independence uprisings. He explained that having been introduced in 1958 after the 
colonial government declared a state of emergency, the purpose of Section 132 was to 
suppress dissent among the natives with the object of protecting and 
sustaining the colonial government in power then. However, the 
resultant effect was to instil fear and submission among the people. 
 
He argued that Section 132 contradicts the Bill of Rights (Article 20(2) of the Constitution. 
As stressed by Article 20(2), people have the right to exercise freedom of expression to 
the greatest extent, subject only, to the limitation of that right under Article 33 (2) or any 
other provision in the constitution. 
 
Alai’s lawyer, Mr. Ongoya had argued that Section 132 of the Penal Code was 
unconstitutional as Article 4(2) of the current constitution describes Kenya as a multi-party 
democracy, 
…which means people must have a wide latitude to speak about 
their government since that government is made of public officers” 
(Robert Alai vs Attorney General and Director of Public Prosecution, 
2016). He opposed criminalisation of government criticisms by the 
Penal Code that was forcing “people to speak in low tones in a 
democratic society.  
 
The Attorney General raised a securitising frame when he argued that Section 132 seeks 
to punish a person who contravenes freedom of expression as stated in Article 33 (3) of 
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the constitution, in particular people who “bring into contempt, excite defiance or 
disobedience to lawful order” (Robert Alai vs Attorney General and Director of Public 
Prosecution, 2016).  While the chief government prosecutor argued that section 132 seeks 
to “preserve dignity of public officers.” 
 
In a similar case, two administrators of a popular Facebook Group successfully petitioned 
the High Court of Kenya to declare Section 194 of the Penal Code unconstitutional (see 
Jacqueline Okuta and Jackson Njeru v. Attorney General and Director of Public 
Prosecution, 2017). Jacqueline Okuta and Jackson Njeru, the administrators of 
BuyerBeware-Kenya (Original), a group with about 108,000 members, by the time of 
writing this work, had been prosecuted for offences of criminal defamation under Section 
194 after they published allegedly defamatory statements on Buyer Beware-Kenya 
(Original).  Okuta and Njeru had respectively posted the following information:  
…the persons pictured and named therein are wanted for illegal 
possession and handling of property. Anyone with information 
regarding either of the three to get in touch with Facebook page-
100,000 Likes for justice to be done for Jacky and her Kids. 
 
Justice Mativo advised the aggrieved to seek civil remedy in form of damages for 
defamation. The judge explained how the invocation of the criminal defamation law to 
protect reputation is “unnecessary, disproportionate and therefore excessive and not 
reasonably justifiable in an open democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom.” 
 
In another case, an activist successfully challenged the constitutionality of Section 29 of 
the Kenya Information and Communication Act, 2013. Godfrey Andare had been charged 
under this section with the offence of improper use of a telecommunication equipment. He 
was accused of using his Facebook account to post grossly offensive information about 
Mr Titus Kuria, the complainant. He had posted: 
...you don’t have to sleep with the young vulnerable girls to award 
them opportunities to go to school, that is so wrong! Shame on you. 
 
But through his lawyers, Godfrey Andare convinced the High Court to declare Section 29 
of the Act unconstitutional because it was a threat to freedom of expression as it vaguely 
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criminalises publication of certain information (Geoffrey Andare v. Attorney General and 
Director of Public Prosecution, 2015). The section provided as follows: 
A person who by means of a licensed telecommunication system—  
(a). sends a message or other matter that is grossly offensive or of 
an indecent, obscene or menacing character; or  
(b). sends a message that he knows to be false for the purpose of 
causing annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety to another 
person, commits an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine 
not exceeding fifty thousand shillings, or to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding three months, or to both.  
 
Justice Mumbi Ngugi found this section “so vague, broad and uncertain that individuals” 
would not know offending communication as it is expected in criminal offences. The judge 
was guided by the case of Sunday Times vs United Kingdom Application No 65 38/74 para 
49, in which the European Court of Human Rights stated that “a norm cannot be regarded 
as “law” unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his 
conduct.” 
 
In a 2014 petition filed by CORD, the opposition party that lost to President Uhuru Kenyatta 
in the 2013 presidential elections, several sections of the Communication Act were 
declared unconstitutional by the High Court (see Coalition for Reform and Democracy and 
others v. Republic of Kenya and others, 2015). The executive had influenced Parliament 
to enact Security Laws (Amendment) Act, No 19 of 2014 (SLAA) as an urgent measure to 
enhance national security in the face of increased terrorist attacks. SLAA amended 22 
other Acts of Parliament that were either directly or indirectly concerned with national 
security matters. The High Court declared 10 Sections of the Act unconstitutional because 
they either violated the freedom of expression and the media or of rights of the accused 
as guaranteed by the Constitution. Among those found unconstitutional was Section 66A 
of the Penal Code that aimed at prohibiting publication through:  
...print, digital or electronic means, insulting, threatening, or inciting 
material or images of dead or injured persons which are likely to 
cause fear and alarm to the general public or disturb public peace”. 
It seems this section was aimed at restricting incivility in social media 
content since it is mainly in social media that such restricted content 
is found. Legacy media restrict publication of such offending 
information through editorial policies, house style and professional 
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ethics guidelines. (Coalition for Reform and Democracy and others 
v. Republic of Kenya and others, 2015). 
 
As seen in the cases described above, courts stopped many criminal cases related to use 
of social media because the cases were based on unconstitutional Acts of Parliament. 
This judicial knowledge is clear in Kuria & Three Others vs Attorney General (2002), a 
case that I quote at length:    
The court has power and indeed the duty to prohibit the continuation 
of the criminal prosecution…It is a duty of the court to ensure that its 
process does not degenerate into tools for personal score-settling or 
vilification on issues not pertaining to that which the system was even 
formed to perform...The machinery of criminal justice is not to be 
allowed to become a pawn in personal civil feuds and individual 
vendetta. It is through this mandate of the court to guard its process 
from being abused or misused or manipulated for ulterior motives  
 
These rulings caused an institutional void when the courts stopped the executive from 
using restrictive means of controlling incivility. It seems independence of the judiciary 
encouraged by the Constitution of Kenya 2010 has created a void between courts and 
other arms of government over securitisation of incivility. Although the NCIC and the police 
are dominant securitising actors working through prosecution of offenders, their 
relationship with the Judiciary is antagonistic. It gives the impression that as the two state 
organs securitise incivility, the courts are desecuritising.  
 
For example, the police spokesperson blamed the courts for the growing hate speech, 
claiming the courts should convict ‘reckless politicians’ (see Kajilwa, 2015). The 
spokesperson said police officers often present ‘watertight evidence’ but only for the courts 
to frustrate their work by unconditionally releasing suspects. The NCIC made similar 
accusations claiming the courts and uncooperative witnesses have made it difficult to 
arrest hate mongers (Kisika, 2017).  
 
Nonetheless, this tension is more than conflict over incivility policies, it shows the tactics 
being used by the Executive to challenge the rule of law. The police and NCIC can use 
the language of national security in its favour as it can skew the tensions in favour of the 
Executive. What the NCIC and the police are doing is to repeatedly use the discourses of 
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national security to contest the nature and limits of liberal democracy without directly 
slipping from democracy into dictatorship (see Huysmans, 2006:11). The tensions 
between the Judiciary and the Executive show how politics of national security, Laclau and 
Mouffe would argue, from an ontological dimension, is part of ‘the political’ rather than pure 
security discourses that are part of the ontic.  
 
However, this institutional void does not mean the courts were not repairing the dislocation 
caused by incivility. To recall, this is how the law works as a hegemonic tool. Regular 
acquittals enable the regime to be symbolically totalitarian while looking democratic for not 
convicting people based on the strict criminal laws, but at the same time use these laws 
to scare people. It can therefore be argued that the courts securitise incivility even without 
convictions but through juridical practices that accompany investigations, arrests or even 
detentions. As explained in Jacqueline Okuta and Jackson Njeru v. Attorney General and 
Director of Public Prosecutions, (2017), “even if the accused is eventually acquitted, he 
may well have undergone the traumatising gamut of arrest, detention, remand and trial. 
Moreover, if the accused has employed the services of a lawyer, he will also have incurred 
a sizeable bill of costs which will normally not be recoverable.”   
 
The hegemonic operation of courts is similar to hegemonies of regimes that look merciful, 
Žižek (2008:666) argues, by ensuring that “everyone is guilty of something” but not yet 
convicted because the regime has withdrawn full enforcement of the severe laws. Such 
regimes retain “a permanent threat to discipline its subjects”. In this case, social media 
contributors are free because of the mercy of the courts not because there is freedom of 
expression. Yet this mercy is what gives courts legitimacy as it enables courts to appear 
neutral and objective. This court-guaranteed freedom means people can only take the 
court’s preferred freedom. Thus, judicial discourses are objective discourses that attempt 
to conceal the ‘the political’ which means that laws are rules used to tame ‘the political’. In 
any case, hegemony is not only dominance but also negotiation strategies which generate 






7.3.3. The Legacy Media Nodal Point: Journalistic Traditions and Voices of 
Organic Intellectuals. 
In analysing legacy media, I looked at mainstream newspapers as governmentality tools 
availing mini-narratives that shape and define incivility. Here, newspapers are channels 
for ‘serious speech’ that are part of institutional practices. Because this study is an 
‘argument over definition’ of mediatised incivility — ‘the naming of unnamed things’, the 
suitable analytical techniques are metaphors on the one hand and catachresis, how 
arguments attempt to “[give] a name to something that did not already have a name” on 
the other hand, considering that a sign is not ontologically fixed, therefore any fixity is a 
social-historical expression of power (see Laclau 2005:71). This subsection analyses how 
legacy media discourses sedimented the regime’s definition of mediatised incivility through 
mini-narratives articulated by organic intellectuals.  
Legacy media contribute to the formation of regimes of truth at macro-level through two 
ways: firstly, the editorial policies that create subject positions for media workers and 
secondly, by giving a voice to organic intellectuals through opinion editorial spaces. That 
is to say, legacy media institutions engage in the creation of nodal points when they adhere 
to traditional journalism principles claiming to serve as ‘neutral’ channels while spreading 
the regime’s speech acts or when they give a voice to organic intellectuals to use opinion 
editorials to create nodal points. In addition to merely supporting the construction of nodal 
points by other actors, the news media is directly involved in the tropological 
transformation of incivility to something else when legacy media, as part of ideological 
state apparatus, creates nodal points for the regime. The following part starts with the 
analysis of editorial policies, followed by an analysis of opinion editorials. 
7.3.3.1. Editorial Policies. 
 
Editorial policies are technologies of self as they provide media employees with 
institutional values used to work them into ideal employees. As Foucault (1988:18) would 
have said, they:  
...permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of 
others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, 
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thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves 
in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, 
perfection, or immortality. 
Editorial policies act as instruments that enable journalists to fit the needs and challenges 
of media organisations. Hence editorial policies entice media workers to spread the 
regime’s truths.  
For example, the social media editorial policy for the Nation Media Group, the biggest 
news media organisation in Kenya, warns its journalists against editing “pages that relate 
to controversial issues or campaigns as this can be traced back to them and to NMG” 
(Nation Media Group, 2014). The policy also reminds journalists to “[a]lways assume that 
all that [they] post online will at some point become public.” Such policy statements are 
nodal points as they prepare journalists to produce news or cover the regime’s securitising 
speech acts without providing critical alternatives.  
In its ‘Comment Policy’ (2016), the Standard Group, the second biggest media 
organisation in Kenya, lists types of abusive comments it does not publish. The media 
organisation warns against posting comments that are defamatory, false or misleading, 
insulting, threatening or abusive; obscene or of a sexual nature; offensive, racist, sexist, 
homophobic or discriminatory against any religions or other groups”.  To the Standard 
Media Group, commentators should:  
…respect people's privacy. You are not allowed to submit 
confidential or private information. For example, you must not upload 
the telephone number, email address or any other contact details of 
any person. You should not write anything which could prejudice 
pending or on-going court proceedings of which you are aware. For 
example, if you have any personal knowledge about someone who 
has been arrested or charged or (is) being prosecuted for an offence, 
you must not mention it. If you do, you could be in contempt of court, 
which is an extremely serious matter (Comment Policy, 2016).  
 
The Star, the third leading newspaper in terms of circulation, warns social media users 
against abusive contents that are “defamatory; obscene; promote or incite violence, 
terrorism, illegal acts, hate speech, or hatred on the grounds of race, ethnicity, cultural 
identity, religious belief, disability, gender, identity or sexual orientation, or are otherwise 




Legacy media is using its editorial policies as technologies of power to promote 
governmentality. Here, technologies of power are the editorial management practices that 
produce cooperative journalists and social media users and hinder opportunities for 
alternative voices. Even though they do not do it directly, editorial policies produce 
mentalities that make securitisation of incivility possible.  
 
Editorial policies are similar to ‘quasi-logical’ tools that persuade by defining accepted 
premises. Just like linguistic tropes, editorial policies make media workers understand 
incivility in terms of other things. This means editorial policies create nodal points that 
stabilise the meaning of incivility in social media. The nodal points create objective 
discourses which support the lager narratives that name incivility as something else.  
7.3.3.2. Opinion Editorials. 
 
The second strategy for creating nodal points through legacy media, as mentioned earlier, 
is through the opinion editorial voices of organic intellectuals. From a non-essentialist 
standpoint, organic intellectuals are those playing intellectual roles outside the academy 
(see Gramsci, 2005:49). This group of intellectuals constitutes nodal points through which 
it attempts to fix meanings of incivility. The study analysed discourses by intellectuals who 
contributed in public debates through the news media — those who wrote letters to the 
editors, opinions and columns.  
 
In selecting opinion editorials, I strived to include all articles mentioning incivility and its 
catachresis’s names such as hate speech, incitement to violence, inflammatory or 
defamatory speech published since the year 2007. The 2007/08 post-election violence 
and the resultant actions like constitutional changes, motivated my choice as this period 
captures the climax of dislocations, the period when an institutional void was created and 
incivility (re)constructed. I identified, from newspapers, the speech acts that produced 
serious truth claims (see Foucault, 1981:61), “what experts say when they are speaking 
as experts” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982:48). I considered opinions that were ‘serious 
speech acts’, and not news that was more of the various forms of ‘everyday ordinary’ 
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discourses (see Griggs & Howarth, 2017:7). This selection was followed by a careful 
reselection of thirty statements from the two leading newspapers with national circulation: 
the Daily Nation and the Standard. These are articles that I judged to epitomise the 
dominant discourses at play in shaping the naming and constitution of incivility in social 
media. The importance of selecting such articles in Discourse Analysis is to help a 
researcher to identify recurring discourses and not to prove hypotheses like it is common 
in the positivist studies. To echo what I stated in the sampling strategy, samples should be 
selected “according to the intensity with which the interesting features, processes, 
experiences” occur in them (Flick, 2007:28). Accordingly, the 30 opinion articles can be 
used to describe how the hegemonic intellectual function is pushing for closure in the 
ongoing discourses on incivility in social media. 
 
The voices of organic intellectuals in the selected statements were analysed from two 
perspectives: their subject positions/positions of enunciation (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985:115) 
of the organic intellectual and the argument itself, a combination of post-Marxist views on 
identity and use of rhetorical devices. This analytic approach should be seen as part of the 
tactics for creating order in the otherwise vast data available, and not attempts to reduce 
the data using quantitative principles or evidence supporting casual claims. Consequently, 
in analysing the opinions, I looked for how organic intellectuals repeatedly used the 
classical Aristotelian triad of ethos (their subject positions), pathos and logos in debating 
incivility. Although Laclau (2000:77) confines rhetoric to the ontological level of analysis of 
ideologies, especially the tropes of naming, this study looked for the ontical domain, the 
rhetorical styles of persuasion, to describe the ontological level. That is to say, the analysis 
describes how rhetorical styles are being used to create “catachresis that names 
something that is unnamed” (see Finlayson, 2012:758).  
7.3.3.2.1. Ethos: Subject Positions/Positions of Enunciation 
To perform functions of organic intellectuals, one has to take suitable subject positions, 
this is equivalent to the Aristotelian ethos. Such subject positions rely on the respect given 
due to the subject’s authoritative position, what Locke sees as a kind of illegitimate use of 
force as such proof cannot advance knowledge (Locke, 1838 [1690]: 524). The interest 
here was to look for how the organic intellectuals created and occupied subject positions 
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to make their arguments more authoritative. What is important for the organic intellectual 
is not the individual actor, but how the individual actor creates and occupies positions that 
support their arguments.  
 
In addition to the organic intellectuals’ positions as authors, there was a tendency to cite 
traditional regime sources of authority, meaning intellectuals merely legitimised the 
regime’s truths. For instance, in letters to the editor published by the Daily Nation 26th 
October 2017, the author took authoritative subject positions by citing the Constitution of 
Kenya (see Kibet, 2017). Although Kibet does not sign off as a lawyer, he reiterates how 
the constitutional protection of freedom of expression “should not extend to war 
propaganda, incitement to violence or hate speech.” The author also echoes the guidelines 
issued by the Kenya Film Classification Board Chief Executive Officer, Ezekiel Mutua on 
how the media should limit divisive content to promote ‘coexistence’ among people from 
different ethnic backgrounds. Kibet (2017) cites the Media Council of Kenya Code of 
Conduct to support his stand on restricting journalists from producing content that can 
invoke “feelings of contempt, hatred, violence, or inflammatory statements.”  
 
Other than citation of authorities, appeal to ethos was also seen in how intellectuals 
persuaded audiences by identifying their expertise. In an article published in the Star on 
15th February 2017, the author positions herself as an academic and an ersatz spokesman 
for government agencies. Mercy Muendo signs off as an information technology law 
lecturer at Mount Kenya University (Muendo, 2018, the article was originally published 
online by The Conversation). Muendo starts by explaining the failed metonymy of hate 
speech as seen in recurrent acquittal of suspects accused of spreading hate speech. The 
acquittals for hate speech offenders mean hate speech has failed to symbolise the whole, 
thus incivility in political discourses is only part of the puzzle of rough speech. 
 
Organic intellectuals can take the subject position of experts based on their education, 
attachment to professional associations or first-hand experience with incivility in social 
media. For example, Muendo (2018) appeals to authority based on her educational 
qualifications and attachment to the legal profession — “the author is a lawyer and a 
university lecturer specialising in law and information technology.” Through this appeal to 
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authority, the intellectual implicitly claims epistemic privilege over the general public, and 
uses this privilege to legitimise her authoritative positions. Thus, the author’s formal 
professional qualifications acted as a strategy for intellectual self-legitimation. 
 
Subject positions of experts were also created by declaring a macro-epistemic stance 
emanating from either the authors’ expressions of epistemic support or evidentiary 
justification of their statements (see Marín-Arrese, 2015:210).  In a broad sense, the former 
conveys personal estimation of veracity of the statement (epistemicity) whereas the latter 
emphasises the sources of knowledge, the evidential information, used to prove the 
statements uttered. Several authors used the Constitution and laws on hate speech in 
Kenya and other jurisdictions to take macro-epistemic stances. Since laws and 
government policies at large are the regime’s constitutive rules, by using them to support 
their statements, intellectuals reiterate the government’s truth.  
 
For example, Wainaina (2017) blames the gaps in Kenya’s hate speech laws for hate 
speech in social media. The author laments that existing laws only target individuals but 
not the social network corporations. She proposes that in addition to the current laws, the 
National Cohesion and Integration Act and guidelines issued by the NCIC and CA 
stipulating a fine of Ksh.1 million (€8,000) or a five-year jail term for sharing inflammatory 
content via Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp, there should be additional laws to ensure 
corporations take responsibility for conveying  inflammatory content. The author names 
Germany as a success story for passing what she terms “a controversial law which fines 
social media companies up to Ksh. 5.9 billion (€50 million) for failing to pull down hate 
speech.”  
 
Organic intellectuals can also enhance their expert positions by taking the subject position 
of spokespersons, albeit indirect. These are the authors who directly or indirectly speak 
on behalf of a group or organisation. The position of indirect spokespersons is taken when 
organic intellectuals informally support views by institutions. In such cases, intellectuals 
become ‘ersatz spokespersons’ as they endorse causes or lend their voices in any other 
way to a variety of constituencies (see Pels, 2013).  Muendo (2018) attaches herself to 
the Communications Authority of Kenya, which had acquired equipment for monitoring 
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social media: “The regulator has … warned that it could pull the plug on social media if 
national security comes under threat.” The author further explains how the security laws 
can be used to control ‘hate speech:  
…the Preservation of Public Security Act has a provision that 
imposes criminal liability for journalists suspected of compromising 
public safety, public order, morality or defence. …The Prevention of 
Terrorism Act also allows [limits] freedom of expression. This can 
also be used by the government to regulate and monitor social media 
platforms. 
  
Muendo further attaches herself to the NCIC to explain how the National Cohesion and 
Integration Act defines hate speech. From the ‘spokesman’ subject position, the 
intellectual attempts to articulate the NCIC’s metonymical ‘analogies’:  
Hate speech may include words or behaviour, the display, publishing 
or distribution of written material and public performances of plays 
and recordings…This provision can be used to monitor, remove or 
block content, including online content. It has been used to compel 
mobile service providers to monitor hate speech internally. In the run 
up to the March 2013 elections, it was applied to fight hate speech 
via SMS and on the Internet. 
 
From this perspective, strong arguments come from attached organic intellectuals — those 
working as representatives of organisations.  
 
Authoritative subject positions can be created by highlighting the author’s personal 
experience. Musyoki (2017) narrates how he initially thought tribal associations were 
formed by university students not used to what he calls metropolitan campuses, but got 
shocked when he found out tribal associations were prevalent in work places, churches 
political parties, and even WhatsApp groups. He suggests that Kenyans should avoid tribal 
associations and protect the interest of the country. The author uses his experience with 
tribalism to explain the consequences of incivility in political discourses.  
7.3.3.2.2. Ethos-Logos: Subject Positions and Grammars of Politics  
At the apex of rhetorical substitution and displacement is the experts’ appeal to logic. 
These are ‘quasi-logical’ arguments rather than logic used outside politics, like in 
mathematics or physics. As explained by Laclau (2000:76), logic in politics is not “formal 
logic, or even about a general dialectical logic, but about the notion which is implicit in 
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expressions such as ‘the logic of kinship’, the ‘logic of the market’ and so forth”. Therefore, 
logic in Discourse Theory is the “‘grammar’ or clusters of rules which make some 
combinations and substitutions possible and exclude others [this] broadly coinciding with 
the ‘symbolic’ in Lacanian theory. Incivility, as antagonistic events, is similar to Lacan's 
notion of the Real as it cannot be symbolised through institutionalised performances (see 
Laclau, 2000:77). Thus, in looking for how the organic intellectuals are using logics to 
repair dislocation, I looked for the grammars of politics that, at an ontic level, attempted to 
symbolise the ‘real’, considering that we can only have partial access to the ontological by 
passing through the ontic (see Marchart, 2007:24). 
 
The grammar is used not as rules of correct language usage, but as a system for 
reproducing patterns of political practices that “build a mental picture of reality, to make 
sense of their experience of what goes on around them and inside them.” (Halliday, 
1985:101). Similar to how the grammars of language describe how words are combined 
to make meaning, the grammars of politics describe the rules made to create sense of 
political practices such as incivility in social media (cf. Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996:1). 
Sedimentation of these rules is what creates nodal points about incivility in social media. 
Just as grammar of language, sedimented political grammars must be obeyed for one to 
interpret politics within the socially accepted parameters.    
 
The grammars of politics attempting to stop the “subversion of the Symbolic by the Real” 
can be identified from the structural locations that are similar to the linguistic structure of 
combination and substitution (Laclau, 2000:77). Thus as stated in Chapter Five, I analysed 
the regime’s grammars of incivility by identifying the metonymic combinations and 
metaphoric substitutions struggling to stop the subversion of the symbolic by the Real (see 
Laclau, 2008:66). Moreover, political actions have what Laclau (2000:78) calls a parodic 
component, the tropological displacement of meaning without logic, from one context 
“towards new uses which subvert its literality.” The actions can also be catachrestical when 
the meaning created through the displacement does not have any literal meaning outside 
the very displacements from which they emerge.” The organic intellectuals appeal to the 
logic of politics based on probabilities, reciprocity and cause-effect relationships about the 
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given nature of the world, what falls in the realm of the enthymemes that persuade by 
connecting unfamiliar claims to something known (see Finlayson, 2012:761). 
 
After going through the opinion articles, it is quite clear that a homogenous view of incivility 
does not exist. However, the dominant discourses about incivility attempt to create the 
nodal point of hate speech but with occasional narratives of freedom of expression. These 
nodal points are explained below. 
 
7.3.3.2.2.1. Hate Speech Nodal Point 
The hate speech nodal point follows the peace narrative that has dominated the news 
media since the 2007/08 violence that erupted after the botched presidential elections. As 
noted by Ogola (2011:88), the news media in Kenya was so fragmented by events related 
to the Kibaki-Raila fallout before the 2007 elections that after the elections, the media 
institution was in crisis, challenged by the same tensions that led to the violence. Since 
then, editors have been pushing a peace narrative against a backdrop of ethnic 
antagonisms that shape politics in Kenya today. The hate speech media discourses have 
continuously denied ethnic identities legitimacy by addressing the public as a 
homogeneous group within a unified nation-state (see Ogola, 2011:90).  
 
A somewhat typical example of the nodal point of hate speech constructed through the 
peace narrative is the opinion by Munene (2013:25), a newspaper editor, who gives an 
‘expert’ assessment of extreme speech.  Munene positions himself as an expert when he 
starts by quoting Sudanese poet, professor and cultural critic, Taban Lo Liyong. The writer 
describes Liyong’s views on causes of hatred in Kenya, and then supports his argument 
through the use of the grammars of politics. The Standard newspaper editor argues that 
those who abuse freedom of expression suppress freedoms of those exercising their 
freedoms responsibly. He advises Kenyans to avoid social media users who post ethnic 




In addition to delegitimising ethnic affinities by propping a homogeneous nation-state, the 
organic intellectuals also used the grammar of patriotism (Bilig, 1995)6 to reintroduce the 
“ideology of order”. To Ogola (2011:90), “it was in the interest of both the state and the 
media that the nation should survive.” The intellectuals have over time emphasised the 
dangers of chaos, but have rarely tried to look at the root causes. To these intellectuals, 
“alternative readings of the nation” risks dividing it.    
 
The then Commissioner of Police, Major General Mohammed Hussein Ali, appealed to the 
grammar of patriotism when he discouraged the news media from broadcasting hateful 
content as Kenya had adopted European traditions of limiting constitutional rights to 
freedom of expression where such freedom threatens public peace (Ali, 2007:13). “There 
are those who subscribe to the American model that opposes any restrictions on free 
speech, including hateful incitement and bigotry”, that is not our approach, the 
Commissioner of Police said. He warned the media against inciting people by 
exaggerating facts or slanting news reports, arguing that such hate speech ought to be 
discouraged as it limits free development of political discourses. Ali warned of the 
possibility of Kenyan FM stations being as vicious as Radio Milles Collines, an FM station 
that has been blamed for the 1994 Rwanda Genocide.  
 
The patriotism views are reiterated by Dr. Othieno (2013:21), a regular commentator, who 
identifies himself as a science writer. He appeals to the grammar of patriotism by arguing 
that it is the middle class and well-educated Kenyans who stand to lose more if the country 
experiences violence due to hate speech, yet it is the same people spreading hate speech. 
The author argues that although the poor were accused of causing post-election violence 
                                                          
6In this project, the patriotism grammar is differentiated from nationalism, following Billig (1995), 
based on social categorisation even though the two are fundamentally similar. Nationalism is 
categorised as extreme and dangerous, such as ethnic nationalism, while patriotism is beneficial. 
to the nation-state. The grammar of patriotism is the loyalty rules used to reproduce established 
nation-states, what Billig calls banal nationalism. Different from ‘hot’ nationalism that is 
dangerously irrational, the grammar of patriotism makes it appear 'natural', invisible and beneficial 
to the nation (cf. Billig, 1995:16-17). Thus the political logics of patriotism sediment discourses by 






in 2007, it is the middleclass people who are currently spreading hate speech through 
social media.  
 
Similar patriotism grammar used by the organic intellectuals to create nodal points through 
peace narratives was the discursive othering through the inclusive or exclusive personal 
pronoun 'we'. This pronoun put readers in fixed subject positions, with the 'we' being the 
patriotic civil people while side-lining the alternative subject positions occupied by uncivil 
other to construct us-them distinctions. These personal plural pronouns, Billig (1995:93) 
argues, are the routine small words, “that offer constant, but rarely conscious, reminders 
of the homeland, making ‘our’ national identity unforgettable.” The plural pronoun ‘we’ in 
this study is the Kenyan national ‘we’ which is speaker and addressee inclusive but 
exclusive of unpatriotic trouble makers. Thus ‘we’ created the subject positions of the 
organic intellectuals and the newspaper readers as patriotic Kenyans, meaning it 
metonymically replaced Kenya with organic intellectuals and their readers. The extracts 
below illustrate the inclusive Kenyan ‘we’. The paragraphs are numbered in the extract for 
the ease of discussion:  
Let’s resist tribal divisions 
[12] I challenge all Kenyans to stand up against tribalism. We should 
resist unhealthy competition, conflicts, indifference and hatred. 
[13] We should follow the example of the Good Samaritan, who 
illustrates that a neighbour is not necessarily a person who lives 
next-door, or a fellow tribesman, but anybody in need irrespective of 
race gender or tribe. Let us promote peace making and 
reconciliation.   
[15] Kenya is a great nation and we should rise above economic and 
political discrimination, or that of any other kind. Let us choose our 
leaders on merit alone (Tarus, 2007).  
 
In the 15 paragraph article, Let’s Resist Tribal Divisions, the organic intellectual 
speaks for all Kenyans who should be patriotic to control hostility during elections. In 
paragraph 12, the author urges all Kenyans to stop tribalism and unhealthy 
competition in politics. The intellectual subtly uses ‘we’ (us) to create “we-ness” with 
readers (see Petersoo, 2007:426). The personal pronoun ‘we’ is used in reference 
to our “strong fabric of family relationships”, “values” and “continent” [4]. Through this 
grammars of patriotism, Tarus (2007) pushes the nodal point of peace by speaking 
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for and to all Kenyans. Thus the inclusive Kenyan ‘we’ is used to repair dislocation 
by attempting to ‘symbolise the ‘real’ through peace narratives.  
  
7.3.3.2.2.2. Freedom of Expression Nodal Point 
Not all writers used the regime grammar to repair dislocation through the metaphors of 
hate speech. Thus, there is an institutional void within the legacy media created by organic 
the intellectuals’ nodal point of freedom of expression. For instance, a university lecturer 
and columnist for the Daily Nation, Dr. Godwin Murunga, makes a divergent argument on 
the relationship between hate speech and electoral violence (Daily Nation, 2013). To him, 
the connection between hate speech and electoral violence is weak and it is clear 
politicians are the cause of the violence because they use hateful messages as tools for 
mobilising support in a General Election, an election they treat as a do-or-die thing. He 
argues that the cycles of electoral violence since 1992 can be attributed to political elites, 
some of them having been named in various judicial reports. The author warns of the 
possibility of political elites using hate speech as pretexts for limiting freedom of 
expression.  
 
In “The state must deal firmly with ethnic incitement on internet and social media”, Dr 
Mutuma Rutere, a United Nations Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, 
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, argues that criminal laws for 
regulating Internet should be based on clear legislation and “restricted to a very small 
category of speech”. Such “restrictions should not be at the sole discretion of those in 
power, or done in secrecy in the name of national security. Even more important, such 
decisions must be open to review by free and independent judiciaries” (Rutere, 2014). 
Although the author was discussing how incitement could be avoided, he warns against 
using criminal laws as an excuse to reduce freedom of expression in the name of 
controlling hate speech.    
 
The freedom nodal point was also created by Osoro (2013), a policy analyst working with 
the civil society. To him, the problem is not incivility in social media but the negativity of 
ethnicity in Kenyan politics. He argues that “unless we take immediate corrective action to 
counter the tribal nature of this country’s politics, Kenyan nationals at home and abroad 
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will continue to find new channels to trade tribal insults” [16]. Many of his other arguments 
are self-explanatory in relation to this study, as such it was worth quoting him at length:  
 
Strong arm tactics simply won’t work 
[4]. The social media war of words seems to draw its fault lines along 
tribal roots. There is concern that unless this behaviour stops, the 
Internet insults may spill over in to our social lives…  
[5]. Prosecution may not work since the line of separation between 
freedom of expression and hate speech is far too thin to allow for 
effective court action… 
[6]. Coming out too forcefully may drive the problem underground 
only for it to explode later. The event preceding the Arab Spring 
comes to mind.  
[7]. …The solution lies in either leaving the social media war to burn 
out on its own, or addressing the serious shortcomings ailing our 
political system that spawn tribal animosities.   
[8]. The government should commission a study to unearth the 
malady and propose probable solutions. Unleashing security agents 
to police how Kenyans enjoy fundamental rights will only negate the 
advances made so far.  
[9]. Put bluntly, Kenya should not embark on a journey of self-
examination to find out why negative ethnicity appears to pervade all 
aspects of its political, social, and economic life. 
[10]. Reading the war of words on social media objectively, one is 
bound to accept the fact that the crude dialogue captures precisely 
the sick political culture that has pervaded this country’s social fabric 
since independence.  
[11]. Attempts to gag this disgusting dialogue without addressing the 
causes will be tackling the symptoms instead of dealing with political 
mischief, which is the real culprit.  
[12]. Let us not bury our heads in the sand.  
[18]. The use of coercive methods such as tracing social media 
offenders, arrests, and court prosecutions as a control mechanism 
to cure this problem should be discouraged (Osoro, 2013).  
 
The above opinion shows the dislocatory effect of incivility in social media. The problem is 
not incivility but the political culture that has failed to tame violence. The writer uses the 
freedom of expression nodal point to destabilise the regime’s attempt to fix the meaning 
of incivility.  
 
Some organic intellectuals blamed the negative ethnicity for the violence that accompanies 
general elections in Kenya. Kipkoech Tanui, a regular columnist and the Managing Editor 
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of The Standard Weekend Editions, argues that political campaigns in Kenya are dirty as 
candidates on either side use any means to win (2007:12).  In an election year, “the thirst 
for victory kills conscience”, Tanui opined. The editor is happy that sometimes voters are 
annoyed when political elites attempt to incite them. He gave the example of “the people 
of Emining, a small town in Koibatek”, who apprehended Administration Police officers 
found distributing inciting leaflets along Kabarnet-Nakuru road. From this information, it is 
clear that the incivility is a political strategy used by political elites even those with control 
over government security agencies.   
 
Similar blame of political elites, although indirect, was made by the Commissioner of 
Police, who advised the media institutions to be vigilant of people out to use the media to 
broadcast hate speech to propagate ethnic stereotyping (Ali, 2007:13). According to Ali, 
“such activities are basically incitement, which elicits intense resentment that lasts long 
after the election period”.  Corresponding arguments were made by Munene (2007), on 
how ethnic hatred is used by politicians to woo voters. The politicians, Munene claims, use 
tribal hatred against some people even though the essential differences in Kenya are 
between the haves and have-nots.  
 
To summarise, the dislocatory effects of incivility, as seen in the organic intellectuals’ 
discourses above, can be narrowed to two conflicting nodal points: hate speech vs 
freedom of expression. On both sides, the grammars of politics are used to make 
arguments on how incivility should be perceived in relation to democracy. The hate speech 
nodal point pushes for the restriction of freedoms that are harmful to others, while the 
freedom of expression nodal point advocates expanding spaces as a prerequisite for 
democracy. The main argument within the hate speech nodal point is that democracy 
consists of political stability and harmony, but for the freedom nodal point, democracy 
requires freedom of expression.  
 
The majority of the articles in the corpus supported the hate speech logic by equating 
incivility to hate speech. As Laclau (2000:77) would have said, organic intellectuals used 
the regime’s ‘grammars’ to combine and substitute incivility with extreme speech. These 
‘parodic performances’ were built around the discourses of the 2007/08 post-election 
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violence and the antagonistic ethnic political struggles that define politics in Kenya. Such 
parody is not mere playful use of language but hegemonic action through which “a certain 
meaning which was fixated within the horizon of an ensemble of institutionalised practices 
is displaced towards new uses which subvert its literality” (Laclau, 2000:7). The second 
nodal point was created by the counterhegemonic grammars of free speech. Such 
intellectuals were against the combination and substitution of incivility with hate speech. 
They see incivility as part of freedom of expression and warn against the assumption that 
all extreme speech is hate speech. To these organic intellectuals, the hate speech 
grammars attempt to stop “subversion of the symbolic by the Real” (Laclau, 2008:66).  
7.3.4. Knowledge Nodal Point: Traditional Intellectuals.  
Considering that power produces knowledge (Foucault, 1972:27), this section describes 
how the regime is spreading a type of knowledge that tropologically transfers incivility from 
politics to a national security threat. The regime’s knowledge is the society’s regime of 
truth, the politics of what is true and what is not, “the types of discourse which [the society] 
accepts and makes function as true” (Foucault, 1980:131). These categories of discourses 
fall in Austin’s (1962) expositive acts, the speech acts that clarify reasons and arguments 
which are objective “by human agreement” but not ‘brute’ facts” (see Searle, 1995:1).  
The regime is supported by people who can see truth from a vantage point due to their 
intellectual qualifications. These are individuals who are institutionally recognised because 
their subject positions grant them ‘epistemic privileges’ in the society. Traditional 
intellectuals are “individuals with authority”, the group Gramsci (2005:94) called 
intellectuals bounded to the regime — the government administrators, scholars and those 
with non-ecclesiastical authority (Gramci, 2005:49-50). Foucault (1977:11) called such 
individuals ‘technicians’, the specialists who transformed the physical punishment by 
executioners to control through training. They are “technicians of behaviour: engineers of 
conduct, orthopaedists of individuality” who discipline by producing docile bodies created 
by a body of knowledge. 
It is not through sheer force but when regimes use technicians to return sedimenting 
discourses that the regime can express its power, even though sedimentation hides traces 
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of the regime when people forget that the world is politically constructed. To use Laclau’s 
(1990:60) words, objectivity “is nothing but the sedimented form of power, in other words 
a power whose traces have been erased.” 
Starting with a series of online searches, I identified several intellectual statements during 
critical junctures in relation to extreme speech in Kenya. I then undertook repeated 
readings and isolated major documents with serious speech acts about incivility in social 
media (see Griggs and Howarth, 2017:7). This was followed by the careful selection of two 
statements — The Final Report of the Truth, Justice & Reconciliation Commission of 
Kenya 2013 and The Report by The Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence 
(Waki Report, 2008 —  which I judged to have played a dominant role in shaping the 
regime’s truth about incivility in social media. The two reports were part of The National 
Accord, a peace agreement signed to end the 2008 post-election violence. Thus, my 
judgment was guided by my situated knowledge about incivility in social media in Kenya 
and theoretical assumptions about the role of traditional intellectuals in the construction of 
public discourses.   
The following part starts by describing how traditional intellectuals are using ‘effect for 
cause’ metonyms to construct a regime preferred narrative about incivility after the 
violence that followed the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections. From January to 
March 2008, post-independence Kenya went through the worst violence, which even 
without being categorised as civil war, left over 1,300 people dead, over 500,000 displaced 
and a massive quantity of property destroyed. This was a period of dislocation as effects 
of the violence made the concept of hate speech a central nodal point in the struggle to 
stabilise the meaning of incivility in social media. Although election-related ethnic violence 
can be traced to the first and subsequent multiparty elections in 1992 and 1997 
respectively, the media was formally blamed for spreading hate speech after the 2007/08 
post-elections violence. From this perspective, incivility was viewed as a security problem 
by being knit to nodal points that are forms of destructive extreme speech, such as hate 
speech and incitement to violence.  
As a ‘statement’, the Waki Report, constituted rules for regulating extreme speech, which 
is otherwise a floating signifier. Considering that the commission was established to 
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“investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the violence…and to make 
recommendations concerning these and other matters”, the report is a serious speech act. 
The commission’s mandate can be viewed as an attempt to repair dislocation after the 
violent disruption.   
The Commission’s findings on the culpability of media in respect to incitement and extreme 
speech have shaped current understanding of incivility in social media. As explained by 
Klopp (2009:150), the Commission “provided a long, detailed and graphic report about the 
varied forms and dynamics of violence in different parts of the country”, including how the 
news media can threaten national security. Although Kenya had had two similar 
Commissions whose recommendations were ignored (the Kiliku Report and Akwiumi 
Report), Justice Waki’s Commission recommendations were designed to be self-
executing.  
Furthermore, the commission was more independent and had more resources, both 
financial and personnel, than the two previous commissions. For example, the commission 
hired experts from all over the world, among them Dr. Suzanne Mueller, a renown German 
political scientist, Robert Grinstead, a Canadian investigator, Ms. Melinda Rix, a New 
Zealander sexual violence expert, and Ms. Gladys Mwariri, a Kenyan counselling 
psychologist. This was in addition to other forms of support from several United Nations 
agencies, the Government of Kenya, and civil society organisations working in the areas 
of peace and conflict resolution (see Waki Report, 2008:2). Foucault (1995:295) would 
have called this team a group of “technicians of behaviour”. 
The Commission reported that vernacular language FM radio stations broadcasted 
inflammatory information that created a climate of hate, and incited people to violence. 
When the Commission handed to The Hague-based International Criminal Court a list of 
suspects “bear[ing] the greatest responsibility for crimes”, among the suspects was 
journalist Joshua arap Sang who the Commission accused of using his morning show on 
KASS FM to broadcast inflammatory content (Waki Report, 2008:472). 
In his testimony to the Commission, Bitange Ndemo, an associate professor at the 
University of Nairobi, a columnist with a leading newspaper, and by then Permanent 
Secretary of Information and Communications, said the government’s ban on live 
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transmission was in the interest of the nation as there was need to control the media, which 
was operating “freely and sometimes recklessly and irresponsibly”, using untrained 
“journalists who were partisan, and sometimes were politically biased.” He said:   
…. media houses took sides in the run up to the 2007 election, that 
there were complaints that “most editors had been compromised”, 
and that “some media houses became sensational and 
unnecessarily alarmed their audiences and inflamed their passions”. 
He told the commission that the live broadcast of vote tallying of the 
2007 election results at the KICC [the vote tallying centre] and the 
visible acrimony of political leaders inflamed tensions, bringing “the 
country to the brink”. (Republic of Kenya, 2008:296-7).  
 
The above views were attempts to repair dislocation through securitisation by generating 
regime truths about incivility to oust it from politics. For example, in the statements, the 
person speaking had the right to speak as an authority. Therefore, the statement is likely 
to be taken as true. In addition, the speaker used accepted conventional security grammar 
and had political capital to depict the news media as an existential threat to the State.  
 
However, fissures are seen in this government truth when the CIPEV report explains how 
the 2007 violence was preceded by deliberate use of violence by political actors, coupled 
with failure to punish perpetrators, a situation that created “a culture of impunity and a 
constant escalation of violence” since the return of multi-party democracy in 1991 
(Republic of Kenya, 2008:22). This means the blame directed to ‘hate radio’ stations for 
alleged incitement was mere regime truths attempting to remove politics from an otherwise 
political problem. Thus what the regime considered inciting speech does not constitute a 
natural opposition to peace. It is the other conditions that make inciting speech a threat to 
the nation. 
 
Nevertheless, there was dislocation within the narratives by traditional intellectuals. 
Contrary to Prof. Ndemo’s construction of a regime of truth, the then Chairman of the 
Kenya Editors’ Guild, Macharia Gaitho, argued that although the media was “accused of 
playing a part in fanning the [post-election] violence”, this accusation was made by political 
actors who felt they were not supported by the media. Mr. Macharia disagreed with Prof. 
Ndemo on alleged media partisanship, maintaining that taking sides is not wrong provided 
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the audience is informed. To Macharia, it was wrong to accuse the media of incitement 
when it “played a very critical role in lessening tensions” by not airing the real inflammatory 
statements from politicians. It would have been better:  
...if the media had aired more rather than fewer inflammatory 
statements by politicians who then would have been exposed to the 
public for who they were (Republic of Kenya, 2008:297-8). 
  
Acknowledgment by the Chairman of the Kenya Editors’ Guild that media institutions 
‘lessened tensions’ by reporting fewer inflammatory speeches, is itself a form of 
securitisation as it classifies some speech as too inflammatory to be political. As noted 
previously, such strategies hide the fact that incivility has political causes and requires 
political solutions. Consequently, testimony by the Chairman of the Kenya Editors’ Guild 
shows how the regime is securitising incivility through authorities working for ideological 
state apparatus.  
7.4. Conclusion  
It can be argued that not all ideological state apparatuses are working in unison to 
securitise incivility. For example, NCIC and Parliament are in conflict with courts. Apart 
from the institutional ambiguity caused by the conflict between courts and state 
apparatuses, the classic Austinian Speech Act premises securitisation on the force of 
enunciation of security to create a new social order which brackets ‘the political’ and 
neglects the equally important role of the audience (see Buzan et al., 1998: 32). Thus the 
security Speech Act Theory eliminates ‘the political’ from politics by denying audiences 
agency. The dominant speech acts equated security to “conventional procedures such as 
marriage or betting in which the ‘felicity circumstances’ (conditions of success)” determine 
success of the act, yet securitisation is influenced by the power of the speaker and the 
listener (see Balzacq, 2005:172). Thus the speech act has some essentialism and it is 
inadequate to singularly explain the securitisation of incivility. We, therefore, need to 
explain the role of the audience in this process to bring back politics to democracy. This 
means incivility has not been securitised ‘successfully’ as conflicts within the regime are 
forms of desecuritisation, or from an ontological perspective, the impossibility of every 
symbolic order to conceal the real (see Laclau 1990: 39). Chapter Nine describes the 






Chapter Eight  
Dislocation and repair through technologies of dissemination: Physical and 
software affordances with non-anthropocentric agency 
 
…non-humans are able to produce discourses. 
       Carpentier (2017). 
8.1. Introduction  
Attributing agency to objects, seeing objects as full-fledged actors is a departure from 
conventional poststructuralist Discourse Analysis, which reserves agency to humans. This 
study crosses boundaries by moving away from pure human agency traditions to non-
anthropocentric agency in order to discover how Internet artefacts are participating in fixing 
the meaning of incivility. Indeed, poststructuralists provide an incomplete overly simplistic 
account of discourse when they put too much emphasis on language at the neglect of 
material realities of life. That is to say, we can, without essentialising Discourse Theory, 
use ‘new materialism’ approaches to interpret how non-linguistic signs participate in 
discourse. 
 
Therefore, the crossing of boundaries into analysis of non-human agency tries to trace ‘the 
political’ in the social media from struggles over the use of technical resources to, on the 
one hand, initiate and repair dislocation , on the other,. This material semiotics approach 
is in line with the dissertaion’s ontology that focuses on underlying presumptions, both 
linguistic and material texts discourses. Indeed, Laclau and Mouffe (1985:108) reject the 
classical materialism assumption of “thing’s existence outside thought”, instead they opt 
for radical materialism since things cannot “constitute themselves as objects outside any 
discursive condition of emergence.” As Howarth (2000:102) says, all objects are conferred 
with meaning through a system of relations between objects and practices. Simply put, 
this chapter provides a holistic approach to discourse as it adds the material technologies 




A non-anthropocentric agency refers to an analysis of how physical and software 
affordances, the mundane artefacts that “knock at the door…[and] beg us for 
understanding” (Latour, 1992:227), are participating in the struggle to dislocate or repair 
dislocations caused by incivility in social media. Chapter Seven described a similar 
dislocation and repair through technologies of representation, the linguistic texts operating 
at the ontological level. In this chapter, I move beyond representation to analyse the 
technologies of dissemination that represent through material modes, the non-linguistic 
semiotic systems (see Malafouris, 2013:90; Lievrouw & Livingstone, 2006:8). I follow 
Latour’s (1990:103) argument that 
…in order to understand domination we have to turn away from an 
exclusive concern with social relations and weave them into a fabric 
that includes non-human actants, actants that offer the possibility of 
holding society together as a durable whole.  
Discourse Analysis of technologies of dissemination is divided into two parts. The first part 
describes the dominant-hegemonic use of social media artefacts — how people are using 
Internet objects as intended by the designer. It is through dominant use that technologies 
can resuscitate existing hegemony or repair the dislocation caused by incivility in social 
media. Through the analysis of the agency of object, this thesis exposes the government 
of things that is otherwise concealed in Internet technologies, both the software and 
hardware. We can thus argue that through various governmentality strategies, non-
humans are working hand in hand with the regime to stabilise domination in the face of 
the dislocation caused by incivility in the social media. 
 
In the second part, I look at objects playing an oppositional role by contradicting 
governmentalities. Oppositional use utilises hidden affordances or overturns false 
affordances into actual affordances not imagined by designers. Thus Hall’s (1980) concept 
of oppositional reading is married with Laclau and Mouffe’s project to analyse how 
affordances of social media are contradicting regime-preferred human–machine 
interaction.  In any case, Hall’s concept should not be read in an overly deterministic way 
but a balance should be found between technological determinism and the social shaping 
of technology (see Shaw, 2017:5). Just like linguistic texts, use of technologies (as texts) 
is not ideologically neutral, although   
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…misuses of technology are often framed as failures, particularly 
when committed by people who are seen to be ‘marginal’[…,we] 
might, via Hall, reclaim those ‘misuses’ as not a fault, but, while not 
accounted for by a designer, they are still plausible deployments of 
a technology’s affordances (Shaw, 2017:6). 
 
In the above categories of Discourse Analysis of dislocation and repair, as Knappett and 
Malafouris (2008:xii) would have said, two agents, people and objects, “come together to 
construct a new hybrid agent”, meaning action involves a coalescence of human and 
nonhuman elements and as such the responsibility for action must be shared (also see 
Latour, 1999:182).  As explained by Torfing (1999:35), materials can support the temporal 
stability of a discourse by sedimenting the objective meaning of “non-linguistic objects 
such as artefacts”. After sedimentation, these objects “achieve the status of mere 
‘objective presence’" (Laclau, 1990:34), making people to accept the social and symbolic 
authority of the objects without reflecting on their taken-for-grantedness. In other words, 
Internet artefacts are subtly sedimenting the regime’s hegemonic discourses. As explained 
in chapters Five and Six, although Post-Foundational Discourse Analysis projects have 
not operationalised discursive materiality, this dissertation makes Internet artefacts 
empirically visible as physical and software affordances. 
 
Similar to the regime’s use of technologies of representation, physical and software 
affordances are metonymically substituting incivility with hate speech and constructing it 
as a threat to national security. That is to say, artefacts are working with the regime to 
construct a metaphoric ‘symbolic order’ to repair the dislocation caused by incivility in 
social media. Artefacts here are the ‘text’ because, as explained by McLuhan (1994:9), “it 
is the medium that shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and 
action.” These artefacts are what Latour (1991:103) terms the non-human actants that 
hold the society together on behalf of elites. The non-human actants are technologies that 
make social media users to reduce incivility without thinking about it.   
 
How artefacts are substituting and combining incivility with hate speech can be seen in the 
way artefacts utilise their affordances to restrict users from freely accessing social media. 
From a Discourse Analysis perspective, affordances are not seen as ‘objective’ physical 
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features even though they look so, instead they are seen as statements which provide 
hegemonic affordances to the regime.  The regime’s statements at this point are object 
and apparatus which force social media users to accept the regime’s hegemonic 
discourses. The word 'statement', therefore, refers not to linguistics, “but to the gradient 
that carries us from words to things and from things to words” (Latour, 1991:106). 
 
Nevertheless, how to uncover ‘things’ remains a nightmare for researchers using 
Discourse Theory because Laclau and Mouffe offer no easy answers, instead, their works 
remain abstract and elusive in regard to the empirical inquiry of objects. This weakness, 
as Carpentier (2017:37) explains, means Laclau and Mouffe give “considerably less 
attention to material components of reality”. While remaining faithful to Laclau and Mouffe’s 
work, I innovated strategies for analysing objects by appropriating other theoretical fields 
that attribute agency to objects. Indeed, to utilise Discourse Theory, researchers must look 
elsewhere while maintaining sight on Laclau and Mouffe’s works.  
 
In this dissertation, the agency of Internet artefacts was identified from what they allow or 
forbid users to do (Akrich & Latour, 1992: 259). To use Latour’s analogy, the speed bump 
is not only an iconic sign that reminds drivers to slow down but more important a sign with 
an ability to direct physical action. I describe similar enactive signs in social media: the 
‘action possibilities’ made available or hidden by social media artefacts. In this regard, I 
identified nodal points created by affordances of Internet artefacts, the specific features 
designed to encourage or demand regime desired behaviour. These nodal points are the 
identification technologies; the technologies of ‘efficiency’; and the technologies of ‘safety’. 
The three nodal points enable the regime to sediment discourses by forcing social media 
user to behave in a specific way. A detailed analysis of technologies of material statements 
acting as forcing functions is presented below.  
8.2. Forcing functions: hegemonic use of social media artefacts, 
As explained in the methodology section, forcing functions are “constraints that force the 
desired behaviour” (Norman, 2013:141). In relation to the struggle over incivility in social 
media, forcing functions are nonhumans that either forbid users or require them to first 
perform other indirect actions before they get to access social media. The forcing 
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functions, as Norman (1988:9) suggests, are perceived and actual features that determine 
“how the thing” can be used. It is like forcing functions demand users to pledge loyalty 
before permitting them to use social media. From an ontic perspective, forcing functions 
are technologies that work with the regime to prevent or repair the interruption of the 
symbolic world (see Glynos & Howarth, 2007:14). The meaning of incivility in social media 
is settled when objects indirectly limit how people access and use social media. Through 
this strategy, the regime delegates the work of repairing dislocation to social media 
objects. 
Consequently, the function functions build objective discourses, the opposite of ‘the 
political’ (Laclau, 1990:34). Here hegemony is created not through linguistic tools, but 
technologies that naturalise some way of doing politics while suppressing alternative 
understandings. That is to say, forcing functions hides ideology by masking alternative 
uses of the technologies of social media. The forcing functions also hide the traces of 
power, making people forget that technology is political (see Laclau 1990:60). The forcing 
functions clandestinely make some myths to appear as objectively true while others as 
impossible. 
The metaphor of forcing functions can be found in rules and regulations embedded in 
technologies that require users to perform other actions before being allowed to access 
social media. The forcing functions mean technologies are either syntagmatic, both Latour 
(1990:107) and Laclau (2014:58) would agree, when they work together with human 
actants, or paradigmatic when the technologies substitute some human actants in 
enforcing the regimes instructions. These syntagmatic and paradigmatic relationships 
form integrated chains of human and non-human actants that assist the regime to repair 
dislocation caused by the social media. These forcing function metaphors are explained 
in details below. However, these metaphors are not the only forcing functions in the social 
media discourses as everything is discursive (see Laclau & Mouffe, 1987:108), 
nevertheless I only identified the most visible few to make this study practicable.  
8.2.1. Interlocks: Identification Technologies as Nodal Points 
To recapitulate what I said in the data analysis strategy, interlocks are affordances that 
encourage users to perform actions in a proper sequence (see Norman, 2013:142). This 
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type of affordance prevents unsafe use of gadgets. Hence the interlocks metaphor in this 
dissertation refers to how artefacts inspire subjects to follow a predetermined sequence 
before accessing social media. In relations to social media incivility, interlocks act as nodal 
points since they participate in fixing the meaning of incivility by demanding that users 
create content only after performing other actions. In regard to identity technologies, 
interlocks demand that users identify themselves before using social media. Therefore, 
interlocks are nodal points as they repair dislocation by removing anonymity and making 
users more responsible for their actions.  As Lacan (1977) would say, interlocks ‘quilt’ 
incivility so that it stops sliding and acquiring a specific meaning. Through this ‘quilting’ by 
the national security nodal point, the regime creates a fixed meaning of incivility as a threat 
to the nation’s wellbeing, placing it outside politics.  
In this regard, one of the most visible constraints that forces regime preferred behaviour 
on social media users is the various identifications systems. The most obvious interlock is 
the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) registration. In 2010, the defunct Communications 
Commission of Kenya (CCK) (now Communications Authority of Kenya) ordered telcos to 
register user’s SIM cards. On purchase of a SIM card, subscribers are required to provide 
full names as recorded on the identity card or passport, physical and postal addresses, 
dates of birth (see Republic of Kenya, 2013). In addition, subscribers must provide a 
passport photo to accompany the identification. Minors, below 18 years, can only be 
registered under their guardian’s identify. Unregistered users have been blacklisted, 
consequently they cannot use telecommunication gadgets to access social media 
services.  
Although the SIM card registration information is supposed to remain ‘private’, the Kenya 
Information and Communications (Amendment) Act (2013) states that telcos should 
provide the information when needed “in connection with the investigation of any criminal 
offence or for the purpose of any criminal proceedings; or…for the purpose of any civil 
proceedings”. The Act further states that: “A subscriber shall be prima facie liable for 




Although the aim of the mandatory SIM-card registration was to curb what the regime calls 
fraudulent activities online and through telecommunication services, the SIM card lends 
itself to abuse by the government. For example, to track individuals who post anti-
government comments online. Indeed, it is feared that mandatory SIM-card registration is 
creating “a mobile–centric surveillance society” (Donovan, & Martin, 2014). Definitely, the 
aim of SIM-card registration in Kenya has not only been to track criminals but also to get 
to know people, who the regime thinks, are spreading hate speech (see Ngirachu, 2012).  
The mandatory SIM-card registration is part of the growing assemblage of surveillance 
incorporating other biometric identity technologies to create panoptic regimes. For 
example, it was reported by Privacy International and the National Coalition of Human 
Rights Defenders-Kenya, that the Government of Kenya had in 2012 contracted a 
Ukrainian company, EDAPS to create an Integrated Population Registration System 
(IPRS) (see The State of Privacy in Kenya, 2018). This dissertation  used data from several 
identity databases held by government agencies to make a ‘super’ identity database by 
combining the following registers: birth and death, citizenship, personal identification card, 
aliens register, passport, marriage and divorce, voters register, tax register, drivers 
register, National Social Security Fund National Hospital Insurance Fund and the Kenya 
National Bureau of Statistics registers. Since Kenya has not adopted a data protection law, 
such centralised data can be abused by the regime out to rein in dissenting voices.   
 
The second category of identification technologies are social media software. Users must 
first create and authenticate personal accounts in order to participate in content 
generation. Each social media application has an authentication method but as dominant 
applications expand and acquire start-ups, authentication platforms are being integrated.  
A common authentication system makes it easier for the social media applications and the 
government to acquire user information. Reminiscent of Althusser’s criticism of 
newspapers as ideological state apparatuses, social media is exposing users’ private 
information without causing alarm. It is like users are not aware of the risk of exposing their 




Furthermore, although social media users in Kenya can replace their real names with 
nicknames to create anonymous accounts, the nicknames do not guarantee anonymity. 
Instead, pseudonyms work as false affordances, features that make people to perceive a 
non-existent affordance (see Gaver, 1991:2). Nicknames are false affordances as the 
anonymity of users is exposed through various software identification technologies, such 
as data mining. With software identification technologies, it means even without self-
disclosure, mined data can be used to reconstruct users’ identities. According to 
Facebook’s own revelation, although integration of third party apps has improved social 
media networks, the integrated “flow of information has the potential for abuse…[as]… 
[b]ad actors can gather information from people and use it in ways that they aren’t aware 
of and didn’t agree to” (Baser, 2018). Facebook is against locking out such bad actors as 
this lockout will in turn limit users’ ability to share information. In any case, social media 
networks are sustained by content created by users for free. As explained by Baser (2018), 
the giant social media corporation is against misuse of data by third parties but claims that 
it has no control over data mining techniques used by bad actors like Cambridge Analytica, 
a British political consultancy firm that was accused of acquiring personal data of 
Facebook users without consent and using the data to manipulate voter choices during 
the August 2017 Presidential and Parliamentary elections. Through social media data 
mining, third party organisations can covertly collect users’ data from different platforms, 
comprehensively analyse and integrate all the data in order to construct personality 
profiles of users. The profiles can then be used to target social media users with 
individually tailored content.  
 
Furthermore, users identify themselves indirectly through self-disclosure since social 
media applications are designed to induce users to share routine experiences. Users 
create public profiles through which they present identities. These applications allow social 
media users to determine the type of information exposed, giving them power to self-
present in front of significant others, who in many cases are within the network of real-life 
friends. The network of real-life friendship limits anonymity and motivates users to create 
an “idealised projection of the real-life ‘actual self’” (Krasnova, Günther, Spiekermann, & 
Koroleva, 2009:42). The real-life friendship network combined with other self-disclosure 
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features prevent users from engaging in misrepresentation, unlike in purely anonymous 
online forums.  
 
The above identification technologies are nodal points because they act as non-linguistic 
signs used by regimes to repair dislocation by making it look like the use of 
telecommunication gadgets is a threat to national security. The SIM registration technology 
and social media applications are the means of exercising power because they are used 
by the regime to guide social media users’ activities. These identification technologies are 
a strategy for repairing dislocation by absorbing it into existing repressive forces, the 
channelling of dislocation into what Glynos and Howarth (2007:104) term “existing 
institutions and structures of power”.  Here, technologies of identification are being used 
to transform incivility from the state of being “elements” to “moments” by making 
telecommunication and social media networks a national security issue.  
 
These technologies of identification Laclau and Mouffe (1985:111) would have called the 
material “field of discursivity” used by regimes to metonymically combine incivility with 
insecurity (see Laclau, 2008:66). The identification technologies create hegemony by 
subtly turning incivility from a polysemic sign to a sign with regime preferred fixed 
meanings. To Laclau (1990:60), such transformation is the objectivity that hides its social 
constructedness because the influence of identification technologies on politics remains 
invisible.  
 
Furthermore, technologies of identification are helping individuals to take their subject 
positions. Indeed, governments use forms of self-identification to produce different subject 
positions. Consequently, social media users in Kenya have taken the subject positions 
created by “techniques of the self” (Foucault, 1997:87). Taking subject positions created 
by identification technologies means accepting the government inspired way of thinking 
about oneself. Such a subject position, Foucault (1980:98) argues, is a non-repressive 
power that encourages instead of stopping us from doing something.  
 
Identification technologies are also evocative of Bentham's Panopticon, a surveillance 
technology that makes it easy for a supervisor to watch many people in theatre-like cages 
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that makes the observed an “object of information, never a subject in communication” 
(Foucault, 1977:200). The post-Panoptic telecommunication surveillance system built by 
registered SIM cards is a power technology in which users are the bearers as they assist 
in being observed. This electronic Panopticon captures features of the current society as 
it is similar to what Foucault (1977:201) calls power that is ‘visible’ as the users (inmates) 
are aware that the government has their data but it is ‘unverifiable’ as they are unable to 
know whether they are being watched at any one moment but are sure they may always 
be watched. Force becomes unnecessary when using such technology of power because 
subalterns participate willingly in the enforcement process. In the place of force, the regime 
takes over the minds of its subjects, and “acts even before the offences, mistakes or crimes 
have been committed” (Foucault, 1977). Through identity registration, social media users’ 
activities have become transparent. Therefore, the society has become a panoptic prison, 
only that the prisoners are not fully aware.  
 
Considering that the SIM card registration has created an electronic panoptic prison, 
Foucault (1980:98) would have said that the regime is using non-repressive power whose 
force enacts not by restricting but by encouraging or freeing us. From this perspective, 
governing is through the ‘rule of freedom’ (see Joyce, 2003:1)  to do some things 
considering that “power is exercised only over free subjects [or those] with a field of 
possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse 
comportments, may be realised” (Foucault, 1982:790). Consequently, material discourses 
are fixing the meaning of incivility in social media by making us feel free but at the same 
time directing our conduct. Although it looks like the regime has allowed the people the 
freedom to do whatever they want with social media provided that they register their 
gadgets, it is this freedom to use social media that is being used to rule them.  Freedom 
here becomes a formula for “exercising power” in a regime governed through indirect 
control, encouraging various forms of self-direction.  
 
This exercising of power over free people, Foucault (1982:789) named “conduct”, leads 
others into possible outcomes. Which means power becomes less confrontational but a 
question of government. Hence, the instruments of governing are no longer laws, but “a 
range of multiplatform tactics” used to direct the conduct of others (Foucault, 1991:95). 
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Through conduct, governing is no longer a process of imposing law on men, but using 
tactics including tactical use of laws. In relation to the social media, the possible fields of 
action are being shaped by, among others, the identification technologies.  
 
In addition to the Panopticon metaphor, SIM card monitoring is a technology for hidden 
psychological punishment, with its effectiveness being “its inevitability, not from its visible 
intensity” (Foucault, 1977:9). Such punishment is different from conventional “punishment-
as-spectacle” that inflicts pain on the victim but also shames the executioner (ibid). 
Through discourses of identification, Foucault (1977:9) would have said, technicians have 
taken over the work of the executioner but instead of inflicting “unbearable sensations, 
punishment has become an economy of suspended rights.” 
  
8.2.2. Lock-ins: Dominant Technologies as Nodal Points 
 
To recapitulate, lock-ins are technologies that ensure continuous operation or prevention 
of users from prematurely terminating activities (see Norman, 2013:143). These efficiency 
technologies might not be the best but can become the industry’s most popular. Brey 
(2005:70) gives the example of a computer’s “soft” on-off switch that avoids disconnecting 
power but instead starts by shutting programmes, saving files and finally turning off the 
computer — these ensure that programmes and files are safely shut before power is 
disconnected. Even though lock-in features are designed to improve the efficiency of social 
media, they end up reducing the users’ action possibilities. Indeed, through lock-ins, users 
are constrained to popular applications, which are not necessarily superior. Consequently, 
lock-ins support the logics of governmentality by encouraging the use of popular but not 
necessarily superior social media applications. These efficiency technologies are 
equivalent to hegemonic programs (Latour, 1991:105), what the regime wishes social 
media users to do  
The first lock-in identified in this study is technology related, the early adoption advantages 
that make it possible for an innovation to hook users. After some time, even if the 
technology is not the best, lock-ins make users reluctant to switch because of the 
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resources invested in the technology through learning and networking. For instance, 
through technology lock-ins, users remain with the social media application even when 
software designers limit what users can do. To take the case of Twitter, one is limited to 
writing in not more than 140 characters, while Facebook users cannot rearrange the order 
of comments appearing on their pages. Yet these two applications remain popular. The 
technological lock-ins in Facebook and Twitter do not lead to the best communication 
environment but are social media’s QWERTY keyboard — the well-entrenched 
technologies that deter additional innovation.  
Lock-ins move power from users to designers and can support continued use of 
technologies that would otherwise be considered inferior or limiting, what I call the 
QWERTY keyboard of social media technologies. The lock-ins also mean market forces 
are unable to determine the best social media technologies. Instead of market forces, 
consumers depend on the number of people using the product, in such cases “popularity 
may prove more important than usefulness or effectiveness” (Barnes, Gartland, & Stack, 
2004:372). Hence, social media applications have agency as they determine the action 
possibilities available for users without recognising the logics of market competition. The 
action possibilities are determined by popularity instead of superiority.   
The second category of lock-ins are social media applications that lock-in users due to 
their incompatibility with other applications. For instance, the two sites most popular in 
Kenya, Facebook and Twitter are incompatible, which means each site’s users are locked-
in. As explained by Norman (2013:143), lock-in designs have been used as a business 
strategy by providing internal consistency to motivate customer’s loyalty. The lock-in 
means once people get used to a system, they hesitate to change leading to the system 
becoming dominant. This incompatibility of lock-in hooks users on particular social media 
sites, making it hard for them to leave, even when there are several other platforms.  
As a business strategy, lock-ins are used by social media applications to hook customers 
and motivate them to stay. Due to the increasing number of social media applications, this 
efficiency becomes hegemonic as users end up disregarding alternative applications. For 
example, Facebook and Twitter, the two most popular sites in Kenya are incompatible with 
each other and with a majority of the other social media sites. This strategy has enabled 
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Facebook and Twitter to lock-in users, reduce their bargaining power and thus make them 
reliant on the two sites. In fact, it can be argued that Facebook and Twitter are in control 
of social media discourses as their lock-in strategies have given them near monopoly in 
Kenya. 
Social media users get entrapped in the application’s lock-ins when they continuously add 
personal information to their accounts, thereby creating personalised sites. As it was found 
out elsewhere, people stay with their current service providers because of, among other 
reasons, approval by family and friends, the hitches of moving and amount of time and 
effort required to move to a new provider (see Harrison, Beatty, Reynolds and Noble 
(2012:402). Social media by its nature has created lock-in from emotional resonance and 
personal relationships among users. It can, therefore, be argued that the detailed 
databases kept by social media applications such as Facebook and Twitter encourage 
users to remain within these applications as the databases cannot be moved to other 
social media platforms.  
Although lock-ins seem helpful to ordinary users, they become hegemonic technologies 
when they deny people full control over artefacts. For example, user lock-ins in current 
social media applications block new market entrants.  Through their lock-in strategies, 
Facebook and Twitter, have acquired near monopoly status and are likely to remain the 
leading applications for a long period. This monopolistic control of the social media market 
has blocked the entry of potential substitutes. These barriers to market entry mean social 
media spaces will remain limited to what Facebook or Twitter has, invents, acquires or 
allows.  
8.2.3. Lock-outs: Technologies of ‘safety’ as Nodal Points 
The metaphor of lockouts is derived from features of artefacts that prevent users from 
using the artefacts ‘dangerously’ or wrongly. These safety technologies work with the 
regime to exercise power over social media users without coercion. Here, freedom and 
safe use are tools of power as they encourage users to behave in regime-preferred ways. 
The analysis of social media artefacts and software has identified hegemonic lockouts that 
encourage users to only access what the regime claims is safe content. These, Foucault 
would equate to technologies of safety. The second category of lock-outs are user-
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excluding technologies that physically assist subscribers not to ‘improperly’ use social 
media artefacts. Through these lockouts, social media applications are working together 
with the regime to support user’s ‘safety’.   
The Device Management System (DMS) is one of the lockout technologies used in Kenya. 
The system enables telecommunication companies to monitor all gadgets used to access 
the Internet communication through text and telephone calls. After details about the 
installation of DMS within telecommunication networks in Kenya leaked to the press in 
March 2017, Mr Francis Wangusi (n.d), the Director-General of CK, issued a press 
statement denying that the government agency was implementing DMS7 to monitor and 
access private data of mobile phone users. The Director-General claimed DMS was 
installed in the country’s telcos to prevent use of counterfeit devices imported into the 
country illegally. The authority argued that counterfeits degrade the quality of 
telecommunication services and are a security threat because their users cannot be 
identified or traced. Considering that 98 per cent of users access the Internet through 
mobile phones (see Communications Authority of Kenya, 2017:25), the DMS was likely to 
constrain free use of the Internet.    
 
What should be noted is that blacklisting of fakes through the DMS was in line with the 
existing world intellectual property regime that supports the capitalism mode of production. 
Thus, the antagonism against restricting the use of counterfeit phones from accessing the 
Internet is a form of incivility against global dominance in the telecommunication devices 
market. Counterfeits as physical incivility are part of the emerging economic and cultural 
phenomenon supported by development in the duplication technology in the global South. 
By using counterfeits, users resist market control by international super brands. Hence 
counterfeiting, from the Marxist critique of the capitalistic mode of production, is technology 
                                                          
7 The Communications Authority of Kenya acquired a Device Management System (DMS) to prevent use of 
illegal telecommunication devices on mobile telecommunications networks in Kenya. DMS was to be 
installed by telcos in Kenya as a technology for whitelisting genuine and backlisting all illegal devices, such 




that is creating conditions that can make it possible to abolish capitalism itself (see 
Benjamin, 2008:1). After all, some counterfeit technology has been “refined to the extent 
that virtually … [the]… products are indistinguishable from the official or authorised ones.” 
With improved faking technology, it has become difficult to distinguish the fake from the 
‘original’. Furthermore, some of the products categorised as fake were produced with the 
same material as the originals or even in the same factories although without permission. 
This means that what is fake is not poor in quality but what is produced without authority. 
Thus, some counterfeits no longer fit the dialectics of real/fake, original/copy, but the legal 
distinction as official-unofficial, authorised-unauthorised because many of them are 
manufactured by corporations subcontracted to make original products (see Chang, 2004: 
233; Mathews, Ribeiro and Vega, 2012:232). The fact that the CA is using DMS technology 
to weed out counterfeit devices means these fakes are nearly the same as originals, what 
Mathews et al. (2012:232) calls the first-rate copies that are true simulacra, the counterfeits 
that can only be detected by a complex detection technology.  
It was also found out that the regime is using technologies that filter content. For example, 
even after denying, it is suspected that either the Communications Authority of Kenya or 
some state security agencies have installed content filtering technology within Kenya. This 
was reported by The Citizen Lab study which found Kenya to be among 16 other countries 
that have installed Blue Coat Devices, a covert internet technology used for filtering, 
censorship, and surveillance (Marquis-Boire, Dalek, McKune, Carrieri, Crete-Nishihata, 
Ron Deibert, Khan, Noman, Scott-Railton, & Wiseman, 2013). The Citizen Lab is a 
Canadian interdisciplinary laboratory hosted by the Munk School of Global Affairs at the 
University of Toronto. The research laboratory investigates digital espionage against civil 
society, Internet filtering and other technologies used by regimes to infringe on online 
freedom of expression. The organisation found out that by January 2013, there were three 
PacketShaper installations in Kenya. This technology is used for filtering, censorship, and 
surveillance of Intenet and cellphone communication.  
A similar technical report was made by the Centre for Intellectual Property and Information 
Technology Law (CIPIT) of Kenya’s Strathmore University. The report indicates that there 
is “a middle-box on Safaricom's cellular network” (Safaricom is the largest telco in East 
Africa). According to CIPIT, this technology has a dual-use purpose: it can be used by the 
245 
 
telco for legitimate functions such as network optimisation but can also be used for traffic 
manipulation, surveillance and censorship. 
The third category of lock-outs is the gadgets the NCIC uses to monitor hate speech. In a 
press conference on 20th March 2017, the commission vice chairperson, Irene Wanyoike, 
warned politicians that the commission had acquired special equipment that would be used 
to monitor hate speech at political rallies (see Munene, 2017). The NCIC handed over 267 
gadgets to the police in an event covered by the mainstream media. This is comparable 
to what Latour (1992:256) terms moving agency from less reliable soft bodies to more 
faithful hard machines. Thus, using special gadgets to monitor ‘hate speech’ delegates the 
task to nonhuman actors as humans have failed to do it well.  
8.2.2 Oppositional Reading of Technology-texts 
The concept of oppositional reading was developed by Stuart Hall to describe how the 
audience decodes messages to contradict producers’ intentions (see Hall, 1980). In the 
analysis of affordances of social media, the concept of oppositional reading can likewise 
be used to describe how users of social media contradict preferred action possibilities 
provided by technology. Just as the regime seeks to impose meaning and constrain ‘action 
possibilities’ through hegemonic social media artefacts, users can counter-hegemonically 
read artefacts to resist the regime’s hegemony as “neither the writing nor the reading of 
technology-texts is determinate: both are open, negotiated process” (see Hutchby, 
2001:445). To reiterate, “no artefact is idiot-proof because any artefact is only a portion of 
a program of action and of the fight necessary to win against many antiprograms” (Latour 
(1992:255). This means artefacts are not totalising as users can resist their hegemony. 
Regarding oppositional use of the social media artefacts, the study looked for how users 
used hidden affordances to manoeuvre around the regime’s forcing functions (see Shaw, 
2017:7). From this perspective, ‘misuse of technology’ is not a failure, especially when the 
misuse is by people perceived by the society as ‘marginal’. 
To pre-empt the likely misinterpretation of the counterhegemonic ‘misuse’ of technology 
as plain criminality, I reiterate the dualism of incivility in social media: it is democratic if 
used in the struggle against power — a form of shouting at power —, but antidemocratic 
if used as a tool of repression — a form of shouting with power. Examples of radical 
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democratic incivility is impoliteness that expresses opposition by subordinates directed at 
the power structure, while antidemocratic radical incivility is fundamentalist, racist, and 
similar vulgarity that pushes democracy backwards as it is aimed at the subalterns. 
Along this duality, democratic radical media may overlap with repressive radical media, 
but the differences are easy to see (see Downing, 2001:89). Incivility that falls in the 
confines of repressive radical media does not enhance the people’s powers nor increase 
personal or collective freedom. In addition, if misuse of technology is to fall within the 
boundaries of radical democracy media, the type of ‘misuse’ should neither be on the far 
Left nor on the ultra-Right, as the two extremes mirror each other. Thus, radical democratic 
‘misuse of technology’ is a strategy that amplifies counterhegemonic antagonistic 
struggles against power, where power is anything from brutal repressive state apparatus 
to diffuse ‘micropower’ described in Foucault (1977) works.  
The Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act, 2018, summarises most of the radical 
democracy Internet ‘misuses’ criminalised by the regime (see Republic of Kenya, 2018). 
The ‘misuse’ law proposed the establishment of a National Computer and Cybercrimes 
Co-Ordination Committee, under the Cabinet Secretary responsible for matters relating to 
internal security. While legislators claim to have passed the law to create a committee that 
can work with the National Security Council to prevent unlawful computer use, prosecute 
cybercrimes and protect the rights to privacy and freedom of expression, the law has 
several parts limiting subalterns’ strategies of resistance. Among the litany of crimes 
included in this law is unauthorised access, use of illegal devices and programmes, cyber 
espionage, false news, pornography, forgery, online harassment, identity theft, and 
obscenity.  
Due to the institutional void accompanying the dislocation caused by social media, courts 
temporarily suspended 26 provisions of the Act after the Bloggers Association of Kenya 
(BAKE) obtained a court order soon after the President assented to the law. BAKE had 
petitioned the court to find the Act unconstitutional as this law was aimed at reintroducing 
criminal defamation and other laws that had been declared unconstitutional by the courts 
earlier. The bloggers’ association petitioned the court to suspend the law as it was aimed 
at infringing on fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 
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Laws criminalising various ‘computer misuses’, BAKE claimed, were “problematic because 
they are so broad and overly vague in their wording” (Wangui, 2018). From the courts 
thinking, not every claim of ‘misuse of technology’ should be criminalised since some of 
these ‘misuses’ expand freedom of expression. As it was explained by Shaw (2017:6), a 
Stuart Hall follower, ‘misuses’ of technology should not at all be viewed as erroneous. 
What the regime claimed was misuse, Shaw (2017:6) argues, are some of the affordances 
“not accounted for by a designer”, but which remain “plausible deployments” when 
identified by the technology’s users. This is to say, although technology texts have open 
regime preferred readings aimed at closing the discursive spaces, the texts remain open 
since users can find alternatives to the regime’s efforts.   
The affordances ‘misused’ by the audience for counterhegemonic purposes are mainly 
hidden. The affordances described in the previous section, the “constraints that force the 
desired behaviour” —interlocks, lock-ins, and lockouts — are all perceivable as they have 
perceptual information. Accordingly, the regime knows what the objects can allow people 
to do. But some affordances remain hidden from the regime until it realises that people 
have made these affordances perceptible.  
One of the hidden affordances discovered by people is the practice of using social media 
for counter-surveillance purposes — watching those in authority.  This practice is made 
visible by sousveillance — the tendency by subalterns to record and circulate information 
about the powerful8. It can be argued that the affordance that has enabled people to ‘watch 
from below’, is among the reasons the regime passed the Computer Misuse and 
Cybercrimes Act, 2018. Indeed, most of the actions criminalised by the Act are forms of 
sousveillance. Specific examples include, unauthorised access, use of illegal devices and 
password access codes, unauthorised disclosure of password, cyber espionage, 
                                                          
8 The term sousveillance was coined by Mann, Nolan and Wellman (2003:332)8, to describe 
inverted surveillance, the act of watching from below. The authors developed the sousveillance 
neologism from two French words ‘sous’, meaning below and ‘veiller’ meaning to watch. 
Sousveillance is the opposite of surveillance because the watchers are below those watched. 
Nevertheless, this inverted panopticon should not be mistaken for synopticism, an inverted 
panopticon model in which the many observe the few through institutional news media, for 
instance, the media coverage of celebrities (see Mathieson 1997:220)8. 
248 
 
publication of false information, computer forgery, cybersquatting, identity theft and 
impersonation, and phishing. These actions, although criminalised by the Cybercrimes 
Act, make the ruling elite to fear they are constantly being monitored. In this case, 
internalisation of discipline and behaviour correction happen among the ruling elites, 
contra the classic panoptic surveillance.  
The list of actions criminalised by the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act, 2018 is 
proof of institutional dislocation. It seems that the existing laws are not able to deal with 
changes that came with the wide adoption of Internet services. From an ontic perspective, 
Glynos and Howarth (2007:14) argue, dislocation is the moment of interruption of a 
subject’s symbolic world, a disruption that shakes the existing hegemonic order of things. 
In this case, the dislocation has caused institutional ambiguity by making the existing laws 
irrelevant, challenging the regime to create new laws to support new things for doing 
politics.  
8.3. Conclusion  
 
The examples of repair identified above show how, through forcing functions, the regime 
is working via non-human actants to covertly patch-up the dislocation caused by incivility 
in social media. This is part of the regime’s techniques that remain hidden in artefacts that 
direct social media users’ behaviour. It is through such artefacts that the regime’s 
discourses are sedimented to a singular meaning that seems natural. Through forcing 
functions of various artefacts, the regime is naturalising discourse and thus hindering 
alternative understandings of incivility in social media. As was stated in the methodology 
part, the regime sediments its ideology by making discourses objective since what is 
objective becomes naturalised and appears as given and unchangeable and seems not to 
derive its meaning from its difference from something else (Laclau, 1990:89). In this case, 
forcing functions are covertly naturalising the regime’s discourses by moving incivility in 
social media out of politics through associating it with insecurity, crime and intolerance. It 
is through artefacts that the regime can covertly label incivility in social media as a security 
issue. This places incivility out of the sphere of normal politics and legitimises the regime’s 
use of extraordinary measures outside normal democratic principles. Consequently, it can 
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be argued that social media artefacts are ideological tools that hide their traces of power 





Chapter Nine  
Conclusion: Incivility as an encounter with the Real and return of ‘the political’ in 
the post-political era. 
…pure agonism is impossible for me. Or maybe it is possible, but 
you cannot call it political anymore. But the same holds for a pure 
antagonism. That is possible, but it is rare  
Decreus, Lievens and Mouffe (2011:681). 
9.1 Introduction  
 
The aim of this study was, as Derrida would have said, to do ‘a double reading’ of extreme 
speech in social media so as to decentre the current dominant views and demonstrate 
alternative understanding of what has otherwise been categorised as extreme speech but 
which can be beneficial to democracy. The double reading was done within the lens of 
Laclau and Mouffe’s (1987) collaborative work, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Indeed, 
the post-Marxist position of Laclau and Mouffe’s political project remains useful to scholars 
attempting to explain the re-emergence of ‘the political’, at ontological level, not only after 
the ‘end of history’ in the West, but also during similar transitions that came at the end of 
the authoritarian rule in Africa and other places located outside the West. In fact, if ‘the 
political’ is seen as a friend enemy relationship, then politics, at ontological level, is 
universal as seen in the resemblance between the eruption of right-wing nationalism in 
developed countries and xenophobia and ethnic violence in the global South. It means 
Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory can act as a vehicle for understanding politics in 
non-Western countries which did not experience classical Marxism at the peak of 
communism. 
 
Therefore, this dissertation views incivility in social media as a type of re-emergence of 
‘the political’ or as Honig (1993:2) put it, a return of disruptive politics to political theory. 
The study re-opens the present Zeitgeist, the fear of hate speech, which is no more than 
the despair by the left and “their capitulation to a neoliberal hegemony” (Mouffe, 2000a:5), 
even though affordances of social media provide an opportunity to challenge what is 
looking like the unavoidable universalization of the liberal democracy principle.  In other 
words, outside the binary opposition of acceptable and unacceptable speech, this 
dissertation proposes that we look at incivility as what Derrida (1981:42) would term 
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“irruptive emergence of a new “concept”…that can no longer be, and never could be, 
included in the previous regime.” Without a doubt, the institutionalised rational consensus 
politics that led to an ‘outbreak of peace’ at the end of history is currently faced with the 
hurdle of solving political problems through political means, especially when the problems 
involve adversarial politics like what incivility in social media has allowed. That is to say, 
although we are living in a world that has constructed an illusion that there is no alternative 
to the hegemonic deliberative democracy, this political system cannot explain the 
contemporary social disorder outside the left-right or other forms of us-them divide, 
disruptions that are more suggestive of the permanent existence of hostility than 
consensus. 
 
The dissertation followed Laclau and Mouffe who read classical Marxism against itself to 
remove economistic views in Gramsci’s idea of hegemony by bringing it together with 
Saussure’s concept of signs as an arbitrary relationship between a signifier and a signified. 
Using the concept of arbitrariness of signs, but working against Saussure’s synchronic 
study of language, Laclau and Mouffe argue that signs cannot be permanently fixed even 
though discourses attempt to fix the signs into certain positions (see Laclau & Mouffe, 
1985:113). Through this linguistic turn, Laclau and Mouffe break away from the 
essentialism bedevilling Marxism by seeing relationships of domination not as material or 
permanently fixed, even though some discourses struggle to fix them. Through their line 
of thinking, Laclau and Mouffe and their followers take leave from the Marxist concern with 
the economy: explanation of political actions is no longer done within economistic and 
class reductionism lenses, but from ‘texts’, where the texts are viewed beyond linguistic 
perspectives.  
 
In Kenya, political antagonisms that fall outside classical Marxism, such as ethnic 
movements, have become the postworking-class forms of struggle against domination. 
Rather than a single working class identity, Kenya’s end of history was the beginning of 
overlapping identities not determined by economic relationships, such as students, 
women, minorities and ethnic groups, among others — with none managing to consolidate 
itself as a separate position, instead the multiplicity led to convergence and 
overdetermination at the same time. We no longer have a core founding principle of the 
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whole but numerous forms of antagonism both within and outside the binary proletariat-
bourgeoisie axis. Moreover, just as the post-communist era in Europe demanded 
alternative understanding of political struggles, its parallel in Africa — the post-dictatorship 
era — demands a search for a new non-material ‘constitutive outsider’ shaping the current 
us-them relationships.  
 
After locating incivility within the field of disruptive politics, I extended Chantal Mouffe’s 
(1993) concept of agonism to explain how what is seen as extreme speech can be 
productive, a stand challenging the dominant liberal democracy model. By providing a new 
viewpoint about incivility, the study has demonstrated the need to return politics to 
democracy, considering that politics has been displaced to the juridical since the ‘end of 
history’. To bring back politics, this dissertation attempted to account for the persistence 
of conflict in politics as it is seen in incivility in social media. A new way of understanding 
the role of incivility in democratic processes is essential because social media has 
provided spaces with minimal editorial control, which in turn is serving as an opportunity 
to radicalise democracy through tough speech. A critical understanding of incivility is 
however hindered by the hegemony of liberal democracy that overemphasises consensus 
at the expense of politics.  
 
Although Laclau and Mouffe can be accused of holding poststructuralist views that 
deemed to be European particularisms describing the West’s post-communism ongoing, 
their work is relevant to scholars attempting to explain disruptive politics in Africa 
considering that other non-Western nations have had events similar to European post-
communism occurances. While it was the end of communism that marked an increase in 
ethnic conflicts and nationalism in Europe, non-western countries experienced similar 
conflicts, although initially after the end of colonialism and later after the end of 
authoritarianism. That is to say, despite the inappropriateness of the left-right dichotomies 
in analysing politics in Africa, this shortcoming should not allow claims that African 
democracy is in a liminal stage existing betwixt and between liberal democracy and 
nameless ways of doing politics. Rather, the universality of Laclau and Mouffe’s concept 
is derived from Carl Schmitt’s view that at the ontological level, politics is a friend-enemy 
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relationship, be it within or outside countries practising politics based on the left-right 
binary.  
 
After this brief introduction, this chapter continues with an overview of the findings, then 
draws the conclusion and describes the implication of this new understanding of incivility 
as radical democracy.  
9.2. Overview of the Findings 
 
In Kenya, debates on extreme speech in social media have been characterised by 
governmentality, with regulatory narratives creating a binary opposition of speech between 
what is acceptable and what is not, thereby concealing the continuum of extreme speech. 
This binary division fits well in the widespread ‘post-political’ deliberative democracy era 
that has attempted to displace politics since the ‘end of history’. However, rather than 
reduce extreme speech to hate speech as governmentality efforts would prefer, I did 
double reading to deconstruct the regime preferred meanings. As Derrida would have said, 
I looked for the gap between what the regime “commands” on incivility in social media and 
what is impossible for the regime to “command” as the meaning is within the text but 
outside a regime’s command (see Derrida, 1967:158). Thus, I view incivility as a re-
emergence of the adversarial model of politics in Kenya outside the classical left-right 
divide.  
 
Hence, this dissertation was a project in destabilising the dominant rationalist approach to 
democracy, arguing against the existence of an Archimedean point from where a 
reasonable public debate can eliminate antagonism from politics. Against rationalism, I 
argue, following Chantal Mouffe, that incivility in social media is part of ‘the political’ — the 
various forms of antagonism that can never be eradicated from social relations as 
deliberative democracy has attempted to do. Contrary to the ambitions of liberal 
democracy, I argue that extreme speech in social media is a form of conflict that should 
be tailored to take the form of an agonistic relationship between adversaries but should 




Chapter One introduced the overall content of the dissertation and clarified that extreme 
speech exists on a continuum from hate speech to speech that can strengthen conflictual 
democracy. This section gives a background of regime preferred hate speech narrative, 
followed by an interlude which moves the study away from the binary division of speech 
into what is acceptable and what is not. Unchained from the hate speech bias, the chapter 
starts a process of dismantling the seemingly objective regime preferred meanings of 
extreme speech. The chapter presents the problem statement and research questions of 
this study.   
 
Chapter Two answers research subquestion one — what discourses have shaped the 
meaning of incivility in social media? — through critical reading of Habermas’ (1989a) 
public sphere against Fraser’s (1990) subaltern counter-publics, and Cammaerts’s (2007) 
political jamming, to develop a continuum of democracy-enhancing extreme speech. In 
this chapter, I explain the contexts under which incivility in social media can be democracy-
enhancing or antidemocratic. I argue that when used by subalterns as a way of resisting 
existing power structures, extreme speech supports conflictual democracy. I also use 
Žižek’s (1993) concept of ‘tolerance as ideology’ to argue that demands for civility are part 
of strategies used by ruling elites to depoliticise democracy by making it look like incivility 
is a cultural problem of intolerance rather than a sign of normal political struggles between 
the dominant and subalterns. I explain how the demand for tolerance makes incivility to be 
perceived as a problem of intolerance rather than normal power struggle. I also propose, 
without falling into the primordialist trap, that in Kenya, it is ethnic identities created from 
both the political economy perspective and discursive subject positions, rather than the 
universalised left-right divide that acts as adversarial boundary markers. In this section, I 
explain the weaknesses of historical materialism, and advance a poststructuralist thinking 
by looking for alternative approaches to resistance other than the universalised working-
class-elite opposition.  
 
Chapter Three continues arguments against the unquestioned assumptions about 
harmful extreme speech by proposing how artistic practices can be counterhegemonic 
forces. Contrary to the hate speech narrative, the chapter proposes that extreme speech 
in its artic form can subvert dominant forces in a democratic society by levelling hierarchies 
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created by rational consensus. I utilise this chapter to describe how the contemporary 
world resembles Medieval Age when extreme speech was occasionally allowed as a 
means of breaking down power hierarchies. I link the Bakhtian primitive art activism to the 
contemporary practice of utani, a folk culture of joking relationships common in East Africa. 
 
Chapter Four is an application of Chantal Mouffe’s concept of agonism to return politics 
to political theory. In this chapter, I propose that extreme speech is suitable for an agonistic 
model of democracy that advocates a ‘conflictual consensus’ and seeks to come to terms 
with the political rather than disavowing it as deliberative democracy has attempted. 
Offensive expressions in social media are viewed as a strategy for advancing agonistic 
democracy. A fundamental argument made here is that extreme speech content in social 
media political discourses is equivalent to disagreements that can widen the democratic 
spaces constrained by consensus since the ‘end of history’. In this chapter, the role of 
incivility in social media is interpreted as a return of ‘the political’ to politics, an 
interpretation that emphasises struggles as the key foundation of politics. Through 
agonistic democracy, I propose that extreme speech in social media is a constant struggle 
that can tame the friend-enemy frontier from exploding into violence. It is argued that rather 
than attempt to eliminate dissent, agonism should be used to transform contests that are 
central to politics.   
 
Chapter Five develops a method for empirical Discourse Analysis from Laclau and 
Mouffe’s (1985) book, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy:  Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics and uses this method to critique the taken-for-granted understanding of incivility in 
social media. Since Laclau and Mouffe did not develop a strategy for using Discourse 
Theory as a method for empirical research, this chapter advances the theory by 
transforming it into a Post-foundational research strategy.  Considering that social media 
is the medium that has popularised present-day incivility, the Discourse Analysis strategy 
proposes analysis of both the medium and the conventional linguistic ‘texts’ in line with 
Laclau and Mouffe’s views that everything is discursive.  
 
Chapter Six continues the methodology section by describing the sample and a data 
analysis strategy. This chapter, together with chapter five, create a way of using Laclau 
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and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory to analyse how extreme speech in social media is 
dislocating dominant political practices. Here, Discourse Theory is brought together with 
discourse analysis to develop a method for empirical research.  
   
Chapter Seven describes how the dislocation caused by extreme speech is followed by 
three events: repair and absorption of the dislocation to maintain objective discourses; 
transformation of the dislocation into nodal points to create new hegemonic practices or 
encounter with the ‘real’ at ontological level. This chapter is an analysis of how the regime 
is repairing extreme speech at the linguistic symbolic system of representation level, by 
associating it with hate speech.   
 
Chapter Eight is an analysis of dislocation and its repair through technologies of 
dissemination — the material texts. This chapter, gother with chapter seven describe how 
the regime is allocating new meanings to incivility by knotting the floating signifier of 
incivility to the national security nodal point. The two chapters describe how incivility 
mirrors ‘the political’ from an ontological perspective by identifying institutional voids 
created by incivility. The discourses analysed in chapters eight, just like in chapter seven, 
were identified through double reading of linguistic and non-linguistic texts.  
 
The next section demonstrates how extreme speech can reinvigorate democracy following 
the alternative understanding developed in this study.  
9.3. Productivity of incivility in social media and its implication on conflictual 
democracy 
To understand the double meaning of the varieties of extreme speech, such as incivility in 
social media, we must look beyond the previous era of consensual politics when the news 
media acted as ideological state apparatuses in a society with sharp differences between 
the left and the right or where dictatorship acted as the constitutive outside that brought 
subalterns together. In the previous era of the left-right divide, political frontiers were 
clearly marked, but the current epoch lacks political frontiers clearly demarcated by 
communism or the democracy-totalitarians opposition. Thus, in Kenya this emptiness is 
filled by a rebirth of new collective identities that are establishing political frontiers outside 
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the left-right divide. The unity previously created by the common struggle against 
authoritarianism vanished with increased party and electoral reforms, leading to the friend-
enemy relations “taking a multiplicity of new forms linked to the resurgence of old 
antagonisms – ethnic, national, religious and others” (Mouffe, 1993:3). Indeed “[t]he 
absence of a political frontier, far from being a sign of political maturity, is the symptom of 
a void that can endanger democracy” (5). 
 
Contrary to consensual politics, the political at the ontological level, is an event that 
dislocates established orders to reconstitute the society afresh. Therefore, rampant 
incivility in social media should not be equated to an “upsurge of 'the archaic'” (Mouffe, 
1993:1), but should instead be seen as a return of ‘the political’ in the current post-political 
consensus that instead of eradicating antagonism following the end of authoritarianism, 
has fostered new antagonisms such as ethnic hatred, xenophobia and right-wing return of 
nationalism.  
 
The post-political era that followed the decline of the left-right divide (which had not even 
stabilised in Kenya), and the end of the near ‘dictatorship’ after the return of multiparty 
elections, was followed by a new political spectre in the form of antagonisms which cannot 
be resolved by political institutions of the previous epochs, both liberalism, its hybrids and 
classical Marxism, as all these philosophies exclude ‘the political’ from democracy. Indeed, 
after the failure of communism and the convergence of the left and right, liberal democracy 
ideologists advocated handing over politics to experts who could rationally resolve political 
problems in a post-political environment. Although this hegemony of the post-democracy 
‘politics’ that emphasises consensus was celebrated for advancing a democracy without 
conflict, incivility in social media can be viewed as part of critical artistic practices, the 
radical democratic project that is disrupting the consensualisms and “bringing to the fore 
its repressive character” (see Mouffe, 2008:6). 
 
The current political environment in Kenya reflects a struggle to re-politicise new frontiers 
after the end of the binary totalitarianism-democracy opposition that had for long provided 
what Mouffe (1993:3) calls “the main political frontier enabling discrimination between 
friend and enemy”. Because it is no longer possible to unite against the absent 
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totalitarianism, the friend-enemy frontier has to take new forms reminiscent of primordial 
antagonisms, such as ethnic, national and religious conflicts, what Mouffe (1993:2) calls 
the “unrecognised manifestations of antagonism,” following the spread of an illusion that 
after the demise of Marxism, “we can finally dispense with the notion of antagonism”.  As 
explained by Mouffe (1993:4), after defeating the totalitarian enemy, the meaning of 
democracy must be redefined by the creation of new frontiers of friend-enemy relations. 
The rampant extreme speech in social media is part of the attempts at redefining the 
meaning of democracy in a post-political society.   
 
While the state-individual struggles characterised Marxist political activism, an interesting 
reform of radical democracy has emerged through rethinking of political consensus that 
came with a reduction of the space between the left and right. There is a need for 
reconsidering the political as the essence of class in Marx and Engels’ Communist 
Manifesto impedes other sources of identity in the post-communist era.  If class was the 
essential source of identity, then the working-class group would be united regardless of 
the existence of other identities, but this is not the case. Therefore, through ‘double 
reading’ of extreme speech, we can develop a new perspective for theorising radical 
democracy by identifying the constitutive role of extreme speech. This new perspective is 
informed by a positive view of extreme speech as a counter-hegemony tool that can be 
used by subalterns to contest societal power hierarchies. Just like the famous Saussurian 
examples of the meaning of the knight in chess, incivility by itself means nothing outside 
the game of politics since its value is constituted within the game. However, the political 
discourses shape the meaning of incivility through articulation, the combination of several 
signs to give incivility a standard meaning.  
 
The dislocation caused by incivility in social media has produced new political practices 
by returning politics to ‘the political’ thereby moving politics outside pre-defined political 
institutions. Since discourse cannot achieve complete closure, the nodal points identified 
in Chapter Seven and Eight — the linguistic and material texts — have failed to 
permanently define speech that is restricted and speech that is not. As explained in Part 
II, dislocation is not only traumatic, but also a condition of possibility for new political 
creations, which frees politics from being restricted within institutions of liberal democracy. 
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This is to say, ontologically, extreme speech is a symptom of inherent enmity in politics, 
which in Lacan’s three psychoanalytic orders, is the ‘Real’, what loses its “reality” once it 
is symbolised through language. Incivility is merely pointing at the ‘Real’, the friend-enemy 
relations in politics, but can never symbolise it.  
 
Therefore, away from understanding extreme speech from the regime-preferred ontic 
level, the symbolic order that uses texts to make the political accessible, extreme speech 
has deep underlying causes. Here incivility, as part of ‘the political,’ is understood from the 
ontological perspective different from the social practices — the ontic. The political 
introduces radical politics because it is practised outside established institutional order, 
enabling it to “contest fundamental norm of a practice or regime” as it seeks to establish a 
new constitutive order and institutions (Glynos & Howarth, 2007:115). Increased 
mediatised incivility is seen as part of counter-hegemonic demands that challenge the 
hegemony of consensual democracy. Thus, new social practices and an institutional order 
constituted by mediatised incivility are what Mouffe (1993:1) refers to as the emergence 
of new antagonisms which Western democrats “thought belonged to bygone age.” 
Mediatised incivility is ‘the political’, and upsurge of ‘archaic’ politics challenging the 
universalisation of liberal democracy in a post-political era. Indeed the political resists 
diverse forms of post-political subordination because the political cannot be tamed for 
ever, instead it escapes every attempt to tame it through new fissures.  
 
The post-political vision has failed to explain the reasons for the emergence of 
fundamentalism, such as ethnic hatred, that appeal to our primordial forms of identification, 
in an era when liberal democracy is expected to have matured with the passage of time. 
Although the rise in fundamentalism has been blamed on the reincarnation of atavism that 
had not been fully overcome (see, Mouffe, 2018:22), like the claim that democracy has 
remained in liminality in Africa (see Van Gennep, 1960:3), and ethnic hatred will disappear 
only when liberal democracy has matured, the inadequacy of such explanations was 
revealed by the growth of right-wing populist parties in western countries. The political in 
extreme speech, just like the political in adversarial democracy, has been concealed by 
claims that political adversary is a moral issue (see Mouffe, 2005a:73). Through moralistic 
claims passion has been:  
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…mobilised against what was designated as the ‘extreme right’, 
using the traditional repertoire of antifascist discourse. People were 
made to feel very good and very virtuous by simply participating in 
the denunciation of the ‘evil forces’. Of course, this mobilization of 
passion was not acknowledged as such but perceived as the rational 
reaction of moral human beings wanting to defend universal values. 
 
Incivility in social media faces similar moralistic condemnation in the current post-political 
society with weakened political frontiers. This is what Mouffe (2005:74) terms playing 
politics in the moral register. This moralisation does not make politics more moral, but it 
means that “political antagonisms are being formulated in terms of moral categories”. Even 
though we are still faced with the friend/enemy discrimination in the current consensual 
post-adversarial era, the friend/enemy relations are categorised in the vocabulary of 
morality. This denial of the adversarial politics is the weakness of consensual democracy 
because moralisation of politics seals fissures and makes it impossible for antagonism to 
take agonistic forms. “When opponents are defined not in political but in moral terms, they 
cannot be envisaged as an ‘adversary’ but only as an ‘enemy’. With the ‘evil them’ no 
agonistic debate is possible, they must be eradicated” (Mouffe, 2005a:76). Without an 
escape route that can turn antagonism into agonism, the moralised friend/enemy model of 
post-democracy creates the same conditions it declared obsolete-an anti-democratic 
friend/enemy environment. This is the risk created by the grand regime narratives about 
extreme speech, such as hate speech, xenophobia, incitement to violence among other 
speeches that have been moralised to legitimise their securitisation.  
 
Following Schmitt, Laclau and Mouffe, I argue that incivility is a pluralistic outlet for the 
ineliminable antagonism in politics. This outlet is different from liberal democracy 
institutions for eliminating hostility, such as parliamentary systems which over time have 
come to symbolise what Mouffe (1993:6) declared are the “apparent excess… of 
consensus”, the harmony that prepares the ground for domination by privileged groups. 
Thus, extreme speech in social media can be viewed as part of particularisms that are 
challenging the universalisation of liberal democracy (see Mouffe, 1993:1). 
 
In conclusion, contrary to triumphalist consensualist narratives of Fukuyama and his 
followers, I see incivility in social media as a crisis in the current dominant post-political 
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imaginaries. Against the regime preferred ontic view of antagonisms, such as the grand 
narrative of hate speech, we should not forget that such antagonisms are only a “symbolic 
inscription of the ‘Real’” politics (see  Mouffe, 2011:682). Incivility in social media is part of 
the antagonism that “belongs to the ontological, but since it already contains some kind of 
symbolic inscription, is also an ontic category.” Therefore, if we are to return ‘the political’ 
to the practice of democracy, we must find ways of accommodating varieties of extreme 
speech, such as incivility as this type of speech is politics at the ontological level. 
Nevertheless, we should find a way of moving away from the friend-enemy relations 
towards agonism in which conflict is between adversaries and not enemies. But as Mouffe 
(2011:684) notes, “[t]here remains a form of antagonism in every agonism”, as such 
because of social media, our politics is now “situated somewhere in-between agonism and 
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